BUDDHIST ANALYSIS OF MATTER

By

Y. KARUNADASA

B. A. Hons. (Ceylon), Ph. D. (London)

Lecturer in Pali & Buddhist Civilization, University of Ceylon.

1967

PUBLISHED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CULTURAL AFFAIRS, COLOMBO.

PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRESS, CEYLON

2——

ABSTRACT

This study constitutes an inquiry into the analysis of matter as expressed in the sources of Theravāda Buddhism, especially in the later systematization known as the Abhidhamma. The introductory chapter is devoted to an examination of the many senses and contexts in which *rūpa*—a term often used in the sense of matter—occurs; the definition of *rūpa* in the sense of matter; and the general nature of the *rūpa-dhammas*, i.e. the ultimate irreducible factors into which matter is analysed. These *rūpa-dhammas*, twenty eight in all, are classified into two categories as primary and secondary. Chapter II deals with those that constitute the primary category and shows how they represent four fundamental properties of matter: solidity and extension, viscidity and cohesion, temperature of cold and heat, distension and mobility. Chapter III examines the position of the secondary *rūpa-dhammas* in relation to the primary and indicates how some items of the former category stand for certain facts intimately connected with matter. Chapter IV deals with those secondary *rūpa-dhammas* which in the Abhidhammic commentaries came to be recognized as entities possessing objective reality. This involves a discussion of five material sense-organs, four varieties of sense-objects, two faculties of sex, the material faculty of life, the nutritive "quality" of matter, and the physical basis of mental activity. Chapter V deals with those secondary *rūpa-dhammas* which in the Abhidhammic commentaries came to be recognized as nominal entities with no autonomous objective counterparts. This involves a discussion of two modes of self-expression, three characteristics and four phases of the matter of the body, and the space delimited by matter. Chapter VI introduces the many ways in which the *rūpa-dhammas* are sought to be classified, and Chapter VII explains how their inter-dependence and inter-connection are sought to be established with reference to laws of causation and conditionality. Chapter VIII introduces the theory of *rūpa-kalāpas*—the Theravāda form of atomism—and shows how it presents a close analogy to the atomic theories of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. The concluding chapter endeavours to determine the philosophical and the ethical basis of the Buddhist analysis of matter, and to understand the whole subject in the context of Buddhism as a religion.

theory of moments and the denial of motion. Herein an attempt has been made to sift the material embodied in the works referred to, with a view to presenting a comprehensive account of the subject.

What has so far been observed about the Theravāda is less true about the other schools of Buddhism. For Prof. Stcherbatsky's works, notably *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, Prof. O. K. J. Rosenberg's Die *Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie* (Heidelberg, 1924) and Dr. Mc Govern's *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, Vol. I (London, 1924), (e.g.) have gone a long way to elucidating the Buddhist theories of matter as expressed in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese sources. Along with these should be mentioned Prof. De la Vallée Poussin's monumental translation of the Hiuan Tsang version of the *Abhidharmakośa*, under the title: *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu*, Vols. I—VI (Paris, 1923–31). With its voluminous notes and critical observations, this translation has become an indispensable source book for a study of the doctrines and theories of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.

Although the present study is concerned with the Buddhist analysis of matter as expressed mainly in the sources of Theravāda Buddhism, an attempt has been made to take into consideration the parallel data found in the sources of non-Theravāda schools of Buddhism, too. This has been done with a view to bringing the subject into a wider perspective and to presenting it with a greater measure of precision. In this connection, the emphasis has fallen more on the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika schools of Buddhism. These were two of the leading Hīnayāna schools with whom the Theravādins had much in common. Both subscribed to a realistic view of existence; the former had a tendency to naive realism and the latter a predilection for—but certainly not a committal to—subjectivism. Although less emphatic, these two trends are observable within the Theravāda scholasticism itself. In the later works of the Theravādins there is a marked tendency to declare as nominal what in the earlier are recognized as real. In view of these circumstances, it was deemed proper that, in elaborating the Theravāda analysis of matter, special attention should be paid to the theories and doctrines of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.

The Vijñānavādins' denial of matter does not come within the purview of this study. However, some passing comments on their attitude to the subject under consideration have been made, wherever it was felt necessary.

I must take this opportunity of recording my deep sense of gratitude to my *ācārya*, Dr. D. Friedman, under whose guidance this study was pursued. His constant encouragement, no less than his valuable suggestions and criticism, has sustained me throughout these labours.

I am also grateful to the authorities of the London School of Oriental and African Studies for granting me a Studentship, which enabled me to undertake this study as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

In presenting this book, I must express here my profound gratitude to Dr. G. P. Malalasekara, Professor Emeritus, Prof. N. A. Jayawickrama, Prof. W. S. Karunaratna and Dr. D. J. Dhirasekara—all my *ācāryas* at the University of Ceylon—who

initiated me into Buddhistic studies. I am also most grateful to Prof. K. N. Jayatilaka for the deep and abiding interest he has taken in my work.

I must also express my gratitude to Mr. N. Amarasinghe, the Editor of the Ceylon National Bibliography, and to Mr. Siripala Leelaratna, of the staff of the Vidyalankara University of Ceylon, for the help they have given me in getting the manuscript ready for the press.

Finally, I owe a special debt of gratitude to the authorities of the Department of Cultural Affairs for undertaking the publication of this book, and to the authorities of the Government Press, in particular, to Mr. Bernard de Silva, the Government Printer, for the interest and care with which they launched it through the press.

Y. KARUNADASA.

Department of Pali,
University of Ceylon,
Colombo 3.
5th March, 1967.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

A.	Aṅguttaranikāya
AA.	Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā
Abhd.	Abhidharmadīpa (with Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti)
Abhmṛ.	Abhidharmāmṛta
Abhvk.	Abhidhammatthavikāsinī
Abhvt.	Abhidhammāvatāra
ABORI.	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
ADS.	Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha
ADSS.	Abhidharmārthasaṅgrahasannaya
ADSVṬ.	Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha Vibhāvinī-ṭīkā
AK.	L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu
AKvy.	(Sphuṭārthā) Abhidharmakośavyākhyā
AM.	Asia Major, Leipzig
AMG.	Annales du Musee Guimet, Paris
AO.	Archiv Orientalni, Journal of the Czechoslovak Oriental Institute, Prague
Asl.	Atthasālinī (Dhammasaṅgaṇī Aṭṭhakathā)
BB.	Bibliotheca Buddhica, St. Petersberg
BEFEO.	Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise de l'Extreme Orient, Hanoi
BSOAS.	Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, London
CJS.	Ceylon Journal of Science, Colombo
Cpd.	Compendium of Philosophy
CP. Mdhy. Vṛt.	Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Mādhyamakavṛtti
D.	Dīghanikāya
DA.	Dīghanikāya Aṭṭhakathā
Dhp.	Dhammapada
Dhs.	Dhammasaṅgaṇī
Divy.	Divyāvadāna
Dkp.	Dukapaṭṭhāna
ERE.	Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vols. I–XIII, ed. J. Hastings, Edinburgh, 1908–1926
HJAS.	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Cambridge, Mass.
IC	Indian Culture, Calcutta
IHQ.	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta
It.	Itivuttaka
JA.	Journal Asiatique, Paris
JOIB.	Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda
JPTS.	Journal of the Pali Text Society, London
JRAS.	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society

KSP.	Le Traité de la Demonstration de l'Act (Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa)
Kvu.	Kathāvatthu
KvuA	Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā
La Siddhi	La Siddhi de Hiuan Tsang
M.	Majjhimanikāya
MA.	Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā
MCB.	Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, l'Institut belge des hautes etudes chinoises, Bruxelles
Mdhy. Vṛt.	Mādhyamakavṛtti
Mh. Nd.	Mahāniddesa
Mh. NdA.	Mahāniddesa Aṭṭhakathā
Mil.	Milindapañha
Mvn.	Mohavicchedanī
NRP.	Nāmarūpaparicoheda
NRS.	Nāmarūpasamāsa
PBO.	Polski Biuletyn Orientalistyczny, the Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies
Peṭ.	Peṭakopadesa
PIPC.	Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress
Psm.	Paṭisambhidāmagga
PsmA.	Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā
PTS.	Pali Text Society, London
PTSD,	Pali-English Dictionary of the Pali Text Society
PugA.	Puggalapaññatti Aṭṭhakathā
S.	Saṃyuttanikāya
SBB.	Sacred Books of the Buddhists
SBH	Sacred Books of the Hindus
SBJ.	Sacred Books of the Jainas
Sn.	Suttanipāta
SnA.	Suttanipāta Aṭṭhakathā
SS.	Saccasaṃkhepa
ThīgA.	Therīgāthā Aṭṭhakathā
Tkp.	Tikapaṭṭhāna (with commentary)
Triṃś.	Triṃśikā (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)
UCR.	University of Ceylon Review, Colombo
UdA.	Udāna Aṭṭhakathā
Vbh.	Vibhaṅga
VbhA.	Vibhaṅga Aṭṭhakathā
VBQ.	Visva-Bharati Quarterly, Calcutta
VG.	H. Kern, Verspreide Geschriften onder zijn Toezicht Verzameld, Vols. I-XV, s'Gravenhage, 1913-1936
Viṃś.	Viṃśatikā (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi)
Vism.	Visuddhimagga
VismS.	Visuddhimārgasannaya
VismṬ.	Visuddhimagga-ṭīkā
VS.	Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kaṇāda
Yam.	Yamaka
YamA.	Yamaka Aṭṭhakathā

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A.—Original Texts

Pali, Sanskrit, Prakrit and Sinhalese works
(arranged according to the Sanskrit alphabet)

Aṅguttaranikāya, I-VI. Ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, C. A. F. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1885-1910.

Aṅguttaranikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Manorathapūranī), I-V. Ed. M. Walleser, H. Kopp. PTS., 1924-1956.

Abhidhammatthavikāsinī Ed. A. P. Buddhadatta. Colombo, 1961.

Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha. Ed. T. W. Rhys Davids. JPTS., 1884, (pp. 1-48).

Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha-Vibhāvinī-ṭīkā. Ed. D. Paññānanda. Colombo, 1889.

Abhidhammāvatāra. Ed. A. P. Buddhadatta. Buddhadatta's Manuals I (pp. 1-142), PTS, 1915.

Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Sphuṭārtha), I-II. Ed. U. Wogihara. Tokyo, 1932-1936.

Abhidharmadīpa (with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*). Ed. P. S. Jaini. Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, IV, Patna, 1959.

Abhidharmasamuccaya. Ed. P. Pradhan. Visva-Bharati Studies, XII, Santiniketana, 1950.

Abhidharmāmṛta. Restored from the Chinese into Sanskrit by Santi Bhiksu. Santiniketana, 1953.

Abhidharmārthasaṃgrahasannaya, included in *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha.* Ed. Paññāmoli Tissa, Ambalangoda, 1926.

Itivuttaka. Ed. E. Windisch. PTS. 1889.

Udāna Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī). Ed. F. L. Woodward. PTS., 1926.

Kathāvatthu, I-II. Ed. A. C. Taylor. PTS., 1894-1897.

Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā. Ed. J. Minayeff. JPTS., 1889 (pp. 1-222).

Khuddakapāṭha. Ed. H. Smith. PTS., 1915.

Tikapaṭṭhāna (with commentary), I-II. Ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1921-1923.

Triṃśikā (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi), with the commentary of Sthiramati. Ed. S. Levi. Paris, 1925.

Theragāthā. Ed. H. Oldenberg. PTS., 1883.

Therigāthā Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthadīpanī). Ed. E. Muller. PTS., 1893.

Davvasaṅgaha (with a commentary by Brahmadeva). Ed. and tr. S. C. Ghoshal. SBJ., I, Allahabad, 1917.

Divyāvadāna. Ed. E. B. Cowell and R. A. Neil. Cambridge, 1886.

Dīghanikāya, I-III. Ed. T. W. Rhys Davids and J. E. Carpenter. PTS., 1890-1911.

Dīghanikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Sumaṅgalavilāsinī), I-III. Ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, W. Stede. PTS., 1886-1932.

Dukapaṭṭhāna. Ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1906.

Dhammapada. Ed. S. Sumangala. PTS., 1914.

Dhammasaṅganī. Ed. E. Muller. PTS., 1885.

Dhammasaṅganī Aṭṭhakathā (Atthasālinī). Ed. E. Muller. PTS., 1897.

Dharmapada, Gāndhārī. Ed. J. Brough. London, 1962.

Nāmarūpapariccheda. Ed. A. P. Buddhadatta. JPTS., 1914 (pp. 1–114).

Nāmarūpasamāsa. Ed. P. Dhammarama. JPTS., 1916 (pp. 1–19).

Niyamsara. Ed. and tr. U. Sain. SBJ., IX, Lucknow, 1931.

Pañcastikāyasāra. Ed. and tr. A. Chakravartinayanar. SBJ., III, Allahabad, 1920.

Paṭisambhidāmagga, I–II. Ed. A. C. Taylor. PTS., 1905–1907.

Paṭisambhidāmagga Aṭṭhakathā (Saddhammappakāsinī), I–III. Ed. C. V. Joshi. PTS., 1933–1947.

Puggalapaññatti Aṭṭhakathā. Ed. Landsberg and Mrs. Rhys Davids. JPTS., 1914 (170–254).

Peṭakopadesa. Ed. A. Barua. PTS., 1949.

Majjhimanikāya, I–IV. Ed. V. Trenkner, R. Chalmers, Mrs. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1888–1925.

Majjhimanikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Papañcasūdanī), I–IV. Ed. J. H. Woods, D. Kosambi, I. B. Horner. PTS., 1922–1938.

Mahāniddesa, I–II. Ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin and E. J. Thomas. PTS, 1928–31

Mahāniddesa Aṭṭhakathā (Niddesavaṇṇanā = Saddhammappajjotikā), I–III. Ed. A. P. Buddhadatta. PTS., 1931–1941.

Mādhyamakavṛtti. Ed. L. de la Vallee Poussin. BB., IV, 1903–13

Milindapañha. Ed. V. Trenckner. London, 1880.

Mūla-ṭīkā. Ed. D. Paññāsāra and P. Vimaladhamma. Colombo, 1939.

Mohavicchedanī. Ed. A. P. Buddhadatta and A. K. Warder. PTS., 1961.

Yamaka, I–II. Ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1911–1913.

Yamakappakaraṇa Aṭṭhakathā. Ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. JPTS., 1910–1912 (pp. 51–107).

Rūpārūpavibhāga. Ed. A. P Buddhadatta. Buddhadatta's Manuals, I, 1915 (pp. 149–159).

Vibhaṅga. Ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1904.

Vibhaṅga Aṭṭhakathā (Sammohavinodanī). Ed. A. P. Buddhadatta. PTS., 1923.

Visuddhimagga, I–II. Ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1920–1921.

Visuddhimagga-ṭīkā (Paramatthamañjūsā), Ed. M. Dhammananda. Colombo, 1928.

Viśuddhimārgasannaya, I–VI. Ed. M. Dharmaratne. Colombo, 1890–1917.

Viṃśatikā (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi). Ed. S. Levi. Paris, 1925.

The Vaiśeṣika Sūtras of Kanāda. Ed. and tr. N. Sinha. SBH., VI, Allahabad, 1911.

Saccasaṃkhepa. Ed. P. Dhammarama. JPTS., 1917–1919 (pp. 1–25).

Samayasara. Ed. and tr. J. I. Jaini. SBJ., VIII, Lucknow, 1930.

Saṃyuttanikāya, I–VI. Ed. L. Feer, Mrs. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1884–1904.

Saṃyuttanikāya Aṭṭhakathā (Sāratthappakāsinī), I–III. Ed. F. L. Woodward. PTS., 1929–1937.

Suttanipāta. Ed. D. Andersen and H. Smith. PTS., 1913.

Suttanipāta Aṭṭhakathā (Paramatthajotikā, II), I–III. Ed. H. Smith. PTS., 1916–1918.

B.—Translations

L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu, I–IV. Tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin. Société Belge d'Études Orientales, Paris, 1923–1931.

Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics (Dhammasaṅganī). Tr. Mrs. Rhys Davids. Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, XII, London, 1923.

Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Mādhyamakavṛtti (Douze chapitres ....). Tr. J. May. Paris, 1959.

Compendium of Philosophy (Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha). Tr. S. Z. Aung, revised and ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1910.

Dhammasaṅgaṇī. Tr. (into French) A. Bareau. Paris, 1951.

Dialogues of the Buddha (Dīghanikāya), I–III. Tr. T. W. Rhys Davids. SBB., II–IV, London, 1899–1912.

Discourse on Elements (Dhātukathā). Tr. U. Narada, assisted by T. Nyuan. PTS., 1962.

Documents d'Abhidharma. Tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin. MCB., V, 1937 (pp. 7–187).

The Expositor (Atthasālinī), I–II. Tr. Maung Tin, revised and ed. Mrs. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1920–1921.

Further Dialogues of the Buddha (Majjhimanikāya), I–II. Tr. Lord Chalmers. SBB., V–VI. London.

Origin and doctrines of early Indian Buddhist schools (translation of the Hsuan-Chwang version of Vasumitra's treatise). Tr. J. Masuda. AM., II, 1925 (pp. 1–78).

L'origine des sectes bouddhiques d'apres Paramārtha. Tr. P. Demieville. MCB., I, 1932 (pp. 15–64)

The Path of Purification (Visuddhimagga). Tr. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli. Colombo ,1956.

Points of Controversy (Kathāvatthu). Tr. S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids. PTS., 1915.

La Siddhi de Hiuan Tsang. Tr. L. de la Vallée Poussin. Paris, 1928–1929.

Le Traité de la Demonstration de l'Acte (Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa). Tr. E. Lamotte. MCB., IV, 1936 (pp. 151–228).

Trois traites sur les sectes bouddhiques attribues a Vasumitra, Bhavya et Vinītadeva. Tr. A. Bareau. J.A., CCXLII, 1954 (pp. 229–266).

Les versions chinoises du Milindapañha. Tr. P. Demieville. BEFEO., XXIV, 1924 (pp. 1–264).

C.—Secondary Authorities

Aneski, M. and Takakusu, J. '*Dhyāna*'. ERE., Vol. IV (pp. 702–4).

Aung, s. z. '*Abhidhamma literature in Burma.*' JPTS., 1910–1912 (pp. 112–132).

Bareau, A. *L'Absolu en Philosophie Bouddhique : Evolution de la notion d'asaṃskṛta.* Paris, 1951 ; '*Les origines du Sāriputrābhidharmaśāstra.*' Le Museon, Vol. LXIII, 1–4 (pp. 69–95). '*Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Vehicule et leurs Abhidharmapiṭaka.*' BEFEO., Vol. XLIV, Fasc. I (pp. 1–11).

Basham, A. L. *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas.* London, 1951.

Bhaduri, S. *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics.* Poona, 1947.

Bhattacharya, V. *The Basic Conception of Buddhism.* Calcutta, 1930.

Chatterji, D. '*The problem of knowledge and the four schools of later Buddhism.*' ABORI., Vol. XII (pp. 205–215).

Coomaraswamy, A. K. '*Some Pali Words.*' HJAS., Vol. IV, 1939 (pp. 358–401).

Dasgupta, S. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. Cambridge, 1922.

Divanji, P. C. '*Naturalism in Greek and Indian Philosophies.* JOIB., Vol. IV, 1954–1955 (pp. 162–175).

Dutt, N. *Early history of the spread of Buddhism and the Buddhist schools.* London, 1926 ; '*The Dhammasaṅganī.*' IHQ., Vol. XV, 1939 (pp. 345–372).

FALK MARYLA. *Nāmarūpa and Dharmarūpa. Origin and aspects of an ancient Indian conception.* Calcutta, 1943.

FILLIOZART, J. '*The psychological discoveries of Buddhism*'. UCR., Vol. XIII, 1955 (pp. 69–82).

FOLEY, C. A. '*The Vedalla Sutta as illustrating the psychological basis of Buddhist Ethics*'. JRAS. (London), 1894 (pp. 321–333).

GODAKUMBURA, C. E. '*References to Buddhist Sanskrit writers in Sinhalese literature.*' UCR., Vol. I, 1943 (pp. 86–93);

Sinhalese Literature. Colombo, 1955.

GUENTHER, H. *Philosophy and psychology in the Abhidharma.* Lucknow, 1957.

HEIMANN, B. *Significance of prefixes in Sanskrit philosophical terminology.* Royal Asiatic Society Monographs, XXV, London, 1961.

HIRIYANA, M. *Outlines of Indian Philosophy.* London, 1932.

HORNER, I. B. '*Abhidhamma Abhivinaya*'. IHQ., Vol. XVII, 1941 (pp. 548–560);
'*Foundations of Theravada.*' Middle Way, Vol. XXIV, 1950 (pp. 115–119) and *ibid* Vol. XXV, 1950 (pp. 19–22).

JACOBI, H. '*Atomic Theory (Indian)*'. ERE., Vol. II (pp. 199–202).

JAINI, P. S. '*Buddha's prolongation of life*'. BSOAS., Vol. XXI, 1958 (pp. 546–552);
'*Origin and development of the theory of viprayuktasaṃskāras*'. BSOAS., Vol. XXII, 1959 (pp. 531–547).

JAYATILLEKE, K. N. '*Some Problems of Translation and Interpretation*', I–II. UCR., Vol. VII, 1959 (pp. 212–223) and *ibid* Vol. VIII, 1960 (pp. 45–55); *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge*, London, 1964.

JHAVERI, I. H. '*Concept of kāla and ākāśa in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga system.*' JOIB., Vol. V, 1955–56 (pp. 417–419); '*The concept of ākāśa in Indian Philosophy*'. ABORI., Vol. XXXVII, 1956 (pp. 300–307).

KARUNARATNA, W. S. *The development of the theory of causality in early Theravada Buddhism.* Ph.D. Thesis (unpublished), SOAS., 1956.

KASYAP, J. *The Abhidhamma Philosophy*, Vols. I–II. Benares, 1943.

KEITH, A. B. *Indian logic and atomism.* Oxford, 1921; *Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon.* Oxford, 1923; '*The Doctrine of the Buddha.*' BSO(A)S., Vol. VI, 1930–1932 (pp. 393–404);

'*Some problems of Indian Philosophy*'. IHQ., Vol. VIII, 1932 (pp. 425–441);

'*Pre-canonical Buddhism*'. IHQ., Vol. XII, 1936 (pp. 1–20).

KERN, J. C. H. *Manual of Indian Buddhism.* Strassburg, 1896; '*Ruppati, ruppana*'. VG., Vol II (pp. 261–2).

LAW, B. C. '*Non-canonical Pali Literature*'. ABORI., Vol. XIII, 1932–32 (pp. 115–163).

LEDI SADAW. '*Some points in Buddhist doctrine.*' JPTS., 1913–14 (pp. 115–163);
'*On the Philosophy of Relations*'. JPTS., 1915–16 (pp. 21–53).

MALKANI, G. R. '*The conception of reality as dynamic*'. PIPC., 1953 (pp. 179–187).

MASSON-OURSEL, P. *Esquisse d'une histoire de la philosophie indienne.* Paris, 1923.

MC. GOVERN. *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, Vol. I. London, 1923.

MISRA, U. *Physical theory of sound and its origin in Indian thought.* Allahabad University Studies, II, Allahabad, 1926.

MOOKERJI, S. *Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux.* Calcutta, 1936.

MURTI, T. R. V. *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism.* London, 1955.

NYĀNAPONIKA. *Abhidhamma Studies.* Island Hermitage Publication, No. 2, Colombo, 1949.

NYĀNATILOKA. *Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.* Colombo, 1949;
Buddhist Dictionary. Island Hermitage Publication, No. I, Colombo, 1956.

OLDENBERG, H. *Buddha, his life, his doctrine, his order.* London, 1882.

OLTRAMARE, P. *L'histoire des idees theosophiques dans l'Inde—La theosophie bouddhique.* AMG., Vol. XXXI, Paris, 1923.

PARANAVITANA, S. '*Mahayanism in Ceylon*'. CJS., Vol. II (pp. 35–71).

POUSSIN, L. DE LA VALLÈE. *The Way to Nirvana.* London, 1925. '*Cosmogony and Cosmology (Buddhist)*'. ERE., Vol. IV (pp. 128–138);
'*Agnosticism.*' ERE., Vol. I (pp. 220–225).

PRZYLUSKI, J. '*Origin and development of Buddhism*'. Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XXXV (pp. 307–35);
'*Dārṣṭāntika, Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivādin*'. IHQ., Vol. XVI, 1940 (pp. 246–54).

RADHAKRISHNAN, S. *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I. London, 1948.

RAJU, P. T. *Idealistic Thought of India.* London, 1953.

RAY, P. (Editor of) *History of chemistry in ancient and medieval India* (incorporating History of Hindu Chemistry, by P. C. Ray). Calcutta, 1956.

RHYS DAVIDS, C. A. F. *Buddhist Psychology.* London, 1914; '*Buddhism and the Negative*'. JPTS., 1924–27 (pp. 237–50);
'*Dhyāna in early Buddhism*'. IHQ., Vol. III, 1927 (pp. 689–715);
Sakya or Buddhist Origins. London, 1931;
The Milinda Questions. London, 1930;
'*Relations (Buddhist)*'. ERE., Vol. X (pp 648–9).

RHYS DAVIDS, T. W. '*The Sects of the Buddhists*'. JRAS. (London), 1891 (pp. 409–22); and

STEDE, W. *Pali-English Dictionary.* PTS. 1925.

ROSENBERG, O. K. J. *Die Probleme der buddhistischen Philosophie.* Heidelberg, 1924.

SARATHCHANDRA, E. R. *Buddhist Psychology of Perception.* Colombo, 1958.

SCHAYER, ST. '*Precanonical Buddhism*'. AO., Vol. VII, 1935 (pp. 121–32);
'*New contributions to the problem of pre-Hinayanistic Buddhism*'. PBO., Vol. I, 1937 (pp. 8–17).

SEAL, B. N. *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus.* Delhi, 1925.

SILBURN, L. *Instant et Cause.* Paris, 1955.

SINHA, T. N. *Indian Psychology: Perception.* London, 1934; *Indian Realism*, London, 1938.

SOGEN, Y. *Systems of Buddhist Thought.* Calcutta, 1934.

STCHERBATSKY, TH. *The Soul Theory of the Buddhists.* Bulletin de l'Academie des Sciences de Russie, Petrograd, 1920;
The Central Conception of Buddhism. Prize Publication Fund, Vol. VII, London, 1923;
The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana. Leningrad, 1927;
'*The Doctrine of the Buddha.*' BSO(A)S., Vol. VI, 1930–1932 (pp. 867–96);
'*The "Dharmas" of the Buddhists and the "Guṇas" of the Sāṃkhyas*'. IHQ., Vol. X, 1934 (pp. 737–60).

STEDE, W. *v.* RHYS DAVIDS, T. W.

SUZUKI, D. T. '*The analytic and the synthetic approach to Buddhism*'. Middle Way, Vol. XXIV 1954.

TAKAKUSU, J. v. ANESKI, M. '*The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins*'. JPTS., 1904–5 (pp. 67–146);

The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy. (Ed. W. T. CHAN and C. A. MOORE). Honolulu, 1947.

TATIA, N. '*Paṭiccasamuppāda*.' Nava-Nalanda Research Publication, Vol. I, 1957 (pp. 177–239).

THOMAS, E. J. *History of Buddhist Thought*. London, 1933; '*State of the dead (Buddhist)*'. ERE., Vol. XI (pp. 829–33).

VAIDYA, P. L. *Etudes sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥśataka*. Paris, 1923.

WADDELL, L. A. '*Buddha's Secret from a Sixth Century Pictorial Commentary and Tibetan Tradition*'. JRAS. (London), 1894 (pp. 367–84);

Buddhism of Tibet. Second Edition, Cambridge, 1958.

WARDER, A. K. '*On the relationships between early Buddhism and other contemporary systems* BSOAS., Vol. XVIII, 1956 (pp. 14–24);

'*Mātikā*' (An introductory essay to Mvn.). Mvn. pp. XIX–XXX.

WIJESEKARA, O. H. DE A. '*Vitalism and Becoming : a comparative study*'. UCR., Vol. I, 1943 (pp. 49–58);

'*Upanishadic terms for sense-functions*'. UCR., Vol. II, 1944 (pp. 14–24).

WINTERNITZ, M. *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. II. Calcutta, 1933;

'*Problems of Buddhism*'. VBQ., Vol. II, 1936 (pp. 41–56).

CHAPTER ONE

Introductory

ON the basis of its occurrence in the philosophical terminology of the Pali Canon, at least four meanings of *rūpa* can be distinguished : Frequently it occurs in the (generic) sense of matter, and with almost equal frequency in the more specific sense of what is visible, to be more precise, " the sphere of visibility ". Rarely it is seen to figure as a simple substitute for the more specific compound, *rūpa-dhātu* (*-loka*), which signifies the second of the three planes of existence recognized in Buddhist cosmology—what Mrs. Rhys Davids calls " the realm of attenuated matter ", and with almost equal rarity, as referring to four stages of ecstatic experience, technically and more specifically known as *rūpajjhāna*. These four may be represented as the generic, the specific, the cosmological and the " psychological " meanings of the term.

Buddhaghosa and Dhammapāla—the two illustrious commentators of Theravāda Buddhism—collate as many as nine meanings (*attha*) in which the term in question is said to occur in the canonical works, namely,

(1) *rūpakkhandha*—the material aggregate
(2) *sarīra*—the physical body of a living being
(3) *vaṇṇa*—colour
(4) *saṇṭhāna*—form, figure, configuration
(5) *kasiṇa-nimitta*—the " meditation "-object
(6) *paccaya*—condition, cause
(7) *sabhāva*—nature

The 8th and 9th are what we have introduced as the cosmological and " psychological " meanings. That the number is not exhaustive is recognized by the addition of the word, *ādi*, " etc. "[1]

Some of these items could, however, be brought under *rūpa* in the generic sense of matter.

Rūpakkhandha (No. 1) is the first of the five aggregates into which Buddhism analyses the empiric individuality, the other four being *vedanā* (feelings), *saññā* (perceptions), *saṅkhāra* (synergies, formations) and *viññāna* (consciousness). Sometimes it is used in a wider sense to mean the totality of matter (*sabbaṃ rūpaṃ*).[2]

[1] See *AA*. I, p. 21 and *ThigA*. p. 98; see also *Abhidhānappadīpikā-sūci*, ed. Subhuti (Colombo, 1938) pp. 304 ff.
[2] See e.g. *S*. II, p. 252; III, pp. 68, 80.

It may also be noted here that in the Nikāyas sometimes it is used in a subjective sense, too—a usage which does not seem to have been retained in the post-Nikāyan works.[1] For the moment, we may overlook this latter usage. *Sarīra* (No. 2) can be considered as referring to the matter that enters into the composition of a living being.

That *rūpa* sometimes occurs in the sense of *vaṇṇa*, colour (No. 3) is said to be supported by the oft-recurrent canonical statement : *cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ*[2]=because of the eye and because of *rūpa* (the visible) there arises visual consciousness. In the opinion of the Pali commentators, *rūpa* in this context means colour.[3] But according to the Pali Canon, colour as well as shape, form or figure constitute the sphere of visibility (*rūpāyatana*).[4] The commentators,[5] however, ousted the latter from its traditional domain on the ground that in an absolute sense it was not visible and, as the Sautrāntikas did, explained it as a mental construction " superimposed on the difference of coloration ".[6] It is in the light of this subsequent development that we should understand why the term *rūpa* in the quoted sentence is sought to be interpreted as colour.

The mention of *saṇṭhāna*, form, figure (No. 4) is perhaps in order to recognize one of the general meanings of *rūpa*. But its mention separate from *vaṇṇa*, colour (No. 3) is also a logical necessity arising from the above-mentioned development.

For the moment let us confine ourselves to the Pāli Canon and take both items (Nos. 3 and 4) as being represented by *rūpa* in its specific sense of what is visible. This, as interpreted in Buddhism, constitutes one of the sub-divisions of *rūpa* in the sense of matter.[7]

Why *rūpa* is sometimes used to refer to *kasiṇa-nimitta*, the " meditation-object " (No. 5) is of course not far to seek. This is a name given to an object which could be profitably used for the practice of concentration which has the attainment of *jhāna* (Absorption, Ecstasy) as its end. According to the classical account given in the *Visuddhimagga*, at the initial stage of concentration the selected object is called *parikamma-nimitta*, the preparatory image. As the process of concentration gathers more and more intensity there comes a time when the original sensuous object is replaced by its corresponding mental image called *uggaha-nimitta*, the acquired image. With further progress in concentration there sets in what is called *paṭibhāga-nimitta*, the counter-image which is subtler than the immediately preceding one.[8]

---

[1] See below, pp. 9 ff.
[2] See e.g. *M.* I, p. 259.
[3] See *Asl.* p. 317.
[4] See *Dhs.* p. 139.
[5] See *Asl.* p. 317.
[6] Stcherbatsky, *Cent. Concep.* p. 11.
[7] See below, pp. 49 ff.
[8] *Op. cit.* pp. 180 ff.

Image, figure, sign, appearance—these are some of the general meanings of *rūpa*. And if the object of concentration is sometimes referred to by *rūpa*, then it is one of these general meanings that comes to our mind.

That *rūpa* is at times used in the sense of *paccaya*, condition (No. 6) does not seem to be supported by the example cited—a quotation from the *Aṅguttaranikāya*, which runs as follows : " *Sarūpā bhikkhave uppajjanti pāpakā akusalā dhammā no arūpā* ".[1] The Commentary notes that *rūpa* in " *sarūpā* " and its negative " *arūpā* " should be understood as synonymous with *paccaya*.[2]

When the original passage where the sentence occurs is taken into consideration, considerable doubt arises on the validity of this explanation. Therein we find nine similar sentences, each differing only in respect of the first and the last words. Five of them come before the above sentence ; they begin with (*a*) *sanimittā*, (b) *sanidānā*, (c) *sahetukā*, (d) *sasaṅkhārā* and (e) *sappaccayā*, and end with the respective negatives. Four of them come after it ; they begin with (f) *savedanā*, (g) *sasaññā*, (h) *saviññāṇā* and (i) *saṅkhatārammaṇā*, and end with the respective negatives.[3]

Commenting on them the Commentator observes that *nidāna*, *hetu*, *saṅkhāra*, *paccaya* and *rūpa* in (b), (c), (d), (e) and *sarūpā* are all synonymous with *kāraṇa*, reason.[4] That *nidāna*, *hetu* and *paccaya* as used in the Pāli texts carry more or less the same sense is, of course, understandable. But one fails to understand why *saṅkhāra* and *rūpa* too should be treated similarly. For one cannot fail to notice here the names of the five *khandhas* in *sarūpā*, *savedanā* (f), *sasaññā* (g), *sasaṅkhārā* (d) and *saviññāṇā* (h). However, it should be noted that in the passage in question the names of the five *khandhas* do not occur in the same order as they are usually enumerated. For the sentence beginning with *sasaṅkhārā* does not come between the two beginning with *sasaññā* and *saviññāṇā*.

It is to be noted that in respect of *savedanā*, *sasaññā* and *saviññāṇā* the same treatment is not given. It is specifically stated that *savedanā* means " *vedanāya sati* ", i.e. when there is or because of *vedanā*. And it is also stated that the other two terms (and *saṅkhatārammaṇā*), too, should be understood in the same manner.[5]

This explanation fits in well with the context. And it seems to us that *sarūpā* and *sasaṅkhārā*, too, should be approached in the same way. That is to say, *sarūpā*= when there is or because of *rūpa*, and *sasaṅkhārā* = when there is or because of *saṅkhāra*. Viewed in this way, the two terms cannot be understood as synonymous with cause or condition. On the contrary, it shows that the two aggregates, *rūpa* and *saṅkhāra*, are causes or conditions in relation to something, i.e. the arising of evil and unwholesome states of mind (*pāpakā akusalā dhammā*).

---

[1] *Op. cit.* i, p. 83.
[2] See *AA.* I, p. 21, and II, p. 154.
[3] *A.* I, pp. 82–83.
[4] *Nidānaṃ hetu saṃkhāro paccayo rūpan ti sabbāni pi hi etāni kāraṇavevacanān'eva.—AA.* II, p. 154.
[5] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

It is of much significance that in the list of meanings given by Dhammapāla, *rūpa* in the sense of *paccaya* does not occur. Along with this may be mentioned that in one of the manuscripts collated by the PTS. Editor of the *Aṅguttara-nikāya Aṭṭhakathā* II, the statement that *rūpa* and *saṅkhāra* are synonymous with *nidāna*, *hetu* and *paccaya* is missing.[1]

Coming to No. 7, the example cited to show that *rūpa* sometimes means *sabhāva*, nature, appearance is : " *Piyarūpe sātarūpe rajjati* "[2] = " One delights in what is of pleasant nature, in what is of delightful nature ". This is reminiscent of a passage in the *Yamaka* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka where in the form of questions and answers an attempt is made to unfold and delimit the implications of the term, *rūpa* :

Question : *Rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho ti ?* (Is *rūpa* *rūpakkhandha* ?)

Answer : *Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ rūpaṃ, na rūpakkhandho ; rūpakkhandho rūpañ c'eva rūpakkhandho ca.* (*Piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa* are *rūpa* but not *rūpakkhandha* ; *rūpakkhandha* is *rūpa* and is also *rūpakkhandha*).

Question : *Na rūpakkhandho na rūpan ti ?* (What is not *rūpakkhandha* is also not *rūpa* ?)

Answer : *Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ na rūpakkhandho, rūpaṃ. Rūpañ ca rūpakkhandhañ ca ṭhapetvā avasesā na c'eva rūpaṃ na ca rūpakkhandho.* (*Piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa* are not *rūpakkhandha*, but *rūpa*. Apart from *rūpa* and *rūpakkhandha*, the rest are neither *rūpa* nor *rūpakkhandha*).[3]

This catechism is rather enigmatic. At first sight it seems to suggest that the *Yamaka* has recognized certain kinds of matter (*rūpa*) which it excludes from the aggregate of matter (*rūpakkhandha*).

Shwe Zan Aung, while agreeing that *rūpa* is often used in the sense of matter, refers to this catechism to show that sometimes the term is used to express states of mind. He translates and understands it as follows :

" Does [everything that is called] *rūpa* [belong to] the ' material group ' ? [*The eighty-one worldly classes of consciousness and their concomitants called*] *rūpa* that is ' attractive ' and ' pleasant ' are called *rūpa*, but they do not belong to the ' material group '. The twenty-eight material qualities (. . .) that go to make up the material group are designated *rūpa* and they belong also to the ' material group '.

[Again] is anything that does not belong to the ' material group ' ever called *rūpa* ? [such is the question.] Things attractive and desirable are called *rūpa* though they do not belong to the material group. Those things and that group apart, the remainder [*viz. the eight classes of transcendental, i.e. lokuttara, consciousness and their concomitants, and Nibbāna*] are neither called *rūpa* nor do they go to make up the material group ".[4]

[1] See *AA.* II, p. 154, n.I.
[2] *ThigA.* p. 98.
[3] *Yam.* I, pp. 16 ff.
[4] *Cpd.* (Appendix) p. 273.

It will be seen that this translation, with what is given within the square brackets, explains satisfactorily the whole catechism. It will also be seen that the whole translation has become coherent and meaningful because of the two interpretations, underlined[1] and given within square brackets.
To repeat :

(i) " *Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ* " is interpreted to mean the eighty one worldly classes of consciousness and their concomitants.

(ii) " *na c'eva rūpaṃ na ca rūpakkhandho* " = " *avasesā* " (neither *rūpa* nor *rūpakkhandha* = the rest) is interpreted to mean the eight classes of transcendental consciousness, their concomitants, and *Nibbāna*.

It is implied that the items in (i) can be described as *piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa* and that the items in (ii) cannot be so described.

On the basis of this interpretative translation one could certainly say that in this particular passage of the *Yamaka rūpa* is used not only to refer to the material aggregate but also to express states of mind. This same explanation appears in Mrs. Rhys Davids' Introduction to the *Yamaka*.[2] And, Surendra Dasgupta, too, seems to have understood the passage in the same way when he refers to *Yamaka*, I, p.16 as an instance where *rūpa* is sometimes used in a subjective sense.[3]

There are, however, certain difficulties that militate against such a conclusion. At the very outset it should be stated that neither in the *Yamaka* nor in the Commentary is it explicitly said that " *Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ* " and " *avasesā* " are to be understood in the same way as they are interpreted above. Could it, then, be taken as implied in the catechism and demanded by the context ?

This, too, does not seem to be possible because of more positive difficulties. It may be noted here that in the Nikāyas a wide variety of things, mental as well as material, are described as *piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa*[4]—a fact pointing to the generality of their usage. Coming closer to the *Yamaka* : the same situation obtains even in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. In the *Vibhaṅga*, for instance, we find sixty items enumerated as an answer to the question : What is *piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa* ? Among them ten are the first five sense-organs and the corresponding objective fields.[5] These ten items, it may be noted here, are included in the *rūpakkhandha*. It may then be asked that if some items included in the *rūpakkhandha* are describable as *piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa*, why is it that in the *Yamaka* what is *piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa* is completely excluded from the *rūpakkhandha*.

The question does not arise if the catechism is understood in the light of certain exegetical methods pursued in the *Yamaka*. In unfolding the implications of terms sometimes it lays emphasis on what appears to be obvious and seems to make more

[1] underlining is ours.
[2] *Yam.* I, Introduction, IX.
[3] *Hist. of Ind. Phi.* I, p. 94.
[4] See e.g. *S.* II, pp. 108–9 ; *Iti.* p. 114 ; *Psm.* I. p. 40.
[5] *Op. cit.* pp. 101 ff.

complicated what is manifestly clear. The nature of the work is summarized by Nyānātiloka Thera when he observes : " To me it looks, as if this book was composed for examination purposes, or to get versed in answering sophistical and ambiguous or captious questions, on all the manifold doctrines and technical terms of Buddhist philosophy. The questions of identity, subordination and co-ordination of concepts are playing a prominent part in our work, which tries to give a logical clearing up and delimitation of all the doctrinal concepts as to their range and contents. "[1]

Following is an example of how it attempts to unfold the import of the term, *gandha*.

Question : Is *gandha* the *gandhāyatana*, the sphere of smell ?

Answer : *Sīlagandha* (fragrance of virtue), *samādhigandha* (fragrance of concentration), *paññāgandha* (fragrance of wisdom) are *gandha* but not *gandhāyatana*.[2]

The purpose is to show that *gandha* in its figurative usage (e.g. *paññā-gandha*) should not be confused with *gandha* when it stands for smell, the objective field corresponding to the olfactory organ.

To take another example :

Question : Is *sota* the *sotāyatana* (the organ of hearing) ?

Answer : (Yes, but not always, e.g.) *taṇhāsota* (the stream of craving) is (also) *sota* but not *sotāyatana*.[3]

Here, both *sotāyatana*, the organ of hearing and *taṇhāsota*, the stream of craving are called " *sota* " because it occurs in both words—although of course *sota* in *sotāyatana* is different in meaning from *sota* in *taṇhāsota*. In the former it means " ear " and in the latter " stream ". And, it is precisely in order to point out this difference that the whole catechism is set forth.

The catechism in question, too, should be understood in a similar way. In this particular context " *Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ* " should be translated, not as " Things pleasant and desirable " (=Aung), but as " of pleasing and delightful 'nature' " (=Nyānātiloka).[4] Usually (but not always) when Pāli works refer to things pleasant and desirable they use the words : *yam piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ* . . .[5]=that which is pleasant and desirable . . . But that is not the main argument here. The moment we understand it as " Things . . . ", we are at a loss to understand why they are completely excluded from the *rūpakkhandha*. For, as observed above,[6] in the *Vibhaṅga* what is included in the *rūpakkhandha* is also described as *piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa*. And it is very unlikely that the *Yamaka* has deviated from this tradition.

[1] *Guide through the Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*, p. 33.
[2] *Yam.* I, p. 54 ; also p. 167.
[3] *Ibid.* I, p. 54 ; also p. 168.
[4] *Guide through the Abh. Piṭaka*, p. 31.
[5] *Cf.* e.g. *S.* II. p. 108 ; *Psm.* I, p. 40.
[6] See above, p. 5.

Taking all these facts into consideration we may then explain the four points of the catechism as follows :

(i) " *Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ* " (of pleasing and delightful nature or appearance) is called *rūpa* in the same way as *taṇhāsota* is also called *sota*.

(ii) *Rūpa* (=*Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ*) is excluded from *rūpakkhandha* (material aggregate) in the same way as *sota* (=*taṇhāsota*) is excluded from *sotāyatana*. The exclusion of *piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa* from *rūpakkhandha* is tantamount to saying that the meaning of *rūpa* in the first two words is different from the meaning of *rūpa* in the compound *rūpakkhandha*. In the former it means (of pleasant and delightful) nature or appearance ; in the latter, (aggregate of) matter.

(iii) *Rūpakkhandha* is called *rūpa* as well as *rūpakkhandha* in the same way as *sotāyatana* is called *sota* as well as *sotāyatana*. Here only one meaning of the term is taken into consideration.

(iv) The last statement : " Apart from *rūpa* (=*Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ*) and *rūpakkhandha*, the rest (*avasesā*) are neither *rūpa* nor *rūpakkhandha* ", could be understood in the same way as : " Apart from chairs and tables, the rest are neither chairs nor tables ". The words, " the rest " (*avasesā*) according to this explanation cannot be interpreted as referring only to the eight classes of transcendental consciousness, their concomitants and *Nibbāna*. They too are certainly included. But " the rest " means much more, i.e. all except *rūpa* (*Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ*) and *rūpakkhandha*.

The explanation we have given here may look strange. But when one considers how the *Yamaka* seeks to unfold the implications of *gandha* and *sota*, strangeness ceases to be a disqualification. Be it also repeated here that neither in the *Yamaka* nor in its commentary is it stated that " *Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ* " and " *avasesā* " (the rest) should be understood in the same way as they are interpreted in the quoted translation (underlined and given within square brackets).[1] Moreover, the present explanation does not contradict but falls in line with the situation which obtains in the *Vibhaṅga*. The whole purpose of the catechism is to clarify the implications of the term *rūpa* in the compound *rūpakkhandha* and to avoid its being confused with *rūpa* as it occurs in *piyarūpa* and *sātarūpa*. In point of fact, the Commentary rightly observes that the questions in this catechism are asked for the sole purpose of clarifying the implications of terms—*vacana-sodhanatthaṃ*.[2]

We may then conclude that as far as this particular *Yamaka* catechism is concerned it is not correct to say that *rūpa* is used to express states of mind.

In the foregoing pages we have referred to many of the senses and contexts in which the term *rūpa* occurs in the canonical texts. Our purpose was not so much to examine them all—although of course we have had the occasion to examine some—as to give an indication of how even in the technical terminoligy it occurs

[1] See above, p. 4.
[2] *YamA.* p. 59.

in a plurality of senses. For we are not concerned with all the meanings of *rūpa* as a technical term,[1] let alone its many meanings as a general term. Within the purview of this study will come an examination of *rūpa* in what we have called its generic sense, i.e. in the sense of matter. Stated otherwise, ours will be a study of *rūpakkhandha* in its widest scope, i.e. as *sabbaṃ rūpaṃ*, the totality of matter.

Rūpakkhandha :

Concerning the meaning of *rūpakkhandha* there is, however, one important fact that should not be overlooked.

According to the Abhidhamma the compound denotes twenty-seven[2] (in some works twenty-eight[3]) items called *rūpa-dhammas* (material elements), classified into two categories as primary and secondary. They are often referred to as *sabbaṃ rūpaṃ*. This, however, is not to overlook that sometimes the compound is used in a "narrower" sense to mean the *rūpa-dhammas* that enter into the composition of a living being.[4] On the other hand, the situation in the Nikāyas is rather complex. For, as we have already indicated,[5] therein sometimes *rūpa* in *rūpakkhandha* is seen to occur in a subjective sense, too. We may first clarify its position in the Nikāyas.

As in the Abhidhamma, in the Nikāyas too *rūpakkhandha* is sometimes used to mean the matter that enters into the composition of a living being.[6]

Sometimes, as is also the case in the Abhidhamma, it is given a wider scope : The four primary elements (*mahābhūta*) and the matter that is dependent on them (*upādā-rūpa*) are *rūpa*.[7] They are either internal (*ajjhattaṃ*, *ajjhattika*), i.e. as part of the complex that makes a living being, or external (*bahiddhā*, *bāhira*), i.e. matter other than that which enters into the composition of living beings. In combination both refer to the totality of matter (*sabbaṃ rūpaṃ*).[8] The other usual way of referring to all matter is : whatever matter, whether it is past, future or present, whether it is internal or external, whether it is low or debonair, whether it is far or near, (in other words) the totality of matter.[9] With the necessary adjustments, this kind of description is extended to the other *khandhas*, too.

---

[1] On the subject of *rūpajjhāna* and *rūpaloka*, see Stcherbatsky, *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna*, the ch. on "Buddhism and Yoga"; Aung, *Cpd.* pp. 18 ff.; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psy.* pp. 94 ff., "*Dhyāna in early Buddhism*", IHQ. Vol. 3, 1927 (pp. 689–715); M. Aneski and J. Takakusu, "*Dhyāna*", ERE, Vol. 2 (pp. 702–704); E. J. Thomas, "*State of the dead* (*Buddhist*)", ERE, Vol. 2 (pp. 829–833); Y. N. Sinha, *Ind. Psy. : Perception*, pp. 314 ff.

[2] See *Vbh.* pp. 12 ff.; *Dhs.* pp. 124 ff.

[3] The commentaries add *hadaya-vatthu* as the 28th, see below, pp. 62 ff.

[4] See *Vbh.* p. 3.

[5] See above, p. 2.

[6] See e.g. *M.* II, p. 68; *S.* III, p. 58.

[7] *Cf. yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ sabbaṃ rūpaṃ cattāri mahābhūtāni catunnañ ca mahābhūtānam upādāya rūpaṃ. M.* II, p. 87.

[8] See below, p. 116.

[9] *Yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā hīnaṃ vā paṇītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā sabbaṃ rūpaṃ—S.* III, p. 68.

Where, how and why *rūpa(kkhandha)* is sometimes used in a subjective sense may now be considered. In the Khandha Saṃyutta of the *Saṃyuttanikāya*[1] one reads :

Ruppatī ti kho bhikkhave tasmā rūpan ti vuccati. Kena ruppati ? Sītena pi ruppati uṇhena pi ruppati jigacchāya pi ruppati pipāsāya pi ruppati ḍaṃsamakasavātātapasiriṃsapasamphassena pi ruppati.

It will be seen that the most significant and central word in this passage is the verb *ruppati*, which, in the PTSD, is explained as : to be vexed, oppressed, hurt, molested. Buddhist exegesis, too, recognizes the same meaning when it paraphrases it as : is disturbed or excited (*kuppati*), hurt or impressed (*pīḷiyati*), broken or disintegrated (*bhijjati*).[2] In the *Abhidharmakośa* version of the passage (somewhat different) it occurs in the Sanskrit form as *rūpyate* and is commented : être rompu (*rupyate*) signifie être endammagè (*bādhyate*).[3]

There is, however, this fact to be noted. According to the Buddhist exegesis *ruppati* occurs in two different contexts. In the first it refers to distress, excitement, or dissipation as a state of mind;[4] in the second, to disturbance, mutability or changeableness of matter.[5] In the first it is disturbance in a psychological and subjective sense and in the second it is disturbance in a physical and objective sense.

In the opinion of the scholiasts *ruppati* in the quoted passage occurs in the latter context; that is to say, the verb implies disturbance in what we have described as the physical sense. The disturbance implied by the verb *ruppati*—it is suggested—is the disturbance of the physical body of a person. It is disturbed (*ruppati*) by cold (*sīta*), heat (*uṇha*), "hunger" (*jigacchā*), "thirst" (*pipāsā*) and by the touch of gnats mosquitos, wind, the sun, and reptiles (*ḍaṃsamakasavātātapasiriṃsapasamphassa*).[6]

We are given to understand that "hunger" (*jigacchā*) and "thirst" (*pipāsā*), as used in the present context, do not mean hunger and thirst as a subjective experience or as two organic sensations but the physical factor that brings them about, that is to say, the heat inside the belly (*udaraggisantāpa*).[7]

This incidentally reminds one, of the Vaibhāṣikas who too used the two terms, hunger (*bubhukṣā*) and thirst (*pipāsā*) in two distinct senses. In the first they mean a variety of subjective experience, a state of mind (*jighatsā caitasiko dharmaḥ .... evam pipāsā pi vaktavyā*).[8] In the second they mean the physical factors which bring about the two organic sensations in question. If the physical causes are also called after the psychological effects, this, it is said, should be understood as a case of hypallage, of cause being designated after the effect—*kāraṇe kāryopacārād*. It is

---

[1] III, p. 86.

[2] See *VbhA.* p. 14; *Mh. NdA.* p. 13; *SA.* II, p. 290.

[3] *AK.* Ch. I, p. 24; see also *AKvy.* I, p. 34.

[4] See *Mh. Nd.* I, p. 5; *Vism*S. V, p. 51.

[5] See *PsmA.* I, p. 109; *Abhvk.* p. 245; *VismS.* V, p. 51.

[6] See *VismS.* V, p. 51.

[7] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[8] *Akvy.* I, p. 27.

like the saying : appearance of the Buddhas is happiness. What, in point of fact, is meant to say is that the appearance of Buddhas is the cause of happiness and not happiness in itself.[1]

To come back to the passage : it was noted that according to the scholastic interpretation the term *rūpa* which in the passage is defined as "that which is disturbed" (*ruppatī ti*) means the physical body because it is disturbed or affected by the factors enumerated. It is, however, admitted that when the body is disturbed the mind too is disturbed, in this sense. When the body, to be more precise, the organ of touch which is spread all over the body, comes into contact with heat, cold, etc., there arise tactile sensations. Hunger and thirst (i. e. in the psychological sense) are also explained as tactile sensations. They are brought about when "hunger" and "thirst" (i. e. in the physical sense — *udaraggisantāpa*) come into contact with the organ of touch which, as stated above, is spread all over the body. But it is not admitted that this "mental disturbance" (tactile sensations) is either meant or represented by the term *rūpa* in the quoted passage.[2]

For all its precision of statement one is tempted to doubt whether this interpretation represents the original meaning of the passage. The given interpretation seems to be a reversal of what the passage was meant to convey. If we understood the items enumerated in a direct way, the resulting conclusion would certainly be different.

In the Nikāyas the verb *ruppati* is mostly, if not always, used in a subjective sense to mean "distressed, grieved or pained". Its extension to refer to the disturbance or mutability of matter appears to be the work of later scholasticism—although of course such a use is perfectly understandable. Prof. Kern's study of the verb as it occurs in the *Jātaka* and the *Cariyāpiṭaka* has also brought into relief its implication of grief.[3] In understanding the above passage, the *Suttanipāta gāthā* sentence, "*sallaviddho'va ruppati*"[4] — "is pained, distressed or molested like unto one, pierced by an arrow", is of much significance. In paraphrasing this *ruppati* the *Niddesa* uses, among other words, *domanassito hoti* — becomes sorrow-stricken.[5] Commenting on the Sanskrit version of the sentence, Yaśomitra observes that herein it is proper that *rūpyate* should be understood as indicative of disturbance in a psychological sense, i. e. the painful feeling (*duḥkhavedayitṛdvād bādhyata iti yuktaṃ*).[6] It will thus be seen that, as recognized in the Buddhist exegesis itself, *ruppati* in the sentence refers, not to the physical disturbance of the body created by the arrow, but to the mental affliction, the painful experience which results from the latter.

[1] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 12; cf. *attum-icchā jighatsā caitasiko dharmaḥ. tasya kāraṇam. antar udare kāyendriyena yaḥ spṛśyate. sā jighatsā nāmopadāya-rūpam. yathā buddhānaṃ sukham utpāda ity-ādi abhyudaya-niḥśreya-sa-sukhakāraṇatvāt buddhotpādasya sa sukham ity ucyate. tadvat.*—*AKvy*. I, p. 27.

[2] See *VismS*. V, pp. 51 ff.

[3] *Verspreide Geschriften*, II, p. 261.

[4] *Sn*. p. 151 (verse 767).

[5] *Mh. Nd*. I, p. 5.

[6] *AKvy*. I, p. 34.

Ruppati of the quoted passage, too, could be understood in a similar (direct) way. "*Sītena. . . . ruppati jigacchāya. . . . ruppati*" could well be taken to mean "is disturbed or affected by cold, hunger". This is another way of saying that one is experiencing the disturbance or affections, namely, of cold and hunger. The other items, too, can be understood in the same manner. When understood in this way the resulting conclusion is that in the quoted passage the term *rūpa* is used in a subjective sense, i. e. as referring to certain organic affections.[1]

This, moreover, is not the only Nikāyan passage where *rūpa(kkhandha)* is used in a subjective sense. In the *Majjhimanikāya* ii 98, it seems to refer to the visible, sounds, smells, tastes and the tangible in their appearance as sensations.

From this it should not be concluded that in the Nikāyas *rūpa(kkhandha)* is always used in the sense of, and understood as, sensations. This is only one of the senses in which the term is sometimes used. For, as noted earlier,[2] more often than not it is used in the sense of matter, whether it is understood as a part of the complex that makes a living being (*ajjhattaṃ*) or otherwise (*bahiddhā*). Some degree of elasticity in the use of terms is more evident in the Nikāyas than in the post-Nikāyan works. Such a situation is understandable, for at the earlier phase of Buddhism the emphasis seems to have been more on practice than on theory. As yet, it was too early for the need to demarcate clearly the range and use of the terms to be felt. Rigid and standard definitions, delimitation of the implications of the doctrinal concepts and terms, coinage of more and more technical terms, were more the work of Abhidhamma scholasticism. A glance at the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka would show, among other things, how and to what extent the process of "vacana-sodhana" (clarification of the implications of terms) was carried out. And we saw,[3] how the *Yamaka* sought to clarify the apparently obvious fact that *taṇhā-sota*, the stream of craving is quite different from *sotāyatana*, the organ of hearing. Since our immediate concern is with the term *rūpa(kkhandha)*, let us narrow down the field and see how it came to be explained and defined with more and more precision.

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka there is certainly some uniformity in the application of the term *rūpa(kkhandha)*. It was observed that in the Nikāyas although it stood as a general term for matter, at times it was also used to express certain subjective phenomena. Herein, on the other hand, the latter use is given up. *Rūpakkhandha* includes a group of twenty-seven items called *rūpa-dhammas*, material elements. However, the constituents of the group are not as uniform as might be expected.

[1] See Dasgupta, *Hist. Ind. Phi.* I, p. 94. The quoted passage seems to give an indication of the type of afflictions which often assailed the monks in their solitary retreats. Cold, heat hunger, thirst, the touch of mosquitos, the sun, wind, and reptiles—these would have often visited the monks who often betook themselves to forests and solitary haunts for purposes of meditation. In fact the self-same items are enumerated elsewhere (see *M*. II, p. 176, III, pp. 56, 68) and the good monk is described as one who could put up with them (*khāyī*).

[2] See above, p. 8.

[3] See above, p. 6.

Some represent certain elements of matter and the others certain facts connected with matter—all postulated as *rūpa-dhammas*.[1] Thus, although the term is delimited as to its application, yet the diversity of the items denoted by it suggests that in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, too, it was used with some degree of elasticity.

In the post-canonical Abhidhammic works this situation, too, was reformed. On the basis of a classification as *nipphanna* and *anipphanna* the real elements of matter (*nipphanna*) were distinguished from the nominal.[2] A contribution more positive than this, too, was made. It is true that in the *Dhammasaṅganī* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka each *rūpa-dhamma* is given a short and laconic definition. It is also true that on the basis of these individual definitions one could understand how it interpreted matter. Nevertheless it has not provided us with what might be called a formal and general definition of matter. The later scholiasts took up the matter and fulfilled the need. And this is the next aspect that we propose to consider here.

Definition of Matter:

We have already discussed the significance of *ruppati* in the quoted *Saṃyuttanikāya*-passage and shown that therein *rūpa* is used to refer to certain organic affections.[3] That ethical edification was one of the reasons in using this verb here and elsewhere (but not everywhere) is fairly obvious. For conveying as it does the idea of grief, affliction, molestation it is very suggestive of the fact of suffering (*dukkha-sacca*), which is one of the cardinal doctrines of Buddhism. In the commentaries and the kindred works this verb along with its noun, *ruppana* were made use of to develop a definition of *rūpa* in the sense of matter. And in these latter contexts they came to assume, so to say, a less religious and more scientific tone. This association of *ruppati* with matter could certainly be traced to the Sutta passage. Could it then be concluded that in the Sutta passage, too, *rūpa* was used in the same sense? Such a conclusion does not necessarily follow. We believe sufficient evidence was adduced to show that the reference is to certain subjective phenomena. What seems to have happened is this. The Sutta passage provided a clue to develop a definition of *rūpa* in the sense of matter. And once this was done, the passage itself was sought to be interpreted so as to fall in line with this definition. The apparent connection between *ruppati* and *rūpa* (matter), too, seems to have encouraged the scholiasts in associating the former with the interpretation of the latter. As a matter of fact, it is sometimes suggested that *ruppati* is the etymological base of *rūpa*.[4] Such attempts at postulating etymological bases to suit given interpretations are, in fact, met with in the Buddhist exegesis.

---

[1] See *Dhs.* pp. 124 ff.

[2] See *Vism.* pp. 381–2 ; *Asl.* p. 343 ; *Abhvt.* p. 74.

[3] See above, p. 10.

[4] See *Abhvk.* p. 245 ; see also *Abhidhānappadīpikā-sūci*, p. 350.

It hardly needs mention that the verb *ruppati* and the noun *ruppana*, when associated with the definition of matter, are indicative of disturbance in a physical sense or on a physical level. The commentators' statement, namely *ruppana-lakkhaṇaṃ rūpaṃ*, expresses the mutability, changeableness or disintegration of matter or its susceptibility and receptivity to being disturbed, obstructed, scattered or dispersed.[1] In the *Abhidharmakośa* the agency of *ruppana* is given as the hand.[2] The implication is that material things could be subjected to *ruppana* by other material things. And, the fact of *ruppana* in matter is said to take place by way of its modification (*vipariṇāmotpādana*) and by way of its scattering, dispersal (*vikriyotpādana*).[3] In the Theravāda sources the phenomenon of *ruppana* is often illustrated with reference to cold (*sīta*) and heat (*uṇha*). When a physical object is confronted with such contrary forces as cold and heat, the climatic disturbance which it undergoes is a case of *ruppana* in matter.[4]

The above definition is certainly not very specific. To say that matter is that which is subject to *ruppana* is too general a statement, just as *rūpaṃ aniccaṃ* (matter is impermanent). What is more, as recognized in the Buddhist exegesis itself, *ruppana* could also mean disturbance on a psychological level.[5] It was perhaps the recognition of this generality that led certain Buddhists to advance another definition, more specific than the above. According to this definition, given in the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Vyākhyā*, " *pratighāta* " is the fundamental characteristic of matter.

Pratighāta is "l'impénétrabilité, le heurt ou résistance, l'obstacle qu'un *rūpa* oppose a ce que son lieu soit occupé par un autre *rūpa* ".[6] This definition points to the fact of extension (occupation in space) and to the fact of resistance as the fundamental characteristics of matter. Matter is that which is *sapratigha*, i.e. that which covers or is extended in space—*yad deśaṃ āvṛṇoti*.[7] Where there is one *sapratigha* object there cannot be (at the same time) another *sapratigha* object—*yatraikaṃ sapratighaṃ vastu tatra dvitīyasyotpattir na bhavati*.[8]

Thus the definition of matter as *sapratigha* brings into relief its characteristic of " covering " (*āvaraṇalakṣaṇa*), i.e. extension in space, and its power of resistance or impenetrability (*pratibandhana*).[9]

---

[1] *Cf. UdA.* p. 42 ; *VbhA.* pp. 3, 4 ; *VismS.* V, p. 51 ; *PsmA.* I, p. 79.

[2] *Op. cit.* Ch. I, p. 24.

[3] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[4] *Cf. Ruppatī ti sītuṇhādīhi vikāraṃ āpajjati, āpādiyatī ti attho. Vikāruppatti ca sītādivirodhappaccayasannidhāne visaduppatti yeva.*—*Abhvk.* p. 245 ; see also *VismS.* V, p. 52.

[5] See above, p. 9.

[6] *AK.* Ch. I, pp. 24, 25.

[7] *AKvy.* I, p. 24.

[8] *Ibid.* I, p. 56 ; Stcherbatsky, *Cent. Concep.* p. 11, n.2.

[9] See *AKvy.* I, p. 58.

3——RR 19372 (11/66)

In the Theravāda Abhidhammic works *paṭigha* is often used as indicative of the contact, actual or potential, between the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects. The ten items in question are therefore described as (*rūpaṃ*) *sappaṭighaṃ*.[1] Nevertheless the characteristics implied by the above definition are recognized in the Theravāda, too. This is shown by the conception of the four primary elements of matter (*mahābhūta*).

As we shall see in detail in the next chapter, although the four are named *paṭhavī*, *āpo*, *tejo* and *vāyo*, they are not understood in the popular sense as earth, water, fire and air respectively. The first represents solidity (*kakkhaḷatta*) and extension (*pattharana*); the second, fluidity (*davatā*) and cohesion (*bandhanatta*); the third, the temperature of cold and heat (*sīta*, *uṇha*) and the fourth, distension (*thambhitatta*) and mobility (*samudīraṇa*). They are positionally inseparable (*padesato avinibhoga*) and necessarily co-existent (*niyata-sahajāta*) and are present in varying degrees of intensity (*ussada-vasena*) in all instances of matter, beginning from the smallest material unit (*rūpa-kalāpa*)[2] to anything bigger than that.

Now the fact that *paṭhavī-dhātu*, which represents solidity and extension, is said to be present in every instance of matter, is another way of saying that every instance of matter is characterized by solidity (whatever be the degree) and extension (whatever be the extent). In the *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Vyākhyā* the four primary elements are defined in more or less the same way. Hence it is very likely that, when they take *pratighāta* as the fundamental characteristic of matter, they have built up this general definition on the same basis.

Elements of Matter:

Useful though these general definitions are, how Buddhism interpreted matter would not be quite clear before a study of what are called *rūpa-* (*rūpino*) *dhammas* had been made. A clearer picture would emerge only when the individual definitions given to these items were examined. This will be the subject of study in the next four chapters. However, a few preliminary observations on their general character may be made here.

By *rūpa-dhammas* Buddhism means the ultimate irreducible factors or data that make up the physical world. Any given material thing is analysable into these (ultimate) factors. Apart from them, no other matter is recognized. That elusive metaphysical entity called " matter " is explained away as an illusion.

Although each *rūpa-dhamma* is postulated as if it were a discrete entity, this does not imply that it has an independent existence. It is only for the purposes of description, that it is so postulated. In actual fact, it always exists in inseparable

[1] See *Dhs.* pp. 134 ff. and p. 147.

[2] See below, Ch. VII.

association with a set of other *rūpa-dhammas*. Even when the analysis of matter " ended " in atomism, this theory of " co-operate " existence was not abandoned. For even the so-called atom (*paramāṇu*) is again a collection or group (*kalāpa*) of *rūpa-dhammas*, one inseparable from another, and all forming a unity.

Their interconnection is sought to be explained with reference to laws of causation and conditionality. One does not inhere in another; nor is one a substance of another. In brief, no distinction between substance and quality is introduced. A distinction is, however, made between primary and secondary. Even here the dichotomy is sought to be established with reference to certain causal laws.

Finally a word may be said concerning the list of twenty-seven (sometimes twenty-eight) *rūpa-dhammas*. Some of the items in the list represent certain facts (e.g. phases, modes, limitation) connected with matter. To translate them as material elements would certainly be a misnomer. However, there is this justification for our doing so: Buddhist commentators themselves observe that they are not true *rūpa-dhammas*, but nominal " entities ". Yet, as a matter of convention—*rūḷhiyā*—they themselves refer to them by the same term.[1] Hence if we, too, keep on translating all the items as " material elements ", or " elements of matter", this, be it noted, is done as a matter of " *rūḷhi* ".

[1] See below pp. 67 ff.

CHAPTER TWO

The Primary Elements

MOST of the schools of Indian thought, notably the Sāṃkhya, the Vedānta and the medical tradition as represented by Caraka and Suśruta, recognize five *mahābhūtas* (elemental substances), viz. *pṛthivī* (earth), *ap* (water), *tejas* (fire), *vāyu* (air) and *ākāśa* (ether).[1] That *ākāśa* is the fifth, is admitted by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, too. But in many respects it differs from the other four: It is a non-corporeal (*amūrta*) substance devoid of tactility (*sparśa*) and characterized by ubiquity (*vibhū*), absolute continuity and infinite magnitude. As such, unlike the other four substances, it is not, in the ultimate analysis, composed of atoms. Thus, although *ākāśa* is introduced as a *bhūta*, in view of its peculiar characteristics, it has to be distinguished from the other four and is, in a way, on a par with such intangible substances as *kāla*, time.[2] In Jainism, on the other hand, it is not ranked with what is called *bhūda-catukka*, " the elemental tetrad " which consists of *pṛthivī*, *ap*, *tejas* and *vāyu*. Both *ākāśa* and *bhūda-catukka* are brought under the general heading, *ajīva*, non-spirit; but only the latter is brought under the more specific, *puggala*, matter.[3]

The position of Buddhism in regard to this question is similar to that of Jainism. That is to say, only *paṭhavī*, *āpo*, *tejo* and *vāyo* are brought under the heading, *mahābhūta*. It is of course true that, as pointed out by Mrs. Rhys Davids,[4] in the Nikāyas, sometimes, *ākāsa* is enumerated immediately after, and apparently as co-ordinate with, the above four items.[5] But this does not mean that *ākāsa* is the fifth *mahābhūta*, just as much as *viññāna* (consciousness) which, too, is sometimes enumerated after the five items in question,[6] is not the sixth *mahābhūta*. It may be noted here that, when *ākāsa* and *viññāna* are mentioned along with *paṭhavī*, *āpo*, *tejo* and *vāyo*, the general designation used in respect of all the six items is *dhātu*. On the other hand, the term *mahābhūta* is always used in a more specific sense, i.e. as referring only to the last four items.

In the later scholasticism, too, the situation remains unchanged. True, on the nature of *ākāsa*, the scholiasts advance more than one interpretation.[7] But on its non-recognition as a *mahābhūta*, they all agree.

[1] See Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Hindus*, Ch. I.
[2] See Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, Ch. III.
[3] See *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, pp. 79 ff.
[4] See *Bud. Psy. Ethics*, p. 86.
[5] *Cf.* e.g. *D.* III, p. 274; *M.* I, pp. 431 ff.
[6] *Cf.* e.g. *M.* III, p. 31; *A.* I, p. 176.
[7] See below, pp, 91 ff.

With this clarification as to the number of *mahābhūtas*, we may now proceed to consider how they are understood in Buddhism.

In the Nikāyas they are defined in simple and general terms and are illustrated mostly with reference to the constituents of the body. *Paṭhavī-dhātu* is that which is hard (*kakkhaḷaṃ*) and rigid (*kharigataṃ*), e.g. hair of the head or body, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, etc. *Āpo-dhātu* is water (*āpo*) or that which is watery (*āpogataṃ*), e.g. bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, tears, etc. *Tejo-dhātu* is fire or heat (*tejo*) or that which is fiery (*tejogataṃ*), e.g. the heat in the body which transmutes food and drink in digestion. *Vāyo-dhātu* is air (*vāyo*) or that which is airy (*vāyogataṃ*), e.g. " wind discharged upwards or downwards, wind in the abdomen or belly, vapours that traverse the several members, inhalings and exhalings of breath ".[1]

What one can gather from these definitions is that from the very beginning Buddhism did not make a radical departure from the popular conception of the *mahābhūtas*. There are, however, some Nikāya passages which seem to imply that they were understood in a more " abstract " way,[2] i.e. as interpreted in the Abhidhamma. (To this we shall come soon). But within the Nikāyas themselves such implications are not worked out into a clearly formulated theory.

It is really in the Abhidhamma that we meet with such a situation. Here we are presented with a different conception of the *mahābhūtas*. Much of the earlier terminology is retained, but the earlier definitions are modified. The subject is presented in greater detail and with more precision. New theories have been evolved and new interpretations advanced, so as to bring the whole subject in line with the other subsequent developments of the doctrine.

For the Abhidhamma, too, *kakkhaḷa* and *khara* which mean hard and rigid respectively bring out the essential nature of *paṭhavī-dhātu*, the earth-element.[3] The first is said to represent its characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*) and the second, its mode (*ākāra*).[4] The question is raised whether *kakkhaḷatta*, i.e. hardness, is itself not the *paṭhavī-dhātu*. It is maintained that although this is the case, yet for the convenience of definition, *paṭhavī-dhātu* is said to possess the characteristic of *kakkhaḷatta*.[5]

It will be seen that according to the Nikāyan definition what is (comparatively) *kakkhaḷa* (hard or rigid) is *paṭhavī*, whereas according to the Abhidhammic definition *kakkhaḷatta* (the fact of hardness or rigidity) is itself *paṭhavī*.

The conception of *paṭhavī-dhātu* in this way is not peculiar to the Theravāda alone. Parallel definitions are met with in other schools of Buddhist thought. In its chapter on the Genesis of the World, the *Mahāvastu* says that when the living beings who lived at a new evolution of the world began to eat whole mouthfuls of the essence of

[1] See *M.* I, pp. 421 ff.
[2] *Cf. D.* I, pp. 215 ff.; *D.* III, p. 87; *S.* I, p. 15.
[3] See *Dhs.* p. 177; *Vbh.* p. 82.
[4] *Tattha paṭhamaṃ lakkhaṇa-vacanaṃ dutiyaṃ ākāra-vacanaṃ.*—*Vism.* p. 286.
[5] *Cf. Nanu ca kakkhaḷattameva paṭhavīdhātū ti ? Saccametaṃ. Tathā pi viññātāviññātasaddatthatāvasena abhinne pi dhamme kappanāsiddhena bhedena evaṃ niddeso kato. Evaṃ hi atthavisesāvabodho hotī ti.*—*VismṬ.* pp. 362–3.

this earth as food, their bodies came to possess the characteristics of *gurutva*, heaviness, *kharatva*, roughness, and *kakkhaṭatva*, hardness.[1] The implication is given that *gurutva, kharatva* and *kakkhaṭatva* represent the essential nature of *paṭhavī-dhātu*. The *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Vyākhyā*, too, use the latter two terms in defining the *pṛthivī-dhātu*.[2] In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* it is defined as *kaṭhinatā*,[3] a term which could be interpreted as meaning rigidity or solidity. As such this interpretation is almost the same as that given by the Theravādins. Thus there is general agreement among the Buddhist scholiasts in maintaining that what is called *paṭhavī-dhātu* stands for the phenomenon of hardness, rigidity, solidity or compactness in matter.

Paṭhavī-dhātu is also explained as that which extends or spreads out—*pattharatī ti paṭhavī*.[4] Extension is occupation in space. " Tri-dimensional extension gives rise to our idea of a solid body. As no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time, Buddhists derive their idea of hardness (*kakkhaḷatta-lakkhaṇa*) from *paṭhavī* ".[5] Thus the interpretation of *paṭhavī-dhātu* as the element of extension brings into relief a different method of approach.

In the commentaries we get further discussions on the peculiar function of this element. Buddhaghosa observes that it acts as a foundation, a sort of fulcrum, and that it manifests itself as receiving (*sampaṭicchana-paccupaṭṭhāna*).[6] This has been further explained to mean that the other three primary elements are established on it (*paṭhavī-patiṭṭhitā*) and that therefore it serves as a support, a basis (*patiṭṭhānaṃ*) for them.[7] That this view is shared by the Vaibhāṣikas, is shown by their contention that the " bearing up " or supporting (*saṃdhāraṇa*) of ships by water (= ocean) is a sufficient ground for the inference that the *pṛthivī-dhātu* is present in water.[8]

The above conception of the function of *paṭhavī-dhātu* appears to be only a refinement of the popular view that the earth, as it is ordinarily understood, is a receptacle, a sort of dumping ground for all types of material things. It is, in fact, significant to note that the *Vibhāvinī Ṭīkā* observes that just as what we conventionally call earth is the support of trees, mountains, etc., even so the earth-element is a support for the other material elements.[9]

Āpo-dhātu represents the fact of viscidity (*sineha*) and cohesion or binding together in matter (*rūpassa bandhanattaṃ*).[10] *Bandhanatta* or cohesion refers more to its function. " For the *āpo-dhātu* binds together iron, etc in masses, makes them

[1] *Op. cit.* I,p. 339 ; cf. *Yato ca bhikṣavaste satvā taṃ pṛthivīrasamālopakārakamāhāram.īhārensuḥ atha teṣāṃ kāye gurutvaṃ ca kharatvaṃ ca kakkhaṭatvaṃ ca upanīpate.*
[2] *AK.* Ch. I, p. 22 ; *AKvy.* I, pp. 57, 66.
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 3.
[4] *Vism.* p. 287 ; *Abhvt.* p. 64.
[5] *Cpd.* p. 155, n. I.
[6] *Vism.* p. 289 ; see also *Asl.* p. 332 ; *Mvn.* p. 58.
[7] *Vism.* p. 289 ; see also *Asl.* p. 332 ; *Mvn.* p. 58 ; *Abhvk.* p. 249.
[8] See *AKvy.* I, p. 33.
[9] *Tarupabbatādīnaṃ pakatipaṭhavī viya sahajātarūpānaṃ patiṭṭhānabhāvena pakkhāyati, upaṭṭhātī ti vuttaṃ hoti—ADSVṬ.* p. II0.
[10] See *Dhs.* p. 177 ; *Vbh.* p. 83.

rigid. Because they are so bound, they are called rigid ; similarly in the case of stones, mountains, palm-seeds, elephant-tusks, ox-horns, etc. All such things the *āpo-dhātu* binds and makes rigid ; they are rigid because of its binding ".[1] *Paggharaṇa*, flowing, and *nissandabhāva*, state of streaming, are also cited as two other characteristics of *āpo-dhātu*[2]—a view which suggests the popular and common sense idea of water. However, this does not mean that *āpo-dhātu*, as it came to be interpreted in the Abhidhamma, is identical with water. No primary element can exist independently of, or in isolation from, the other three.[3] Hence *āpo-dhātu* is present not only in water but also in air, fire, etc.

In the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, too, the *ap-dhātu* is defined in a similar manner. It stands for *dravatva*, liquidity, and *snehatva*, viscidity in material things.[4] It may be noted here that the " *ap-* "substance of the Vaiśeṣikas, too, has the same two characteristics : *āpo dravaḥ snigdhaḥ*.[5] But, according to the Vaiśeṣikas liquidity and viscidity are qualities inherent in the " *ap* "-substance. No such dichotomy is recognized by the Buddhists. Notwithstanding these metaphysical differences, the parallelism goes still further. The Vaiśeṣikas maintain that *saṃgraha*, cohesion or agglutination, is a distinct quality produced by fluidity and viscidity operating together.[6] The Buddhists maintain that *āpo-dhātu*, which stands for the facts of liquidity and viscidity, performs the function of *saṃgraha*. Hence it is that according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the phenomenon of cohering or non-broken continuity in a blazing fire is due to the presence therein of *āpo-dhātu*.[7] The same idea is recognized by the Theravādins, too, when they say that *āpo-dhātu* manifests itself by its action of cohesion (*āpo-dhātu saṅgahapaccupaṭṭhānā*).[8]

Tejo-dhātu signifies the phenomenon of heat, the term being used is *usmā* or *usumā*.[9] In the Sanskrit sources we get *uṣṇatva*, and its corresponding Pali form, *uṇhatta* is the standard term used in the Pali commentaries and the *ṭīkās*.

One significant feature of the Theravāda conception of *tejo-dhātu* concerns the question of *sīta*, cold. The Vaiśeṣikas, for instance, maintain that *uṣṇa*, heat is the peculiar quality of the fire-substance (*tejasa uṣṇatā*) and that *śīta*, cold is that of the water-substance (*apsu śītatā*).[10] Since the natural touch of water is cold, " other substances (bodies) are cold only in proportion to the extent to which water enters

[1] *Ayapiṇḍi-ādīni hi āpodhātu ābandhitvā thaddhāni karoti, tāya ābaddhattā tāni thaddhāni nāma honti. Pāsānapabbatatālaṭṭhihatthidantagosiṅgādīsu pi es'eva nayo. Sabbāni h'etāni āpodhātu eva ābandhitvā thaddhāni karoti, āpodhātuyā ābaddhattā va thaddhāni honti.—Asl.* p. 335 (tr .from *Expositor*).
[2] See *Vism.* p. 289 ; *Asl.* p. 336 ; *Abhvk.* p. 250 ; *Mvn.* p. 58.
[3] See below, p. 23.
[4] See *AK.* Ch. I, p. 23, n. 3 .
[5] *VS.* p. 56.
[6] Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, p. 126.
[7] *AKvy.* I, p. 33.
[8] *Asl.* p. 332 ; *Abhvt.* p. 65 ; *Abhvk.* p. 250.
[9] See *Dhs.* p. 177 ; *Vbh.* p. 83.
[10] *VS.* p. 59.

into their composition ".[1] That the Vaibhāṣikas, too, associate *śīta* with *āpo-dhātu*, is shown by their contention that the touch of cold in wind points to the presence therein of *āpo-dhātu*.[2] Bhadanta Śrīlābha's view: " Le feu élémentaire existe dans l'eau, puisque celle-ci est plus ou moins froide,"[3] carries the implication that heat and cold are represented by *tejo-dhātu* and *āpo-dhātu* respectively.

The position taken up by the Theravādins in regard to this question is quite different. In the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka we do not get any explicit statement concerning the position of *sīta*, cold in relation to the primary elements. Nevertheless there is no possibility of its being considered as represented by *āpo-dhātu* because this particular primary element, as maintained by the Theravādins, does not come within the sphere of the tangible (*phoṭṭhabbāyatana*).[4] It is only in the *ṭīkā* literature that we are presented with a clear statement on this subject: " Although cold (*sītatā*) is known by the sense of touch, it is really *tejo*. The sensation of cold (*sīta-buddhi*) is obtained when the heat is less, for there is no distinct quality (*guṇa*) called cold . . . . Hence it is that during the summer season when people having first stayed in the sun enter the shade they experience the sensation of cold. And when they stay there for a long time they experience the sensation of heat ".[5] Thus in the view of the Theravādins, cold is not the peculiar characteristic of *āpo-dhātu* (as is believed by the Vaibhāṣikas), but is the relative absence of heat. And heat is represented by *tejo-dhātu*.

The characteristic function of *tejo-dhātu* is *paripācana*, i.e. ripening or maturing.[6] For this is the element which heats, matures, sharpens and imparts heat to all other material elements.[7]

Vāyo-dhātu, the air-element, as defined in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, signifies *thambhitatta*, inflation or distension, and *chambhitatta*, fluctuation or mobility.[8] While the other three primary elements stand for the facts of solidity, cohesion and heat, this represents the more restless and dynamic aspect of matter.

The standard term used in the Pali commentarial works to describe the *vāyo-dhātu* is *samudīraṇa*, which means mobility or motion.[9] In the Sanskrit sources *samudīraṇatvaṃ* occurs in combination with *laghu* or *laghutā* (light or lightness).[10] For the Theravādins, *lahutā* represents one of the secondary elements of matter.[11] This

[1] Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, p. 129.
[2] *AKvy.* I, p. 33.
[3] *AK.* Ch. II, p. 146.
[4] See below, pp. 29—30.
[5] *Kiñcāpi hi sītatā phusitvā gayhati, sā pana tejo yeva. Mande hi uṇhatte sītabuddhi, sītatāsaṅkhātassa kassa ci guṇassa abhāvato. ... Tathā hi ghammakāle ātāpe ṭhatvā chāyaṃ paviṭṭhānaṃ sītabuddhi hoti, tatth'eva cirakālaṃ ṭhitānaṃ uṇhabuddhi.—ADSVṬ.* p. 111; see also *VismṬ.* p. 459; *VismS.* V, pp. 75 ff.
[6] See *Asl.* p. 332.
[7] *Cf. Tejeti paripāceti niseti vā tikkhabhāvena sesabhūtattayaṃ usmāpetī ti tejo.—ADSVṬ.* p. 110.
[8] *Op. cit.* p. 177; see also *Vbh.* p. 84.
[9] See *Asl.* p. 332; *Abhvk.* p. 251.
[10] See *AK.* Ch. I, p. 23, n. 2; *AKvy.* I, p. 33.
[11] See below, pp. 77—78.

seems to be the reason why they do not associate it with *vāyo-dhātu*, which is one of the primary elements of matter. The *Abhidharmakośa* takes note of a similar problem, when it observes that according to a Sūtra the *vāyo-dhātu* is *laghutva*, whereas according to the *Prakaraṇas laghutva* is a secondary material element. It seeks to reconcile the two views by stating that " le *dharma* qui a pour nature la motion (*īraṇātmaka*), c'est l'élément vent : sa nature (légéreté) est manifestée par son acte de motion (*īraṇakarman*) ".[1] As the Theravādins conceive *lahutā* as a secondary element of matter, in their opinion it is not associated with one particular primary element but is dependent on all the four.[2] These are only minor differences. There is general agreement among the scholiasts that *vāyo-dhātu* is representative of mobility or motion (*īraṇa, samudīraṇa*).

With the development of the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇa-vāda*),[3] the above definition of *vāyo-dhātu* could not be retained without modification. We shall discuss this theory in a later chapter. Suffice it to note here that according to it, all elements of existence, mental as well as material, are of momentary duration. They are characterized by instantaneous being in the sense that they arise and perish in continual succession projecting a picture of static existence. Closely connected with this theory is the denial of motion. As the *Abhidharmakośa* observes: " Le conditionné n'existe pas au delà de l'acquisition de son être : il périt à la place ou il est né ; il ne peut de cette place aller à une autre ".[4] If *vāyo-dhātu* is representative of mobility or motion, how is this statement to be reconciled with the denial of motion ?

In keeping with the theory of momentariness motion, too, is given a different interpretation : " Par motion, on entend ce qui fait que la série d'états qui constituent une chose va se reproduisant dans des lieux différents ; de même qu'on parle de la motion d'une flame ".[5] Accordingly, motion has to be understood, not as the movement of an element of matter from one locus in space to another (*deśāntaragamana*), but as the appearance of different elements in adjacent locations (*deśāntarotpatti*).[6] For in the case of momentary elements, wherever appearance takes place there itself takes place disappearance: *yatraivotpattiḥ tatraiva vināśaḥ*.[7] The classic example given in this connection is the light of the lamp. The so-called light of the lamp, it is contended, is nothing but a common designation given to an uninterrupted production of a series of flashing points. When the production changes place one says that the light has changed. But in reality other flames have appeared in another place.[8]

It is interesting to notice that this new definition of motion has somehow or other found its way to Theravāda scholasticism that flourished after the time of Buddhaghosa. In the earlier Pāli commentaries *vāyo-dhātu* is understood as indicative of

[1] *AK.* Ch. I, p. 23.
[2] See below, pp. 77 ff.
[3] See below, pp. 84 ff.
[4] *Op. cit.* Ch. IV, pp. 4–5.
[5] *AK.* Ch. I, pp. 22–23.
[6] *AKvy.* I, p. 33; see also *KSP : MOB.* IV, 1936, p. 268.
[7] *AKvy.* I, p. 33.
[8] See, Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, I, p. 99.

motion; but therein motion is not denied. In the later works, notably the *ṭīkās*, motion is denied; that is to say, it is interpreted as *desantaruppatti*, the appearance of momentary elements in adjacent locations.[1] This new development has necessitated a modification in the earlier definition of *vāyo-dhātu*. Hence it is that the scholiasts seek to define *vāyo-dhātu* as the cause of " motion " (=*desantaruppatti*). It is that which causes or brings about the arising of momentary elements in adjacent locations (*desantaruppatti-hetu-bhāvena . . . gametī ti*).[2] The recognition, on the part of the Theravādins, of this new definition of motion is no matter for surprise for, as we shall see in a later chapter,[3] they, too, developed a theory of momentariness which, except for minor details, presents a close parallelism to that of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.

From the foregoing description of the four *mahābhūtas* it would appear that, as interpreted by the Ābhidhammikas, *paṭhavī* stands for solidity and extension, *āpo* for viscidity and cohesion, *tejo* for the temperature of cold and heat, and *vāyo* for motion or (according to the later interpretation) the cause of " motion ". The four are not the qualities or attributes of what is called *bhūta-rūpa*, the primary matter; on the contrary, they are its constituents. In this respect, they are like the three *guṇas* of Sāṃkhya, which form the constituents of *prakṛti*, the ultimate causal nexus of the world of non-self.

The four *mahābhūtas* are co-ordinate and represent four distinct forces or phenomena in the realm of matter. The characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*), functions (*rasa*), and manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) of one are different from those of another.[4] The non-alteration of their characteristics is constantly alluded to. However much one *mahābhūta* is influenced by the others, it never abandons its essential nature. In this connection the *Atthasālinī* refers to a Sutta passage where it is stated that the four *mahābhūtas* might alter their characteristics sooner than it were possible for the Āriyan disciple, endowed with assured faith in the Buddha, to alter.[5] The implication is that both are impossibilities. What all this amounts to is that the four *mahābhūtas*, which stand for four distinct ultimate data of all material phenomena, are neither transmutable into one another nor reducible to a common ground.

There is, however, a way in which they group themselves into two pairs, each having one common characteristic. Buddhaghosa notes that *paṭhavī-dhātu* and *āpo-dhātu* are similar in heaviness (*garukattā sabhāgā*) and that *tejo-dhātu* and *vāyo-dhātu* are similar in lightness (*lahukattā sabhāgā*).[6] This theory seems to have been developed from the observation of some of the features of the *mahābhūtas* as

[1] See *VismṬ*. p. 359; *ADSVṬ*. p. 110; *Abhvk*. pp. 249, 251.

[2] *VismṬ*. p. 359.

[3] See below, pp. *84* ff.

[4] . . . *sabbāsam pi dhātūnaṃ saḷakkhanādito nānattaṃ. Aññān eva hi paṭhavīdhātuyā lakkhaṇa-rasapaccupaṭṭhānāni, aññāni āpodhātu-ādīnaṃ.*—*Vism*. p. 346.

[5] *Op. cit*. p. 336.

[6] See *Vism*. p. 289.

understood in the popular or literal sense. It is also reminiscent of the contention of the Vaiśeṣikas, namely that weight is possessed by only two elemental substances —earthand water.[1]

Another fundamental feature of the *mahābhūtas* is that they always exist together (*sahajāta, sahabhū*). No *mahābhūta* can exist independently of the other three.[2] The nascence, subsistence and the evanescence[3] of one do always synchronize with those of the others. It is precisely for this reason that their relation is described as one of reciprocal co-nascence (*aññamañña-sahajāta*).[4] That is to say, since no *mahābhūta* can come into being independently of the others, in this sense, each is postulated as a condition by way of co-nascence (*aññam'añña-sahajāta-paccaya*) in relation to the other three.[5]

The commentators seek to explain the mutual conditionality of the *mahābhūtas* under all possible combinations and permutations: Taking each one beginning with " earth " there are three others whose occurrence is due to that one, thus with three due to one, their occurrence takes place in four ways. Likewise each one beginning with " earth ", occurs in dependence on the other three, thus with one due to three, their occurrence takes place in four ways. But with the last two dependent on the first two, with the second and fourth dependent on the first and third, with the first and third dependent on the second and fourth, with the first and fourth dependent on the second and third, with the second and third dependent on the first and fourth, they occur in six ways with two elements due to two.[6] The fundamental principle involved in the relation by way of reciprocal co-nascence is that when one element arises, what is related to it, too, must arise simultaneously. With this as the basis, the commentators have shown how each of the *mahābhūtas* becomes, at one and the same time, the condition as well as the conditioned, in relation to the others, under different combinations and permutations.

Closely connected with this is the inseparability of the *mahābhūtas*. They exist in inseparable (*avinibhoga*) association: they are not positionally resolvable; one *mahābhūta* cannot be separated from the rest.[7] Buddhaghosa explains this characteristic of inseparability in a rather mysterious way: " And just as, whomsoever the great creatures such as the spirits grasp hold of (possess), they have no standing place either inside him or outside him and yet they have no standing independently of him, so too these elements are not found to stand either inside or outside each other, yet they have no standing independently of one another ".[8] What is attempted to show is that they have no thinkable standing place relative to each other.

[1] See Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, p. 125.

[2] See *Tkp*. pp. 3, 14, 36 ff; *AK*. Ch. II, p. 248.

[3] See below, pp. 84 ff.

[4] *Tkp*. pp. 3, 14.

[5] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[6] *Path of Purification*, p. 405 (*Vism*. p. 391).

[7] See *Vism*. p. 381.

[8] *Path of Purification*, p. 401; (*Vism*. p. 387: *Yathā ca yakkhādīni mahābhūtāni yaṃ gaṇhanti n'eva nesaṃ tassa anto na bahi ṭhānaṃ upalabhanti, na ca taṃ nissāya na tiṭṭhanti, evam'eva etāni pi n'eva aññam'aññassa anto na bahi ṭhitāni hutvā upalabbhanti. Na ca aññam'aññaṃ nissāya na tiṭṭhantī ti*).

This explanation as to the relative position of the *mahābhūtas* is sought to be justified on the following grounds : If they were to exist inside each other, then they would not perform their respective functions. If they were to exist outside each other, then they would be resolvable, and in such a case the theory of inseparability (*avinibbhuttavāda*) would have no validity. Therefore their standing place cannot be shown.[1]

Each *mahābhūta* assists the remaining three by performing its peculiar function : The earth-element which is held together by water, maintained by fire and distended by air is a condition for the other three great primaries by acting as their foundation. The water-element which is founded on earth, maintained by fire and distended by air is a condition for the other three primaries by acting as their cohesion. The fire-element which is founded on earth, held together by water and distended by air is a condition for the other three primaries by acting as their maintaining. The air-element which is founded on earth, held together by water and maintained by fire is a condition for the other three primaries by acting as their distension.[2] Thus each *mahābhūta* depends on, and is depended on by, the other three. Theirs is a case of mutual co-operation, a remarkable policy of give and take.

Since the four *mahābhūtas* exist always together, and since they are not separable one from another, the position taken up by the Buddhists in respect of the question how they enter into the composition of different material aggregates is quite clear : In every instance of matter all the four *mahābhūtas* are necessarily present. On this view there is general agreement among the Buddhist schools. The Vaibhāṣikas, for instance, maintain that the presence of *jala*, *tejas* and *vāyu* in an earthy substance (*pṛthivīdravye*) is inferred from its cohesion, maturing and expansion respectively ; the presence of *pṛthivī*, *tejas* and *vāyu* in water is shown by its support of ships, its heat and motion ; the presence of *pṛthivī*, *udaka* and *vāyu* in a blazing fire is shown by its solidity (*sthairya*), cohesion or unbroken continuity and mobility ; and the presence of *pṛthivī*, *ap* and *tejas* in the air is shown by its action of holding up, its touch of cold and its touch of heat.[3]

Accordingly, all material things or aggregates are necessarily "*tetra-bhautic*". With this may be contrasted the Vedāntic view according to which there can be "*mono-bhautic*" substances as earthy, watery, etc. But this statement needs qualification.[4] For in the view of the Vedāntins, there are five *sūkṣma-bhūtas* (subtle) corresponding to the five *mahābhūtas* (gross). And according to the theory of

---

[1] *Yadi hi imā dhātuyo aññam'aññassa anto ṭhitā na sakiccakarā siyuṃ . . . Atha bahiṭṭhā vinibbhuttā siyuṃ. Tathā sati avinibbhuttavādo hāyeyya. Tasmā na niddisitabbaṭṭhānā.*—*VismṬ*. p. 364 ; see also *Abhvk*. p. 248.

[2] *Path of Purification*, p. 403 (*Vism*. p. 452).

[3] *pṛthivī-dravye saṃgraha-pakti-vyūhana-darśanāc chesānāṃ jala-tejo-vāyūnāṃ astitvaṃ anumīyate. apsu nau-saṃdhāraṇoṣṇaterana-karma-darśanāt pṛthivī-tejo-vāyūnāṃ astitvaṃ. agni-jvālāyāṃ sthairya-sampiṇḍana-calana-darśanāt pṛthivyudaka-vāyūnāṃ astitvaṃ. vāyau saṃdhāraṇa-śītoṣṇa-sparśadarśanāt pṛthivy-ap-tejasāṃ iti Vaibhāṣikāḥ.*—*AKvy*. I, p. 33.

[4] See Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, Ch. I.

pañcīkaraṇa, quintuplication, "the five *sūkṣma-bhūtas* are present as ingredients, though in different proportions, in each *mahābhūta*".[1] Hence from the standpoint of the *sūkṣma-bhūtas*, each and every material object turns out to be "*penta-bhautic*".

It is in fact the view of the Vaiśeṣikas that stands in clear contrast to the Buddhist theory. The differences between the Buddhists and the Vaiśeṣikas in regard to this question will be clear if we consider how they explain the constitution of the human body. According to the former it is composed of all the four *mahābhūtas* (*cātummahābhūtiko'yaṃ kāyo*). According to the latter it is essentially earthy. The other substances do not enter it as its substantive or material causes.

The Vaiśeṣika theory is based on the following arguments : The conjunction of things perceptible and imperceptible is itself imperceptible. Hence, since *ākāśa* and *vāyu* are imperceptible, to maintain that the human body is a conjunction of the five *bhūtas* is tantamount to saying that it is itself imperceptible.[2] Secondly, it is one of the theses of the Vaiśeṣikas that the quality in the effect is preceded by the corresponding quality in the cause.[3] It is also maintained that no effect can take place except through the combination of two component elements. Therefore, if earth unites with water to form a compound, the compound will be devoid of odour, for odour is present only in earth. Similarly a compound of earth and fire will have no odour and taste, for they are possessed only by earth. Likewise a compound of earth and air will be odourless, tasteless and colourless, for odour, taste and colour belong to earth and not to air. Now all the foregoing qualities are present in the human body. Therefore it is to be concluded that it is not a combination of all the five *bhūtas*.[4]

The above argument of the Vaiśeṣikas is partly based on the contention that air possesses only touch, fire possesses colour and touch, water possesses taste, colour and touch and that earth possesses smell and all the foregoing qualities. For the Buddhists smell, taste, colour, etc. are not the qualities of the *mahābhūtas* ; they are a set of secondary elements dependent on the latter. In point of fact, a theory similar to that of the Vaiśeṣikas is cited by Buddhaghosa only to be refuted as unsatisfactory. The main theme of his argument may be stated as follows : If smell were the special quality of earth, then the smell of cotton which has an excess of earth in it should be greater than that of fermented liquor which has an excess of water in it. Again, if colour were the special quality of fire, then the colour of hot water which has an excess of fire in it should be brighter than that of cold water. Neither of these things is true. Therefore the theory in question should be abandoned.[5] It is also observed that, of the *mahābhūtas* which are not separable,

---

[1] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[2] Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, p. 152.

[3] *Kāraṇaguṇapūrvakaḥ kāryaguṇo dṛṣṭaḥ*—*VS*. p. 63.

[4] Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, pp. 151 ff.

[5] *Cf. Te vattabbā : iccheyyāma yadi āpādhikassa āsavassa gandhato paṭhavī-adhike kappāse gandho adhikataro siyā, tejādhikassa ca uṇhodakassa vaṇṇato sītūdakassa vaṇṇo parihāyetha. Yasmā pan'etaṃ ubhayam pi natthi, tasmā pahāyeth'etam p'etesaṃ nissayabhūtānaṃ visesakappanaṃ.*—*Vism*. p. 444.

one from another, one cannot say that this is a quality of that one or that is a quality of this one.[1]

The fact that Buddhism does not conceive the *mahābhūtas* as eternal and ever-perduring substances has also some relevance to its attitude towards the composition of material aggregates. A piece of ice, according to Buddhism, is composed of all the four *mahābhūtas*. Its solidity, cohesion, etc. point to their presence therein. For the Vaiśeṣikas, ice is essentially a watery (*ap*) substance. In their view all matter is ultimately reducible to the four kinds of eternally existing atoms, namely, the earthy, the watery, the fiery and the airy. Since no substance is destroyable, decomposition of a compound means its reversal to the original position. Hence, when ice melts it becomes water and water is ultimately composed of watery atoms.[2] From the Buddhist standpoint whether ice remains as it is, or whether it becomes water when melted, or vapour when excessively heated, in all these different states the four *mahābhūtas* are present.

Although all the four *mahābhūtas* are present in every instance of matter, yet there is no quantitative difference between them. In other words, they enter into the composition of material things in equal proportion.[3] There is as much *āpo-dhātu* in a blazing fire as there is in wood or water. It is argued that if there were to be a quantitative difference between the *mahābhūtas* that enter into the composition of material objects, then the thesis that they are inseparable would not be logical (*na yujjeyya*).[4] This theory is not confined to the Theravāda alone. This is what the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism call " *tulya-bhūta-sad-bhāva* ".[5]

If the *mahābhūtas* are present in equal proportion in each and every material thing, what explains the diversity of the latter ? For it is a matter of common experience that in many respects a comparatively hard stone is different from water and both from a blazing fire. Or to put it differently : Now the Theravādins say that the *mahābhūtas* with the exception of *āpo-dhātu* are tangibles (*phoṭṭhabbāyatana*), while the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism say that all the four are tangibles (*spraṣṭavyāyatana*).[6] Such being the case, what accounts for the diversity in tactile sensations ? For it is a matter of common experience that one does not get the same sensation when one touches, say, a flower and a blazing fire.

The diversity, it is maintained, is not due to a difference in quantity (*pamāṇa*) but due to a difference in capability (*sāmatthiya*) or extrusion (*ussada*).[7] That is to say, in a given material object one *mahābhūta* is more intense than the others. For instance, in a comparatively solid thing, say, in a stone, although all the *mahābhūtas* are present in equal proportion, yet the *paṭhavī-dhātu* is more intense or more extruded than the others. So is *āpo-dhātu* in water, *tejo-dhātu* in fire and *vāyo-dhātu* in air.

[1] *Avinibbhogavuttīsu hi bhūtesu, ayaṃ imassa guṇo ayaṃ imassa guṇo ti na labbhā vattun ti.—Ibid. loc. cit.*

[2] See Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, Ch. IV.

[3] See *VismṬ*. pp. 450 ff. ; *Abhvk*. pp. 273 ff.

[4] *Aññathā hi avinibbhogavuttitā na yujjeyya.—VismṬ*. p. 451 ; see also *Abhvk*. pp. 273 ff.

[5] See *AKvy*. I, p. 124.

[6] See below, pp. 29 ff.

[7] See *VismṬ*. p. 451 ; *Abhvk*. p. 273.

In the *Aṭṭhasālinī* we get more details on this subject. It says that the *mahābhūtas* (except *āpo-dhātu*) reach the avenue of the sense of touch simultaneously. Although they strike the sentient body simultaneously, yet bodily cognition of them does not arise at once. For the object of touch is determined by one of two alternative factors, namely, deliberate attention (*ābhuñjita-vasena*) and extrusion (*ussada-vasena*).[1]

The first alternative is illustrated as follows : When the bowl is filled with food and brought, one who takes up a lump and examines whether it is hard or soft is considering only the element of extension, though there may be heat and mobility present. One who investigates by putting the hand in hot water is considering only the element of heat, though extension and mobility are present. One who lets the wind beat upon the body by opening the window in the hot season is considering, while the wind beats gently and softly, only the element of mobility, though extension and heat are present.[2]

The other alternative, where the element of deliberate attention is absent, is explained with reference to *ussada*, i.e. extrusiveness of one element in relation to others. " But he who slips or knocks his head against a tree, or in eating bites on a stone, takes as his mental object only the element of extension on account of its extrusiveness, though where he slipped, etc. heat and mobility were present. One treading on fire makes only the element of heat his object owing to its extrusiveness, although extension and mobility are present therein. When a strong wind blows striking the ear as if to make one deaf, although extension and heat are present therein, the element of mobility alone is made the object owing to its extrusiveness.[3]

It is very doubtful that the Pāli commentators had developed this theory of *ussada* by themselves. That intensity determines as to which element should become the object of touch is recognized by many of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, too. The *Abhidharmakośa*, too, poses the question as to why all the elements do not become the object of touch simultaneously. And the answer given is almost the same as that which we mentioned under the second alternative : " On percoit dans un aggrégat donné celle des substances (*dravya*, terre élémentaire, etc.) qui se trouve la plus vive (*paṭutama*, *sphuṭatama*), et non pas les autres. De même, lorsqu'on touche un faisceau de brins végétaux et d'aiguilles (*sūcītūlīkalāpa*), on percoit les aiguilles ; lorsqu'on mange de la bouillie salée, on percoit la saveur du sel."[4]

[1] *Kim pana etāni tīni mahābhūtāni ekappahāren'eva āpāthaṃ āgacchanti udāhu no ti ? Āgacchanti Evaṃ āgatāni kāyappasādaṃ ghaṭṭentī ti ? Ghaṭṭenti. Ekappahāren'eva tāni ārammaṇaṃ katvā kāyaviññānaṃ uppajjati n'ūppajjatīti ? N'ūppajjati. Kasmā ? Ābhuñjitavasena vā hi ussadavasena vā ārammaṇakaranaṃ hoti.—Asl*. p. 333.

[2] *Expositor*, II, p. 434 (*Asl*. pp. 333–4).

[3] *Expositor*, II, p. 434 (tr. slightly changed).

[4] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 146.

From the *Abhidharmakośa* one gathers that the scholiasts had advanced more than one explanation in respect of this subject. In the first place, there is the opinion of Bhadanta Śrīlābha according to which " les aggrégats comportent les quarte grands éléments, puisque, étant donnée l'action de certaines causes, les choses solides deviennent liquides, etc. Le feu élémentaire existe dans l'eau, puisque celle-ci est plus ou moins froide, ce qui s'explique par la présence en, quantité plus ou moins grande, du feu élémentaire."[1] This view attempts to explain the differences in the objects of touch as being due to a quantitative difference of the *mahābhūtas*. Thus the degree of hotness of water is dependent on the quantity of *tejo-dhātu* with which it is mixed (*miśrībhāva, vyatibhāva*).[2] The Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣikas refuse to believe in a quantitative difference; such a conception, says the *ṭīkā* to the *Visuddhimagga*, does not accord well with the theory of the inseparability of the *mahābhūtas*.[3] Śrīlābha's interpretation is criticised in the *Abhidharmakośa* itself. It says that the variability, say, of cold is due to the variability of the intensity of the *āpo-dhātu*, and not due to the fact that it gets mixed with its opposite, i.e. heat which is represented by *tejo-dhātu*.[4]

Still more different is the explanation given by the Sautrāntikas: " les grands éléments qui ne sont pas perçus dans un aggrégat donné y existent à l'état de semence (*bījatas, śaktitas, sāmarthyatas*), non pas en acte, non pas en soi (*svarūpatas*). C'est ainsi que Bhagavat a pu dire : ' Dans ce morceau de bois, il y a beaucoup de *dhātus* ou substances minerales'. Bhagavat entend que ce bois contient des semences, des potentialités (*śakti*) de nombreux *dhātus*; car l'or, l'argent, etc., n'existent pas actuellement dans le bois ".[5] This theory of the Sautrāntikas appears to be analoguous to that of the Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣikas. There is, however, this fundamental difference to be noted : For the latter excess (*adhikatā*) of one element means that it is characterized by more intensity or capability. They do not say that other elements are in an " état de semence ". All that they say is that in a given object of touch all the elements are present and that those elements which are comparatively intense become the object of touch.

Closely connected with this principle of intensity (*ussada*) is another sense in which the names of the *mahābhūtas* are used. According to the Abhidhammic interpretation of the *mahābhūtas* one cannot speak of material things as *paṭhavī, āpo, tejo* and *vāyo*. For in each and every instance of matter all the *mahābhūtas* are present. However, there is a sense in which the Ābhidhammikas speak of material aggregates named after the *mahābhūtas*. This has been established with reference to the above-mentioned principle of intensity. If in a given material aggregate the *paṭhavī-dhātu* is characterized by a comparatively high degree of intensity (*ussada*) or capability (*sāmatthiya*), then (as a matter of convention) that material aggregate is

[1] *AK.* Ch. II, p. 146.
[2] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[3] *Op. cit.* p. 451.
[4] *Op. cit.* Ch. II, p. 146.
[5] *AK.* Ch. II, p. 147.

also called *paṭhavī*. In such instances the term is sometimes followed by *adhika*, " excessive " (in intensity or capability), e.g. *paṭhavī-adhika*. Similarly are used the names of the other three *mahābhūtas*.[1]

This kind of description is, in a way, an attempt to accommodate the Nikāyan conception of the *mahābhūtas*, according to which hair, nails, teeth, etc. are *paṭhavī*, blood, mucus, etc. are *āpo* and so on.[2] However, as interpreted in the later scholasticism, strictly speaking, no *mahābhūta* is visible. The attribution of visibility, as the *Abhidharmakośa* says, is from the point of view of the common usage : " Dans l'usage commun, ce qu'on désigne par le mot 'terre', c'est de la couleur et de la figure "—*pṛthivī varṇasaṃsthānaṃ ucyate lokasaṃjñayā*.[3] According to the *Kathāvatthu* and its commentary[4] the Andhakas object to the recognition of *mahābhūtas* as not visible : " But do we not see earth, a stone, a mountain, water, fire blazing, trees waving in the wind......? "[5] This objection, it needs hardly any mention, has hardly any relevance to the Abhidhammic interpretation of the *mahābhūtas*. It is only reminiscent of their earlier conception.

The inclusion of the *mahābhūtas* in *phoṭṭhabbāyatana* shows that although not visible they are tangible. They can be known by the sense of touch. From the point of view of the Theravādins this statement needs qualification. For as we have already indicated, in their opinion only three *mahābhūtas*, namely, *paṭhavī, tejo* and *vāyo* come under *phoṭṭhabbāyatana*.[6] In contrast, the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism include all the four in the sphere of the tangible.[7]

Why the Theravādins have excluded *āpo-dhātu* from the sphere of the tangible is partly explained by what we have observed about the position of *sīta*, cold in relation to the *mahābhūtas*.[8] Unlike, for instance, the Vaibhāṣikas, the Theravādins do not associate cold with the *āpo-dhātu*. For the latter, cold is not a force distinct from, but is only the relative absence of, heat (=*tejo-dhātu*). As such, in the view of the Theravādins, both cold (*sīta*) and heat (*uṇha*), in other words, all degrees of temperature, are represented by, and therefore testify to the presence of, *tejo-dhātu*.[9]

Āpo-dhātu, as stated above, is representative of *bandhanatta*, the fact of " binding together " or cohesion and *davatā*, fluidity. But these, according to Buddhists, are not felt by the sense of touch.[10] The point is illustrated by Aung when he says : " when one puts his hand into cold water, the softness of water felt is not *āpo*, but

[1] See *Vism.* p. 357 and *Abhvk.* p. 274.
[2] See above, p. 17.
[3] *AK.* Ch. I, p. 23.
[4] *Kvu.* p. 331 and *KvuA.* p. 93.
[5] *Points of Controversy*, p. 430.
[6] See *Dhs.* pp. 143, 179 ; *Vbh.* p. 72.
[7] See *AK.* Ch. I, pp. 18 ff.
[8] See above, pp. 19–20.
[9] *Cf. Kimidaṃ phoṭṭhabbaṃ nāma? Paṭhavī-tejo-vāyo-dhātuttayaṃ. Kasmā pan'ettha āpo-dhātu aggahitā? Nanu sītatā phusitvā gayhati? Saccaṃ gayhati. Na pana sā āpodhātu. Kiñcarahī ti? Tejodhātu eva. Mande hi uṇhabhāve sītabuddhi. Na hi sītaṃ nāma koci guṇo atthi.*—*VismṬ.* p. 459 ; see also *ADSVṬ.* p. 111.
[10] See *ADSVṬ.* p. 111 ; *VismS.* V, p. 233.

paṭhavī;[1] the cold felt is not *āpo*, but *tejo*; the pressure felt is not *āpo*, but *vāyo*."[2] Its cohesion and fluidity, whatever be their degree of intensity or capability, are not felt by the sense of touch. Hence *āpo-dhātu* is excluded from *phoṭṭhabbāyatana* and is included in *dhammāyatana*.[3] That is to say, it cannot be known by any of the senses other than the mind (*mano*). It is known by a process of inference.

The general position assigned to the *mahābhūtas* may now be considered. If one were to examine how the *mahābhūtas* are interpreted in other systems of Indian thought one would notice that in Buddhism they were assigned a comparatively primary position. What the Sāṃkhya considers as *mahābhūtas* are not the ultimate irreducible constituents of matter, for they are evolved immediately from the *tanmātras* and ultimately from the *prakṛti*, i.e. the uncaused first cause of the world of non-self.[4] According to the Vedāntins the *mahābhūtas* are produced from the *sūkṣmabhūtas*. The former are a species of gross matter and the latter a species of subtle matter.[5] For the Jainas the ultimate constituents of *puggala*, matter, are not the four elements (*dhādu-catukka*) but the homogeneous atoms (*paramāṇu*). The latter are recognized as the essential causes of the former.[6] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas postulate four kinds of atoms corresponding to the four elemental substances, namely, earth, water, fire and air.[7] This may be described as an attempt to reconcile the older theory of the *mahābhūtas* with the later atomic theory. Because of this fact the four substances in question are not reduced to a secondary position.

In Buddhism, unlike in many other systems of Indian thought, the *mahābhūtas* are assigned a primary position in the sense that they are recognized as the ultimate irreducible data of matter. It is of course true that a given instance of matter consists of not only the four *mahābhūtas* but also of a set of *upādā-rūpas* such as colour, smell, etc. But these so-called *upādā-rūpas*, as conceived by the Buddhists, are always dependent on, and therefore secondary to, the *mahābhūtas*.[8] Even the development of the theory of *rūpa-kalāpas*, i.e. the Theravāda form of atomism,[9] did not, in any way, reduce the *mahābhūtas* to a secondary position. For in every *rūpakalāpa*, the smallest unit of matter, all the four *mahābhūtas* are present.[10] Although they are postulated as the ultimate (primary) elements of matter, the *mahābhūtas* are not to be understood as uncaused or as ever-perduring entities. They too come under the laws of "phenomenal" (*saṅkhata*) existence. As Buddhaghosa says, they are *anicca* in the sense of liability to destruction (*khayaṭṭhena aniccā*), *dukkha* in the sense of causing terror (*bhayaṭṭhena dukkhā*), and *anatta* in the sense of having no ever-perduring essence (*asāraṭṭhena anattā*).[11]

[1] because softness is relative absence of hardness = *paṭhavī*.
[2] *Cpd.* p. 155, n. 6.
[3] See *Dhs.* p. 179.
[4] See Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, Ch. I.
[5] *Ibid.* Ch. I.
[6] *Cf.* *Adesamattamutto dhāducatukkassa kāraṇaṃ jo du—so neo paramāṇo parināmaguṇo sayamasaddo—Pañcāstikāyasāra*, p. 28.
[7] See Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, Ch. III.
[8] See below, pp. 31 ff.
[9] See below, Ch. VIII.
[10] *Cf.* *Aññamaññen'upatthaddhā sesarūpassa nissayā catudh'evaṃ kalāpesu mahābhūtā pavattare—NRP*. p. 34.
[11] See *Vism.* p. 422.

CHAPTER THREE

The Secondary Elements – A General Survey

The distinction between the *mahābhūtas*—the four primary elements—on the one hand, and the *upādā (ya)-rūpas*—those that take hold of, cling to, in other words, those that depend on, the *mahābhūtas*—on the other, is alluded to in the Nikāyas themselves.[1] However, therein no attempt is made to explain how and why the latter are dependent on, and therefore secondary to, the former. As far as this particular question is concerned, even the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*, where we get the most exhaustive canonical analysis of matter, does not go beyond the Nikāyas. Some data on the relative position of the two groups could, however, be elicited from the *Paṭṭhāna* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, which seeks to explain the causal relation of all elements of existence in their temporal sequence as well as in their spatial concomitance.

The four *mahābhūtas*, according to the *Paṭṭhāna*, constitute conditions (*paccaya*) by way of co-nascence (*sahajāta*), support or foundation (*nissaya*), presence (*atthi*) and non-abeyance (*avigata*) in relation to the *upādā-rūpas*.[2] The implication that could be drawn from the first is that the *upādā-rūpas*, whenever they arise, arise simultaneously with the arising of the *mahābhūtas*. As a rule their genesis is necessarily concomitant with that of the *mahābhūtas*. They cannot come into being independently of the latter. All the material elements, whether primary or secondary, with the exception of certain ones of the latter group,[3] exist for the same length of time. Hence we might as well say that, since the *upādā-rūpas* arise concurrently with the arising of the *mahābhūtas*, the existence as well as the cessation of the majority of the former coincide with the existence and cessation of the latter.

With this may be compared the view of the Vaibhāṣikas, namely that the *mahābhūtas* are a *janana-* or *janma-hetu*, "cause génératrice" of the *bhautikas* (=*upādā-rūpas*).[4] Following, as pointed out by De la Vallèe Poussin,[5] a definition given in the *Vibhāṣā*, the *Abhidharmakośa* illustrates this further by saying that 'les *bhautikas* naissent d'eux comme l'enfant de ses parents".[6] This illustration, it seems to us, should not be construed to mean that the *mahābhūtas* arise first and that the *bhautikas* arise subsequently, as is really the case in the relation between the parents

[1] See e.g. *M.* I, pp. 52, 185.
[2] See *Tkp.* pp. 3, 4, 6, 7.
[3] *Cf.* the significance of *anipphanna-rūpas*, discussed in Ch. V.
[4] See *AK.* Ch. II, p. 314; *AKvy.* I, p. 239.
[5] *AK.* Ch. II, p. 314 n. 3.
[6] *Ibid.* Ch. II, p. 314.

and the child. For elsewhere in the same work it is stated that, in the view of the Vaibhāṣikas (Sarvāstivādins), the *bhautikas* do always arise simultaneously with the arising of the *mahābhūtas*.[1] In this particular context, therefore, it is a case of the parents and the child being born at one and the same time.

A clue as to why one group is compared to the parents and the other to their child, although both are co-nascent, may be had from the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of *sahabhū-hetu*. When two or more co-existent (*sahabhū*) things are dependent, one on the other, they are said to be *sahabhū-hetus* in relation to one another. The relation between the four *mahābhūtas* is one of this kind. However, all co-existent things are not recognized as *sahabhū-hetus* in relation to one another. The *mahābhūtas* and the *bhautikas* are cited as a case in point.[2] The Theravādins, too, are of the same opinion: That the *upādā-rūpas* are co-nascent (*sahajāta*) with the *mahābhūtas* is admitted; that the two groups are related by way of reciprocal co-nascence (*aññamañña-sahajāta*) is, however, denied.[3]

What both schools attempt to show by this device is the necessary dependence of the *upādā-rūpas* (*bhautikas*) on the *mahābhūtas*. Although the *upādā-rūpas* arise together with the arising of the *mahābhūtas*, their arising is not a necessary condition for the arising of the latter. But the reverse is true: The arising of the *mahābhūtas* is a necessary condition for the arising of the *upādā-rūpas*. Hence the comparison of the former to the parents and the latter to their child is not without significance, although both groups are said to be co-nascent.

The *mahābhūtas*, as stated above, are also a *nissaya* for the *upādā-rūpas*. This only means that the former are a basis, a support or a foundation of the latter.[4] This aspect of the relation between the two groups is explained in more detail by the Vaibhāṣikas. The *mahābhūtas* wield influence on the *bhautikas* like an *ācārya* on his pupil (*niśraya-hetu*); support them like a wall a painting (*pratiṣṭhā-hetu*); maintain them in uninterrupted continuity (*upasthambha-hetu*); and constitute a condition for their growth and development (*vṛddhi-* or *upabṛṃhana-hetu*).[5]

The recognition of the *mahābhūtas* as *atthi-* and *avigata-paccayas*[6] in relation to the *upādā-rūpas* means that the presence and non-abeyance of the latter is due to the presence and non-abeyance of the former. This only amounts to a general statement of what has been stated so far about the relation between the two groups.

Thus what are called *upādā-rūpas* are those material elements which are always co-existent with, are necessarily dependent on, and are thus secondary to, the *mahābhūtas*.[7] The *mahābhūtas*, too, are dependent, one on the other, and are always co-

[1] See *AK*. Ch. II, p. 252; this is implied in the Vaibhāṣika atomic theory, too, see *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 143 ff.
[2] *Ibid.* Ch. II, p. 253.
[3] See *Tkp*. pp. 3, 14, 36 ff.
[4] See below, p. 132.
[5] See *AK*. Ch. II, p. 314; *AKvy*. I, pp. 239 ff.
[6] See below, p. 139.
[7] *Cf. Atthasālinī* (p. 300) definition: *Cattāri mahābhūtāni upādāya nissāya amuñcitvā pavattarūpan ti attho.*

existent. But there is this fundamental difference to be noted: While the *upādā-rūpas* are dependent on the *mahābhūtas*, the *mahābhūtas* are not dependent on the *upādā-rūpas*. The difference is summed up by the *Vibhāvinī Ṭīkā* when it says: "That which clings to the *mahābhūtas* and is also clung to by others is not *upādā-rūpa*; but that which clings to the *mahābhūtas* and is not clung to by another is *upādā-rūpa*."[1]

However, in certain cases the fundamental difference between the two groups tends to get obliterated. The relation between *āhāra* (nutriment) which is one of the *upādā-rūpas* and the four *mahābhūtas* is a case in point. The former, it may be noted here, is recognized as a *rūpa-samuṭṭhānapaccaya*, i.e. a generative condition of matter, primary as well as secondary.[2] From this it follows that those *mahābhūtas*, brought about by *āhāra*, are dependent on an *upādā-rūpa*. Therefore, in so far as this particular situation is concerned, the usual argument that the *mahābhūtas* are not dependent on the *upādā-rūpas* needs qualification.

More important than this are the implications arising from what is called *avinibhoga-rūpa*. According to the Theravādins the category in question includes the four *mahābhūtas* and four of the *upādā-rūpas*, namely, *rūpa* (the visible), *rasa* (taste), *gandha* (smell) and *āhāra* (nutriment).[3] According to the Vaibhāṣikas, it (*avinirbhāga rūpa*) includes the same items but for this difference: in place of *āhāra* is included *bhautika-spraṣṭavya* (the secondary tangible).[4] The reasons for this difference will be explained in a later chapter.[5] Suffice it to note here that according to both schools, the eight items are not separable, one from another (*avinibhoga*, *avinirbhāga*). As a rule, they always arise together (*sahajāta*, *niyata-sahotpanna*). None of them can arise independently of the other seven.

From this it follows that, just as much as those secondary elements cannot arise independently of the four primary elements, even so the four primary elements cannot arise independently of those secondary elements. Both groups are equally dependent on each other. Hence as far as those secondary elements are concerned, the independent genesis of the primary elements is questionable. For none of the eight items in question can arise independently. In view of this situation it is understandable why the Sautrāntikas should have criticized the Vaibhāṣika (Sarvāstivāda) interpretation of *sahabhū-hetu*. Their criticism implies that even certain *bhautikas* should be recognized as constituting *sahabhū-hetu* in relation to the *mahābhūtas*.[6]

Attention may also be drawn here to the observation of Prof. Stcherbatsky, namely, that the classification of the material elements into primary and secondary, as that of the mental elements into fundamental (*citta*) and derivative (*caitta*), approaches very nearly the relation between substance and quality.[7] Although this observation

[1] *Yaṃ hi mahābhūte upādiyati sayañ ca aññehi upādiyati na taṃ upādā-rūpaṃ; yaṃ pana upādiyateva na kena ci upādiyati tadeva upādāya rūpan ti.*—*ADSVṬ*. p. 110.
[2] See *Vism*. p. 389.
[3] See *ADS*. p. 28; *VismS*. p. 389.
[4] See *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 145 ff.; *AKvy*. I, pp. 123 ff.
[5] See below, pp. 154 ff.
[6] *Cf. AK*. Ch. II, p. 254.
[7] See *Cent. Concep*. pp. 35–36.

is made with reference to the Sarvāstivāda, it applies equally to the Theravāda. It is of course true that the material elements, primary as well as secondary, are described as discrete entities. It is also true that the connection between them is sought to be explained by the postulation of causal relations. Nevertheless, as has been observed, since the secondaries are always supported by the primaries, and since this connection is said to be inseparable, the relation between the two groups is not much different from the relation between substance and quality.

It is not without significance that the division of matter into primary and secondary was not accepted by all the scholiasts. Buddhadeva, one of the celebrities of the Sautrāntika school, objects to the introduction of any such distinction. His objection is likewise directed to the distinction drawn between *citta* (consciousness) and *caitta* (consciousness-concomitants). In his opinion the ten *āyatanas*, i.e. the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects, are made up of only the *mahābhūtas*. And apart from the *mahābhūtas* there is no distinct category called *bhautika-rūpa*. Likewise apart from *citta* there is no distinct category called *caitta*.[1]

Buddhadeva's attempt is to discard all distinctions in terms of primary and secondary, not only from the sphere of mental phenomena but also from the domain of matter, and thereby to assign equal status to each and every element of existence (*dhammā*). This attempt did not appeal to the majority of the Buddhists. The author of the *Abhidharmakośa* objects to it on the ground that it is contradicted by a Sūtra passage where the distinction in question is upheld. Buddhadeva, too, invokes the authority of a Sūtra to substantiate his thesis : According to the Garbhāvakrānti Sūtra, man consists of six elements (*ṣaddhātur ayaṃ bhikṣo puruṣaḥ*), namely, the four *mahābhūtas*, *ākāśa* (space) and *vijñāna* (consciousness).[2] The counter-objection is that this Sūtra, in this particular context, purports to describe the essence of a living being (*mūlasattvadravya*) and therefore that it does not amount to an exhaustive definition.[3]

These objections and counter-objections show that, although the division of matter into primary and secondary was one of the well-established tenets of the Buddhist schools, it was not unchallenged by the Buddhists themselves.

According to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the category of secondary matter (*upādā-rūpa*) consists of twenty three items, namely, the first five sense-organs—(1) *cakkhu* (organ of sight), (2) *sota* (organ of hearing), (3) *ghāna* (organ of smell), (4) *jivhā* (organ of taste) and (5) *kāya* (organ of touch); the first four sense-objects—(6) *rūpa* (the visible), (7) *sadda* (sound), (8) *gandha* (smell) and (9) *rasa* (taste) ; three faculties—(10) *itthindriya* (faculty of femininity), (11) *purisindriya* (faculty of masculinity) and (12) *rūpa-jīvitindriya* (material faculty of life) ; two modes of self-expression —(13) *kāyaviññatti* (bodily expression) and (14) *vacīviññatti* (vocal expression); three

[1] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 64 and n. 2.

[2] References as these in the Buddhist works to six *dhātus* are, in the view of St. Schayer, traces of a pre-canonical *vijñānavāda*. For further details on this theory, see his article : "*Pre-canonical Buddhism*," Archiv Orientalni, Vol. VII, pp. 121 ff.

[3] See *AK*. Ch. I, pp. 64 ff.

characteristics of matter—(15) *lahutā* (lightness), (16) *mudutā* (plasticity), and (17) *kammaññatā* (wieldiness); four phases of matter—(18) *upacaya* (integration), (19) *santati* (continuity), (20) *jaratā* (decay) and (21) *aniccatā* (impermanence) ; (22) *ākāsa-dhātu* (space-element) ; and (23) *kabaḷīkāra-āhāra* (nutrition).[1] To this list the commentators add another, namely, (24) *hadaya-vatthu* (heart-basis).[2] Thus, according to the Theravādins there are in all twenty four *upādā-rūpas*.

These twenty four *upādā-rūpas* and the four *mahābhūtas* are represented in the classical list of *āyatanas* as follows :

The first five *upādā-rūpas* (Nos. 1–5) constitute the first five *ajjhattika-āyatanas* : *cakkhāyatana* (No. 1), *sotāyatana* (No. 2), *ghānāyatana* (No. 3), *jivhāyatana* (No. 4), and *kāyāyatana* (No. 5). (The sixth *ajjhattika-āyatana*, i.e. *manāyatana* is mental). The next four *upādā-rūpas* (Nos. 6–9) constitute the first four *bāhira-āyatanas* : *rūpāyatana* (No. 6), *saddāyatana* (No. 7), *gandhāyatana* (No. 8) and *rasāyatana* (No. 9). The *mahābhūtas* except *āpo-dhātu* constitute *phoṭṭhabbāyatana*, i.e. the fifth *bāhira-āyatana*. *Āpo-dhātu* and all the remaining *upādā-rūpas* (Nos. 10–24) constitute *a part* of *dhammāyatana*, i.e. the sixth *bāhira-āyatana*. For the scope of *dhammāyatana* is very wide : it includes all things, mental or physical, past, present or future, real or imaginary, which become the objects corresponding to *mano* (the mental organ).

Ajjhattika		*Bāhira*	
Cakkhāyatana	= No. 1	Rūpāyatana	= No. 6
Sotāyatana	= No. 2	Saddāyatana	= No. 7
Ghānāyatana	= No. 3	Gandhāyatana	= No. 8
Jivhāyatana	= No. 4	Rasāyatana	= No. 9
Kāyāyatana	= No. 5	Phoṭṭhabbāyatana	= paṭhavī + tejo + vāyo
(Manāyatana)		*part of* Dhammāyatana	= āpo + Nos. 10 to 24

It will be seen that altogether sixteen material elements, one primary and fifteen secondary, are included in *dhammāyatana*. These sixteen items are collectively known as "*dhammāyatana-pariyāpanna-rūpa*".[3] They are cognized only by the mind (*mano*) ; their existence is known by a process of inference. In this connection it must be mentioned here that, as interpreted in the Abhidhamma, the first five sense-organs (Nos. 1–5), too, are of this nature. That is to say, they, too, are cognized only by the mind (*mano*).[4] Hence, strictly speaking, they should also be included in the *dhammāyatana*. However, since they are already represented by five separate *āyatanas*, they are not designated as *dhammāyatana-rūpa*. We shall be using the term *dhammāyatana-rūpa(s)* to mean only those sixteen items, which, in the Abhidhamma, are so designated.

[1] See *Vbh*. pp. 1 ff. ; *Dhs*. pp. 125 ff.

[2] See *Vism*. p. 387 ; *Abhvk*. p. 270.

[3] See *Dhs*. p. 179 ; *Vbh*. pp. 14, 72.

[4] Because they are a variety of very subtle and delicate matter (*pasāda-rūpa*), see below, pp. 44 ff.

There is general agreement among the Buddhist schools that the first five *ajjhattika* and the corresponding five *bāhira-āyatanas* are *rūpa* in the sense of matter. From the point of view of the Nikāyas, too, this is so.

It is in regard to the category of *dhammāyatana-rūpa* that the opinion differs. As we have seen, according to the Theravādins it consists of sixteen items. For the Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, there is only one *dharmāyatana-rūpa*, namely, *avijñapti-rūpa*.[1] However, seven of the items which the Theravādins have included in the category of *dhammāyatana-rūpa* are recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas, too, but not as *dharmāyatana-rūpa*. Of the seven, six, i.e. Nos. 10, 11, 13, 14, 22 and *āpo-dhātu* are considered as parts or sub-divisions of other *āyatanas*, and the remaining one, i.e. No. 23 as a combination of three *āyatanas*.[2] Such a difference as to the position of these items in relation to the list of *āyatanas* presupposes a difference in their interpretation. But this need not concern us here. The Theravādins do not recognize under any guise the *avijñapti-rūpa*, which, for the Vaibhāṣikas, is the one and only *dharmāyatana-rūpa*. The Sautrāntikas take strong exception to its recognition, on the part of the Vaibhāṣikas, as a real element of existence.[3] What is more, they do not seem to have included any item of matter in the *dharmāyatana*. The Dārṣṭāntikas are recorded to have challenged the very conception.[4] That this had been a subject of controversy among the Buddhist scholiasts is suggested by a *Vibhāṣā* passage according to which the Abhidharma definition of *rūpaskandha* as consisting of the ten *rūpa-āyatanas* (= the first five *ajjhattika* and the first five *bāhira*) and the *rūpa* that is included in *dharmāyatana* was meant to refute the Dārṣṭāntikas who had denied the *dharmāyatana-rūpa*.[5]

Two facts emerge from the fore-going observations. One is that all schools of Buddhism do not recognize a category called *dharmāyatana-rūpa*. The other is that two of the leading schools who have recognized such a category are totally disagreed on what it should constitute. Both suggest that the inclusion of certain items of matter in the *dhammāyatana* is an Abhidhammic innovation or at least that it did not have a place in early Buddhist thought.

The only significant evidence that could be adduced in support of such a category is a passage from the Saṅgīti Sutta of the *Dīghanikāya*. Therein it is stated, but without any attendant explanation, that matter is of three kinds, namely, (i) *sanidassana-sappaṭigha*, (ii) *anidassana-sappaṭigha* and (iii) *anidassana-appaṭigha*.[6]

The two positive terms and their negatives are used in the Abhidhamma in a technical sense. *Sanidassana* which may be rendered as " visible " is used as an exclusive adjective of *rūpāyatana*, because of the simple reason that this particular

[1] *Cf. katamo rūpaskandhaḥ? sarvaṃ catumahābhūtakṛtaṃ dvādaśāyataneṣu vyapahāya manāyatanaṃ sarvānyanyānyāyatanāni dharmāyatanasaṃgṛhītamavijñaptirūpaṃ ceti rūpaskandhaḥ*—*Abhmṛ*. p. 14 ; see also *AK*. Ch. I, p. 14 ; *AKvy*. I, p. 29.

[2] See *AK*. Chs. I, II, IV.

[3] See *AK*. Ch. IV, pp. 14 ff.

[4] See *AK*. (Introduction, etc.), liv.

[5] See *AK*. (Introduction, etc.), li.

[6] *D*. III, p. 217.

āyatana stands for what is visible, the " fact of visibility ". All the other material elements are *anidassana*, invisible.[1] *Paṭigha* is used in more than one sense. But as it occurs in this particular context, it is understood as indicative of the contact, actual or potential, between the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects. The contact between *manāyatana* and *dhammāyatana* is not covered by the term. Hence the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects are described as *sappaṭigha* and all the other material elements as *appaṭigha*.[2]

Thus, as explained in the Abhidhamma, (i) *rūpāyatana* is *sanidassana-sappaṭigha*, (ii) *cakkhāyatana, sotāyatana, ghānāyatana, jivhāyatana, kāyāyatana, saddāyatana, gandhāyatana, rasāyatana*, and *phoṭṭhabbāyatana* are *anidassana-sappaṭigha*, and (iii) the sixteen *rūpa-dhammas* included in the *dhammāyatana* are *anidassana-appaṭigha*.

Since it is claimed that the phrase " *rūpaṃ anidassanaṃ appaṭighaṃ* " of the Saṅgīti Sutta denotes the *dhammāyatana-rūpas* given in the Abhidhamma, let us see, as briefly as possible, whether these items are known to the Nikāyas, and if known how they are conceived therein. Considering their position in relation to the Nikāyas, we can arrange them into two main groups.

The first group includes thirteen items, namely, Nos. 10–22. Some of them, e.g. *itthindriya* (No. 10), *purisindriya* (No. 11), *ākāsa-dhātu* (No. 22), etc. figure in the Nikāyas.[3] But none of them appear to have been brought under *rūpa*, let alone their being conceived as separate *rūpa-dhammas* forming a part of the *dhammāyatana*.

The second group includes two items,[4] namely, *kabaḷīkāra-āhāra* (No. 23) and *āpo-dhātu* (one of the *mahābhūtas*). It is true that according to the Nikāyas as well as the Abhidhamma, both come under matter. But what should not be overlooked is that in the former, unlike in the latter, they are not interpreted in such a way as to justify their inclusion in the *dhammāyatana*, i.e. as two items of matter, which can be cognized only by the mind (*mano*).

Thus none of the above items appear in the Nikāyas as *dhammāyatana-rūpas*. Nor do the Nikāyas give any indication of some other item or items of matter being included in the *dhammāyatana*. On the other hand, it is scarcely possible to understand the phrase, " *rūpaṃ anidassanaṃ appaṭighaṃ* " of the Saṅgīti Sutta in a way different from the interpretation given to it in the Abhidhamma. The situation that obtains here is rather strange : Although the above Nikāya-phrase presupposes one or more *dhammāyatana-rūpas*, yet there is no evidence to suggest that the Nikāyas have included any item of matter in the *dhammāyatana*.

[1] See *Dhs*. p. 146.

[2] See *Dhs*. p. 147.

[3] See e.g. *S*. V, p. 204 , *A*. IV, p. 57 (= *itthindriya, purisindriya*) ; *D*. III, p. 547 ; *M*. I, p. 421 (= *ākāsa-dhātu*).

[4] We have not brought *hadaya-vatthu* (No. 24) under either of these groups ; its inclusion in the list of *rūpa-dhammas* is the work of the commentators.

As pointed out by many scholars, the Saṅgīti Sutta approaches the Abhidhamma not only in methodology but also in contents.[1] This is indicative of the fact that as a compilation it is of comparatively late origin. Its resemblance to the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, the first of the six *pāda*-supplements to the *Jñānaprasthāna* of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma,[2] points, at least indirectly, to the same conclusion. What is more, its arrangement of the subject matter is so mechanical that new contents could easily be interpolated.

It seems very probable, therefore, that when the Saṅgīti Sutta was compiled the Theravādins had already recognized one or more of the *dhammāyatana-rūpas* which find mention in the Abhidhamma. Or else, the section referring to the three kinds of matter[3] may be considered as a subsequent interpolation. Either of these (alternative) suggestions explains satisfactorily the situation to which we have drawn attention.

Another connection which the Ābhidhammikas seek to establish between the Nikāyas and the *dhammāyatana-rūpas* is concerned with the two pairs of terms, namely, (*a*) *santike* and *dūre*, (*b*) *oḷārika* and *sukhuma*. These terms are used in the Abhidhamma to distinguish the *dhammāyatana-rūpas* from the rest.[4]

As used in this context, *santike* and *dūre* do not signify spatial proximity or distance. The first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects are called *santike* (proximate), because the *ghaṭṭana*, the contact between them, (which results in *cakkhu-viññāna* or visual consciousness, etc.) witnesses to their very presence. In other words, because of their being thus easily known (*gahanassa sukarattā*), they are styled *santike* (proximate). For this self-same reason they are also called *oḷārika*. The *dhammāyatana-rūpas* cannot be known through the medium of any of the first five sense-organs ; their existence is known by a process of inference. In this sense they are not easily known (*duppariññeyya*). Hence they are described as *dūre* (far). For this self-same reason they are also called *sukhuma* (subtle).[5]

Quite different is the sense in which the Vaibhāṣikas use *antikaṃ* (*santike*) and *dūraṃ* (*dūre*) : A given *rūpa* could be *antikaṃ* or *dūraṃ* according to, or depending on, the time of its existence. The *rūpa* that exists (present) is *antikaṃ* ; the *rūpa* that was (past) or the *rūpa* that will be (future) is *dūraṃ*.[6] On the other hand, the Vaibhāṣikas, too, use *audārika* (*oḷārika*) and *sūkṣma* (*sukhuma*) to distinguish the *dharmāyatana-rūpa* (= *avijñapti-rūpa*) from the rest : *Audārika* is applied to the latter and *sūkṣma* to the former. However, as an alternative explanation, it is said that the two terms are not expressive of an absolute division, but are of relative application (*āpekṣikaṃ*).[7] That is to say, what is *sūkṣma* (subtle) in relation to something could be *audārika* (gross) in relation to something else.[8]

[1] See E. J. Thomas, *Hist. of Bud. Thought*, p. 160 ; Winternitz, *Hist. of Ind. Lit.*, Vol II, p 65.
[2] See Takakusu, *The Abhidharma Literature of the Sarvāstivādins*, JPTS. 1904–5.
[3] See above, p. 36.
[4] See *Dhs*. p. 148.
[5] See *Asl*. p. 337 ; *ADSVṬ*. p. 116 ; *Abhvk*. p. 294.
[6] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 36 ; *AKvy*. I, p. 44.
[7] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 36 and *AKvy*. I, p. 43.
[8] *Cf. apekṣayā vā audārikaṃ sūkṣmaṃ ca bhavati. tad-yathā likṣām apekṣya audārikī yūkā. yūkām apekṣya sūkṣmā likṣeti.*—*AKvy*. I, p. 43.

The above-mentioned two pairs of terms occur in a stock formula of the Nikāyas, where *rūpa* is referred to in its totality : " . . . *yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā hīnaṃ vā panītaṃ vā yaṃ dūre santike vā, sabbaṃ rūpaṃ* . . . . "[1]

If the underlined words were interpreted according to their Abhidhammic usage, then such an interpretation would presuppose *dhammāyatana-rūpas*. But the general tone of the formula does not suggest that herein they are used in such a technical or, so to say, academic, sense. They could well be understood in a direct and literal sense as " whether gross or subtle " and " whether far or near ". All that the formula seeks to do is to lay stress on the totality of matter (*sabbaṃ rūpaṃ*)—first with reference to time (*atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ*), secondly with reference to a given individual (*ajjhattaṃ vā bahiddhā vā*), thirdly with reference to a characteristic of matter (*oḷārikaṃ vā sukhumaṃ vā*), fourthly with reference to the value of matter (*hīnaṃ vā panītaṃ vā*), and finally with reference to distance (*dūre vā santike vā*). With the necessary adjustment this same formula is applied to the other four *khandhas*, too, quite apparently, with a view to laying stress on the idea, " all " or " all kinds of ". This is perfectly understandable, for this kind of description is often made in order to advocate a moral injunction, e.g. one should not have any craving for, or attachment to, any kind of *rūpa*, *vedanā*, etc.

The Nikāya meaning of *dūre* and *santike* is, in fact, retained in the *Vibhaṅga* as an alternative explanation.[2] It also finds expression in the interpretation attributed to Bhadanta : All the elements of matter that exist in a visible locality (*dṛśya-deśa*) are *antikaṃ* ; those that exist in an invisible locality (*adṛśya-deśa*) are *dūraṃ*.[3] The criterion is not whether they are visible or not—for such an explanation would bring *rūpāyatana* under one heading and all the remaining items of matter under the other—but whether the locality is visible or not, i.e. near or far. This explanation tallies well with the context of the Nikāya formula, and as such does not presuppose the fact that any item of matter was included in the *dhammāyatana*.

From what has been observed so far, it should become clear that the inclusion of certain *rūpa-dhammas* in the *dhammāyatana* is of comparatively late origin. Most of these items, it may be noted here, do not properly answer to the definition of matter as given by the Buddhists themselves. The *avijñapti-rūpa* which the Vaibhāṣikas have included in the *dharmāyatana* is a case in point.

What is called *avijñapti-rūpa* is closely connected with the Vaibhāṣika theory of *karma*. Buddhism, as is well known, recognizes three kinds of *karma*, namely, *mano-karma* (mental action), *kāya-karma* (bodily action) and *vākkarma* (vocal action). The Theravādins and the Sautrāntikas take the view that these three types are essentially the same. Pure volition (*cetanā*) is *mano-karma* ; when it is manifested by bodily motion it is called *kāya-karma* ; when by speech it is called *vākkarma*. *Karma*, although it is spoken of as three-fold, is nothing but *cetanā*, volition.[4]

[1] *S*. IV, p. 382 ; see also *S*. III, p. 47 ; *M*. III, p. 16.
[2] . . . *yaṃ vā panaññam pi atthi rūpaṃ anāsanne anupakaṭṭhe dūre asantike : idaṃ vuccati rūpaṃ dūre . . . yaṃ vā panaññam pi atthi rūpaṃ āsanne upakkaṭṭhe avidūre santike : idaṃ vuccati rūpaṃ santike*—*op. cit*. pp. 2–3.
[3] See *AK*. Ch. I, pp. 36–7 and *AKvy*. I, pp. 44–5.
[4] See *Asl*. pp. 84 ff. ; *AK*. Ch. IV, p. 12.

In contrast, the Vaibhāṣikas believe that only *mano-karma* is *cetanā* (*cetanā mānasaṃ karma*). What result from *mano-karma* or *cetanā* are called *kāya-karma* and *vākkarma* (*tajje vākkāyakarmāṇi*). The latter two, it is said, are quite distinct from the former. They are manifested by a peculiar disposition of the body and by way of speech. Hence they receive the name *vijñapti*, the " manifested ".[1] These two types of *vijñapti* " create a thing of a particular nature, semi-material (*rūpa*) and semi-spiritual ",[2] designated as *avijñapti*, the " unmanifested ". " Once produced . . . the *avijñapti* exists and develops of its own accord, without the agency of thought, whether a man is walking, sleeping or absorbed in contemplation ".[3] The *avijñapti-rūpa* is said to depend on the *mahābhūtas* (*mahābhūtāny upādāya*). Hence it is brought under *rūpa* and is recognized as a *bhautika rūpa-dharma*.[4]

Although the Vaibhāṣikas bring *avijñapti-rūpa* under matter, they admit that it is exempt from *ruppana* (the fact of being " hurt ", disturbed) and *pratighāta* (resistance, impenetrability), which are considered as two fundamental characteristics of matter.[5] This seems to be the reason why Harivarman's *Satyasiddhi* insists that it should be assigned a place in the category of *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*, i.e., miscellaneous *dharmas*, neither mental nor physical.[6] The Sautrāntikas contend that, since it does not quite properly answer to the definition of matter, it should not be recognized as matter.[7] This is not to say that they were dissatisfied only with the position assigned to it. On the contrary, they vehemently denied its reality,[8] for they had been very suspicious of the wisdom of postulating new entities. Nor is it conceivable that the conception of *avijñapti-rūpa* was known to early Buddhism.

It is true that the Theravādins do not recognize the *avijñapti-rūpa* under any guise. However, a majority of the *rūpa-dhammas* which they have included in the *dhammāyatana* pose similar problems. These items will be examined in detail in the course of the next two chapters. Suffice it to note here that the list in question is a " strange miscellany " of items, some of which are nothing but certain " qualities " or characteristics, modes, or aspects and phases of matter, all raised to the status of *rūpa-dhamma*. Side by side with the " real " *rūpa-dhammas* are enumerated the " nominal ". The illogicality of the enumeration would not arise had not the Ābhidhammikas made a special attempt to recognize such things as phases of matter by erecting *dhammas* corresponding to them. Such a situation is not met with in the Nikāyas. What is more, some of the Buddhist schools, notably the Sautrāntikas, too, recognized certain characteristics common to both mental and material elements, but rather than postulating them as *dhammas* they relegated them to the

[1] See *AK.* Ch. I, pp. 20 ff. ; Ch. IV, pp. 14 ff.
[2] De la Vallée Poussin, *The Way to Nirvāna*, p. 71.
[3] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[4] For more details on the subject of *avijñapti*, see Sogen, *Systems of Bud. Thought*, pp. 149 ff. ; Mc Govern, *Manual of Bud. Phi.* I, pp. 128 ff. ; Takakusu, *Essentials of Bud. Phi.*, pp. 67 ff. ; Stcherbatsky, *Cent. Concep.* pp. 99 ff.
[5] See *AK.* Ch. I, pp. 25 ff ; Ch. IV, pp. 14 ff. ; *AKvy.* I, p. 35.
[6] See Mc Govern, *Manual of Bud. Phi.* I, p. 102.
[7] See *AK.* Ch. I, pp. 25 ff.
[8] See *ibid.* Ch. IV, p. 14.

domain of *prajñaptis*, mere designations.[1] As far as this situation is concerned, the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is more akin to the Vaibhāṣika system. Attention may be drawn here to the fact that, in recognizing " the characteristics of that which is conditioned " (*saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas*), the Vaibhāṣikas went so far as to postulate them as entities, as real as the things which they characterize.[2]

If we were to follow the generally accepted meaning of *dhamma*, then we had to understand all the items in the Theravāda list as real and discrete entities. However, it is extremely doubtful whether such an interpretation could be justified. For the names and explanations given to some items show that all were not conceived as having equal status, although they all were designated as *rūpa-dhammas*. It seems very likely that it was the avowed antipathy of the Buddhists towards introducing the distinction between substance and quality that impelled the Ābhidhammikas to take such a step. If this was the reason, then it is very doubtful whether this device had its desired effect. The fact that the Pāli commentators deemed it necessary to bring about a radical change in the position of some of the *dhammāyatana-rūpas*—to this we shall come in the next chapter—shows that the Theravādins themselves came to realize the inadequacy of this arrangement.

The apparent want of consistency in the Theravāda list of *rūpa-dhammas*, as suggested by Mc Govern,[3] seems to suggest that it represents a comparatively early tradition. It seems very probable that with the gradual development of Buddhist scholasticism, some of the items in the list " which were inconsistent with a more logical, systematic and scientific view of the universe ",[4] were either eliminated or placed under more appropriate places.

A glance at the positions assigned to some of the items of the Theravāda list by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas should show that such a possibility cannot be entirely ruled out. For instance, the three characteristics and the four phases of matter (Nos. 15–21) do not figure in the lists of *rūpa-dhammas* supplied by these two schools. And we have already noticed that seven of the *dhammāyatana-rūpas* of the Theravādins figure in the Vaibhāṣika list as sub-divisions or combinations of other *āyatanas*.[5] The development of a novel category called *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*,[6] too, seems to have facilitated this process of systematization. Thus by assigning a place to *jīvitindriya* in the above category the Vaibhāṣikas eliminated the necessity of postulating—as was done by the Theravādins—two *jīvitindriyas*, one mental and the other material.[7] Harivarman's insistence on relegating the *avijñapti* (which the Vaibhāṣikas have brought under matter) into the same category,[8] signifies another step in this process of systematization.

[1] See below, p. 84.
[2] See below, p. 84.
[3] *Manual of Bud. Phi.* I, p. 111.
[4] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[5] See above, p. 36.
[6] On the origin and development of this category, see Jaini, BSOAS, Vol. XXII, Pt. 3 (1959).
[7] See below, p. 59.
[8] See above, p. 40.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Secondary Elements: Group A *(Nipphanna)*

IT was observed in the previous chapter that some of the *upādā-rūpas*, the secondary elements, though elevated to the status of *rūpa-dhamma*, are nothing but certain phases, qualities, modes, etc. of matter. It is therefore no matter for surprise that with the passage of time the Theravādins themselves realized the unsatisfactoriness of this arrangement. The authors of the Abhidhammic commentaries and the kindred works seek to remedy the situation by classifying all the material elements, primary as well as secondary, into two groups called *nipphanna* and *anipphanna*.

The positive term, *nipphanna*, with the intensive prefix *pari* (= *parinipphanna*) occurs in three of the *Kathāvatthu* controversies, in a more or less technical sense.[1] When something is qualified as *parinipphanna*, the following characteristics are implied: it is impermanent (*anicca*), conditioned (*saṅkhata*), causally dependent (*paṭicca-samuppanna*), subject to decay (*khaya-dhamma*), subject to waning away (*vaya-dhamma*), capable of producing dispassion (*virāga-dhamma*), subject to cessation (*nirodha-dhamma*) and to change (*vipariṇāma-dhamma*).

From this it follows that the term, *parinipphanna*, like *saṅkhata*, applies to all mental and material elements that make up the totality of contingent existence, for they share all the above characteristics. Narrowing down the field, we may say that all the *rūpa-dhammas* are necessarily *parinipphanna*. What is not so should be either *asaṅkhata* (like *Nibbāna*) or *paññatti*, a mere designation with no corresponding objective reality.[2]

If the commentators, too, use the term *nipphanna* with the same implications, then it follows that only those items which they qualify by that term could be considered as true *rūpa-dhammas*. The fact that the *Atthasālinī* sometimes uses *parinipphanna* instead of *nipphanna*[3] shows that the commentators made no distinction in meaning between the simple term and that with the intensive, *pari*. And that the term is used with the same implications is also shown by the given explanations.

Buddhaghosa observes that *nipphanna-rūpas* are called so because they can be seized in their intrinsic nature (*sabhāveneva pariggahetabbato*). The rest are contrary thereto (*tabbiparīta*).[4] Sumaṅgala says that only *nipphanna-rūpas* are brought about by the four generative conditions of matter, viz. *citta* (consciousness), *kamma*

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 459–62 ; 626–27.

[2] See below, p. 95.

[3] *Op. cit.* p. 343.

[4] *Vism.* p. 381.

(volitional act), *utu* (temperature of cold and heat) and *āhāra* (nutriment).[1] This is another way of saying that they alone are true *rūpa-dhammas*, for no *rūpa-dhamma* could come into existence without reference to certain conditions.

This is further shown by the use of the peculiar compound, *rūpa-rūpa*, to describe the same category.[2] In almost identical words, Dhammapāla and Sumaṅgala observe that only *nipphanna-rūpas* are called *rūpa-rūpa*, because they alone are subject to *ruppana*.[3] On the coinage of this compound, they make this interesting comment: " This term *rūpa*, as a matter of convention, has been used to indicate things which are devoid of the nature of *rūpa* (matter). Therefore the term is qualified by another *rūpa* ".[4] This is to admit that in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka certain items, which do not answer to the definition of *rūpa* in the sense of matter, are also brought under it and that thereby its meaning has become unduly " stretched ". Hence arises the necessity to reduplicate the term.[5]

Anuruddha adds three more terms to distinguish the *nipphanna-rūpas* from the rest, namely, *sabhāva-rūpa*, *salakkhaṇa-rūpa* and *sammasana-rūpa*.[6] The first is meant to show that the *nipphanna-rūpas* alone have their own intrinsic nature (*attano sabhāvena siddhaṃ*).[7] The second indicates that they alone are endowed with the three salient features, viz. *anicca* (impermanence), *dukkha* (the fact of being a source of suffering) and *anatta* (the absence of any abiding essence); alternatively, that they alone are characterized by the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas*, viz *uppāda* (origination), *ṭhiti-jaratā* (subsistence-decay) and *bhaṅga* (cessation).[8] The third is indicative of the fact that, since the *anipphanna-rūpas* have their own intrinsic nature, one could attribute to them the three salient features of *anicca*, etc. and thus could make use of them as proper objects of meditation.[9]

All these different terms combine to show that only those elements, described as *nipphanna*, are true *rūpa-dhammas*. Of the twenty four *upādā-rūpas*, only fourteen are brought under this category. They are: the first five sense-organs; the first four objective fields; *itthindriya, purisindriya, jīvitindriya; kabaḷīkāra-āhāra*; and *hadaya-vatthu*. The four *mahābhūtas*—of which three constitute *phoṭṭhabbāyatana* and the other comes under *dhammāyatana*—are also brought under the same category. Thus there are in all eighteen *nipphanna-rūpa-dhammas*, four being primary and fourteen secondary.

[1] *Cf.* . . . *kammādīhi paccayehi nipphannattā nipphannarūpaṃ nāma.*—*ADSVṬ.* p. 112; see also *Abhvk.* p. 291.

[2] *Vism.* p. 382 ; *ADS.* p. 27 ; *VismṬ.* pp. 459–60 ; *ADSVṬ* p. 113 ; *Abhvk.* p. 291.

[3] *VismṬ.* p. 459 ; *ADSVṬ.* p. 113.

[4] *Svāyaṃ rūpasaddo rūḷhiyā ataṃsabhāve pi pavattatī ti aparena rūpasaddena visesetvā vuttaṃ rūparūpan ti*—*VismṬ.* pp. 459–60, *ADSVṬ.* p. 113.

[5] *Cf. hetu-hetu, dhātu-dhātu, dukkha-dukkha.*

[6] *ADS.* p. 27.

[7] *ADSVṬ.* p. 112.

[8] *Ibid. loc. cit* ; *cf. sace rūpaṃ aparinipphannaṃ na aniccādi-sabhāvaṃ siyā*—*KvuA.* pp. 198–9. On the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas*, see below, pp. 81 ff.

[9] . . . . *sabhāveneva upalabbhanato lakkhaṇattayāropanena sammasituṃ arahattā sammasana-rūpaṃ*—*ibid.* p. 113.

Thus it will be seen that the commentators have recognized only five *dhammāyatana-upādā-rūpas* as true *rūpa-dhammas*. The fifth, *hadaya-vatthu*, is one of their own additions. Had they drawn the line in such a way so that even these five items would have fallen under the opposite heading, i.e. *anipphanna*, then there would remain only the ten (*rūpa*) *āyatanas* plus one *dhammāyatana-rūpa*, i.e. *āpo-dhātu*. And, at the same time, if the *āpo-dhātu*, too, had been included in the *phoṭṭhabbāyatana*, as was actually done by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas, then all the true *rūpa-dhammas* would be represented by ten *āyatanas* only. As far as the number of *rūpa- dhammas* is concerned, one could notice here where the Theravādins have differed from the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. It may be recalled here that while the Vaibhāṣikas have recognized one *dharmāyatana-rūpa*, the Sautrāntikas have not recognized any.

Let us now examine the fourteen elements brought under the general heading " *nipphanna-upādā* " and see what their more specific characteristics are.

Sense-organs

The first five sense-organs, which are conceived as five secondary material elements, are *cakkhu*, *sota*, *ghāna*, *jivhā* and *kāya*, i.e. the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch respectively.

On their nature as a species of matter, the Nikāyas are less informative. True, they figure oft and again in many a sutta. However, the purpose is not so much to explain their nature as a variety of matter. Sometimes they occur in stock formulae where the causality of sense perception is explained;[1] oftener than not they occur in what may be described as hortative discourses where the Buddha is exhorting the disciples not to become victims to sensual pleasures lest they should fall short of the highest ideal.[2]

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka they came to be described as *pasāda*.[3] Literally it means clearness, brightness, serenity, or faith. But as a descriptive term of the sense-organs, it had not been used in the earlier Pāli texts. " Taken causatively ", observes Mrs. Rhys Davids, " it may conceivably have meant either that which makes clear—a revealer as it were—or that which gratifies or satisfies, . . . "[4] It is in fact suggestive of both meanings, for the first indicates the receptive and reacting nature of the sense-organs and the second brings into relief the part they play in the gratification of sensual pleasures.

In the Sanskrit sources, too, the sense-organs are described as *prasāda*. Considering the contexts in which it occurs,[5] it could also be said that in using this term the Buddhists are intent on showing that the sense-organs are of a very subtle and delicate matter. This is borne out by the fact that, according to the *Dhammasaṅganī*, they

[1] *Cf.* e.g. *M.* I, pp. 111–2, 259–60, 190 ; S. IV, pp. 39–40, 67 ff.
[2] *Cf.* e.g. S. IV, p. 225 ; *M.* I, pp. 92 ff., II, pp. 92 ff., II, p. 220, III, pp. 62 ff.; *A.* II, pp. 16 ff.
[3] *Dhs.* pp. 134 ff.
[4] *Bud. Psy. Ethics* , p. 159 n. 2.
[5] *Cf.* e.g. *AK.* Ch. I, p. 15 ; *AKvy.* I, p. 24.

cannot be known by any of the senses other than the mind (*mano*).[1] The Vaibhāṣikas, too, conceive them in a similar way. They are supra-sensible (*atīndriya*),[2] and translucent (*accha*).[3] Because of this translucence, like the luminosity of a gem (*maṇiprabhāvāt*), they cannot be burnt or weighed.[4] Nor can they be cut into two. For example, when a part of the body is chopped off, thereby the body-sensibility (*kāya-prasāda*) does not multiply itself. For the part that is cut off is devoid of body-sensibility ; this is inferred from the fact that, on the basis of the part that is separated, there does not arise tactile sensation.[5]

On this point Yaśomitra makes this interesting observation : " How then could there arise tactile sensation with reference to the tip of the nose when it is cut but not separated from the nose ? Since it is connected with the nose the body-sensibility (*kāyendriya*) arises again. Hence there is no contradiction. But how is it that when the tails of house lizards, etc. are chopped off, they begin to vibrate if they are devoid of body-sensibility ? This is due to the alteration (*vikāra*) of the air-element. "[6]

Since the sense-organs are conceived as a species of extremely subtle matter, it is explicitly stated that they should not be understood according to their popular conception. The *Abhidharmakośa* says that what in common parlance are known as eye, ear, etc. are the *adhiṣṭhāna*, the support, of the real sense-organs.[7] The same distinction is upheld in the Theravāda, too. The *Atthasālinī* remarks that the very purpose of using the term *pasāda* is to dismiss their popular conception. Each sense-organ (i.e. in a broad and general sense) consists of two parts : the compound or peripheral organ (*sasambhāra*) and the sentient organ (*pasāda*). The first is what we ordinarily mean by eye, ear, etc. The second is the real sense-organ, and has the first as its basis (*vatthu*).[8]

In pursuance of this distinction, the *Visuddhimagga* and the *Atthasālinī* give, in almost identical words, a long disquisition on the nature and constitution of the sense-organs : The *sasambhāra-cakkhu* or the compound eye is white from the abundance of phlegm, black from that of bile, red from that of blood, rigid from that of the element of extension, fluid from that of cohesion, hot from that of heat and oscillating from that of mobility. The *pasāda-cakkhu* or the sentient eye is

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 178.
[2] *AK.* Ch. I, p. 15 ; *AKvy.* I,p. 24. Here *indriya* is used with reference to the Ist 5 sense-organs only.
[3] *AK.* Ch. I, p. 67.
[4] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[5] *na hīndriyāṇi dvi-dhā bhavanti chinnasyāṃgasya kāyād apagatasya nirindriyatvāt. idam api kathaṃ gamyate. nirindriyaṃ tad aṃgaṃ yac chinnaṃ kāyād apagatam iti. yasmāt tat pratītya spraṣṭavy'ādikaṃ ca kāy'ādi-vijñānānupapattiḥ. AKvy.* I, p. 68.
[6] *kathaṃ tarhi chinnena punar lagnena nāsikā'grena kāya-vijñānotpattiḥ. nāsikā-mūla-saṃbandhena punaḥ kāyendriyotpatteḥ adoṣaḥ. katham iha gṛhagodhik'ādīnāṃ pucchāni chinnāni spandante yadi tatra kāyendriyaṃ nāsti. vāyu-dhātor eṣa vikāro. AKvy. I*, p. 113 ; see also Stcherbatsky, *Cen. Concep.* p. 12.
[7] *Op. cit.* Ch. I, pp. 56, 65 ; also *AKvy* I, p. 24.
[8] *Op. cit.* pp. 306–7.

situated in the centre of the compound eye. It permeates the ocular membranes as sprinkled oil permeates seven cotton wicks. It is served by the four elements doing the functions of sustaining, binding, maturing and vibrating, just as a princely boy is tended by four nurses doing the functions of holding, bathing, dressing and fanning him. It is not bigger in size than the head of a louse. The organ of hearing is situated in the interior of the compound organ, at a spot shaped like a finger ring and fringed by tender tawny hairs and is tended by the four primary elements. The organ of smell is in the interior of the compound organ, at a spot shaped like a goat's hoof. The organ of taste is above the middle of the compound organ, at a spot shaped like the upper part of a torn lotus leaf. The organ of touch is to be found everywhere in this physical body like a liquid that soaks a layer of cotton.[1]

Although the organ of touch is said to be co-extensive with the whole body, yet the possibility of confusion (*saṅkara*) between the sense-organs as to their functions is repeatedly ruled out. The characteristic (*lakkhaṇa*), function (*rasa*), manifestation (*paccupaṭṭhāna*) of one sense-organ are different from those of another. For instance, the organ of sight has the characteristic of being sensitive only to the sphere of visibility, but not to sounds, tastes, etc.; its function is to draw attention to its respective objective field only; and it manifests itself as the physical basis of visual consciousness, but not as the basis of auditory or any other kind of consciousness.[2]

Prof. Stcherbatsky observes that the Buddhist conception of the sense-organs as composed of matter subtler than the things that become the corresponding objects, is reminiscent of the Sāṃkhya view, namely, that matter developed along two different lines, the one with predominance of the translucent intelligence-stuff (*sattva*), the other with predominance of dead matter (*tamas*), resulting in sense-objects in their subtle (*tan-mātra*) and gross (*mahābhūta*) forms. But the fundamental difference, to which Prof. Stcherbatsky himself draws attention, is that, unlike in the Sāṃkhya, in Buddhism the two groups are not conceived "as modifications or appurtenances of an eternal substance." [3]

Moreover, the force of this parallelism tends to fade away because of the circumstance that, in most of the systems of Indian thought, the sense-organs are conceived in a more or less similar manner. The Jainas speak of two kinds of sense-organs: *dravyendriya*, the physical sense-organ, and *bhāvendriya*, its psychical correlate. The former, in turn, consists of two parts; *nivṛtti*, the organ itself, and *upakaraṇa*, the supporting environment. According to Caraka the sense-organs are distinct from their peripheral seats. The Mīmāṃsakas maintain that "the sense-organs consist in the faculty of potency (*śakti*) abiding in the sockets" The Sankarite Vedāntin is of the view that the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch are composed of the *sāttvic* parts of light, ether, earth, water and air respectively.[4]

---

[1] Translation mainly based on Ñāṇamoli's *Path of Purification* (*Vism.* pp. 445–6; *Asl.* pp. 307 ff.).

[2] See *Asl.* p. 312; *Vism.* p. 444.

[3] Stcherbatsky, *Cent. Concep.* p. 12.

[4] See Sinha, *Ind. Psy.* Ch. I.

It is of course very likely that this somewhat common tradition is due to the influence of the Sāṃkhya on the other systems of Indian thought. It is also significant to notice that a similar view seems to have been held by Ajita Kesakambali, who, as we gather from the suttas, was contemporaneous with Buddha. In the Sāmaññaphala-sutta he is recorded as having told King Ajātasattu that man is composed of four *mahābhūtas*, viz. *paṭhavī*, *āpo*, *tejo* and *vāyo*, and that after his death, while the four *mahābhūtas* join with their respective groups (in the external world), his *indriyas* join the *ākāsa* (ether).[1] On the basis of its general usage, if *indriya* is understood as referring to the sense-organs, then the fact that they are said to join the *ākāsa* suggests that, in Ajita Kesakambali's view, they are a very delicate variety of matter.

The association of such characteristics as subtlety, transparence, translucence with the sense-organs is understandable, for this is an attempt to explain the big problem as to why the sense-organs are sensitive to external phenomena.

Once the sense-organs were distinguished from the other *upādā-rūpas* by their being described as *pasāda-rūpa*, the next problem that required an explanation was why they were different, one from another.

There was the well-known theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas: The difference is due to the circumstance that the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch are composed of light, ether, earth, water and air respectively. Each organ is sensitive to that phenomenon which is the particular quality (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) of the substance that enters into its composition. Colour, sound, smell, taste and touch are the respective qualities of light, ether, earth, water and air. As such they become the objects corresponding to the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch respectively. There is thus a community of interest between the sense-organ and the corresponding objective field.[2]

That this Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory, in a modified form, was accepted by certain Buddhists is shown by some comments made by Buddhaghosa on two similar theories. According to the first, among the primary elements that support the organ of sight, heat is in excess; likewise, in the case of the organs of hearing, smell and taste, air earth and water are in excess. And, as for the organ of touch, there is no difference between the supporting primary elements. According to the second, the five sense-organs (in the order they are mentioned above) have respectively heat, ether? (*vivara*), air, water and earth in excess.[3]

---

[1] *Cātummahābhūtiko ayaṃ puriso, yadā kālaṃ karoti paṭhavī paṭhavī-kāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, āpo āpa-kāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, tejo teja-kāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, vāyo vāya-kāyaṃ anupeti anupagacchati, ākāsaṃ indriyāni saṃkamanti.* *D.* I, p. 55.

[2] See Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, pp. 152 ff.

[3] *Keci pana tejādhikānaṃ bhūtānaṃ pasādo cakkhu, vāyu-paṭhavī-āpādhikānaṃ bhūtānaṃ pasādo sota-ghāna-jivhā, kāyo sabbesan ti vadanti. Apare tejādhikānaṃ pasādo cakkhu, vivara-vāyu–āpa-paṭhavādhikānaṃ sota-ghāna-jivhā-kāyā ti vadanti.—Vism.* p. 376; see also *Asl.* pp. 312–3; our interpretation of "*bhūtānaṃ*" as "among the supporting primary elements" is supported by the rest of the passage in the *Vism.* and by the *VismS.* V, pp. 56-7.

The two views are cited only to be refuted. That they were advocated by certain Buddhists is clear from Buddhaghosa's contention, namely that those who put forward them should be pressed to quote a sutta in favour of their argument—an attempt, says Buddhaghosa, in which they would be disappointed.[1] In the *ṭīkā* to the *Visuddhimagga* the first is attributed to certain Mahāsāṅghikas and is said to have been advocated by one Vasudhamma.[2] And in the Sinhalese *sannē* to the same work the second is attributed to the Abhayagirivāsins, the rival sect of the Mahāvihāra.[3]

Buddhaghosa's argument is as follows : ' But some give as their reason that it is because these (several sensitivities =sense-organs) are (respectively) aided by visible data, etc., as qualities of fire and so on. They should be asked, " But who has said that visible data, etc., are qualities of fire and so on ? For it is not possible to say of primary elements which remain always inseparable, that " This is a quality of this one, that is a quality of that one. " Then they may say, " Just as you assume, from excess in such and such material things, the (respective) functions of upholding (*sandhārana*) etc., for earth, etc., so from finding visibility, etc., (respectively) in a state of excess in material things that have fire in excess, one may assume that visible data, etc., are (respectively) qualities of these. " They should be told, " We might assume it if there were more odour in cotton which has earth in excess than in fermented liquor which has water in excess, and if the colour of cold water were weaker than the colour of hot water which has heat in excess. But since neither of these is a fact you should therefore give up conjecturing the difference to be in the supporting primary elements.' [4]

Buddhaghosa's general refutation of the two theories is understandable. For, as represented by him, their underlying assumption is that colour, smell, etc. are the qualities of the primary elements—a view to which Buddhism in general took strong exception. His own explanation—repeated by his successors, too—as to the difference between the sense-organs is based on an earlier tradition, namely that they come into being through the action of *kamma* (*kammasamuṭṭhāna*).[5] The difference between the sense-organs, it is said with much emphasis, is due to the difference in the *kamma* of which they are the results.[6]

However, as pointed out by Dr. Sarathchandra, although the Buddhists rejected the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory as regards the affinity between a given sense-organ and the corresponding sense-object, yet they seem to have been influenced by it in postulating the media in which the sensory stimuli travelled. The media for the organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch were, respectively, light (*āloka*), space or ether (*ākāsa*), air (*vāyo*), water (*āpo*) and earth (*paṭhavī*).[7]

[1] *Vism.* p. 444 ; see also *Asl.* p. 312.
[2] *Op. cit.* p. 431.
[3] *Op. cit.* V, p. 57.
[4] Ñāṇamoli, *Path of Purification*, pp. 491–2 (*Vism.* pp. 444–5) ; also *Asl.* pp. 312–3.
[5] See below, pp. 110 ff.
[6] *Vism.* p. 445 ; also *Asl.* p. 313.
[7] *Bud. Psy. of Percep.* p. 40.

Before we end this section we need examine why the sense-organs are called *indriya*. Buddhists interpret the term as expressive of power, dominance or suzereignty (*ādhipacca, issariya*).[1] As the bases or supports (*vatthu, nissaya*) of the consciousness (*viññāna*), the sense-organs are said to weild a dominating influence on the former.[2] Since consciousness cannot arise without reference to a given sense-organ and the corresponding object, the question is raised as to why the former alone is called *indriya*. The answer is that the intensity of the consciousness is relative to the strength of the sense-organ. If the latter is " sharp ", strong (*tikkha*) the former, too, becomes " sharp ", strong ; likewise if the latter is weak (*manda*) the former, too, becomes weak.[3]

Objective fields

The Nikāyan descriptions of *rūpa* (the visible), *sadda* (sound), *gandha* (smell), *rasa* (taste) and *phoṭṭhabba* (the tangible) take a general form, determined mostly by ethical and practical considerations. They are not permanent (*anicca*) and have no abiding essence (*asāra*). Attachment to them cannot, therefore, be made the basis of true happiness. It only nourishes and prolongs " *saṃsāric* " existence. For the realization of the highest ideal all sensual pleasures should be eschewed. But *rūpa*, *sadda*, etc. are the five strands of sensual pleasures (*pañca kāma-guṇā*). Hence it is that they are sought to be described in such a way as to bring home the perils (*ādinava*) that result from attachment to them and thereby to emphasize the need to eschew all kinds of craving in respect of them (*nissarana*).[4]

This, in brief outline, is how the earlier texts approach the subject under consideration. In the post-Nikāyan works they have become the subject of a more detailed study. Certainly the ethical approach prevails, but the emphasis is not as pronounced as in the Nikāyas. Their treatment in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is very laconic ; the logical implications are not discussed. However, the commentaries and the sources of Sanskrit Buddhism help us to understand the descriptions in a wider perspective.

Let us take *rūpāyatana*, the sphere of the visible, first. In the *Dhammasaṅganī* under *rūpāyatana* are enumerated first some examples of colour—blue, yellow, red, white, etc.—and then some examples of figure—circular, oval, square, hexagonal, etc.[5] As far as the inclusion of both items under *rūpāyatana* is concerned, this explanation is fundamentally the same as that of the Vaibhāṣikas.

They, too, maintained that it consisted of colour (*varṇa*) as well as figure (*saṃsthāna*). The visible can be colour without being figure (*saṃsthāna-nirapekṣaṃ*); e.g. blue, red, yellow, white, shade, sun-light (*ātāpa*), light (*āloka*), darkness (*tamas*). It can be figure without being colour (*varṇa-nirapekṣaṃ*) ; e.g. that part of long,

[1] See *Vism.* pp. 491 ff.
[2] See *Vism.* p. 493.
[3] See *Vism.* p. 493 ; see *AK.* Ch. II, pp. 107–8 and *AKvy.* I, p. 96 where a similar explanation is given.
[4] *Cf.* e.g. *D.* I, p. 233 ; *M.* I, p. 503, III, pp. 143, 233 ; *S.* I, p. 144, III, pp. 107, 139.
[5] *Op. cit.* p. 139.

short, etc. which constitutes the *kāya-vijñapti*, bodily expression.[1] Or else, it can be, at one and the same time, both colour and figure, i.e. all other varieties of the visible.[2]

The Sautrāntikas, in whose system of thought one could detect the burden of emphasis shifting from the outer to the inner, declared that colour (*varṇa*) alone was real, that it alone constituted the visible, and that figure (*saṃsthāna*) was only a mental construction (*mānasaṃ*) with no corresponding objective reality (*prajñaptisat*).[3]

Their thesis is sought to be established by three main arguments. One can obtain the notion of long, short, etc. by seeing or by touching something. Therefore, if the figure were a real entity, then one should admit that it could be perceived by two sense-organs—a view which goes against the canonical definition of *rūpāyatana*, according to which it is the objective field corresponding only to one sense-organ, namely, the organ of sight.

The Vaibhāṣikas contend that when we obtain the idea of, say, long after having touched something, it is not that we actually perceive it by the organ of touch, but that we are reminded of the figure (long) because it is associated with the tangible. It is just as when we see the colour (visible) of fire we are reminded of its heat (tangible); or when we smell the odour of a flower we are reminded of its colour. The Sautrāntikas point out that this analogy is not of universal validity. Concerning the two examples cited: colour reminds us of the tangible and the odour reminds us of the colour, because there is an invariable association (*avyabhicāra*) between the two things given in each example. But every tangible is not associated with a particular figure. Hence it is not correct to say that the perception of a given instance of tangible should necessarily and always remind us of its figure. If it were otherwise, runs the argument, then every time we touched something we should also know the colour associated with it.

Secondly, if figure is a real *rūpa* then it has to be conceded that there could be a plurality of *rūpas* in one and the same locus (*ekadeśa*). In a variegated carpet, for instance, there are a large number of figures. If figure is a real entity, then a figure that is a part of a long line cannot, at the same time, be a part of a short line.

Thirdly, colour is a constituent element of the smallest unit of matter.[4] But the same cannot be predicated of figure.

---

[1] See below, pp. 70 ff.

[2] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 16; *AKvy*. I, pp. 25–26.

[3] See *AK*. Ch. I, pp. 16–17, Ch. IV, pp. 8 ff; *KSP : MCB*. IV, pp. 209 ff. see also Stcherbatsky, *Cen. Concep*. p. 11; cf. Yaśomitra's comment: *na hi cākṣusam etat saṃsthāna-grahaṇaṃ. mānasaṃ tv etat parikalpitaṃ. varṇa-saṃniveśa-viśeṣa eva hi saṃsthānaṃ. na saṃsthānaṃ nāma dravyaṃ kiṃcid asti. varṇāgrahaṇe saṃsthāna-grahaṇābhāvāt*. *AKvy*. I, p. 26.

[4] See below, Ch. VIII.

The Vaibhāṣikas retort that, if figure is nothing but a certain disposition of colour, then the figure can never change if the colour is the same. The Sautrāntikas meet this objection by saying that one calls something long, etc. when a number of real *dharmas* (elements) are placed in a certain manner or disposition.[1]

The strong opposition of the Vaibhāṣikas to interpreting *saṃsthāna* as a mental construction with no corresponding objective reality, is, in all probability, motivated by their desire to establish the reality of *kāyavijñapti*. They are of the view that it is a certain figure of the body (of a living being) known as an object of visual consciousness.[2] Unlike the Sautrāntikas, they could not deprive *kayāvijñapti* of its reality because along with *vāgvijñapti*, it is closely associated with *avijñapti-rūpa*.[3]

The foregoing Sautrāntika arguments against the conception of *saṃsthāna* as a real entity cannot be overlooked if we are to understand in a broad perspective how the commentators interpreted the *Dhammasaṅganī* account of *rūpāyatana*. It was noted earlier[4] that in this manual some examples of figure, too, are brought under *rūpāyatana*. But in the *Atthasālinī* they are interpreted in such a way that it presents a close parallelism to the Sautrāntika theory.

Commenting on the examples of figure cited in the *Dhammasaṅganī*, the *Atthasālinī* says: ...... the terms 'long', etc. are accomplished by mutual reference (*aññam 'aññam upa-nidhāya*). The terms, 'circular', etc. are accomplished by juxtaposition (*sannivesena*). Among them with reference to what is short 'long' is so called as being higher (*uccatara*) than that; 'short' is so called as being lower (*nīcatara*) than 'long'. With reference to what is big, a thing smaller than that is 'little', with reference to which a greater thing is 'big'.[5]

Then it goes on to say: Among these expressions, because it is possible to know 'long', etc. also by touch, but not 'blue-green', etc., therefore, in reality 'long' is not directly (*nippariyāyena*) a visible object, neither is short or similar terms.[6]

That " 'long' is not directly a visible object " clearly shows that, strictly speaking, figure (*saṇṭhāna*) is not a part of *rūpāyatana*. Explaining why in the earlier account some examples of figure are enumerated under *rūpāyatana*, the *Atthasālinī* remarks that this has been done as a concession to popular usage (*vohārato*).[7] No such implication could be drawn from the original account.

---

[1] See *AK*. Ch. IV, pp. 8–12; *AKvy*. II, pp. 348 ff; *KSP*: MCB. IV, pp. 209 ff.

[2] See below, pp. 70 ff.

[3] See above, pp. 39 ff.

[4] See above, p. 49.

[5] *Dīghādīni hi aññam'aññaṃ upanidhāya siddhāni, vaṭṭādīni sannivesena. Tattha rassaṃ upanidhāya tato uccataraṃ dīghaṃ, taṃ upanidhāya tato nīcataraṃ rassaṃ, thūlam upanidhāya tato khuddakataraṃ anukaṃ, taṃ upanidhāya tato mahantataraṃ thūlaṃ*—*op. cit*. p. 317.

[6] *Tattha yasmā dīghādīni phusitvā pi sakkā jānituṃ, nīlādīni pan'eva na sakkā tasmā na nippariyāyena dīghaṃ rūpāyatanaṃ; tathā rassādīni.—ibid. loc. cit.*

[7] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

One cannot overlook the fact that among the Sautrāntikas there was a strong tendency to interpret as nominal (*prajñaptisat*) some of the *dharmas* which in the Vaibhāṣika and in the Theravāda were postulated as real (*dravyatas*, *saccikaṭṭha-paramaṭṭhena*). Their advocacy of the theory of representative perception (*bāhyāṇu-meyavāda*) and their non-recognition of any of the *dharmāyatana-rūpas*, such as the *avijñapti-rūpa*, are indicative of their subjectivist tendencies.[1] It is very likely, therefore, that among Buddhists it was they who first advocated the theory in question before it found expression in Theravāda scholasticism.

Whether it was an introduction from an outside source, or one of their own creations, the Theravādins could easily accomodate it into their system. For, unlike the Vaibhāṣikas, they did not interpret *kāya-viññatti* as a figure (*saṇṭhāna*) of the body.[2] Nor did they recognize *avijñapti-rūpa*. Hence they could conveniently relegate *saṇṭhāna* to the domain of *paññattis* without thereby undermining the basis of any other established doctrine.

And, it is as a logical result of this new interpretation that in the *Mūlaṭīkā*, the older term *rūpāyatana* is sometimes substituted by the more specific *vaṇṇāyatana*, i.e. " the sphere of colour."[3]

As for *sadda*, sound, the account given in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* is, in the main, an enumeration of different kinds of sounds: of drums, of tabors, of chank-shells, of tom-toms, of singing, of music, etc.[4] In the post-canonical scholasticism we are presented with two different theories on the subject. Earlier is the one given in the (Sīhala) *Aṭṭhakathā*. Although the work is not extant now, a reference to one of its views is made in the *Atthasālinī*.[5]

According to this reference, sound travels in an elemental series—*bhūtaparamparā*. Of much interest is the example given in support of this view: The bodily movements of men felling trees or of washermen washing clothes are seen (quickly), although they are at a great distance. On the other hand, the sound they make is relatively slow of ascertainment (*vavatthāna*), because it comes in an elemental series (*dhātuparamparāya*) and strikes the auditory organ.[6]

---

1 See Murti, *Cen. Phi. of Buddhism*, pp. 81 ff.

2 See below, pp. 70 ff.

3 *Op. cit. passim.*

4 *Op. cit.* p. 140.

5 *Op. cit.* p. 313.

6 *Dūre rukkhaṃ chindantānam pi rajakānañ ca vatthaṃ dhovantānaṃ dūrato va kāyavikāro paññāyati. Saddo pana dhātuparamparāya sotaṃ ghaṭṭetvā saṇikaṃ vavatthānaṃ gacchatī ti vuttaṃ*—*Asl.* p. 313.

The *Aṭṭhakathā* view, as noted by Dr. E. R. Sarathchandra,[1] is on a parallel with the one advanced by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas concerning this subject: " Either sounds reach the ear in concentric circles of waves like the waves of water, or they shoot out in all directions like the filaments of a Kadamba."[2]

The *Atthasālinī* has alluded to the *Aṭṭhakathā* theory of sound only to dismiss it as unsound. The main objection raised is that such a theory cannot adequately account for our knowledge of the direction of sound: If sound comes slowly having arisen at a distance then it will be apprehended after some time. Coming in an elemental series and impinging on the sensitive portion of the ear, the direction it comes from might not be evident.[3] For when one hears a sound one can (fairly accurately) say whether it is a distant sound, or a near sound, or whether it is a sound from the farther bank or from the hither bank.[4]

Following the *Atthasālinī* argument, Dhammapāla, too, observes that if sound travels towards the ear, then there cannot be the determination of its locality and direction (*desādesa-vavatthāna*). He further notes that when sound is apprehended it remains where it has arisen. As to how an echo arises, it is said that the sound, although it remains at a distance, becomes a condition (*paccaya*) for the arising of an echo elsewhere even as a magnet (*ayo-kanta*) for the movement of iron.[5] Then there is the observation of Sumangala: the fact that one hears the sound of thunder which arises at a distance or the sound generated within the body which is covered by the skin, shows that for its apprehension sound need not travel towards the ear and strike its sensitive portion.[6]

It is significant to notice that this theory, which has been introduced in place of the earlier, is similar to the one accepted by some of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, according to which sound is characterized by " *apravāha-vartitva* ", i.e. it does not exist in a series.[7]

---

1 *Bud. Psy. of Percep.* p. 34.

2 Sinha, *Ind. Psy.* p. 22.

3 *Saddo pi sace saṇikaṃ āgaccheyya dūre uppanno cirena sūyeyya paramparāghaṭṭanāya ca āgantvā sotaṃ ghaṭṭento asukadisāya nāmā ti na paññāyeyya.*—*Asl.* p. 314.

4 *Ibid.* p. 314.

5 See *VismṬ.* pp. 446–7.

6 See *ADSVṬ.* p. 114.

7 See *AK.* Ch. I, p. 67; *AKvy.* I, p. 69. The rejection, on the part of the Pāli commentators, of the earlier view is necessitated by the introduction of a new theory concerning the position of the sense-organs in relation to their respective objects. According to the (*Sīhala*) *Aṭṭha-kathā* (see *Asl.* p. 313) the sense-organs are " *sampatta-gocara* ", i.e. they apprehend their objects when the latter come into actual contact with them. Buddhaghosa and his successors modified this to the effect that in the case of *cakkhu* and *sota*, they are not *sampatta-gocara*, i.e. they apprehend their objects at a distance; see *Vism.* p. 445; *Asl.* p. 313; *ADS.* p. 76; *Abhvt.* p. 67; *Abhvk.* p. 262. The same idea is expressed in *AK.* Ch. I, pp. 87 ff. and *AKvy.* I, p. 83. Consult *Bud. Psy. of Percep.* pp. 32 ff. and *Cpd.* p. 160, n. 2 for details. Although *Asl.* denies that *cakkhu* and *sota* are *sampatta-gocara*, sometimes it uses the term *sampatta* in respect of the corresponding objects, e.g. *vaṇṇo . . . cakkhu-sampatto* (p. 314). It seems that *sampatta* is used not only as referring to the physical contact between the organ and the object, but sometimes as referring to the apprehension of the object by the sense-organ. See *AK.* Ch. I, p. 87 n. I where Poussin cites a *Vibhāṣā* passage, according to which *prāpta* which, in this context, corresponds to Pāli *sampatta* occurs in the same two senses.

With the development of atomism an important problem cropped up concerning the production of sound. As we shall see in a later chapter [1], the Vaibhāṣikas deny the possibility of atoms coming into immediate contact with one another. How, then, is the phenomenon of sound to be explained?

The Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmīr had the answer ready: " si les atomes se touchaient, la main en collision (*abhyāhata*) avec la main s'y fondrait,[2] la pierre en collision avec la pierre s'y fondrait, comme de la gomme se fond dans de la gomme. Et le son ne se produirait pas."[3]

Thus it is the very fact that atoms do not touch one another that makes possible the production of sound. The fact that sound arises is itself taken as proof in support of the theory of atomic non-contact.

With the development of the theory of *rūpa-kalāpas*, the Theravādins, too, had to answer a similar question. For in their view, too, the *rūpa-kalāpas*, the ultimate units of matter, do not come into immediate contact.[4] If this thesis were to be maintained, the production of sound could not be attributed to an actual concussion of the *rūpa-kalāpas*. Hence it is that the *ṭīkā* to the *Visuddhimagga*, having observed that sound results from the *ghaṭṭana*, striking together, of the *rūpa-kalāpas*, goes on to define what this *ghaṭṭana* is: " it is the arising of *rūpa-kalāpas* in proximity to one another due to conditions."[5] The words: " arising . . . . in proximity " are meant to rule out their actual contact as well as their movement. For the theory that motion is an illusion created by the genesis of momentary elements in adjacent locations (*deśāntarotpatti*), is put forward in the later works of the Theravādins, too.[6]

On the subject of *gandha*, odour, and *rasa*, savour, the treatment is mainly a matter of classifications.

The *Dhammasaṅganī* does not commit itself to a definite number as regards the types of odour.[7] The *Atthasālinī* makes a classification of all varieties into two broad groups: (*a*) *sugandha* or *iṭṭhagandha*, i.e. agreeable odour; (*b*) *duggandha* or *aniṭṭhagandha*, i.e. disagreeable odour.[8] In the Vaibhāṣika each group is again considered as *utkaṭa*, excessive, or *anutkaṭa*, non-excessive.[9] Some Buddhists recognize a variety called *sama-gandha*, odour which is neither agreeable nor disagreeable.[10]

[1] See below, Ch. VIII.

[2] because, according to the Vaibhāṣikas, the atom is partless and hence non-resisting (*apratigha*); see below, pp. 147 ff.

[3] *AK*. Ch. I, p. 89.

[4] See below, pp. 151 ff.

[5] *Op. cit.* p. 452.

[6] See above, pp. 21 ff.

[7] *Op. cit.* p. 141.

[8] *Op. cit.* p. 320.

[9] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 18.

[10] *AKvy*. I, p. 27.

As to *rasa*, savour, the Theravāda sources do not lay down a definite number of types. The *Dhammasaṅganī* description is an enumeration of different types, e.g. bitter, pungent, saline, alkaline, acrid, astringent, followed by the words: " or whatever other savour there is ".[1] The Vaibhāṣikas, on the other hand, recognize six fundamental varieties (*san-mūla-jāti*), viz. sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and astringent, and admit that their mixtures could give rise to a wide variety.[2]

As for the tangible, the objective field corresponding to the organ of touch, it was already observed that, according to the Theravāda, it consists of three of the four primary elements. This subject was discussed in the course of our chapter on the primary elements.[3]

Faculties of sex

By faculties of sex we mean *itthindriya* (faculty of femininity) and *purisindriya* (faculty of masculinity). According to the *Dhammasaṅganī* definition, the former means the physical appearance, marks, traits and deportment peculiar to a female or the state or condition of femininity—*itthatta*, *itthibhāva*. Likewise, the latter means physical appearance, etc. peculiar to a male, or the state or condition of masculinity—*purisatta*, *purisabhāva*.[4]

Two passages in the *Aṅguttaranikāya* show that the earlier texts, too, have understood them in the same sense.[5] But nowhere in the Nikāyas are they brought under *rūpa* (matter), let alone their being postulated as two *rūpa-dhammas*. The commentators seem to have been rightly aware that, in the abstract sense of femininity and masculinity, the two items could not be included in the category of *nipphanna-rūpa*. Apparently, the one and only alternative is to bring them under the opposite heading, i.e. *anipphanna-rūpa*. But instead of doing this they modified their earlier definition so as to justify their inclusion in the present category.

Hence it is that according to the *Atthasālinī*, the physical appearance and other features which are peculiar to a female are not expressed by *itthindriya*. They are what arise because of it. Just as, because of a seed a tree grows, replete with twigs and branches, even so because of *itthindriya* there come into being such physical features, etc. as are peculiar to a female. With the necessary adjustments, the same observation applies to *purisindriya*, too.[6]

Thus the " that " (*yaṃ*)[7] of the *Dhammasaṅganī* is in the Commentary understood as " that through which " (*yena*)[8]. This commentarial explanation falls in line with the one given by the Vaibhāṣikas. For, in their opinion, too, the two

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 142.

[2] *AKvy*. I, p. 27.

[3] See above, pp. 29 ff.

[4] *Op. cit.* p. 142; see also *Vbh.* pp. 122–3.

[5] *Op. cit.* iv, p. 57.

[6] . . . *itthiliṅgādi pana na itthindriyaṃ, . . . yathā bīje sati bījaṃ paṭicca rukkho vaḍḍhitvā sākhāviṭapasampanno ākāsaṃ pūretvā tiṭṭhati. Evam eva itthibhāvasaṅkhāte itthindriye sati itthiliṅgādīni honti. Bījaṃ viya hi itthindriyaṃ.*—*op. cit.* p. 321.

[7] *Ibid.* p. 321 (. . . *yan ti kāraṇavacanaṃ. Yena kāraṇena* . . .).

[8] See *Dhs.* p. 143.

faculties of sex determine those differences between the male and the female as regards their physical form (*saṃsthāna*), tone of voice (*svara*), dispositions (*abhiprāya*), manner of being (*ācāra*), demeanour (*ceṣṭā*), etc.[1]

There is, however, this fundamental difference: The Theravādins believe that *itthindriya/purisindriya* is spread all over the body (*sakala-sarīra-byāpaka*) as *kāyendriya* (the organ of touch) is.[2] On their relative position Buddhaghosa observes that it is not correct to say that *itthindriya/purisindriya* is either "located in the space where the organ of touch is located" or "located in the space where that is not located".[3] What is attempted to show is that, although both are spread all over the body, yet the one is not an aspect or a part of the other. Those primary elements which support the organ of touch are different from those that support the faculty of sex (*bhinna-nissayatā*).[4]

On the other hand, the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that *strīndriya/puruṣendriya* is not distinct from *kāyendriya*. "A part dans l'organe appelé *kāyendriya*, organe du tact, les deux organes sexuels. Ces deux organes ne sont pas distincts du *kāyendriya*.".[5] This is precisely why the Vaibhāṣikas do not count them as two separate *rūpa-dharmas*.[6]

Buddhaghosa's commentator seems to have had the Vaibhāṣika theory in mind when he says that some entertain the wrong belief that the faculty of sex is only a part of the body (*sarīrekadesavutti*). And he goes on to remark that it is partly with a view to refuting this belief that in the *Visuddhi magga* it is described as pervading the whole body.[7]

In consonance with their view, namely that the two faculties of sex "ne sont pas distincts du *kāyendriya*", the Vaibhāṣikas also maintain that "ils connaissent le tangible".[8] That the Theravādins do not subscribe to such a view is shown from the fact that the two items are not included in the category of "*rūpaṃ sappaṭighaṃ*.".[9]

Since *indriya* signifies that which exercises a dominant influence, in which sense and over what do they wield their influence? The Vaibhāṣikas explain this in two ways: Firstly, they are the determinant factor of the distribution of living beings into two groups as male and female (*sattva-bheda*). Secondly, they determine the differentiation of living beings (*sattva-vikalpa-bheda*); it is because of them that there are differences between the two sexes as regards the physical features, etc.[10]

---

[1] See *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 104, 108; *AKvy*. II, pp. 94, 97.

[2] See *Vism*. p. 378; *Abhvk*. 269; *ADSVṬ*. p. 111.

[3] *na ca kāyappasādena ṭhitokāse ṭhitan ti vā aṭṭhitokāse ṭhitan ti vā vattabbaṃ.*—*Vism*. p. 378.

[4] See *VismṬ*. p. 448; cf. *na ca tassa kāyappasādena saṅkaro lakkhaṇabhedato nissayabhedato vā.*—*Abhvk*. p. 269.

[5] *AK*. Ch. II, 108; see also *AKvy*. I, p. 97.

[6] See above, p. 36.

[7] *VismṬ*. p. 448.

[8] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 108.

[9] See above, pp. 36 ff.

[10] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 104; *AKvy*. I, p. 94.

From what has been observed so far, it should become clear that the Theravāda answer to the question amounts to the same.[1]

We might note in passing some interesting comments made in the *Atthasālinī* on some differences between the two sexes:

The shape of a woman's hands, feet, neck, breast, etc. is not like that of a man's. The female lower body is broad, the upper body is less broad. The hands and feet are small, the mouth is small. The female breast is prominent. The face is without beard or moustache. The dressing of the hair, the weaving of clothes are also unlike those of a man's. The masculine features are just the opposite. For the shape of the hands, feet, neck, breast, etc. of a man is unlike the shape of those of a woman. For a man's upper body is broad, the lower body is less broad, his hands and feet are large, the face is large, the breast-flesh is less full; beard and moustache grow.

Then there are differences as to habits and deportment: Thus in youth women play with tiny shallow baskets, pestles and mortars, variegated dolls, and weave string with clay-fibre. There is a want of assertion in women's walking, standing, lying down, sitting, eating, swallowing. Indeed when a man of that description is seen, folk say: He walks, stands, etc. like a woman. In the case of men there is a marked difference. In youth they play with chariots and ploughs, etc., make sand-banks and dig ponds. There is assertion in their walking, etc. When a woman is seen taking long strides, etc., folk say, "she walks like a man."[2]

Coming closer to our subject, we may note here a problem that has been created by the *Atthasālinī* account of the two faculties of sex. The view that they are the determinant factor of the differences between the male and the female as regards their physical features, etc., does not accord with the definition of *indriya-paccaya* as given in the *Paṭṭhāna* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. In this work, with the sole exception of *itthindriya* and *purisindriya*, all the *indriyas* are postulated as *indriya-paccaya*, "condition by way of faculty".[3] The obvious implication seems to be that the two items are not interpreted as *indriyas*, although they are so designated. The situation is perfectly understandable for, as we have seen,[4] according to the earlier texts they mean femininity (*itthatta*) and masculinity (*purisatta*) and not, as interpreted in the *Atthasālinī*, what are responsible for them.[5]

---

[1] *Cf*. . . . *itthindriyañ ca purisindriyañ ca sattapaññāya padaṭṭhānaṃ.*—*Peṭ*. p. 101.

[2] Tr. from *Expositor* II, pp. 419 ff.; arrangement is changed (*Asl*. pp. 321–2).

[3] See below, pp. 136 ff.

[4] See above, p. 55.

[5] According to the *Vibhāṣā*, an *ācārya* named Saṅghavasu contended that only the Ist 5 sense-organs and the faculty of life (see pp. 161 ff) were *indriyas* in the real sense of the term—*AK*. (Introduction), XLIII. In the opinion of some *ācāryas*, only the 6 sense-organs (the 6th is *manas*= the mental organ) form what is called "*mūlasattvadravya*", i.e. the fundamental constituents of a living being—*AK*. Ch. II, p. 111, n. 1 and 2; *AKvy*. I, p. 98. As far as the position of the two *indriyas* in question is concerned, both these traditions accord well with the above situation which obtains in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

In all probability, it was this situation that prompted the authors of the later works to modify the *Atthasālinī* view on the subject. It is pointed out that, as a matter of fact, feminine features, etc. are due to the past *kamma*. But, since they arise mostly in a continuity endowed with the *itthindriya*, *itthindriya* is to be recognized as their *kāraṇa*, " reason ", i.e. a sort of supplementary cause. The same is true of *purisindriya*.[1]

That the two faculties of sex come into being through the action of *kamma* (*kamma-samuṭṭhāna*), is a view referred to both in the earlier and the later works.[2] When this view and the above modification are taken into consideration, the following situation results :

Kamma is the cause, not only of the two faculties of sex, but also of those differences which the two sexes exhibit as regards their physical appearances, etc.

This reduces the fundamental difference between the two faculties of sex on the one hand, and feminine and masculine features, etc. on the other. The recognition of the former as a *kāraṇa* of the latter seems to be only a flimsy device to save the situation. It will also be seen that, in these circumstances, the position of *itthindriya* and *purisindriya* comes very close to that assigned to them in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. It seems more proper that the two items were excluded from the category of *nipphanna-rūpa*. Such a step does not necessitate a modification of the*Dhammasaṅganī* definition ; nor does it give rise to the peculiar situation to which we have drawn attention.

Before we close this section we may refer here to the fact that, in the view of the *Atthasālinī*, *purisindriya* is superior to *itthindriya* : The former is brought about by higher morality (*mahantena kusalena*) and the latter by weak morality (*mandena kusalena*).[3] Mrs. Rhys Davids observes that in assigning a superior position to the former the author of the *Atthasālinī* is mindful " to appreciate the sex to which he belongs ".[4] This is not unlikely. However, there has been an earlier tradition according to which manhood is superior to womanhood.

The *Vibhaṅga*, for instance, says that there is no possibility of a female being the Sakka, the Māra or the Brahmā.[5] An interesting view recorded in the *Abhidharmakośa* is that, although the two faculties of sex do not obtain in the *Rūpa-loka*, yet the living beings there are males for this reason : " Ils possédent cette autre masculinité (*puruṣabhāva*) qu'on voit chez les males du *Kāmadhātu*, forme du corps, son de la voix, etc." [6] Here, too, one cannot fail to notice the attempt to boost up masculinity.

[1] See *VismṬ*. p.448 ; *VismS.V*, p. 62 ; cf. *Kiñcāpi itthiliṅgādīni yathāsakaṃ kammādinā paccayena samuṭṭhahanti yebhuyyena pana itthindriyasahite yeva santāne taṃ-tadākārā hutvā sambhavanti, itarattha na bhavantī ti tesaṃ tabbhāvabhāvitaṃ upādāya indriyaṃ paṭicca jāyantī ti vuttāni.*—*Abhvk*. p.266.

[2] See below, pp. 107 ff.

[3] *Op. cit.* p. 322 ; see also *Abhvk*. pp. 267-8 ; *Abhvt*. p. 68.

[4] *Bud. Psy Ethics*, p. 175, n. 1.

[5] *Op. cit.* p. 336.

[6] *Op. cit.* Ch. II, p. 130.

Faculty of life

It is fairly certain that the recognition of two *jīvitindriyas*, faculties of life, is a doctrinal development confined only to the Theravāda.

The first, called *arūpa-jīvitindriya* (mental), is one of the fifty two *cetasikas* (consciousness-concomitants), and as such, is included in the *saṅkhārakkhandha*.[1] It is the factor that stabilizes and sustains every type of *citta* (consciousness) as well as those *cetasikas* (consciousness-concomitants) which are co-nascent and co-terminous with it.[2] It is therefore counted as one of the seven " universal concomitants of consciousness " (*sabba-citta-sādhāraṇa-cetasika*).[3]

The second, called *rūpa-jīvitindriya* (material), is an *upādā-rūpa*, and as such, is included in the *rūpakkhandha*. It is the factor that stabilizes and sustains the *kamma-samuṭṭhāna-rūpa* (matter that comes into being as a result of *kamma*),[4] namely, the first five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex, the physical basis of mind,[5] and all other material elements inseparably associated with them.[6] Hence it is that according to the theory of *rūpa-kalāpa*, it enters into the composition of all *kamma-samuṭṭhāna-rūpa-kalāpas*,[7] just as *arūpa-jīvitindriya* is concomitant with every kind of *citta*.

The Vaibhāṣikas, for instance, take an entirely different position : There is only one *jīvitendriya*. It is certainly not of the nature of *rūpa*. Nor is it exclusively a *caitasika* (mental) *dharma*, although it resembles the latter. For, unlike the *caittas* (consciousness-concomitants), it is not associated (*samprayukta*)with *cittas*. Hence it is assigned a place in the category of *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*.[8] This is to show that it applies, not only to *nāma-dharmas* (mental) but also to *rūpa-dharmas* (material). In this respect, it is like the four *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas* [9] which, because they apply to both groups, are included in the same category.

Dr. P. S. Jaini has shown that the reason for the development of two such traditions (Theravāda and Vaibhāṣika) is traceable to the account of *āyu* given in the Mahāvedalla Sutta of the *Majjhimanikāya* and to the problems arising from the recognition, on the part of Buddhists, of the two planes of existence, viz. *asaññabhava* and *arūpaloka*.

According to the Sutta in question, what stabilizes the five sense-organs is *āyu*. *Āyu* depends on *usmā* (heat), and *usmā* in turn on *āyu*. Their interdependence is compared to that between the flame and the light of the lamp. Just as the light is visible because of the flame, even so the flame is visible because of the light.

[1] See *Dhs*. pp. 24, 34 etc.

[2] See *Asl*. pp. 123-4 ; *Vism*. pp. 464, 493 ; *Abhvk*. p. 120.

[3] See *ADS*. p. 6.

[4] In *Vism*. p. 378 the *kamma-samuṭṭhāna-rūpa* is referred to as that *rūpa* which is "*sahaja*" with *jīvitindriya*, because they come into being simultaneously. See also *Abhvk*. p. 270 ; *ADSVṬ*. p. 112.

[5] i.e. *hadaya-vatthu*, the latest addition—see below, pp. 62 ff.

[6] Discussed in pp. 104 ff. ; *rūpa-jīvitindriya*, too, is *kamma-samuṭṭhāna*—see below, pp. 66–7.

[7] See below, p. 156.

[8] See *AK*, Ch. II, pp. 178-9, 214 ff. ; *AKvy*. I, pp. 105, 168 ff.

[9] See below, p. 84.

Āyu is not identical with *vedanā* (feelings), because if it were, then a person experiencing the trance called *saññā-vedayita-nirodha* (the cessation of perceptions and feelings) would not be able to rise again from that trance. Since the four *nāmakkhandhas—vedanā* (feelings), *saññā* (perceptions), *saṅkhāra* (formations) and *viññāna* (consciousness)—are necessarily co-existent, *saññā-vedayita-nirodha* is the *nirodha* (cessation) of all the four. Hence for the self-same reason *āyu* could not be identified with any of these four *khandhas*.

Nor could it be included in the *rūpakkhandha*. *Rūpa* does not obtain in the *arūpaloka*. Consequently to include it in the *rūpakkhandha* is to exclude it from the *arūpaloka*. But the principle of life should be recognized in this plane of existence, too.

Hence it is that the Theravādins have recognized two *jīvitindriyas*, each having its province well demarcated; whereas the Vaibhāṣikas only one, but common to both *nāma* and *rūpa*, yet not identical with either of them.[1]

That this was the reason that led to these two parallel developments, is further confirmed by a *Kathāvatthu* controversy where the point at issue is whether there are two *jīvitindriyas* or not. The Theravādin's (Sakavādin's) claim to the desirability of recognizing two *jīvitindriyas* is based on two main grounds: The first is that it explains the fact that the attainment of *nirodha-samāpatti* is not identical with death. The second is that the denial of *nāma* in *asaññabhava* does not amount to the denial of *jīvitindriya*, for therein there is *rūpa-jīvitindriya*.

The objections of the opponent (the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitiyas, according to the Commentary[2]) are strongly reminiscent of the Vaibhāṣika position. The opponent contends that there is only one *jīvitindriya*, that it is common to both *nāma* (mind) and *rūpa* (matter), and that it is *arūpa* (non-material). Its description as *arūpa* suggests only its exclusion from *rūpakkhandha*, and not its identity with any of the *cetasikas*. For, although he admits its inclusion in the *saṅkhārakkhandha* (*saṅkhārakkhandha-pariyāpannā*), yet he denies that *saṅkhāras* obtain in the *nirodha-samāpatti*.[3] The opponent's view, therefore, seems to be that, although *jīvitindriya* could be assigned a place in the *saṅkhārakkhandha*, it is certainly not a pure *cetasika-dhamma*. It may be recalled here that the Vaibhāṣikas include it in the category of *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*, but make it distinct from the *caitasikas*. In point of fact the Commentary observes that, in the opinion of the opponent, *jīvitindriya* is a *citta-vippayutta-arūpa-dhamma*.[4]

There is thus a close parallelism between the theory of the Vaibhāṣikas and that which the *Kathāvatthu* proposes to refute. And, the controversy could therefore be taken as representative of a conflict between two different solutions to a common problem—the problem of explaining the position of *jīvitindriya* in relation to *asañña-bhava* and *arūpaloka*.

[1] Jaini, *The development of the theory of the viprayukta-saṃskāras*, BSOAS, 1959, Vol. xxii, Pt. 3; see also, *Buddha's prolongation of life, ibid.* 1958, Vol. xxi, Pt. 2.
[2] *KvuA.* p. 112.
[3] *Kvu.* pp. 394 ff.
[4] *KvuA.* p. 112.

However, when the function assigned to *rūpa-jīvitindriya* is taken into consideration, the case for its recognition appears to be weak. Its characteristic function, it is said, is to stabilize and sustain the *kammaja-rūpa*, i.e. the material elements which arise as a result of *kamma*.[1] It is argued that, although what are called *kammaja-rūpa* are the result of *kammas*, their stability and uninterrupted continuity cannot be accounted for without the *rūpa-jīvitindriya*.[2] But *rūpa-jīvitindriya* is itself *kammaja*.[3] Thus here we have a situation where one *kammaja-rūpa* is stabilizing and sustaining the other *kammaja-rūpas*. Adopting a Sautrāntika argument[4] one may contend that if the stability and uninterrupted continuity of the *kammaja-rūpas* cannot be accounted for without a *rūpa-jīvitindriya*, then this *rūpa-jīvitindriya* which is also a *kammaja-rūpa* should require another *rūpa-jīvitindriya* in order to account for its own stability and uninterrupted continuity. And this would result in what the Buddhists call "*anavasthā*", the (fallacy) of infinite regress.

The situation becomes all the more clear when one considers how the Sautrāntikas reacted against the recognition, on the part of the Vaibhāṣikas, of *jīvitendriya* as a real entity (*dravyatas*). Their argument is that *karma* alone is sufficient and efficient enough to sustain what arises as a result of *karma*. The so-called *jīvitendriya*, they contend, is a *prajñapti* (designation) with no objective reality.[5] "Just as the destiny of an arrow and the time it will take to reach its destination are determined at the moment of its shooting, similarly the *karma* of an individual, at the moment of rebirth, fixes the destiny (*nikāya-sabhāga*) and the duration of the *santāna* of the five *skandhas*".[6] The postulation of *jīvitendriya* is not only superfluous, but gives rise to, and leaves unexplained, the question of accounting for its own stability and continuity.[7]

Viewed in the light of this Sautrāntika argument, the reasons adduced by the Theravādins for recognizing the *rūpa-jīvitindriya* are rather far-fetched. As they have often done, had the Theravādins followed the Sautrāntika line of reasoning, they would have readily excluded it from the category of *nipphanna-rūpa*.

Nutriment

Kabaḷīkāra-āhāra, literally, means "food made into a ball" or "morsel-made-food". In the Nikāyan terminology, it means solid material food as against *citta* (consciousness), *cetanā* (volition), and *phassa* (sensory and mental impression) which are also called food (*āhāra*), for they all nourish, sustain and keep going the empiric individuality[8]—a process of alimentation.

While the earlier texts understood *kabaḷīkāra-āhāra* in the general sense of food which all living beings take for their sustenance and growth, the Abhidhamma interpreted it in a more abstract sense to mean the nutritive aspect of matter, the "quality"

[1] See *Vism.* p. 447; *ADSVṬ.* p. 112; *Abhvk.* p. 270.
[2] *Ibid loc. cit; cf. Na hi kammajānaṃ kammam'eva ṭhitihetu bhavituṃ sakkoti.—Abhvk.* p. 270.
[3] *Asl.* p. 342.
[4] See *AK.* Ch. II, pp. 45 ff.
[5] See *AK.* Ch. II, pp. 214 ff.
[6] Jaini, BSOAS, 1959, Vol. xxii, Pt. 3.
[7] See *AK.* Ch. II, pp. 21 ff.
[8] *Cf. e.g.* D. III. pp. 228, 276; *M.* I, p. 48; *S.* II, pp. 11, 98.

of nutrition. It is of course true that the *Dhammasaṅganī* defines it by citing some examples of food such as boiled rice, sour gruel, flour, fish, flesh, milk, curds, butter, cheese, etc.[1] But as the Commentator observes this is a definition given in terms of its embodiment—*vatthu-vasena*.[2] The commentarial observation is admissible for it is supported by the fact that *kabaḷīkāra-āhāra* is one of the *dhammāyatana-rūpas*. It cannot be known by any of the senses other than the mind (*mano*);[3] it is known by a process of inference. Nevertheless this definition by way of " *vatthu* " is reminiscent of its earlier meaning.

Quite in contrast is the Vaibhāṣika definition of *kavaḍīkāra-āhāra* : It consists of three *āyatanas*, viz. *gandhāyatana* (odour), *rasāyatana* (savour) and *spraṣṭavyāyatana* (the tangible). *Rūpāyatana* (the visible) is excluded on the ground that it does not contribute to the function of alimentation.[4]

For the moment if we overlook the exclusion of *rūpāyatana* then this interpretation does not amount to a radical departure from the earlier conception. For, it may be noted here that the three *āyatanas* which make up *kavaḍīkāra-āhāra* along with *rūpāyatana* represent those material elements which are qualified as *avinirbhāga* (inseparable), and which are said to enter into the composition of all material things.[5] Hence, if what in the Nikāyas was considered as *kabaḷīkāra-āhāra* (food in its general sense) was sought to be explained as composed of these four *āyatanas*, then this really amounts to a case of approaching the subject from the stand-point of *āyatana*.

As regards this subject the fundamental difference between the two schools is this : For the Theravādins *kabaḷīkāra-āhāra* is a separate material element, whereas for the Vaibhāṣikas it is a compound of material elements.

The physical basis of mental activity

The enumeration of *hadaya-vatthu* (the heart-basis) as a secondary material element and its recognition as the physical basis of *mano-dhātu* (mind) and *mano-viññāna-dhātu* (mind-consciousness) is a post-canonical development which finds mention in the Theravāda works compiled during and after the time of Buddhaghosa. The Nikāyas are silent on the subject. Even in the *Dhammasaṅganī*, where we get the most exhaustive analysis of matter as far as the Pāli Canon is concerned, no allusion is made to such a theory. The first canonical reference to a physical basis of mental activity is met with in the *Paṭṭhāna* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, but strangely enough the manual does not specify what it is.[6]

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 144.
[2] *Asl.* p. 330.
[3] See *Dhs.* p. 340.
[4] *Cf. kavaḍīkārāhārasya trīṣu gandharasaspraṣṭavyāyataneṣu saṃgrahaḥ. kasmād rūpāyatane na saṃgrahaḥ. yasmāccakṣurdarśanāhārena sattvanikāyasya mahābhūtānāṃ nopacayastasmāt.* —*Abhmṛ.* p. 40 ; see also *AK.* Ch. III, pp. 120 ff.
[5] See above, p. 33.
[6] See below, p. 64.

With their acceptance of the cardiac theory of the seat of mental activity, one question the commentators had to answer was why *hadaya-vatthu* was omitted in the *Dhammasaṅganī*. In their opinion the omission was not accidental, but was due to the necessity of maintaining consistency in the method of exposition. The explanation is as follows :

In the Vatthu-duka section of the *Dhammasaṅganī*, the exposition is made with reference to the bases of the first five kinds of *viññāna*, e.g. " There is *rūpa* that is the basis of *cakkhu-viññāna* ; there is *rūpa* that is not the basis of *cakkhu-viññāna* ".[1] If the dyads were stated with reference to *mano-viññāna*, too, as " There is *rūpa* that is the basis of *mano-viññāna* ; there is *rūpa* that is not the basis of *mano-viññāna*", then the Vatthu-duka section would not fall in line with the Ārammaṇa-duka section (where the dyads are stated with reference to the objects of the first five kinds of *viññāna*).[2] For it is not possible to establish a dyad like : " There is *rūpa* that is the object of *mano-viññāna* ; there is *rūpa* that is not the object of *mano-viññāna* " (because all the *rūpa-dhammas* become the objects of *mano-viññāna*[3]). If there were to be inconsistency between the two sections in question, then there would not be uniformity in the method of exposition. Herein the Teacher's intention was to develop the exposition in a form that has unity (*eka-rasa*). Hence the omission of *hadaya-vatthu*, which is the basis of *mano* and *mano-viññāna*, was unavoidable.[4]

That this is a highly ingenious explanation, is quite obvious. It is of course true that much of the subject-matter of the *Dhammasaṅganī* is cast in a symmetrical form. But it is extremely unlikely that the authors of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka should deliberately avoid mentioning an important element of matter just for the sake of retaining symmetry in the method of exposition.

Dr. S. Z. Aung, too, suggests, but for entirely different reasons, that the omission of *hadaya-vatthu* in the *Dhammasaṅganī* is not accidental : " In view of the popular idea, i.e. of the cardiac theory of the seat of mental activity prevailing in his time, the Buddha preferred to be silent on the point. He did not accept the theory, but if he had expounded his own theory it would not have been acceptable to his hearers".[5]

This explanation, too, is equally unsatisfactory and equally far-fetched. To suggest that Buddhism withheld certain ideas for the simple reason that they would not " go down " with the age is to overlook the element of radicalism in Buddhist thought.

Why *hadaya-vatthu* is not mentioned in the *Dhammasaṅganī*, although it finds mention in the commentaries and in the kindred literature, does not seem to be a very relevant question ; for what we encounter in the later texts need not necessarily find expression in the earlier. If there is a difference between the earlier and the later works as regards doctrinal tenets, this difference can be put down to a historical process at work.

[1] *Dhs.* pp. 125, 149.
[2] *Ibid.* pp. 126, 149 ff.
[3] See *ibid.* p. 178.
[4] See *VismṬ.* pp. 449-50 ; see also *Abhvk.* p. 271 ; *ADSS.* pp. 154-5 ; *VismS.* VI, pp. 64-5, where the same explanation is repeated.
[5] *Cpd.* pp. 277-8.

Of much significance, however, is the passage in the *Paṭṭhāna*, which alludes to a physical basis of mental activity without specifying what it is. The interesting thing to note is the way it makes this allusion. First it specifically states that *cakkhu* is a condition by way of basis (*nissaya-paccaya*) for *cakkhu-viññāna* (visual consciousness). Likewise, *sota*, *ghāna*, *jivhā*, and *kāya* are instanced as basis-conditions for *sota-viññāna* (auditory consciousness), *ghāna-viññāna* (olfactory consciousness), *jivhā-viññāna* (gustatory consciousness) and *kāya-viññāna* (tactile consciousness) respectively.

But when it comes to refer to that which forms a basis-condition for *mano* and *mano-viññāna*, the language becomes less specific: " *Yaṃ rūpaṃ nissāya manodhātu ca manoviññānadhātu ca vattanti, taṃ rūpaṃ manodhātuyā ca manoviññānadhātuyā ca taṃ sampayuttakānaṃ ca dhammānaṃ nissayapaccayena paccayo* ".[1] (= " That material thing, based on which the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element occur—that material thing is a condition by way of basis for the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element and what is associated therewith ".[2])

It will be seen that, in the quoted sentence, the physical basis of *mano* and *mano-viññāna* is not specified. It is referred to in a circuitous way as " *yaṃ rūpaṃ . . . taṃ rūpaṃ* ". Mrs. Rhys Davids' observation, namely that the term is " guarded " and that " the evasion is quite marked ",[3] is certainly to the point. And, as already observed by Aung, if it were thought that heart was the physical basis of mental activity, then the *Paṭṭhāna* would have used the word, " *hadaya-(vatthu)* " instead of " *yaṃ rūpaṃ . . . taṃ rūpaṃ* ". However, we cannot agree with the suggestion made, namely that this non-specification was due to the fact that, although Buddhism gave some sort of concession to the popular belief yet it was not prepared to go so far as to commit itself to the cardiac theory of the seat of mental activity.[4]

In view of the " marked evasion ", it seems more probable that the author or authors of the *Paṭṭhāna* was/were not quite certain as to what exactly constituted the seat of mental activity; hence he or they preferred to observe what may be called a noble silence on the question. This is only a tentative suggestion, for the nature of the situation is such that no categorical statement could be made.

The commentators' interpretation of " *yaṃ rūpaṃ . . . taṃ rūpaṃ* " as *hadaya-vatthu* could neither be supported nor refuted with reference to the *Paṭṭhāna* passage. For it is an answer to a question left unanswered.

An interesting argument in support of their interpretation is found in the sub-commentaries. The first part of this argument is an attempt to find out whether it is possible to identify the " *yaṃ rūpaṃ . . . taṃ rūpaṃ* " of the *Paṭṭhāna* with any of the twenty seven *rūpa-dhammas* mentioned in the *Dhammasaṅganī*.

---

[1] *Tkp*. p. 4.

[2] " What is associated therewith " means those *cetasikas* which arise along with *mano-viññāna*.

[3] *Bud. Psy*. p. 71.

[4] *Cpd*. p. 278.

Attention is first drawn to the fact that *cakkhu*, *sota*, etc., which are the physical bases of the five kinds of *viññānas* named after them, are a variety of *nipphanna-upādā-rūpa*. Therefore—so runs the argument—the physical basis of *mano* and *mano-viññāna*, too, should be a *rūpa-dhamma* which is *nipphanna* as well as *upādā*. This eliminates the four primary elements because, although *nipphanna*, they are not *upādā*. It also eliminates the ten items which we shall examine in the next chapter because, although *upādā*, they are not *nipphanna*. Consequently the field is narrowed down to the fourteen *nipphanna-upādā-rūpas* which we have examined in this chapter.

Among them, none of the first five sense-organs can be selected because they are the physical bases of the five kinds of *viññānas* named after them. The four objective fields and the element of nutrition (*kabaḷīkāra-āhāra*) exist not only in the body of a living being but also outside of it; hence they too have to be eliminated. Since *mano* and *mano-viññāna* obtain even in those living beings who do not possess the faculty of sex, the two faculties of sex, too, have to be eliminated. The faculty of life has its own function to perform; to attribute another is not quite right; hence it should also be eliminated.[1]

So far it has been a case of elimination. And, so far two things have been established: the first is that what is referred to as " *yaṃ rūpaṃ . . . taṃ rūpaṃ* " should be a *nipphanna-upādā-rūpa*; the second is that it cannot be identified with, and should therefore be distinct from, any of the (already known) thirteen *nipphanna-upādā rūpas*. The main purpose is to show that the postulation of a separate *rūpa-dhamma* as the physical basis of mental activity is justifiable.

The next problem is to find out where it is located. It is said that when someone thinks of anything, bringing it to mind intently and directing his whole mind to it, he experiences exhaustion (*khijjana*) in his heart. Therefore, it is to be inferred that the location of the seat of mental activity is inside the heart (*hadayabbhantare*).[2]

What is called *hadaya-vatthu* is not absolutely identical with heart as such. Like the sense-organs, it is a very subtle and delicate species of matter, and is located inside the heart. Like the sense-organs, it also comes into being through the action of *kamma*.[3] But unlike the former,[4] it is not an *indriya*. Because of this reason, although *mano* and *mano-viññāna* have *hadaya-vatthu* as their basis, they are not controlled by it in the sense that the relative strength or weakness of the latter does not influence the former.[5] Since mental culture is a central theme in Buddhism, the scholiasts seem to have taken the view that it is not proper to conceive *mano* and *mano-viññāna* as controlled by the *hadaya-vatthu*, although the latter is recognized as the physical basis of the former.

---

[1] See *VismṬ*. p. 449; *VismS*. V, pp. 64-65; *Abhvk*. pp. 270-271; *ADSS*. pp. 154-155.

[2] . . . *aṭṭhikatvā manasikatvā sabbaṃ cetasā samannāharitvā kiñci cintentassa hadayappadesassa khijjanato tatthedaṃ tiṭṭhatī ti viññāyati*.—*Abhvk*. p. 271.

[3] See *VismṬ*. p. 449.

[4] See above, p. 49.

[5] See *VismṬ*. p. 450; *Abhvk*. p. 271.

In recognizing *hadaya-vatthu* as the seat of mental activity the Theravādins have followed an old Indian tradition. In a prayer in the *Atharva-veda* one reads : " O Mitra and Varuna, take away the thinking power (*citta*) from the heart (*hṛd*) of this woman . . . "[1] Caraka and Suśruta, too, have recognized the cardiac theory of the seat of mental activity.[2] The question is not raised in the Nikāyas. However, as Mrs. Rhys Davids notes, the term *hadaya* finds a place in Buddhist popular psychology, but in the sense of " inmost ", " inwardness " and also of " thorough ".[3] Thus we have " *hadaya-sukhaṃ* " (inward pleasure), " *hadayaṅgama* " (going deep into the bosom of the heart), "*dhammassa hadaya*" (the heart of the doctrine). Attention has also been drawn to a Jātaka where a man's thinking is referred to his heart's flesh (*hadaya-maṃsa*).[4] In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the term *hadaya* is sometimes used as synonymous with *mano* and *mano-viññāna*.[5] References as these, too, may have encouraged the commentators in arriving at their conclusion.

[1] Dasgupta, *Hist. of Ind. Phi.* II, p. 292.
[2] Sinha, *Ind. Psy.* I, p. 1.
[3] *Bud. Psy.* p. 34.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 278.
[5] See *Vbh.* pp. 87, 88, 144.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Secondary Elements: Group B *(Anipphanna)*

We have already shown[1] that only those items, qualified by the positive term, (*pari*) *nipphanna*, are true *rūpa-dhammas* : They are real and discrete entities having their own nature (*sabhāva*). Although real they are not eternal ; not only are they dependent on conditions (*paccaya*), but are also characterized by the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas*, that is to say, they come into being (*uppāda*), exist for some time (*ṭhiti*) and perish completely (*bhaṅga*).[2] They are therefore *saṅkhata-dhammas*. What then are *a(pari)nipphanna-rūpas ?*

According to the *Kathāvatthu*, what is not *parinipphanna* is also not *saṅkhata*.[3] Since the commentators, too, as we have shown,[4] use the term with the same implications, it follows that what is called *anipphanna-rūpa* cannot be *saṅkhata*. But as is recognized in the commentaries themselves, what is not *saṅkhata* need not necessarily be *asaṅkhata*, i.e. something that exists permanently transcending all laws of " conditioned " (*saṅkhata*) existence.[5] It could as well be a nominal *dhamma*, a *paññatti*. Under which of these categories do *anipphanna-rūpas* fall ?

The authors of the *Atthasālinī* and the *Abhidhammāvatāra* seem to have been perfectly aware of these implications. For, immediately after having stated that certain items are *anipphanna*, in almost identical words, they raise the question : " If they were *anipphanna*, would not they become *asaṅkhata ?* "[6]

The question is raised only to answer it in the negative. The answer, when its implications are developed, amounts to this : What are called *anipphanna-rūpas* signify certain positions, phases, characteristics, etc. of the *nipphanna-rūpas*. As such they should not be interpreted as real and eternal entities, transcending all laws of " conditioned " existence. In other words, they are certainly not *asaṅkhata*.[7]

[1] See above, pp. 42 ff.
[2] *i.e.* according to the late interpretation of *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas ;* on various interpretations on the subject, see below, pp. 81 ff.
[3] *Op. cit.* pp. 626—7.
[4] See above, p. 42.
[5] *Cf. KvuA.* p. 92.
[6] *Yadi honti anipphannā bhaveyyuṃ te asaṅkhatā ?—Abhvt.* p. 74 ; see also *Asl.* p. 343.
[7] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

The denial, namely that they are not *asaṅkhata*, does not mean that they are *saṅkhata* either. For, as we have already seen,[1] one of the two purposes of describing the *nipphanna-rūpa* as *salakkhaṇa-rūpa* is to show that the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas* apply only to them.

The resulting conclusion is clear. The *anipphanna-rūpas* do not represent a set of *rūpa-dhammas* which are distinct from, and as real as, the *nipphanna-rūpas*. For, the former merely signify certain facts (positions, phases, characteristics) connected with the latter. Apart from the *nipphanna-rūpas*, there are no distinct and separate material elements called *anipphanna-rūpas*. In other words, the *anipphanna-rūpas* are nominal *dhammas* with no autonomous objective counterparts. As such, once it is recognized that the *nipphanna-rūpas* are *saṅkhata*, the question as to whether the *anipphanna-rūpas* are *saṅkhata* or *asaṅkhata* does not arise. Then why were they postulated as *rūpa-dhammas* (material elements) ?

Dhammapāla answers : They stand for the fact of limitation, certain positions, and characteristics of the *nipphanna-rūpa* ; in this sense they " follow with the latter " (*taggatika*). Hence (as a matter of convention), they are also designated as *rūpa-(dhammas)*.[2] That is to say, since they have a close and intimate connection with what really amounts to *rūpa* (matter), they are also given the same designation. But this designation does not carry with it the implication that they are *rūpa-dhammas* in the same sense as the *nipphanna-rūpas* are. For, it may be recalled here, when Dhammapāla and Sumangala observe that the term *rūpa* has, as a matter of convention, been extended to denote things which do not satisfy its definition, they mean the *anipphanna-rūpas*.[3]

Why the four generative conditions of matter (*rūpa-samuṭṭhāna-paccaya*), viz. *citta* (consciousness), *kamma* (volitional acts), *utu* (temperature of cold and heat) and *āhāra* (nutriment) are said to apply only to the *nipphanna-rūpas*[4] should become clearer now. Since they are *saṅkhata*, and since no *saṅkhata-dhamma* can arise without reference to certain conditions (*paccaya*), it is necessary that their coming into existence should be accounted for by the assignment of conditions. But because of what has so far been observed, similarly cannot be treated the *anipphanna-rūpas*. If they, too, were assigned conditions separately, then this would amount to saying that they were something distinct from the *nipphanna-rūpas*—which is not the case.

There is, however, this situation to be noted. Although we are told that the four factors in question do not apply to the *anipphanna-rūpas*, yet they are often described as *citta-samuṭṭhāna* (given rise to by consciousness), *kamma-samuṭṭhāna* (given rise to by a volitional act) and so on.[5]

---

[1] See above, p. 43.

[2] *Nipphannarūpassa paricchedavikāralakkhaṇabhāvato taggatikamevā ti rūpantveva vuccati.—VismṬ*. pp. 459—60.

[3] See above, p. 43.

[4] See above, pp. 42 ff.

[5] See e.g. *Asl*. p. 340 ; *Vism*. pp. 451—2.

This does not mean that the scholiasts have overlooked the implications of what they have explicitly stated. That that was done from a conventional point of view, is clearly shown from what the *Atthasālinī* observes in respect of the two *viññatti-rūpas*. Although it describes them as *citta-samuṭṭhāna*, when it comes to define them it specifically states that, in an absolute sense (*paramatthato*), this is not so.[1] This is because the *viññatti-rūpa* (as we shall see in detail later[2]) represents, not a separate material element, but a number of *citta-samuṭṭhāna-nipphanna-rūpas* when they are in a particular position. Hence, once these *nipphanna-rūpas* are described as *citta-samuṭṭhāna*, it is not necessary to make the same description in respect of the *viññatti-rūpa*, too, because the latter is a name given to the former when they are in a particular position. And if the latter, too, is described as *citta-samuṭṭhāna*—this, as is recognized by the scholiasts themselves, is a description made according to the " indirect method " (*pariyāyena*) and as such is not valid in an absolute sense (*paramatthato*).[3]

This needs much emphasis, for here one can see one of the main points on which the Abhidhammic commentaries and the kindred works differ from the Adhidhamma Piṭaka. The *Dhammasaṅganī*,[4] for instance, brings under the headings, *citta-samuṭṭhāna* and *kamma-samuṭṭhāna*, many of the items which, in the later works, are brought under the heading, *anipphanna*. Because of this situation those items seem to appear as separate (and real) entities. By maintaining that this situation is not true in an absulute sense, the authors of the later works have don e away with the flimsy claim those items had to stand as real *rūpa-dhammas*.

With these general observations in mind, let us now examine the ten *upādā-rūpas* which in the later Abhidhammic works came to be interpreted as *anipphanna*.

Modes of self-expression

The two *viññatti-rūpas*, namely, *kāyaviññatti* (bodily expression) and *vacīviññatti* (vocal expression), signify bodily movements (gesture) and articulate vocal sound (speech) as two modes of self-expression or as two media for the communication of one's thought to another. This, be it noted, is only a general statement of the Buddhist conception of the two *viññattis*. Although it tends to coincide with the interpretation given by the Sāṃmitīya and the Vātsīputrīya,[5] it does not do full justice to the exact position taken by the other schools including the Theravāda itself. The two *viññattis* are one of those subjects on which the scholiasts have advanced a wide variety of opinions. The initial statement should therefore be understood in a general sense.

---

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 337.

[2] See below, pp. 75, 157.

[3] *Cf. Lahutādīnam pi cittajādibhāvassa pariyāyeneva icchitattā nippariyāyena aṭṭhāraseva nipphannarūpāni kammādito samuṭṭhahantī ti— Abhvk.* p. 290.

[4] *Op. cit.* p. 147.

[5] See below, p. 70.

The definition given in the *Dhammasaṅganī*, though it is the most exhaustive as far as the earlier texts are concerned, is not very clear. For, although it gives some fundamental facts on the subject, it does not give a clear indication of their mutual relation.

The first, i.e. *kāyaviññatti*, is defined as the state of bodily tension or excitement (*kāyassa thambhanā santhambhanā santhambhitattaṃ*), " on the part of a person who advances or recedes or fixes the gaze or glances around or retracts an arm or stretches it forth ".[1] It is said to result in response to a thought whether wholesome (*kusala*), unwholesome (*akusala*), or morally indeterminate (*avyākata*).[2] For this reason it is also described as invariably *citta-samuṭṭhāna*, i.e. set up or given rise to by consciousness.[3]

It is called *kāyaviññatti* because it is the bodily expression or the bodily intimation of that morally qualifiable thought in response to which it arises. It makes the thought known—*viññāpanā*; it is the state of having made that thought known—*viññāpitatta*.[4]

What is quite clear from this brief account is that *kāyaviññatti* is not identical with the movements of the body. It means the bodily tension, the bodily excitement, on the part of a person who moves his body or limbs.

The Sāṃmitīyas and the Vātsīputrīyas adopt a more direct approach : " L'information corporelle (*Kāyavijñapti*) est un mouvement (*gati*) issue d'une pensée . . . qui veut ce mouvement (*tadviṣayālambakacittāder utpannā*) ".[5] The movement is that of the body (*kāya*). And, it is this movement that is recognized here as the *vijñapti*, because it makes manifest or expresses that thought in response to which it arises. It is included in the *rūpāyatana*, the sphere of the visible, because it is the movement of the body, of matter that is visible. Hence it is the opinion of the Sāṃmitīyas and the Vātsīputrīyas that *kāyavijñapti* is apprehended by the organ of sight.[6]

The Vaibhāṣikas object to this interpretation on the ground that there is no movement in an ultimate sense. All elements of existence are momentary (*kṣaṇika*).[7] Wherever they come into existence, there itself they cease to exist.[8] Motion is not something that exists in reality (*dravyatas*), but is a name given to the appearance of momentary elements in adjacent locations (*deśāntarotpatti*).[9] If somebody retracted his arm or stretched it forth, in an ultimate sense, it is incorrect to say that his arm had moved. What actually happened was that the series of momentary elements

[1] *Bud. Psy. Ethics*, p. 186.
[2] *Dhs.* p. 143.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 147.
[4] *Dhs.* p. 143.
[5] *KSP* : MCB. IV, pp. 212–13 ; see also p. 212, n. 21. In the *AK.* Ch. IV, p.4, the theory that *kāyavijñapti* = movement, is attributed to the Vātsīputrīyas whereas in *La Siddhi*, p. 48 it is attributed to the Sāṃmitīyas.
[6] See *KSP* : MCB. IV, p. 214, n. 22.
[7] See below, p. 84.
[8] *yatraivotpattiḥ tatraiva vināśaḥ.*—*AKvy.* I, p. 33.
[9] See *AK.* Ch. IV, pp. 4–8.

that constituted what was called the arm arose in adjacent locations in a certain direction. Only the place of the arising of elements had changed, not a single element had moved.

Hence to identify *kāyavijñapti* with bodily movements is to deprive it of its position as a real *dharma*. To deprive it of its position as a real *dharma* is to undermine the very foundation of the *avijñapti-rūpa*,[1] in defence of which the Vaibhāṣikas, time and again, joined issue with the Sautrāntikas.

Hence it is that according to the Vaibhāṣikas, *kāya-vijñapti* is not the movements of the body, but is such and such figure or disposition—*saṃsthāna*—of the body, given rise to, or conditioned, by a volitional thought (*cetanā*). This *kāyavijñapti-saṃsthāna* is something that is visible.[2] It can be apprehended independently of the colour (of the body) : " *kāyavijñapti-grahanaṃ tu varṇa-nirapekṣaṃ* ".[3]

Thus, although the Vātsīputrīya-Sāṃmitīyas and the Vaibhāṣikas differ in answering what exactly constitutes *kāyavijñapti*, both agree on this point : *kāyavijñapti* comes under *rūpāyatana*, it can be apprehended by the organ of sight.

Viewed against this background, the *kāyaviññatti* of the *Dhammasaṅganī* raises one important problem. We saw that it could not be identified with bodily movements. Nor can it be taken as something that is apprehended by the organ of sight. For its inclusion under the heading, " *dhammāyatana-pariyāpanna* "[4] shows that it cannot be known by any of the senses other than the mind (*mano*). It is known through a process of inference. In which way, then, does it act as a mode of self-expression ? Or, to be more precise, how does it express or make known that morally qualifiable thought in response to which it arises ?

On the solution of this question depends our understanding of the whole subject. But strangely enough, this is the point on which the *Dhammasaṅganī* is practically silent.

It may be noted here that in the *Dhammasaṅganī* account, reference is made not only to the state of bodily tension or excitement (which is *kāyaviññatti*), but also to bodily movements such as retracting an arm or stretching it forth. This seems to be an indication of the fact that, although bodily movements are not *kāyaviññatti*, yet they have a close connection with it. That is to say, they, too, have a part to play in the expression of thought.

What this close connection is, would be clear if a correspondence could be established between the *kāyaviññatti* of the *Dhammasaṅganī* and that of the Dārṣṭāntikas as given in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* : " D'apres les Dārṣṭāntikas, il existe un certain *Rūpa* qui n'est ni couleur (*varṇa*) ni figure (*saṃsthāna*) qui est produit par la pensée. Ce *Rūpa* met en mouvement la main et les autres membres ".[5]

[1] See above, pp. 39 *ff*.
[2] See *AK.* Ch. IV, pp. 4–12 ; *KSP : MCB.* IV, pp. 207–209.
[3] *AKvy.* I, p. 26.
[4] *Dhs.* p. 179.
[5] *La Siddhi*, p. 48.

What this " certain *Rūpa* " is, is not explained here in more positive terms. In the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* of Vasubandhu, an almost identical, if not the same, theory is attributed to the Sauryodayikas. According to this theory, bodily movements are due to the air-element (*vāyudhātu*), given rise to by a certain variety of consciousness (*citta-viśeṣād utpannaḥ*). And, it is this air-element that is recognized as the *kāyavijñapti*.[1]

What interests us here is the fact that according to both accounts (Dārṣṭāntika-Sauryodayika) *kāyavijñapti* is the cause (*hetu*) of bodily movements. From this it may be concluded that the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sauryodayikas do not seem to have overlooked the contention of the Vātsīputrīyas, namely that *kāyavijñapti* occurs only when there is some kind of movement (*iñjita* ?) of the body and not otherwise.[2]

It may then be asked why the designation, *kāyavijñapti* (that which makes known[3]), is given to the cause of bodily movements, but not to the bodily movements themselves. For, according to this explanation the significance of *kāyavijñapti* as a mode of self-expression is rather indirect. This is certainly so. But like the Vaibhāṣikas they, too, were committed to the theory of the denial of motion. For although they speak of movements, they do not recognize them in an absolute sense. Strictly speaking there is no " *deśāntarasaṃkrānti*, " i.e. movement of a thing from one locus in space to another, but only " *deśāntarotpatti* ", i.e. the appearance of (momentary elements) in adjacent locations.[4] It seems very probable, therefore, that it was with a view to retaining its reality that *kāyavijñapti* was sought to be identified with the cause of bodily movements.

That there is some parallelism between the *kāyaviññatti* of the *Dhammasaṅganī* and that of the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sauryodayikas is clear. The former, too, is neither colour (*vaṇṇa*) nor figure (*saṇṭhāna*). For its exclusion from the *rūpāyatana* and its inclusion in the *dhammāyatana* precludes its being identified with either.

Its parallelism with that of the Sauryodayikas goes still further. As we have already noted, it is defined as " *kāyassa thambhanā santhambhanā santhambhitattaṃ* ". It may also be noted here that *thambhitattaṃ* (tension, distension) is one of the terms used in the *Dhammasaṅganī* in defining the air-element.[5] Does this mean that the *kāyaviññatti* of the *Dhammasaṅganī*, like that of the Sauryodayikas, is the air-element ?

In the *Dhammasaṅganī* seventeen *rūpa-dhammas* are listed under the heading *cittasamuṭṭhāna*, i.e. arising in response to, or conditioned by, consciousness. Two of them are the air element and the *kāyaviññatti*.[6] If the latter were the same as the former, then they would not be mentioned separately and counted as two items.

---

[1] See *KSP : MCB.* IV, pp. 219 ff.
[2] See *AK.* Ch. IV, p. 4.
[3] See *ibid.* p. 3, n. 2.
[4] See *KSP: MCB.* IV, pp. 219-20.
[5] *Op. cit.* p. 177.
[6] *Op. cit.* p. 147.

On the other hand, if the *kāyaviññatti* were different from, or if it had no connection with, the air-element, then it would not be explained as (*kāyassa san*)*thambhitattaṃ*. The relation between them seems to be one of identity as well as difference.

The whole situation becomes clear when it is understood in the light of certain observations made by the commentators. Except for one significant fact their interpretation tallies well with the main points brought into relief so far.

According to the commentators what is called *kāyaviññatti* is an " *ākāra-vikāra* " or " *vikāra* " of the *cittasamuṭṭhāna* air-element. " *Ākāra-vikāra* " (lit. " alteration of the mode ") or " *vikāra* " (alteration), as understood in the commentaries and in the kindred works, means a particular position, situation or condition (of the air-element).[1] Since the air-element cannot arise or exist independently of the other three primary elements,[2] it is further observed that in reality it is the *ākāra-vikāra* of all the four (and of any other secondary element that arises and exists with them[3]). But it is called *ākara-vikāra* of the air-element for this reason : Among the primary elements (and any other secondary element that arises and exists with them) of which it is an *ākāra-vikāra*, the air-element is characterised by more intensity (*ussada*) or capability (*sāmatthiya*).[4] In the *Abhidhammatthavikāsinī* this *ākāra-vikāra* is said to resemble the state of effort-making (*ussahana-vikāra*) which appears in the body of a person when, with full effort, he is lifting a huge stone.[5]

We have already observed that in the *Dhammasaṅganī* reference is made to a list of *citta-samuṭṭhāna-rūpadhammas* of which two are the air-element and the *kāyaviññatti*. We have also drawn attention to the close affinity between two of the words used in defining the two items in question. When these two facts are taken into consideration, the interpretation of *kāyaviññatti* as an *ākāra-vikāra* of the *cittasamuṭṭhāna* air-element (and its concomitants) seems to be quite in accord with the earlier account. It could be understood as a re-statement, made in terms of elemental analysis, of the earlier general definition.

The position of *kāyaviññatti* as a mode of self-expression is explained as follows : *Kāyaviññatti* is a condition (*paccaya*) for the occurrence of bodily movements (*pariphandana, calana*). It is through the bodily movements, which are conditioned by *kāyaviññatti*, that the particular thought is expressed or intimated. The thought is known (inferred)[6] after the apprehension of the colour (*vaṇṇagahanāntaraṃ*) of the body which is in movement.[7]

---

[1] See *Asl.* pp. 83, 343 ; *Vism.* p. 448 ; *Abhvk.* pp. 273 ff.
[2] See above, p. 23.
[3] *Cf.* the theory of *avinibhoga-rūpa ;* see above, p. 36.
[4] See *VismṬ.* p. 450 ; *Abhvk.* pp. 273–274.
[5] . . . *mahantaṃ pāsānaṃ ukkhipantassa sabbatthāmena gahanakāle sarīrassa ussahanavikāro viya . . .labbhamāno eko ākāravikāro kāyaviññatti nāmā ti vuttaṃ hoti—op. cit.* pp. 274–275 ; repeated in *ADSVṬ.* p. 13.
[6] . . . *ñāpetabbaṃ . . . anumānato siddhaṃ – Abhvk.* p. 275.
[7] See *Abhvk.* pp. 273–275 ; *VismṬ.* p. 451 ; *ADSVṬ.* pp. 113–114.

In recognizing *kāyaviññatti* as a condition (*paccaya*) for the occurrence of bodily movements,[1] the Theravādins are in general agreement with the Dārṣṭāntikas and the Sauryodayikas. However, there is this significant difference to be noted: According to the Sauryodayikas *kāyavijñapti* is the air-element, whereas according to the Theravādins *kāyaviññatti* is an *ākāra-vikāra* of the air-element (and its concomitants). Why the Theravādins took this position needs explanation.

It seems that *kāyaviññatti* is called so because of two reasons: The first is that it makes manifest or expresses that particular thought in response to which it arises. This manifestation or expression, as we have seen, is a certain tension or excitement of the body (*kāyassa thambhitatta*). It is not something that is visible,[2] but it is the physical representation of a mental event. In this sense it is bodily expression, i.e. *kāyaviññatti*.

The second is that it conditions or helps the occurrence of bodily movements through which that thought is communicated. In this sense it is that which makes known—*viññāpanā*.

Now, elsewhere in the *Dhammasaṅganī* it is stated that the *kāyaviññatti* is *citta-sahabhū*, i.e. co-existent with the thought (in response to which it arises), and *cittānuparivatti*, i.e. follows the pattern of the thought (in response to which it arises).[3] The implied reason is that, since it is the physical manifestation or representation of a thought, its duration too should be equal to the duration of that particular thought. Secondly, since it is brought about by being conditioned by that thought (which it makes manifest or represents), it too follows the pattern of that particular thought.

In this connection, it should be noted here that, in the view of the Theravādins, the duration of a material element is longer than that of a mental element.[4] Accordingly, although the *citta-samuṭṭhāna* air-element and its concomitants arise simultaneously with a thought-moment,[5] yet they do not cease to exist together with that thought-moment. In view of this circumstance, the air-element and its concomitants cannot be described as *citta-sahabhū*, because to describe them so is to admit that their duration is equal to that of the thought-moment. But the *kāya-viññatti* has to be *citta-sahabhū*. This explains why the designation, *kāyaviññatti*, is given, not to the air-element and its concomitants, but to their *ākāra-vikāra*. Is there then no contradiction in recognizing *kāyaviññatti* as a *rūpa-dhamma* while describing it as *citta-sahabhū*?

[1] In the previous chapters we took notice of the fact that in the comparatively late works (the *ṭīkās*, for instance) of the Theravādins, too, motion was interpreted as *desantaruppatti*, i.e. appearance of momentary elements in adjacent locations. From their point of view, therefore, all references to bodily movements should be understood accordingly – a fact explicitly stated in *ADSVṬ*. p. 114.

[2] See *Abhvk*. p. 275; *Mvn*. p. 65.

[3] *Dhs*. p. 148.

[4] See below, pp. 82–83, 132–33.

[5] *Cf. Tkp*. p. 3 where *citta* and *cetasikas* are postulated as a condition by way of co-nascence (*sahajāta-paccaya*) in relation to *citta-samuṭṭhāna-rūpa*.

What we should not overlook here is that what is called *kāyaviññatti* is not a *rūpa-dhamma* in its usual sense. It is not something which is distinct and separate from the air-element and its concomitants. It signifies only a particular situation or position—*ākāra-vikāra*—of the latter. It is a name given to the latter when they are in a particular position. Apart from the air-element and its concomitants, of which it is an *ākāra-vikāra*, there is no separate *rūpa-dhamma* called *kāyaviññatti*, just as much as there is nothing called table apart from a collection of *rūpa-dhammas* (material elements), organized and arranged in a particular order.

In other words, *kāyaviññatti* is a name given to the air-element and its concomitants when they function as bodily expression or manifestation of a thought, just as table is a name given to a collection of *rūpa-dhammas* when they function as that what we conventionally call " table ". Stated otherwise: the air-element and its concomitants are called *kāyaviññatti* as long as that particular thought in response to which they arise, exists, because it is during this time that they make manifest or represent that thought (= *viññatti*) and function as a condition for the occurrence of bodily movements and thereby make known that thought (= *viññāpanā*).

However, the air-element and its concomitants do not cease to exist concurrently with the cessation of that particular thought in response to which they arise, but their position and function as *kāyaviññatti* do. The sun is called mid-sun when it is overhead; but it does not set immediately after its position and function as mid-sun is over. A similar situation obtains here, too.

Thus it is clear that *kāyaviññatti* is not a *rūpa-dhamma*, distinct and separate from the air-element and its concomitants, signifying as it does only an *ākāra-vikāra* of the latter. However, in the *Dhammasaṅganī* not only the air-element and its concomitants but also *kāyaviññatti* are described as *cittasamuṭṭhāna*[1]—a situation which gives the impression that the latter has an arising separate from that of the former. Nevertheless, the fact that *kāyaviññatti* is described as *citta-sahabhū*, although no *rūpa-dhamma* can be so described, suggests that thereby the *Dhammasaṅganī* does not mean that it is a (separate) *rūpa-dhamma*. The logic that seems to have guided it in taking such a step could be that, since the air-element and its concomitants are *cittasamuṭṭhāna*, their *ākāra-vikāra* (*kāyaviññatti*), too, is *cittasamuṭṭhāna*.

The commentators clarify the whole situation when they observe that, strictly speaking, only the air-element and its concomitants are *citta-samuṭṭhāna*.[2] This is quite understandable. For, as we have already seen, *kāyaviññatti* signifies the self-same number of *rūpa-dhammas* when they are in a particular position or situation, and not something that is distinct from them. In other words, it is an *anipphanna-rūpa*.

As for the interpretation of *vāgvijñapti* (Pāli: *vacīviññatti*) there is general agreement among most of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. Voice (*vāc*) or vocal sound (*vāgdhvani*) as a mode of self-expression or as a medium for the communication of one's thought to another is *vāgvijñapti*. It is defined as sound which is discourse by

[1] *Op. cit.* p. 147.

[2] See *Asl*. p. 337.

its nature, i.e. articulate (*varṇātmaka*) sound; as the pronunciation of sounds (*ghosoccarana*); or as the distinct pronunciation of syllables (*vyaktavarṇoccarana*). Since *vāgvijñapti* means vocal sound, it is brought under *śabdāyatana*, the sphere of the audible.[1] It is presumably because of this general agreement on the subject that the accounts of *vāgvijñapti* occupy comparatively little space in the sources of Sanskrit Buddhism.

On the other hand, the Theravāda account of the subject takes quite a different form. The one given in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka does not present a complete picture. First, *vācā* (voice) is described as *girā* (utterance), *vyappatho* (speech, speaking), *udīrana* (vocal emission), *ghosa* (noise), *ghosa-kamma* (act of making noise), or *vacībheda* (broken or articulate voice)—which arises in response to a thought wholesome, unwholesome, or morally indeterminate. Then it is said that the manifestation (*viññatti*), the making known (*viññāpanā*), or the state of having made known (*viññāpitatta*) (of that thought) through *vācā* is *vacīviññatti*.[2]

At first sight it might appear from this statement that *vacīviññatti* means vocal sound as a medium of thought-expression. But its exclusion from *saddāyatana*, the sphere of the audible, shows that it is not conceived as a variety of sound as such. However, the fact that vocal sound is referred to, suggests that it is closely connected with *vacīviññatti*, even as bodily movements are with *kāyaviññatti*. Thirdly, the fact that it is also described as *citta-sahabhū*,[3] shows that like *kāyaviññatti* it is not a discrete *rūpa-dhamma*.

The commentators' interpretation falls within the framework of these three fundamental facts. We may therefore take it as an explicit statement of what has been implicitly recognized in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

That the thought is communicated through vocal sound is admitted. But the *vacīviññatti* is not the same as vocal sound, but is causally related to it in the same way as *kāyaviññatti* is to bodily movements.[4]

Vacīviññatti, it is said, is an *ākāra-vikāra* of the *citta-samuṭṭhāna* earth-element.[5] Although it is called so, in reality, like the *kāyaviññatti*, it is an *ākāra-vikāra* of all the four primary elements (and of whatever secondary element that arises and exists with them). In this case it is the earth-element that is characterised by more intensity and capability; hence it is called the *ākāra-vikāra* of the earth-element.[6]

This so-called *ākāra-vikāra* of the earth-element (= *vacīviññatti*) strikes against the vocal apparatus (*upādiṇṇaka*, *akkharuppattiṭṭhāna*) and produces (vocal) sound through which the thought is communicated.[7]

[1] See *AK.* Ch. IV, p. 14; *KSP* : *MCB.* IV, pp. 156, 260; *Mdhy. Vṛt.* p. 307; *AKvy.* II, p. 351.
[2] *Dhs.* pp. 143–144.
[3] *Ibid.* p. 148.
[4] *Vism.* p. 379.
[5] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[6] *VismṬ.* p. 452.
[7] *Abhvk.* p. 277; see also *Mvn.* p. 65.

Why an *ākāra-vikāra* of the earth-element and its concomitants is recognized as *vacīviññatti* is because of the fact that, like *kāyaviññatti*, it too has to be *cittasahabhū*. And, the position of *vacīviññatti* in relation to the earth-element and its concomitants should be understood in the same way as that of the *kāyaviññatti* in relation to the air-element and its concomitants. That is to say, apart from those elements, of which it is an *ākāra-vikāra*, there is no distinct and separate *rūpa-dhamma* called *vacīviññatti* —hence its inclusion in the category of *anipphanna-rūpa*.

Characteristics of matter

By characteristics of matter we mean the three items, namely, *rūpassa lahutā*, *rūpassa mudutā* and *rūpassa kammaññatā*. The first means lightness (*lahutā*) of matter, its light transformability (*lahupariṇāmatā*), its lack of heaviness (*adandhatā*) or non-rigidity (*avithatatā*); the second, plasticity of matter (*mudutā*), its softness (*maddavatā*) or its absence of hardness (*akakkhaḷatā*); and the third, wieldiness or pliability of matter (*kammaññatā*, *kammaññattaṃ*, *kammaññabhāva*).

According to these definitions, which we have taken from the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*,[1] the three items seem to indicate some characteristics or qualities of matter in general. However, in the later works we are told that they signify certain characteristics of the matter of the body of a living being : They are not found apart from each other (*na aññam'aññaṃ vijahanti*); the triad represents a certain position of the body when it is healthy, efficient or when it is amenable to work.[2]

This gives an indication of why the Abhidhamma has recognized the items in question. In the Nikāyas much emphasis is laid on the desirability of bodily health or efficiency for the purposes of mental culture. A healthy body is usually described as *lahu* and *kammañña*, i.e. pliable and wieldy.[3] Over-eating renders the body *garu*, heavy, and *akammañña*, unserviceable; it is like a load of soaked beans. Such a state of the body is not conducive to putting forth energy in the right direction. Hence the monks are advised to have a body that is *lahu* and *kammañña*.[4] Thus it is that Khitaka of the *Theragāthā* exults in the thought that his body is *lahu* and that it " floats " like a piece of cotton in the air.[5] The term, *mudu* occurs mostly in the references to bodily beauty.

Nevertheless, the fact that *lahu* and *kammañña* occur often in the Nikāyan allusions to the bodily health and efficiency, and the fact that Buddhism attaches much importance to it, seem to confirm the statement, namely that the three items are meant to recognize certain characteristics, not of matter in general, but of the body of a living being (when it is healthy and efficient).

However, nowhere in the Nikāyas are they recognized as *rūpa-dhammas*, although they are so recognized in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Whether this means that they are understood as three discrete material elements is the question that arises here.

[1] p. 144.
[2] See *Abhvk.* p. 281.
[3] *Cf. e.g. D.* I, p. 67, *M.* II, p. 187.
[4] *Cf.* the description of the eight *kusīta-vatthus*, bases of indolence in *A.* IV, pp. 332 ff.
[5] *Thag.* p. 15.

5——RR 19872 (11/66)

The way they are named (note the term *rūpassa* added before each item) and the way they are defined, suggest clearly that they could well be interpreted as qualities of matter (body). Their elevation to the status of *rūpa-dhamma* seems to have been done with a view to forestalling their being interpreted as such. But the commentators appear to have realized that by this device alone their true nature cannot be concealed. This explains why in the later works they are explained in such a way as to deprive them of their apparent position as discrete entities.

What they really amount to, is stated clearly: When the body is not efficient, i.e. when it is not light (*lahu*), pliable (*mudu*), and wieldy (*kammañña*), it is said to be characterised by "*dhātukkhobha*", elemental disturbance.[1] What is called *dhātukkhobha* is either the disharmony between wind (*vāta*), bile (*pitta*) and phlegm (*semha*), or that of chyme? etc. (*rasādidhātu*).[2] In either case, in the ultimate analysis, it means the same thing: it is a certain position or situation (*vikāra*) of the primary elements and of whatever other secondary element concomitant with them.[3]

Likewise, when the body is not characterised by *dhātukkhobha*, in the ultimate analysis, it also signifies a certain position or situation of the primary elements and their concomitants. It is this position or situation that is represented by the triad, *lahutā-mudutā-kammaññatā*. Hence it is called *vikāra-rūpa*.[4] And, since they represent a *vikāra* of the primary elements and their concomitants, apart from them there do not exist three *rūpa-dhammas* called *lahutā*, *mudutā* and *kammaññatā*. Stated otherwise: they are *anipphanna-rūpa*.

Phases of matter

The next four items, namely, *rūpassa upacaya* (growth of matter), *rūpassa santati* (continuity of matter), *rūpassa jaratā* (decay of matter) and *rūpassa aniccatā* (impermanence of matter) are a formulation of four phases, not of matter in general, but of the physical body of a living being. It is of course true that this limitation in their scope is not explicitly stated in the Abhidhamma. But the way they are described, both in the earlier and the later works, makes it clear that this was the underlying assumption. And, it is only when this fact is taken into consideration that their significance as well as their mutual relation become increasingly clear.

Let us take the first two, first. *Rūpassa upacaya* is defined as: "*yo āyatanānaṃ ācayo, so rūpassa upacayo*" (That accumulation of *āyatanas* is also the growth of matter), and *rūpassa santati* as "*yo rūpassa upacayo, sā rūpassa santati*" (That growth of matter is also the continuity of matter).[5] Thus, while the first is explained as "*āyatanānaṃ ācayo*", the second is identified with the first.

One immediate conclusion that can be drawn from this is that both are expressive of the same thing. On the other hand, one cannot overlook the fact that they are counted as two items and that they convey two different meanings: the first means

[1] See *Asl.* pp. 326–7; *Vism.* pp. 448–9.

[2] *Dhātukkhobho: vāta-pitta-semhappakopo; rasādidhātūnaṃ vā vikārāvatthā*—*VismṬ.* p. 453.

[3] *Dvidhā vutto pi atthato paṭhavī ādidhātūnaṃ yeva vikāro daṭṭhabbo*—*ibid. loc. cit.*

[4] See *Abhvk.* pp. 280 ff.

[5] *Dhs.* p. 153.

growth or integration of matter and the second its continuity or subsistence. When both points are taken into consideration, their relation turns out to be one of identity as well as difference. In which sense are they identical and in which different?

From the (*Vibhāvinī*) *ṭīkā* to the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* one gathers that the first refers to the growth of the body (embryo) from the moment of conception till the sense-mechanism is complete.[1] Although in the later works the subject under consideration has undergone much change, yet this particular statement could be supported by the data confined to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

We saw that *rūpassa upacaya*=*āyatanānaṃ ācayo*. We need first clarify what the term *āyatana* signifies here. It is a well known fact that there are twelve *āyatanas*, of which six (*cakkhu*, *sota*, etc.) are qualified as *ajjhattika* and the other six (*rūpa*, *sadda*, etc.) as *bāhira*. But usually the simple term *āyatana* is used to mean only the *ajjhattika* group. *Saḷ-āyatana* (Skr. *saḍ-āyatana*) is a case in point. In the phrase in question, too, the term appears to have been used with this restricted denotation. Further proof of this supposition is the fact that it tallies well with the rest of the data on the subject. Since *āyatanānaṃ ācayo*=*rūpassa upacayo*, we could still narrow down the field to include only the first five *ajjhattika-āyatanas*, i.e. the first five sense-organs, which alone come under *rūpa* (matter).[2]

Since *ācayo* means "heaping up" or "accumulation", *āyatanānaṃ ācayo* implies that the coming into being of the five sense-organs is a graduated process. This is further confirmed by a *Kathāvatthu* controversy concerning the genesis of the sense-mechanism. According to some schools (the Pubbaseliya and the Aparaseliya[3]) the six-fold sense-sphere comes into being all at once (*apubbaṃ acarimaṃ*). The Theravādins reject this view on the ground that it is neither logical nor supported by the Scripture. Their view is that only (*manāyatana*) and *kāyāyatana* come into being at the moment of conception. The other four, namely, *cakkhāyatana*, *sotāyatana*, *ghānāyatana* and *jivhāyatana* arise subsequently in the order they are mentioned here.[4]

With this theory in mind, when one approaches the formula: *āyatanānaṃ ācayo*=*rūpassa upacayo*, its significance becomes clear. The accumulation, i.e. the coming into being, one after another, of the first five sense-organs is, in other words, the growth or integration of the body (*rūpassa upacaya*). It is like saying: the gathering of people is the growth of the crowd. Or to adopt a simile from the commentaries: the welling up of water is the brimming up of the well.[5]

From this it should not be concluded that the sense-organs could arise independently of some other material elements. Since they are *upādā-rūpas*, it is implied that the four *mahābhūtas* and the four *upādā-rūpas* which necessarily arise

[1] *Cf. Tattha paṭisandhito paṭṭhāya yāva cakkhādidasakānaṃ uppatti, etthantare rūpuppādo upacayo nāma.*—*ADSVṬ.* p. 114.

[2] This is not to suggest that the sense-organs could arise independently of other *rūpa-dhammas* because they are a variety of *upādā-rūpa*.

[3] i.e. according to *KvuA.* p. 148.

[4] *Kvu.* pp. 493 ff.

[5] See *Vism.* p. 380; *Asl.* p. 327.

with them[1] are also present. Again, since they are *kamma-samuṭṭhāna-rūpa*, and since the stability of the *kamma-samuṭṭhāna-rūpa* is dependent on the *rūpa-jīvitindriya*,[2] the presence of the *rūpa-jīvitindriya*, too, is implied.[3]

Thus *rūpassa upacaya* means the growth of the embryo with the gradual accumulation of the sense-organs. It covers that interval from the moment of conception to the moment when the sense-mechanism is complete.

With the completion of the sense-mechanism, in other words, with the accumulation of the last sense-organ, ends what is called *rūpassa upacaya*, the growth of the body. This does not mean that there is no growth thereafter. It all means that the body is not deficient in any of the sense-organs. From the point of view of the sense-organs, it is complete. Moreover, if *rūpassa upacaya* means the accumulation of the sense-organs, it follows that with the accumulation of the last sense-organ, there ends the phase called *rūpassa upacaya*.

Thereafter begins *rūpassa santati*, the continuity of the body, complete with all the sense-organs. It is not continuity in a static sense. For certainly the body grows even during this phase. It is therefore continuity (*santati*) by way of growth (*upacaya*). This explains why *rūpassa santati* is defined as *rūpassa upacaya : yo rūpassa upacayo sā rūpassa santati.*

Thus, both *rūpassa upacaya* and *rūpassa santati* mean the growth of the body (=*rūpassa upacaya*). In this sense they are identical. But they represent two phases of growth. In this sense they are different.

The third is *rūpassa jaratā* : " The decay (*jarā*) or the state of decaying (*jīraṇatā*) of the body (*rūpa*), brokenness of teeth (*khaṇḍicca*), greyness of hair (*pālicca*), the state of having wrinkles (*valittacatā*), shrinkage in the length of days (*āyuno saṃhāni*), hyper-maturity of the faculties (*indriyānam paripāko*). "[4]

One question that arises here is whether *rūpassa jaratā* represents a stage in the history of the body or whether it refers to the fact of decay itself. Since brokenness of teeth, greyness of hair, etc. are symbolic of old age, it seems more appropriate if it is understood as a stage which sets in with the passage of time, when the body shows signs of decay. The use of the words, " shrinkage in the length of days ", does also encourage this conclusion.

Once it is understood as a stage, the next question that arises here is whether it overlaps with *rūpassa santati*. What we should not overlook here is that, although *rūpassa santati* means continuity of the body, yet it is defined as *rūpassa upacaya*,

[1] See above, p. 33.
[2] See above, p. 59.
[3] To th s group the later works add *hadaya-vatthu* & the faculty of sex, both of which are said to arise together with (*manāyatana*) & *kāyāyatana*—see *VbhA*. p. 22 ; *ADS*. p. 30 ; *ADSS*. p. 199. The addition of the former is necessitated by its being recognized as the physical basis of mind. Cf. *Tkp*. p. 3 where it is stated that at the moment of conception the relation between mind and matter is one of reciprocal co-nascence (*aññam'añña sahajāta*). The addition of the latter is necessitated by the new interpretation given to it, see above, pp. 55 ff.
[4] *Dhs*. p. 144 ; this same description occurs as a stock formula in *D*. II, p. 305, *M*. I, p. 49, *S*. II, p. 2.

growth of the body (after the completion of the sense-mechanism). Generally speaking, when decay sets in growth ceases. And, since *rūpassa santati* is defined as the growth of the body, it seems unlikely that it was understood as covering the *jaratā*-phase, too. This is not to suggest that *jaratā* as a phenomenon could not take place during *santati*-(or *upacaya*-) phase. But when life is young the tendency is towards growth. With the passage of time there is a plus tendency towards decay. Gradually the faculties get matured. The body begins to show signs of maturity and decay. It is these two phases that *rūpassa santati* and *rūpassa jaratā* represent. During the first the main characteristic is growth (*upacaya*) ; during the second it is decay (*jaratā*).

Finally we come to the final phase, or rather the moment—*rūpassa aniccatā*. This signifies the break-up of the body at the time of death.[1] It is that moment when the body becomes a (lifeless) corpse.[2]

These four *upādā-rūpas*, which amount to a formulation of four phases of the history of the body, appear to have been based on the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas* referred to in the *Aṅguttaranikāya*. In this Nikāya it is stated that that which is *saṅkhata* has three fundamental characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*), namely, *uppāda*, *vaya*, and *ṭhitassa aññathatta*.[3]

Now, *uppāda*, i. e. birth or origination, corresponds to the beginning of the first phase, *rūpassa upacaya*. *Vaya*, i. e. waning away or cessation, corresponds to *rūpassa aniccatā*. Before one could find out what corresponds to *ṭhitassa aññathatta* one has to find out what it really means.

As we shall soon see, different schools of Buddhism interpret *ṭhitassa aññathatta*, literally, " otherwiseness of that which is existing ", in different ways, as if to justify the very meaning conveyed by the phrase. But what is common to these later-day interpretations is that they are based on the theory of moments. This theory does not find expression in the earlier texts. True, the doctrine of impermanence is constantly alluded to. But the logical implications of this doctrine were not developed on the basis of a theory of moments. And, as Mrs. Rhys Davids rightly observes, " it was inevitable that later exegesis would so develop the theme ".[4]

The second point to be noted here is that, although the Nikāyas recognize the rapidity of change in mental events, they assign a relative permanence to the body.

" Better were it *bhikkhus* that the uneducated many-folk should conceive this four-element-made body, rather than *citta*, to be soul. And why ? The body is seen to persist for a year, for two, three, four, five, ten or twenty years, for a generation

[1] See *Dhs*. p. 144.
[2] This should be the moment when the *rūpa-jīvitindriya* ceases to function. Cf. *KvuA*. p. 113 where it is stated that at the moment of death both *rūpa* and *arūpa-jīvitindriyas* cease to function simultaneously (*Cutikkhaṇasmiṃ dve pi jīvitāni sah'eva bhijjanti*).
[3] *Op. cit.* i, p. 152.
[4] *Bud. Psy*. p. 14.

...... even for a hundred years or even for longer, while that which is called consciousness, that is mind, that is intelligence, arises as one thing, ceases as another, both by night and by day ".[1]

This difference between mind and matter as regards their duration is recognized and upheld in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, too. A number of controversies in the *Kathāvatthu* suggest clearly that the Theravādins had no hesitation in recognizing the momentariness of mental elements.[2] On the other hand, they do not deny the relative permanence of the body or matter in general. In point of fact, the thesis (of the Pubbaseliyas and the Aparaseliyas[3]), namely, that the duration of material things is equal to the duration of a thought-moment (*eka-cittakkhaṇika*) is rejected as untenable.[4]

It was not the Theravādins alone who upheld this tradition. Vasumitra records that, in the view of the Mahāsāṅghikas, the material sense-organs and the primary elements " evolve " (*pariṇamati*), whereas consciousness and consciousness-concomitants do not " evolve ". This has been interpreted to mean that while material elements endure for a longer time, mental elements are " naissant-périssant en un instant " (*kṣaṇabhaṅgura*).[5] Yaśomitra notes that, in the opinion of the Ārya-Sāṃmitīyas, matter is of longer duration, whereas consciousness and consciousness-concomitants are characterized by instantaneous being.[6] A similar view is attributed to the Vātsīputrīyas, too : Some *saṃskāras* exist for some time while others perish at every moment.[7]

On the other hand, many other schools, notably the Sarvāstivāda, the Mahīśāsaka, the Pūrvaśaila, and the Aparaśaila disapproved of this distinction. In their view not only mental but also material elements are of instantaneous being.[8]


It seems fairly clear that over the interpretation of the early doctrine of impermanence the Buddhist schools fell into two general groups. Some recognized the momentary duration of mental elements but assigned a relative permanence to material elements. Others objected to introducing any such distinction. As we have seen, the Theravādins of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka belong to the former group. As yet they were not prepared to admit that material elements were of momentary duration.

---

[1] *S.* II, p. 94 (translation from *Bud. Psy.* pp. 13–14) ; *cf.* also *N'āhaṃ bhikkhave aññaṃ eka dhammam pi samanupassāmi evaṃ lahuparivattaṃ yathāyidaṃ bhikkhave cittaṃ*—*A.* I, p. 10.
[2] See *op. cit.* pp. 204–8, 458–9, 620–1.
[3] according to *KvuA.* p. 196.
[4] See *Kvu.* pp. 620 ff.
[5] *Documents d' Abh. : MCB.* V, 136 ; Masuda, AM. II, p. 34, n. I, 2 ; Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques Du Petit Véhicule,* pp. 73–74.
[6] *Cf. yo py āha nikāyāṃtarīya iti ārya-Sāṃmitīyaḥ. sa ghaṭ' āder mudgar' ādi-kṛto vināśa iti manyate kālāṃtarāvasthāyī hi taṣya rūpaṃ. citta-caittānāṃ tu kṣaṇikatvaṃ*—*AKvy.* p. 179.
[7] Masuda, AM. II, p. 54.
[8] Masuda, AM, II, p. 54 n. 2 ; Bareau, *Les Sectes Bouddhiques Du Petit Véhicule,* pp. 103, 105, 144, 186 ; see *Documents'd'Abh. : MCB.* V, pp. 137–140, where Sanghabhadra criticizes severely the thesis that matter is not of momentary duration. For a compact but comprehensive discussion on this subject, consult Silburn, *Instant et Cause,* pp. 227–274.

In view of this circumstance, as far as material elements are concerned, they seem to have understood *ṭhitassa aññathatta* in a very general sense. That is to say, material things become otherwise while they are existing. Looked at in this way, how it is represented among the four *upādā-rūpas* is easily recognizable. We have already shown that *rūpassa upacaya* and *santati* signify the gradual growth of the body and *rūpassa jaratā* the gradual process of maturing and decay that sets in with the march of years. Since they point to the fact that the body becomes " otherwise " (*aññathatta*) while it is " existing " (*ṭhitassa*) they could be understood as representative of *ṭhitassa aññathatta.*

The position of the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas vis-à-vis* the four *upādā-rūpas* could then be graphically illustrated, as follows :



When the *Aṅguttaranikāya* refers to the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas,* the purpose is to show that all mental and material things are impermanent. The fact that in the earlier texts the impermanence of both groups is not explained in equal terms, is a different question. The Abhidhamma Piṭaka has not deviated from this fundamental principle. It may then be asked why it has made a special attempt to show the " *saṅkhata*-ness " of the body, in particular.

Moral edification seems to be the reason behind this device. True, to the body some relative permanence could be assigned. Yet it is not something that is everlasting. It has a beginning all right, but it has an end, too. It has a phase of growth all right, but it has a phase of decay, too. " This corporeal frame of mine is made up of the four elements, starts from parents, is sustained by rice and other foods, is impermanent and subject to attrition, abraision, erasion, dissolution and disruption, and this consciousness of mine is tied and bound up therewith ".[1] This is how one is expected to approach one's own body so that one's own attachment to it, let alone to any other instance of matter, should cease thereby. When one remembers that the scope as well as the approach of the Buddhist analysis of matter are mainly determined by ethical factors, one need not be surprised why the Abhidhamma Piṭaka has deemed it necessary to enumerate the four items which we have so far discussed.

When the doctrine of impermanence, which in the earlier texts was described in simple and general terms, came to be explained more systematically and with greater precision, attempts were also made to reinterpret the *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas.*

---

[1] *D.* I, p. 54.

The Vaibhāṣikas interpreted *sthityanyathātva* (*ṭhitassa aññathatta*) as *jaratā*, postulated another item, *sthiti*,[1] and thus increased the number to four : (i) *jāti*, origination ; (ii) *sthiti*, existence ; (iii) *jaratā*, decay , and (iv) *anityatā*, extinction. All *dharmas*, elements of existence, mental as well as material, characterized by them are *saṃskṛta*. Only *ākāśa* (space) and the two kinds of *nirodha* (cessation) escape from their inexorable sway.[2] At every *kṣaṇa*, moment, all (*saṃskṛta*) *dharmas* are affected by them. A *kṣaṇa* is the time during which the four *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas* accomplish their operation. The Vaibhāṣikas also maintained that they were not only distinct from, but also as real as, the *dharmas* they characterize—showing thereby a strong predilection to naive realism. And, in consonance with this thesis, it was also claimed that they were in turn characterized by *anulakṣaṇas*, secondary characteristics.

The Sautrāntikas made a prolonged polemic against this Vaibhāṣika interpretation. They pointed out that the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas* were mere characteristics, mere designations, with no objective reality and argued that the recognition of *anulakṣaṇas* would lead to the problem of infinite regress (*anavasthā*). In their view, they apply not to one but to a series of momentary elements. " The series or stream itself is called subsistence (*sthiti*), its origin is called *jāti*, its cessation is *vyaya*, and the difference in its preceding and succeeding moments is called *sthityanyathātva*."[3] A momentary element, so they argued, cannot have a phase called *sthiti* or *jaratā*, for whatever that originates has no time to subsist or decay but to perish.[4]

How the Theravādins of the Abhidhammic commentaries and the kindred works developed the doctrine of impermanence and how they interpreted the *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas*, can be understood clearly when the subject is unfolded against this background. We have already shown that, although the Abhidhamma Piṭaka recognizes the momentariness of mental elements, it does not extend the same principle to material elements. What is more, even this "limited" momentariness is not explained systematically. The new development is to be seen in the formulation of a theory of moments, replacing the early doctrine of momentariness. It applies to both groups of elements equally, but for one significant difference : The earlier tradition that matter is of longer duration is recognized, but of course not in the same form.[5] On some technical points the Theravāda theory differs from those of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. However, in the *ṭīkās* where the subject is dealt with in more detail, it has come very close to that of the Sautrāntikas.

The most striking thing about the Theravāda theory is that the fact of momentariness is explained in quite a different way : Each *dhamma* has three moments, namely, *uppādakkhaṇa*, the moment of origination ; *ṭhitikkhaṇa*, the moment of subsistence ;

[1] According to some *ācāryas* both *sthiti* & *jaratā* are represented by *sthityanyathātva* ; see *AK*. Ch. II, p. 93.
[2] See below, p. 93.
[3] Jaini, *The development of the theory of the viprayukta-saṃskāras*, BSOAS. Vol. XXII, Pt. 3.
[4] This brief sketch is based on : Jaini, *op. cit.* ; De la Vallée Poussin, *Documents d' Abh. : MCB*. V, pp. 134 ff. ; Stcherbatsky, *Central Concep*. pp. 39 ff., *Bud. Logic* I, pp. 79-118 ; Silburn, *Cause et Instant*, pp. 254–262. See also *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 222–238 ; *AKvy*. I, pp. 174 ff. ; *CP*. *Mdhy. Vṛt*. pp. 108 ff. ; *La Siddhi*. pp. 198.
[5] See below, p. 132.

bhaṅgakkhaṇa, the moment of cessation. The three moments do not correspond to three different *dhammas*. On the contrary, they represent three phases (*avatthā*)—the nascent, the static and the cessant— of one "momentary" *dhamma*. Hence the statement, namely, the *dhammas* are momentary, means that a given *dhamma* has three momentary phases or stages. It arises in the first moment, subsists in the second moment and perishes in the third moment.[1]

Commenting on the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya*,[2] the Commentator says that *uppāda* is *jāti* (birth, origination), *vaya* is *bheda* (destruction) and *ṭhitassa aññathatta* is *jaratā* (decay). And he goes on to say that these three are represented by *uppādakkhaṇa*, *bhaṅgakkhaṇa* and *ṭhitikkhaṇa* respectively.[3] The fact that *jāti* and *bheda* are said to be represented by *uppādakkhaṇa* and *bhaṅgakkhaṇa* respectively, does not pose a very significant problem. But the fact that *jaratā* is said to be represented by *ṭhitikkhaṇa* shows that the so-called moment of subsistence is also the moment of decay.

In contrast, the Vaibhāṣikas take *jaratā* as distinct from *sthiti* and accordingly count them as two separate *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas*. Since the Theravādins explain *ṭhiti(kkhaṇa)* as *jaratā*, it may be concluded that there is some kind of change or modification in a given *dhamma* during the moment of its subsistence.

That this is so, is shown by two comments made by Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta. In almost identical words, they observe that *jaratā* is manifested as the loss of *navabhāva*, newness, of a *dhamma* (*navabhāvāpagama*), and not as the loss of its *sabhāva*, intrinsic nature (*sabhāvānapagama*). It is like (new) paddy becoming old (*vīhipurāṇabhāvo viya*).[4] Since *jaratā* = *ṭhiti*(*kkhaṇa*), this means that a *dhamma* is new and fresh at the moment of its origination, but is old, matured, changed or modified at the moment of its subsistence—though its intrinsic nature remains the same.

Of much significance is the fact that both commentators took special care to point out that *jaratā* does not signify the loss of *sabhāva*, but only the loss of *navabhāva*. Thereby they were intent to show that during the *jaratā*-phase the identity of a *dhamma* is not completely lost. If it were otherwise then it would mean that the *dhamma* that subsists is not the same as the *dhamma* that originates. There would be two *dhammas* corresponding to the two moments, *uppādakkhaṇa* and *ṭhitikkhaṇa*—a situation which would undermine the very foundation of the theory of moments.

Although this explanation does not lead to the collapse of the theory of moments, yet it raises one significant problem which seems to have escaped the attention of its authors. If a *dhamma* becomes different without, however, losing its intrinsic

[1] See *VbhA*. pp. 7–8, 25–29 ; *Vism*. pp. 291–292, 613–614. The *ṭhitikkhaṇa* of *rūpa* is of longer duration than that of the mental elements ; see below, pp. 132–33. On how the theory of perception is explained on the basis of the theory of moments, see Sarathchandra, *Bud. Psy. of Percep*. pp. 42 ff.
[2] See above, p. 8.
[3] *AA*. II, p. 252.
[4] See *Vism*. p. 449 ; *Abhvt*. p. 71.

nature, then this situation approaches the doctrine of *pariṇāmavāda* (theory of evolution), according to which the essence, the substance, remains the same while its modes undergo change. Change, as it came to be finally interpreted in the schools of Buddhist logic, is not the transformation of one and the same *dharma* from one stage to another, but the replacement of one momentary *dharma by* another.[1] The following polemic in the *Abhidharmakośa*, directed against the Vaibhāṣikas who admitted *jaratā* of one momentary *dharma*, applies equally to the explanation given by Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta.

"Mais comment attribuer à un *dharma* la vieillesse ? La vieillesse, c'est la transformation, la dissimilitude entre deux états. Or, peut-on dire d'un *dharma* qu'il devient différent de lui-même ?

S'il reste celui-ci, il n'est pas celui-là ; s'il est transformé, il n'est plus celui-ci. Donc la transformation d'un *dharma* est impossible."[2]

The authors of the *ṭīkās*, notably Sumangala, seem to have taken notice of the whole problem stemming from the recognition and definition of *jaratā*. This explains why an attempt has been made to foist a new interpretation into *jaratā*—an interpretation which really amounts to its denial.[3]

It may be recalled here that according to the earlier account *jaratā* is manifested as the loss of *navabhāva* of a *dhamma*, and not as its complete loss of identity. According to Sumangala's interpretation, *navabhāva* is only a figurative expression for *uppādakkhaṇa*, the moment of origination—so called because of its chronological priority in relation to *ṭhitikkhaṇa*, the moment of subsistence. That is to say, since *uppādakkhaṇa* of a *dhamma* precedes its *ṭhitikkhaṇa*, in this sense the former is its *navabhāva*. Understood in this way, the loss of *navabhāva* is nothing but the lapse of *uppādakkhaṇa*, and the (immediate) lapse of *uppādakkhaṇa* means the succession of *ṭhitikkhaṇa*. Now, just as *uppādakkhaṇa* is called *navabhāva*, "newness", because it comes before *ṭhitikkhaṇa* even so *ṭhitikkhaṇa* is called *jaratā*, "oldness", because it comes after *uppādakkhaṇa*.[4]

There is another reason—this of course is only implied—why *ṭhitikkhaṇa* could be designated as *jaratā*. Sometimes *ṭhitikkhaṇa* is defined as "*nirodhābhimukhāvatthā*" or "*bhaṅgassa abhimukhāvatthā*"[5], i.e. that phase (moment) when a *dhamma* is facing its destruction. The obvious implication is that since *bhaṅgakkhaṇa* is the

[1] See Stcherbatsky, *Bud. Logic*, I. pp. 96 ff.

[2] *Op. cit.* Ch. II, p. 233.

[3] It is very likely that they were inspired by the arguments of the *AK*. The Theravādins of Ceylon show much acquaintance with this (and other notable works of Skr. Buddhism). Cf. e.g. *VismS*. V, pp. 51 ff. where quotations from it are cited, not, as might be expected, with a view to refuting them, but in support of its own statements. On Theravādins' acquaintance with Skr. Bud. works, see Godakumbura, *Sinhalese Literature*, pp. 41–46 ; his art. *References to Skr. Bud. writers in Sinhalese literature*, UCR. Vol. I, Pt. I ; see also Paraṇavitana, *Mahāyānism in Ceylon*, CJS. Vol. I, No. II.

[4] *Cf. Ṭhitikkhaṇe hi jarā nāma ; na ca tadā dhammo sabhāvaṃ vijahati. Navabhāvo uppādāvatthā, tassā apagamabhāvena gayhatī ti āha navabhāvāpagamapaccupaṭṭhānā ti*—*Abhvk*. p. 284.

[5] See *Abhvk*. p. 305 ; *ADSVṬ*. p. 112.

immediate and unavoidable successor to *ṭhitikkhaṇa*, during its moment of subsistence a *dhamma* can only face its own destruction, its own death. Generally speaking death is preceded by old age (*jaratā*). And, since *bhaṅgakkhaṇa* is always (immediately) preceded by *ṭhitikkhaṇa*, on the above analogy, but as a figure of speech, the latter could well be designated as "old age" (*jaratā*).

Sumangala is rightly aware that in the context of this new interpretation the 'oldness-of-the-paddy-simile" (*vīhipurāṇabhāvo viya*)[1] is not relevant, if not misleading. Accordingly, he observes that when paddy becomes old there is at least a change in its savour, etc. On the other hand, when a *dhamma* becomes old, i. e. when it comes to the moment of subsistence, it abandons nothing else but its own moment of origination.[2]

To sum up the difference : according to Buddhaghosa and Buddhadatta, *ṭhitikkhaṇa* is also called *jaratā* because at this moment a *dhamma* has undergone a change, although it has not lost its complete identity. According to Sumangala, although *ṭhitikkhaṇa* is called *jaratā*, the latter term is not to be understood as decay or as implying any idea of change, modification or transformation of a *dhamma*. In other words, there is no *jaratā* when it is understood in its usual sense. According to the former, *ṭhiti*(*kkhaṇa*) is really *jaratā* ; according to the latter, *ṭhiti*(*kkhaṇa*) is really *ṭhiti* in the true sense of the term.

This new interpretation, though it has successfully eliminated the problem stemming from the earlier definition of *jaratā*, upsets the correspondence between the three *khaṇas* (moments) and the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas*. We saw[3] that according to the earlier account *ṭhitikkhaṇa* represented the third *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇa*, i.e. *ṭhitassa aññathatta*. However, since *ṭhiti*(*kkhaṇa*) was explained as *jaratā*, one cannot say that some justice was not done to the idea of "change" or "becoming otherwise" conveyed by the phrase, *ṭhitassa aññathatta*. But in the later account *ṭhiti*(*kkhaṇa*) is not understood as *jaratā*, although it is (figuratively) called so. As such has it any claim to represent *ṭhitassa aññathatta* ?

From a passing comment[4] made by Sumangala one gathers that he did not, because he could not, take *ṭhitikkhaṇa* as corresponding to *ṭhitassa aññathatta*. In view of this circumstance, the third *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇa*, *ṭhitassa aññathatta*, remains unrepresented by any of the three *khaṇas*. We are not told how we should

[1] See above, p. 85.

[2] *Vīhipurāṇabhāvo tāva rasādiṃ apaneti, ayam pana kevalaṃ uppādāvatthameva apaneti*—*Abhvk*. p. 284.

[3] See above, p. 85.

[4] We mean the question : *Kasmā pāḷiyaṃ ṭhitikkhaṇo na vutto ti ?* (*Abhvk*. p. 30). This shows that *ṭhitikkhaṇa* is not taken as representative of *ṭhitassa aññathatta*, for the latter is referred to in the *pāḷi*, i.e. the Canon (see *A*. I, p. 152). We are told that it is because of a purely practical reason, i.e. in the interests of the instructed (*vineyyajjhāsayānurodhena*, cf. *upāya-kauśalya* of Mahāyāna) that the *ṭhitikkhaṇa* is not referred to in the Canon. Perhaps this may mean the same as what certain Vaibhāṣikas say : With a view to creating complete detachment in the minds of the disciples from *saṃskṛta-dharmas*, it was deemed proper that the static phase (*sthiti*) of the *saṃskṛta dharmas* should be overlooked.—see *AK* Ch II, p. 223.

understand it. Nevertheless the denial, namely that it does not apply to a momentary *dhamma*, carries the implication that it applies to a series of momentary *dhammas*.

This brings the position of the Theravādins another step closer to that of the Sautrāntikas.[1] However, there is this fundamental difference to be noted : Unlike the Sautrāntikas, Sumangala (and others) do not deny the *ṭhiti-* phase of a momentary *dhamma*. If this too could be denied, then the difference would become almost negligeable. In point of fact, among some Theravādins there was a movement towards such a direction.

For Sumangala himself refers to one *ācariya*, named Ānanda, who objected to the recognition of the *ṭhitikkhaṇa* under any guise, whether it was interpreted as *jaratā* or not. According to the latter, a *dhamma* has only two phases, one of origination and another of cessation. *Ṭhiti* is recognized, but as applying only to a series. This is called *pabandha-ṭhiti*, the series itself as subsistence. *Ṭhitassa aññathatta* is interpreted as *pubbāpara-visesa*, the difference between the preceding and the succeeding *dhammas* that constitute a series (*pabandha*).[2]

It hardly needs mention, the above interpretation is an attempt to introduce wholesale the Sautrāntika theory into the Theravāda. From what we can gather from the *ṭīkās*, it does not seem to have had a great following among the Theravāda scholiasts. The counter-argument of Sumangala and others amounts to this :

True, a *dhamma* that originates should also cease to exist. But before it could cease to exist, there should be at least a moment when it turns towards its own cessation (*nirodhābhimukhāvatthā*). It is this moment when a *dhamma* is facing its own cessation that we call the moment of subsistence (*ṭhitikkhaṇa*). The underlying assumption of this counter-argument seems to be that a *dhamma* that arises cannot cease to exist at one and the same time, for otherwise existence and non-existence would become co-existent—an extremely difficult situation even to imagine.

This brings us to an end of our survey of how the Abhidhammic commentaries and *ṭīkās* have explained the early doctrine of impermanence on the basis of a formulated theory of moments. Our purpose in giving this account is to show how and why they differ from the Abhidhamma Piṭaka in interpreting the four *upādā-rūpas*, namely, *rūpassa upacaya*, *rūpassa santati*, *rūpassa jaratā* and *rūpassa aniccatā*, with which we are concerned in this section.

How they are defined in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka has already been examined. We have shown that these four items, which amount to a formulation of some phases in the history of the body, are based on the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas*. We have

[1] See above, p. 84.

[2] *Abhvk.* pp. 304–305 ; see also *ADSVṬ*. p. 110.
The argument attributed to Ananda—*Api ca yathābhūto dhammo uppajjati, kiṃ tathābhūtova bhijjati, udāhu aññathābhūto ? Yadi tathābhūtova bhijjati na jaratāya sambhavo ; aññathābhūto añño eva so ti sabbathā pi ṭhitikkhaṇassa abhāvo yeva* (*Abhvk.* p. 305)—is reminiscent of : *yadi sa eva nāsāv athānyathā na sa eva* (*hi—tasmād ekaṣya dharmaṣya nānyathātvaṃ prasidhyate*)—*AK*. Ch. II, p. 233, n. I.

also shown that in explaining how the body is *saṅkhata*, the Abhidhamma Piṭaka does not go so far as to say that the *rūpa-dhammas* that constitute it are of momentary duration.[1] Therefore, and quite understandably, the later scholiasts could not retain the earlier account of the subject in the same form. For, in their view, the three *saṅkhata-lakkhaṇas* represent three momentary phases—the nascent, the static (decay) and the cessant—of a "momentary" *dhamma*. It is to be expected, therefore, that their interpretation of the subject should fall in line with this development.

That *rūpassa upacaya* and *rūpassa santati* are expressive of the same phenomenon is recognized by the later scholiasts, too. (That there is some kind of difference between them is not denied ; but this can be overlooked for the moment). But in their view, it is *jāti* or *uppāda* of *rūpa*, i. e. genesis or origination of matter.[2] With the recognition of this fact the four *upādā-rūpas* get reduced to three, namely, (i) *rūpassa jāti* (= *upacaya* and *santati*), (ii) *rūpassa jaratā* and (iii) *rūpassa aniccatā*. These three items, it may be noted here, correspond to the three *khaṇas* (moments), namely, (i) *uppādakkhaṇa*, (ii) *ṭhitikkhaṇa* (*jaratā*) and (ii) *bhaṅgakkhaṇa*. Once this correspondence is established it is easy to approach the subject from the point of view of the theory of moments.

According to a post-canonical theory of the Theravāda,[3] body consists of an enormous number of *rūpa-kalāpas*, i. e. the ultimate or the smallest groups of *rūpa-dhammas*. The *rūpa-dhammas* of each *rūpa-kalāpa* are not separable, one from another. They form a unity having a common origin, a common existence and a common cessation. Hence the three momentary phases of one *rūpa-kalāpa* mean the three momentary phases of all those *rūpa-dhammas* that make up that particular *rūpa-kalāpa*. The continuity of the body-series is due to the circumstance that when some *rūpa-kalāpas* perish they are immediately succeeded by others. It is a process of continual succession, projecting a picture of static existence.

The nascent phase, in other words, the *uppādakkhaṇa* of all those *rūpa-dhammas* that enter into the composition of the body-series is *rūpassa jāti* (= *upacaya* and *santati*) ; their static phase, in other words, the *ṭhitikkhaṇa* which is also called *jaratā*, is *rūpassa jaratā* ; their cessant phase, in other words, the *bhaṅgakkhaṇa*, is *rūpassa aniccatā*.

Although both *rūpassa upacaya* and *rūpassa santati* are said to signify *rūpassa jāti*, yet this difference between them is recognized : The nascent phase of those *rūpa-dhammas*, which constitute the body-series from the moment of conception till the sense-mechanism is complete, is *rūpassa upacaya*. The nascent phase of those that constitute it thereafter, i.e. upto the time of death (*cuti-pariyosānaṃ*) is *rūpassa santati*.[4]

[1] See above, pp. 82 ff.

[2] *Ubhayam p'etaṃ jātirūpass' evādhivacanaṃ*—*Vism.* p. 380 ; see also *Asl.* p. 326.

[3] See below, Ch. VIII.

[4] What has been stated so far is based on the accounts given in the commentaries as well as in the *ṭīkās* ; cf. *Vism.* pp. 449-50 ; *Asl.* pp. 327 ff. ; *VismṬ.* pp. 454 ff. ; *Abhvk.* pp. 282-284, 287-289 ; *ADSVṬ*. pp. 114 ff.

The latter statement needs some explanation. We have already shown[1] that, according to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, *rūpassa santati* signifies that phase of the body (growth) which comes before *rūpassa jaratā*. But according to the new interpretation, *rūpassa jāti* (= *upacaya* and *santati*), *rūpassa jaratā* and *rūpassa aniccatā* signify three momentary phases of a *rūpa-dhamma*/*rūpa-kalāpa* that enters into the composition of the body-series. As such, strictly speaking, *rūpassa jaratā* as understood by the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, has no place in the context of this new interpretation. This explains why *rūpassa santati* (= *rūpassa jāti*) is said to continue up to the moment of death.

Nevertheless *jaratā*, as understood by the earlier texts, is also recognized, but is given a different interpretation. It is called *pākaṭa-jarā*,[2] " evident decay " and is distinguished from *jarā* or *jaratā* as a momentary phase.[3] The latter is called *avici-jarā*, because it takes place incessantly, without interruption.[4] Brokenness of teeth (*khaṇḍicca*) is an instance of *pākaṭa-jarā*. In terms of elemental analysis, *pākaṭa-jarā* is only a *vikāra*.[5] That is to say, it merely signifies a peculiarity of the position, situation or arrangement of the momentary[6] *rūpa-dhammas*/*rūpa-kalāpas* that constitute the body-series.

In the course of our discussion of the theory of moments we noticed that Ananda (as represented by Sumangala) objected to the recognition of *ṭhitikkhaṇa*, the moment of subsistence, under any guise.[7] When approached from this point of view, the four items would get reduced to two: *rūpassa jāti* (= *upacaya and santati*) and *rūpassa aniccatā*.

Why the items under consideration are brought under the heading, *anipphanna*, may now be considered. These items signify certain phases or, as the commentators say, certain characteristics (*lakkhaṇa*) of the *nipphanna-rūpa*. As such they are not real *rūpa-dhammas*. When a *rūpa-dhamma* originates, it is called *rūpassa jāti*; when it subsists (decay),[8] it is called *rūpassa jaratā*; when it perishes, it is called *rūpassa aniccatā*. In addition to the *rūpa-dhamma* which originates, subsists (decay) and perishes, there are no *rūpa-dhammas* answering to the names: *rūpassa jāti*, *rūpassa jaratā* and *rūpassa aniccatā*.

If these characteristics, too, were postulated as real entities, then it would be necessary to postulate another set of (secondary) characteristics to account for their own origination, subsistence and cessation. And these (secondary) characteristics would, in turn, require another set of (secondary-secondary) characteristics to account for their origination, etc. In this way it would lead to a process *ad infinitum*.

[1] See above, pp. 80-81.
[2] *Asl.* p. 328; *Vism.* p. 449.
[3] i.e. *ṭhitikkhaṇa*; see above, p. 87: according to Buddhaghosa and others *jaratā* implies some kind of change, according to Sumangala and others it is only a figurative expression.
[4] *Asl.* p. 328; *Vism.* p. 449; *Abhvk.* p. 283.
[5] See *Abhvk.* p. 283.
[6] Momentary means having three momentary phases, see above, pp. 85-6.
[7] See above, p. 88.
[8] See above, p. 85.

And it is in order to avoid this problem of infinite regress that the characteristics are not recognized as entities distinct from, and as real as, the *dhammas* which they characterize. This is the significance of the statement made in the *Mohavicchedanī*: " It is not correct to assume that origination originates, decay decays and cessation ceases, because such an assumption leads to the (fallacy) of infinite regress (*anavaṭṭhāna*) ".[1]

Element of space

We have drawn attention to the fact that, although in the Nikāyas *ākāsa* is sometimes enumerated immediately after *paṭhavī*, *āpo*, *tejo* and *vāyo*, it is not recognized as a *mahābhūta*.[2] As far as its exclusion from the category of *mahābhūtas* is concerned, the post-Nikāyan works agree with the Nikāyas. However, when we come to the *Dhammasaṅganī* and the *Vibhaṅga* we find an item called *ākāsa-dhātu*, element of space, recognized as one of the *upādā-rūpas*.[3] Its recognition as an *upādā-rūpa* carries the implication that it is dependent on the *mahābhūtas*.

As pointed out by Prof. Keith and Mrs. Rhys Davids, it is difficult to imagine that it was so recognized because it was a pure form of intuition or a mental construction.[4] This suggestion gathers support from a *Kathāvatthu* controversy on the nature of *ākāsa*, to which we shall come in the course of this discussion.[5] There is no evidence to suggest that the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is acquainted with the comparatively late Sautrāntika theory, namely that *ākāśa* is nothing but the mere absence of resistant matter (*sapratighadravyābhāvamātra*), with no corresponding objective reality.[6]

In explaining why in the *Dhammasaṅganī ākāsa-dhātu* is recognized as an *upādā-rūpa*, Prof. Keith observes that it is intimately connected with matter. It is pointed out that, since it is necessary for the movement of matter, it can well be placed under secondary matter.[7]

That *ākāsa-dhātu* is that which affords room for the movement of material things is of course one of the ways in which it is described in the *Vibhaṅga*.[8] But it is very doubtful whether this was the sole or rather the main factor that was taken into consideration in placing it under matter. For if it were the reason, then it ought to have been given a position at least on a par with the four *mahābhūtas*, rather than being recognized as dependent on, and therefore secondary to, them.

[1] *Na hi jāti jāyati, jarā jīrati, maraṇaṃ mīyatī ti voharituṃ yuttaṃ, anavaṭṭhānato.*—*op. cit.* 67-68. See also *Abhvk.* p. 288; *AK.* Ch. II, p. 238; *AKvy.* I, p. 211; *CP. Mdhy. Vṛt.* pp. 110, n. 273, 126-7.
[2] See above, p. 16.
[3] *Dhs.* p. 144; *Vbh.* p. 84.
[4] Keith, *Bud. Phi.* p. 189; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Bud. Psy Ethics*, Introduction, lxvi.
[5] See below, pp. 94 ff.
[6] See *AK.* Ch. I, p. 10 n.l.; *AKvy.* I, p. 57.
[7] *Bud. Phi.* p. 189.
[8] *Cf.* . . . *yena ca asitapītakhāyitaṃ ajjhoharati, yattha ca asitapītakhāyitaṃ santiṭṭhati, yena ca asitapītakhāyitaṃ adhobhāgā nikkhamati* (= *ākāsa-dhātu*)—*op. cit.* p. 84.

The whole situation becomes clear when it is understood in the light of the Vaibhāṣika conception of *ākāśa* : Two kinds of *ākāśa* are distinguished. One is elevated to the status of an *asaṃskṛta-dharma*, i.e. something that transcends all laws of causation and conditionality, and is referred to by the simple term *ākāśa*. The other is brought under matter and is referred to by the compound, *ākāśa-dhātu*.[1]

Dr. Mc. Govern tells us that in the Chinese sources the former is rendered as *hsu k'ung* and the latter as *k'ung*. *K'ung*, he says, " agrees more or less with the Sthaviravādin (= Theravādin) conception of *Ākāśa* ".[2] To this correspondence, Prof. De la Vallée Poussin too has drawn attention.[3] The fact that both are included in matter does certainly show that there is a close parallelism between them. Of equal significance is the fact that both are referred to, not by the simple term, *ākāsa*, but by the compound, *ākāsa-dhātu*.

This is only a part of the story. There is much evidence to show that the Theravādins too have recognized another kind of *ākāsa*. This they have never included in *rūpa* ; and except for one significant fact it corresponds to the *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa* of the Vaibhāṣikas.[4]

First let us consider what the Buddhists mean by *ākāsa-dhātu* and examine why it is brought under matter. In the *Abhidharmakośa* the Vaibhāṣika *ākāśa-dhātu* is defined as follows : " La cavité ou vide de la porte, de la fenêtre, etc., c'est l'élément espace (*ākāśadhātu*) externe (*bāhya*) ; la cavité de la bouche, du nez, etc., c'est l'élément espace interne (*ādhyātmika*) ".[5] The Theravāda definition is more or less the same ; the distinction between internal (*ajjhattika*) and external (*bāhira*) is also recognized : The cavities of the ear (*kaṇṇacchidda*), of the nose (*nāsacchidda*), the mouth-door (*mukhadvāra*), that through which what is eaten, drunk, or chewed is swallowed, that where it is deposited, and that through which it is evacuated are *ajjhattika ākāsa-dhātu*. Likewise, the cavities and interstices that obtain outside of the body—(the cavities in the wall, of the door-space, etc.[6])—are *bāhira ākāsa-dhātu*.[7]

It will thus be seen that according to both schools, *ākāsa dhātu* means cavities, holes, apertures, interstices, etc. It could therefore be understood as bounded or delimited space. The Chinese rendering, *k'ung*, is said to mean " lack of *rūpa*, or interstices between *rūpa*." [8]

The later works of the Theravāda, too, recognize this meaning when they refer to *ākāsa-dhātu* by the technical term *pariccheda-rūpa*.[9] *Pariccheda* signifies not only

[1] See *AK*. Ch. I, pp. 7-8 and 49-50 ; *AKvy*. I, pp. 15, 57.
[2] *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, I, pp. 110-111.
[3] *AK*. Ch. I, p. 49 n. 4.
[4] See below, pp. 94 ff.
[5] *Op. cit*. Ch. I, p. 49.
[6] *Vbh*. p. 72.
[7] *Ibid*. pp. 84-5
[8] Mc. Govern, *op. cit*. p. 111.
[9] See *Vism*. p. 451.

that which delimits (*paricchindati*) but also that which is delimited (*paricchijjati*).[1] The implication is that, since *ākāsa-dhātu* means cavities, interstices, etc., it sets limits to, and is itself limited by, the surrounding matter.

Once *ākāsa-dhātu* is understood as bounded or delimited space why it is recognized as dependent on the *mahābhūtas* is not far to seek. Holes, cavities, etc. have an intimate connection with matter in the sense that they obtain owing to the peculiar position or situation of the latter. In this sense they can well be conceived as dependent on matter. And since the four *mahābhūtas* should necessarily enter into the composition of all material things, on further analysis, they are dependent on the *mahābhūtas*.

This explanation is further confirmed by Buddhaghosa's statement, namely that *ākāsa-dhātu* is manifested as the confines of matter (*rūpa-mariyāda-paccupaṭṭhānā*) and that it has its proximate cause in matter delimited by it (*paricchinnarūpa-padaṭṭhānā*).[2] The same idea is implied in Yaśomitra's comment, namely that it is established (*vyavasthāpitaṃ*) with reference to (*apekṣya*) walls, etc.[3]

In so far as the Vaibhāṣikas are concerned, one cannot, however, say that this was the only factor that was taken into consideration. In their view, *ākāśa-dhātu* is either light (*āloka*) or darkness (*tamas*) and as such is visible (*sanidarśana*). For this reason it is considered as part of *rūpāyatana*.[4] That the Theravādins do not admit the visibility of *ākāsa-dhātu* is shown not only by its inclusion in the *dhammāyatana* but also by a *Kathāvatthu* controversy. Some Buddhists argue that it is visible on the ground that one can see the interval between two trees or two posts, the space in a key-hole or in a window. The Theravāda reply is that in the case of an interval between two trees, for instance, one sees with his eye only the colour of the two trees and that the interval as such is known only by the mind.[5]

The Vaibhāṣikas, as stated above, distinguish *ākāśa-dhātu* from *ākāśa*. The latter, like *pratisaṅkhyā-* and *apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha*, is an *asaṃskṛta-dharma*. As such, the *saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇas*[6] do not apply to it. It is omnipresent (*sarvagata*) and eternal (*nitya*). Its nature is non-obstruction (*anāvaraṇa-svabhāva*). That is to say, it does not obstruct (*āvṛṇoti*) matter which freely exists therein ; nor is it obstructed (*āvriyate*) by matter, for it cannot be dislodged by the latter. However, it is not the mere absence of obstruction (*anāvaraṇabhāvamātra*), but is something positively real.[7] Thus what is called *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa* may be understood as space, considered as absolutely real and as constituting a receptacle for the existence and movement of matter.

[1] *Rūpāni paricchindati, sayaṃ vā tehi paricchijjati—Abhvk*. p. 279.
[2] *Vism*. p. 448.
[3] *AKvy*. I, p. 57.
[4] *AK*. Ch. I, pp. 49-50 ; *AKvy*. I, p. 57.
[5] See *Kvu*. pp. 330-1 and *KvuA*. p. 93.
[6] See above, p. 84.
[7] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 8 ; *AKvy*. I, p. 15.

This is a brief statement giving the fundamental characteristics of the *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa*, made for the purpose of showing that it has its counterpart in the Theravāda, too.

In the *Milindapañha* we are introduced to an *ākāsa* which is quite different from the *ākāsa-dhātu* of the *Dhammasaṅganī*. Its fundamental characteristics are as follows: In no way can it be grasped (*sabbaso agayho*); it inspires terror (*santāsaniyo*); it is infinite (*ananto*), boundless (*appamāno*) and immeasurable (*aparimeyyo*); it does not cling to anything (*alaggo*), is not attached to anything (*asatto*), rests on nothing (*appatiṭṭhito*) and is not obstructed by anything (*apalibuddho*).[1]

Elsewhere in the same work we are told that two things in this world are not born of *kamma* (*akammajā*) or of causes (*ahetujā*) or of season (*anutujā*), namely, *Nibbāna* and *ākāsa*.[2]

With reference to this *ākāsa* of the *Milindapañha*, Prof. Keith observes that "it is certainly a more philosophic view than is found in the *Dhammasaṅganī* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, where it is classified as a material derivate".[3] According to this observation, the *ākāsa-dhātu* of the *Dhammasaṅganī* and the *ākāsa* of the *Milindapañha* represent two different views on the same subject and that the latter is a more refined version of the former.

It is of course true that the *Milindapañha* is later than the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. However, as we shall see fairly soon, the type of *ākāsa* referred to therein is known to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. Moreover, when one considers the fundamental characteristics of the *Milindapañha ākāsa* one cannot fail to notice its strong similarity with the *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa* of the Vaibhāṣikas. Of much significance is the statement that only *Nibbāna* and *ākāsa* are not born of *kamma* (*akammajā*) or of causes (*ahetujā*) or of season (*anutujā*). This is a clear attempt to bring *ākāsa* on a par with *Nibbāna*. The Vaibhāṣikas too elevate *ākāśa* to such a position by recognizing *ākāśa* and the two kinds of *nirodha* as *asaṃskṛta*. And we have already shown how the *ākāsa-dhātu* of the *Dhammasaṅganī* (and the *Vibhaṅga*) corresponds to the *ākāśa-dhātu* of the Vaibhāṣikas. In view of these circumstances we could quite justifiably assume that, as the Vaibhāṣikas do, the Theravādins too distinguish between two kinds of *ākāsa*. As such the type of *ākāsa* referred to in the *Milindapañha* should be understood, not as a different (later) version of the same kind of *ākāsa(-dhātu)* of the *Dhammasaṅganī* (and the *Vibhaṅga*), but as the Theravāda counterpart of the Vaibhāṣika *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa*.

It is not in the *Milindapañha* alone that we get reference to the Theravāda counterpart of the Vaibhāṣika *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa*. One of the controversies in the *Kathāvatthu* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka concerns the question whether *ākāsa* is *asaṅkhata*. In one of his answers the Theravādin admits that *ākāsa* is not *saṅkhata*.[4]

[1] *Op. cit.* pp. 387-388.
[2] *Ibid.* p. 268.
[3] *Bud. Phi.* p. 169.
[4] *Kvu.* p. 330: To the opponent's question, "*Ākāso saṅkhato ti*" the Theravādin's answer is, "*Na h'evaṃ vattabbe*".

This admission shows that the *ākāsa* at issue here is not the same as the *ākāsa-dhātu* of the *Dhammasaṅganī*, because the latter is *saṅkhata*. On the other hand, it points to the close correspondence between the *ākāsa* of the *Kathāvatthu* controversy and that of the *Milindapañha*. It may be recalled here that, according to the latter work, both *Nibbāna* and *ākāsa* are not born of *kamma* or of causes or of season. This is another way of saying that both are not *saṅkhata*.[1] For all *saṅkhata-dhammas* arise and exist because of causes. Since the *ākāsa* of the *Kathāvatthu* and that of the *Milindapañha* are not *saṅkhata*, it is fairly certain that both works refer to the same kind of *ākāsa*.

There is, however, this significant problem to be considered: Although the Theravādin of the *Kathāvatthu* controversy denies that *ākāsa* is *saṅkhata*, he does not admit that it is *asaṅkhata*.[2] Thus, in his view, it cannot be described either as *saṅkhata* or as *asaṅkhata*.

The commentator says that this is because *ākāsa* is a mere *paññatti* (*paññatti-mattaṃ*),[3] i.e. a nominal *dhamma*. As far as the data are concerned this conclusion is certainly correct. For that which is neither *saṅkhata* nor *asaṅkhata* should be a *paññatti*.[4]

There is, however, the following situation to be considered. The definition of *ākāsa* in the *Milindapañha* does not give any indication of its being recognized as a *paññatti*. On the other hand, as already stated, it bears a strong resemblance to the *ākāśa* of the Vaibhāṣikas, which is an *asaṃskṛta-dharma*. It has also been noted that according to this work both *Nibbāna* and *ākāsa* are not *saṅkhata*. Now, if *ākāsa* is not a *paññatti* and if it is not *saṅkhata*, it should be an *asaṅkhata-dhamma*. But what is significant to note here is that, although the *Milindapañha* applies the term *asaṅkhata* to *Nibbāna*,[5] it (carefully) avoids applying the same term to *ākāsa*. On this point, as we have seen, the *Kathāvatthu* is more positive, for it categorically says that *ākāsa* should not be described as *asaṅkhata* (although of course it denies that it is *saṅkhata*).

When the above situation is taken into consideration, it is difficult to follow the commentator. As we have already observed, it is of course true that his conclusion is supported by the data in the *Kathāvatthu*. But there are some good reasons to believe that the problem at issue here is on quite a different level. As such the commentator's conclusion does not seem to represent the actual situation that obtains in the *Kathāvatthu*.

The Theravādins, it should be noted here, never object to *Nibbāna* being qualified as *asaṅkhata*. What is more, they seem to have deemed it improper to extend the term to something else even if it is not *saṅkhata*, lest this should give the impression

[1] Further confirmed by: *Yat ā mahārāja ākāso na jāyati na mīyati na cavati na uppajjati. evam'eva kho mahārāja nibbānaṃ na jāyati na jīyati na mīyati na cavati na uppajjati.* — *Mil.* pp. 320-21.
[2] See *Kvu.* pp. 328 ff.
[3] *KvuA.* p. 92.
[4] See above, pp. 42, 67-68.
[5] *Op. cit.* p. 70.

that it is as exalted and as noble as *Nibbāna*—the highest ideal of Buddhism. This seems to be the reason why the *Milindapañha* and the *Kathāvatthu* do not apply the term *asaṅkhata* to *ākāsa*, although according to both it is not *saṅkhata*. In other words, *ākāsa*, as conceived in these two works, is not a *paññatti* ; it is a real *dhamma* which is not *saṅkhata*, but which is not designated as *asaṅkhata*.

On the one hand, this suggestion explains the peculiar situation that obtains in the *Milindapañha*. On the other, it gets more positive support from the nature of the Theravāda arguments as represented in the *Kathāvatthu* controversy.

To the statement of the opponent, namely that *ākāsa* is *asaṅkhata*, the immediate reaction of the Theravādin is : " Does this mean to say that *ākāsa* is *Nibbāna*, the Shelter, the Cave, the Refuge, the Goal, the Past-Decease, the Ambrosial ? ".[1] When the opponent denies this, the Theravādin retorts in that case one has to recognize two *Nibbānas*. Even his other arguments are mainly based on the assumption that the extension of the term *asaṅkhata* to *ākāsa* would necessarily amount to a confusion, if not identity, between *Nibbāna* and *ākāsa*. The main argument of the opponent follows what may be called the logic of language : " If you deny that *ākāsa* is *saṅkhata*, you should admit that it is *asaṅkhata* ".[2]

The assumption of the Theravādin is certainly far-fetched. To admit that *Nibbāna* and *ākāsa* are *asaṅkhata* does not necessarily mean that they are identical in all respects, just as much as *nāma-dhammas* (mental elements) and *rūpa-dhammas* (material elements) are not identical in all respects, although both groups are qualified as *saṅkhata*.

In point of fact, similar controversies arising from the restriction of the use of technical terms do occur in the *Kathāvatthu*. A typical example is the one concerning the question : Could *rūpa* (matter) be a *hetu* (cause). The Theravādin answers it in the negative and the opponent in the affirmative. At first sight it appears that the former has rejected a fundamental tenet of Buddhist philosophy by not admitting that *rūpa* (matter) could constitute a cause (*hetu*). But in actual fact this is not so. There is no disagreement between the two parties. The Theravādin (rather arbitrarily) restricted the meaning of " *hetu* " to indicate only the " moral causes ", namely, *alobha* (non-covetousness), *adosa* (non-hatred), *amoha* (non-delusion), etc.[3] Accordingly, and understandably, he denied the proposition that *rūpa* (matter) could constitute a *hetu*. Whereas his opponent understood the term *rūpa* (matter) could constitute a *hetu*. Whereas his opponent understood the term in the general sense of cause, and accordingly he affirmed it.[4] A similar situation seems to obtain in the controversy over the question : Is *ākāsa asaṅkhata* ?

From what we have observed so far it should become clear that the Theravādins, too, distinguish between two kinds of *ākāsa* and that, except for some minor details, they correspond to the two kinds of *ākāśa* recognized by the Vaibhāṣikas. One sometimes reads that while the Vaibhāṣikas elevated *ākāśa* to the status of an

[1] *Kvu.* p. 328 (tr. from *Points of Controversy*).
[2] *Ibid.* p. 330.
[3] On this subject see also *Dhs.* pp. 124, 188 ; *Tkp.* p. 11.
[4] *Kvu.* pp. 532-3.

asaṃskṛta-dharma, the Theravādins brought it under matter.[1] Such a contrast is not justified. It overlooks the fact that both schools have recognized two kinds of *ākāsa*, one of which (= *ākāsa-dhātu*) is included in, and the other (=*ākāsa*) excluded from, matter.

We might also note in passing that parallel situations are met with in other systems of Indian thought, too. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga, for instance, distinguishes between two kinds of *ākāśa*, namely, *kāryākāśa* and *kāraṇākāśa*. The former is derivative, because it is produced from *śabda-tanmātra*, the sound-potential ; the latter is original, because it is associated with *prakṛti*, the uncaused first cause of the world of not-self.[2] Similarly certain Jaina works, too, recognize two varieties of *ākāśa*. One is *logāgāsa*, the space that gives room for the existence of all extended substances (*astikāya*). The other is *alogāgāsa*, the infinite space beyond the cosmos, where the two conditions of motion (*dharmastikāya*) and rest (*adharmastikāya*) do not have their influence.[3]

Of course, the correspondence between these theories does not go very far, because each of them has been formulated according to the metaphysical assumptions of the particular system of thought to which it belongs. But what is striking is the similarity in the pattern of development.

What made the Buddhists draw such a distinction could be traced to the Nikāyas themselves. Therein sometimes *ākāsa* is described particularly with reference to holes, cavities, apertures, etc.[4] Such descriptions suggest the beginning of *ākāsa-dhātu* which is brought under matter.

Sometimes it is described as the ultimate basis, a sort of fulcrum or receptacle, of the whole physical world. Thus in the Mahāparinibbāna-Sutta, Buddha is represented as saying : " This great earth, O Ānanda, rests on water, water on air, and air on *ākāsa* ".[5] And in the Rāhulovāda Sutta it is said that *ākāsa* for its part does not rest on anything (*ākāso na kattha ci patiṭṭhito*).[6] In point of fact, Nāgasena (*Milindapañha*) cites this same canonical statement after enumerating the fundamental characteristics of *ākāsa*,[7] implying thereby that it is such statements in the earlier texts that paved the way to the conception of *ākāsa* which we find in the *Milindapañha* and the *Kathāvatthu*. Equally significant is an observation made by Yaśomitra : When the Vaibhāṣikas argue that *ākāśa* is real they base this argument

[1] See e.g. Mishra, *Hist. of Ind. Phi.* I, p. 403.
[2] See Jhaveri, *The concept of ākāśa in Indian Philosophy*, *ABORI*. Vol. xxxvi, 1956, where attention is drawn to the fact that in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga works earlier than Vijñānabhikṣu's only derivative *ākāśa* is mentioned. *Cf.* also Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Hindus*, pp. 27-28.
[3] See *Davva-.aṅgaha*. pp. 56-57 ; *Pañcāstikāya Samayasāra*, p . 99, *Niyamasāra*, pp. 16 ff.
[4] *Cf. e.g. M.* I, p. 231 ; II, p. 47.
[5] *D.* II, p. 107.
[6] *M.* I, p. 424.
[7] *Mil.* p. 388.

on a (Sūtra) passage where Buddha declares to a brāhmin that the earth rests on the circle of water, the circle of water on air, air on *ākāśa*, and that *ākāśa* for its part does not rest on anything, does not cling to anything.[1]

When we come to the commentaries and the subsequent works the whole subject has undergone a notable change. The *ākāsa* of the *Kathāvatthu* and the *Milinda-pañha*, which, as we have seen, is the Theravāda counterpart of the Vaibhāṣikas' *asaṃskṛta-ākāśa*, came to be designated as *anantākāsa*, infinite space, or *ajaṭākāsa*, unbounded space.[2] Although the two terms are reminiscent of its earlier realistic conception, the use of another term, *tucchākāsa*,[3] false or empty space, indicates an attempt to deprive it of its reality. As a matter of fact, it is clearly stated that it is only a *paññatti*,[4] a nominal *dhamma* with no corresponding objective reality.

Understandably the same fate fell on the *ākāsa-dhātu*, too. The logic that guided the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* in bringing it under matter is certainly far-fetched. Its conception as real is a different question. The later scholiasts were not satisfied with either of these situations. They eliminated both by bringing it under the heading, *anipphanna-rūpa*. For this is another way of saying that it is neither *rūpa* (matter) nor a *dhamma* (element of existence) in the true sense of the terms. As such its description as that which delimits (*paricchindati*) or that which is delimited (*paricchijjati*)[5] should not be understood in a realistic sense. For it is nothing but the mere limitation of matter—*rūpa-pariccheda-mattaṃ*.[6]

[1] *AKv*. I, p. 15; (Sūtra) passage: *pṛthivī bho Gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitā. pṛthivī brāhmaṇa ap maṇḍale pratiṣṭhitā. ap-maṇḍalaṃ bho Gautama kva pratiṣṭhitaṃ. vāyau pratiṣṭhitaṃ. vāyur bho Gautama kva pratiṣṭhitaḥ. ākāśe pratiṣṭhitaḥ. ākāśaṃ bho Gautama kutra pratiṣṭhitaṃ. atisarasi mahābrāhmaṇātisarasi mahābrāhmaṇa. ākāśaṃ brāhmaṇāpratiṣṭhitaṃ anālambanaṃ.*—*Ibid. loc. cit.*

[2] See *KvuA*. pp. 92, 93; *Abhvk*. p. 279.

[3] *KvuA*. p. 92.

[4] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[5] See above, p. 93.

[6] *Abhvk*. p. 7[illegible].

CHAPTER SIX

Classifications of the Material Elements

Section A

In the course of our discussion of the twenty-eight *rūpa-dhammas*,[1] we saw how they were subjected to certain classifications, such as the one into primary and secondary. In addition to those, an earlier discussion of which was necessitated for a better understanding of the subject so far covered, there are others, no less important. And it is these remaining classifications that we propose to examine in this chapter.

Divisions and classifications play a significant part in the Abhidhammic systematization. They are the stock-in-trade of its methodology, the fundamental means whereby the import and the implications of the terms representing the various elements of existence (*dhammā*) are sought to be unfolded. In the seven *pakaraṇas* of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka it is very rarely indeed that one finds a direct enumeration of all the *rūpa-dhammas*; oftener than not they are presented under various classifications. Hence it is that the Rūpavibhatti[2] of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* consists, to a great extent, of an enormous number of classifications, arranged into ten sections in an ascending numerical order.

The first[3] section consists of one hundred and four classifications,[4] each being an arrangement of *rūpa-dhammas* into two groups. The last ninety are developed in a rather " mechanical " way. In each the distribution of *rūpa-dhammas* into two groups is made in such a way that only one *rūpa-dhamma* constitutes the first " group ", whereas all the others the second group. The first is described by a positive term and the second by its negative, formed with the addition of the negative particle, " *na* ". The last ninety should, therefore, be understood as a (monotonous) device to show the characteristics peculiar to a given *rūpa-dhamma*. In each such arrangement the contrast between a given *rūpa-dhamma*, on the one hand, and the rest on the other, is brought into relief. Two methods are adopted for this purpose.

[1] = 4 *mahābhūtas* + 14 *nipphanna-upādā* + 10 *anipphanna -upādā*.

[2] i.e. the section (8th *Bhāṇavara*) where the subject of *rūpa* is explained. As far as the Pāli Canon is concerned, it is the most exhaustive.

[3] Our reckoning as 1st, 2nd, etc. starts from the second section of the *Dhs*. from where onward we get the classifications. In its 1st section " all *rūpa* " is considered under single uncorrelated characteristics. See *Bud. Psy. Ethics*, p. 154.

[4] We use the term classification to mean every arrangement of the *rūpa-dhammas* under two or more headings. Very often only one item falls under one of the two or more headings; in such cases the purpose is to show how a given *rūpa-dhamma* can be distinguished from the rest.

(*a*) Sometimes a characteristic or a function peculiar to a given *rūpa-dhamma* is taken as the basis of the arrangement; e.g. "There is matter which is the basis of visual consciousness (= *cakkhu*, the organ of sight) and there is matter which is not the basis of visual consciousness (= all the remaining *rūpa-dhammas*)".[1] What results from such an approach is obvious: That *rūpa-dhamma*, the peculiar characteristic or function of which is taken as the basis of the arrangement, comes under the positive category and all the rest under the negative. This is a method with wide scope, for what is recognized as peculiar to one *rūpa-dhamma* cannot be predicated of another. However, only the five sense-organs and the corresponding objective fields are subjected to such a treatment. And this results in as many as forty arrangements. For all its tedious length and apparent complexity, it is only a different way of describing the oft-recurrent thesis that the first five sense-organs are the bases (*vatthu, nissaya*) and that the five objective fields corresponding to them are the objects of the first five kinds of consciousness (*viññāna*) and their concomitants (*cetasikas*).[2]

(*b*) Sometimes a given *rūpa-dhamma* itself is taken as the basis of the arrangement; e.g. "There is matter which is *kabaḷinkāra-āhāra* and there is matter which is not *kabaḷinkāra-āhāra* (= the remaining *rūpa-dhammas*)".[3] According to this method matter in its totality can be differentiated in as many ways as there are *rūpa-dhammas*. However, the actual number of the arrangements exceeds the number of *rūpa-dhammas*, because of this reason: Some items such as the sense-organs are repeated under *dhātu, āyatana* and *indriya*. There are, in all, forty such arrangements: Each sense-organ as *dhātu, āyatana* and *indriya* is distinguished thrice from the rest of the *rūpa-dhammas* (15); each objective field as *dhātu* and *āyatana* is distinguished twice (10); the remaining fifteen are each distinguished only once (15).[4]

The fourteen classifications that occur at the beginning of the first section are more important in the sense that they form the nucleus of a great majority that come in the next nine sections. They are the arrangement of *rūpa-dhammas* into two groups as (1) *upādā* and *anupādā*, (2) *upādiṇṇa* and *anupādiṇṇa*, (3) *upādiṇṇupādānīya* and *anupādiṇṇupādānīya*, (4) *sanidassana* and *anidassana*, (5) *sappaṭigha* and *appaṭigha*, (6) *indriya* and *na indriya*, (7) *mahābhūta* and *na mahābhūta*, (8) *viññatti* and *na viññatti*, (9) *cittasamuṭṭhāna* and *na cittasamuṭṭhāna*, (10) *cittasahabhū* and *na cittasahabhū*, (11) *cittānuparivatti* and *na cittānuparivatti*, (12) *ajjhattika* and *bāhira*, (13) *oḷārika* and *sukhuma* and (14) *dūre* and *santike*.

[1] *Atthi rūpaṃ cakkhuviññānassa vatthu, atthi rūpaṃ cakkhuviññānassa na vatthu*—*Dhs.* p. 125.
[2] See below, pp. 129, 132.
[3] *Atthi rūpaṃ kabaḷiṅkāro āhāro, atthi rūpaṃ na kabaḷiṅkāro āhāro*—*Dhs.* p. 127.
[4] Three *mahābhūtas* are collectively referred to by the 5th objective field; *hadaya-vatthu* is not known to *Dhs.*; hence in all 27 items are involved here.

The implications of a great majority of these fourteen classifications have already been examined. No. 1 refers to the distinction between primary and secondary matter,[1] and No. 7 indicates the type of material elements that constitute each group.[2] No. 4 points to a characteristic peculiar to *rūpāyatana*. Since *rūpāyatana* represents the visible, it alone comes under the positive heading, *sanidassana* (visible).[3] As far as the contents are concerned, there is no difference between Nos. 5, 13 and 14: the sense-organs and the objective fields are *sappaṭigha, oḷārika* and *santike*; the remaining *rūpa-dhammas* are *appaṭigha, sukhuma* and *dūre*. We have discussed their significance and shown how they testify to a veiled recognition, on the part of the Theravāda Abhidhamma, of the difference between what early Buddhism, and what most of the Buddhist schools in common, recognize as matter on the one hand, and the later accretions on the other.[4] No. 6 is an attempt to classify all the *rūpa-dhammas* into two groups as *indriya* and "non-*indriya*." The five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex and the faculty of life constitute the first group[5] and the rest the second. No. 8 draws attention to the fact that two *rūpa-dhammas*, namely *kāya-* and *vacī-viññatti*, are *viññattis*[6] and that the rest are not *viññattis*. Nos. 10 and 11 are based on two characteristics (= *cittasahabhū* and *cittānuparivatti*)[7] peculiar to the two *viññattis*. As such these two items alone come under the positive terms and all the rest under the negative.

The classification into *upādiṇṇ'upādānīya* and *anupādiṇṇ'upādānīya* (No. 3) is the same as that into *upādiṇṇa* and *anupādiṇṇa* (No. 2) except for this difference: In the former the term *upādānīya* is added to qualify both the positive and the negative sub-classes of the latter. Thus *upādānīya*[8] signifies a characteristic common to all the *rūpa-dhammas*. No. 3 cannot, therefore, be taken as a separate classification. Most probably it was made in order to avoid any possible confusion between the apparently similar *upādānīya*[9] and *upādiṇṇa*.[10] As the former qualifies all the *rūpa-dhammas*, and the latter only some, the distinction in their meaning is not to be overlooked.


We are thus left with only three classifications, i.e. those into (*a*) *upādiṇṇa* and *anupādiṇṇa*, (*b*) *cittasamuṭṭhāna* and *na cittasamuṭṭhāna* and (*c*) *ajjhattika* and *bāhira*. Before we come to a discussion of them, let us survey the other nine sections which contain more complex classifications.

The second section consists of one hundred and three classifications, each being an arrangement of *rūpa-dhammas* into three groups. Each such arrangement has the classification into *ajjhattika* and *bāhira* of the first section as its invariable basis.

[1] See above, pp. 31-34.
[2] See above, p. 34.
[3] See above, p. 49.
[4] See above, pp. 36, 39.
[5] See above, pp. 49-55, 59.
[6] See above, pp. 69.
[7] See above, pp. 74, 77 ff.
[8] See below, p. 166.
[9] See below, p. 166.
[10] See below, pp. 103 ff.

It is transformed into one with three classes by classifying either the *ajjhattika-rūpas* or the *bāhira-rūpas* (but not both concurrently) into two groups :—


e.g.



The characteristics with reference to which either the *ajjhattika* or *bāhira-rūpas* are classified into two groups are all taken from the first section. Hence the second section is only a complex arrangement of all the classifications given in the first. Its purpose is to show the position of the classification into *ajjhattika* and *bāhira vis-à-vis* the remaining hundred and three of the preceding section.

In the third there are twenty-two classifications, each into four groups. All of them are traceable to the first fourteen classifications of the first section. A selected classification into two groups is made into one with four, by arranging into two groups the items included in the first as well as in the second groups of the former :—

e.g.



All the characteristics involved in these twenty-two classifications are taken from the first section. As such they are an attempt to establish some kind of relation between the different groups in the first fourteen classifications of the first section.

The next seven sections containing seven classifications in order into five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, and eleven groups are more repetitive and therefore less informative.

That into five groups is the same as that into *upādā* and *anupādā* but for this difference : Since *anupādā* consists of the four primary elements, it is accordingly arranged into four " groups ".

In the case of the next three classifications into six, seven and eight groups, the ascending numerical order is obtained by classifying into two a selected group of the immediately preceding classification—a process whereby the first two classifications are rendered superfluous in the sense that both get absorbed into, and thus represented by, the third. Their purpose is to show how the *rūpa-dhammas* can be classified according to the way they become objects of consciousness. Colour (*rūpa*), for instance, differs from sound (*sadda*) in that while the former is known by visual consciousness (*cakkhuviññeyya*) the latter is known by auditory consciousness (*sotaviññeyya*).[1]

The classification into nine groups is the same as that into *indriya* and *na indriya* except for this difference : Since *indriya-rūpa* counts eight *rūpa-dhammas*, the positive group is accordingly arranged under eight headings.

This same classification is next made into one with ten groups by classifying the items that come under the negative heading, i.e. *na indriya*, into two groups as *sappaṭigha* and *appaṭigha*.

The last with eleven headings shows how the *rūpa-dhammas* are distributed in the older list of the twelve *āyatanas :* The first five sense-organs and the corresponding objective fields constitute the ten *āyatanas* called after their names as *cakkhāyatana*, *rūpāyatana*, etc. and the remaining fifteen *rūpa-dhammas* form a part of the *dhammāyatana*.[2]

This brings us to an end of our survey of the two hundred and thirty classifications given in the *Dhammasaṅganī*. From what we have observed in its course, it should appear that it is not necessary to go into each and every one of them separately. We noticed that all the classifications given in the second and third sections and three of the seven given in the next seven sections are all traceable to the first section which consists of classifications into two groups. The few exceptions were noted, and we have indicated in the relevant places that any data they yielded were discussed in more appropriate contexts. In the course of this brief survey if we have stressed what is obvious and repeated what was said elsewhere, it is because our aim is not only to elicit some important classifications for discussion but also to give a conspectus of the Abhidhammic methodology as revealed from the Abhidhammic exposition of matter.[3]

The ensuing discussion will, therefore, be confined to an examination of those classifications of the first section which came under our final selection.

Section B

First let us examine the implications of the classification into *upādiṇṇa* and *anupādiṇṇa*.[4] The positive term, *upādiṇṇa* literally means that which has been appropriated or laid hold of ; but in order to understand what it exactly connotes in the Abhidhammic terminology, we have to get at the agency behind this act of appropriation or laying hold of.

Prof. De la Vallée Poussin is of the opinion that the pair of terms, *upādiṇṇa* and *anupādiṇṇa* of the Pāli Abhidhamma conveys the same sense as *upātta* and *anupātta* as explained in the *Abhidharmakośa*.[5]

[1] See below, p. 129.
[2] See above, p. 35.
[3] The appended charts (see below, pp. 117 ff.) will help to understand the relative positions of the various groups involved in the classifications.
[4] See above, p. 100.
[5] *AK.* Ch. 1, p. 63 n. 1.

The *Kośa* (= *Abhidharmakośa*) defines *upātta* as " ce que la pensée et les mentaux prennent (*upagṛhīta*) et s'approprient (*svīkṛta*) en qualité de support (*adhiṣṭhāna*)."[1] The five sense-organs (with the exception of those that were and those that will be) and those other material elements which are inseparable from, or integrated with, the sense-organs (*indriyābhinna*, *indriyāvinirbhāga*), namely, *rūpa* (colour), *gandha* (odour), rasa (taste) and *spraṣṭavya* (the tangible) are called *upātta*. The relation between this kind of matter and mind is one of close connection : " en cas de bien-être ou de malaise, il y a réaction reciproque entre la pensée et cette matiére." It is this matter, observes the *Kośa*, that the " langue vulgaire " calls " *sacetana* " or " *sajīva*.".[2]

It should also be noted here that, as explicitly stated in the *Kośa*,[3] and also as is clearly implied by the very definition given to the term in question, the mental elements are not *upātta*.

With this background in mind, if we proceed to examine the meaning assigned to *upādiṇṇa* in the *Dhammasaṅganī* and also the meaning revealed from its usage in different contexts, its identification with *upātta* presents some difficulties.

The *Dhammasaṅganī* makes it abundantly clear that what is called *upādiṇṇa-rūpa* comes into being through the action of *kamma* (*kammassa kaṭattā*).[4] However, this statement does not in itself constitute a serious difficulty in identifying it with *upātta-rūpa*. For the *Kośa*, too, refers to a category of matter said to be the result of *karma* (*vipākaja*), the contents of which are the same as those enumerated under *upātta*.[5] It could, therefore, be argued that, when the *Dhammasaṅganī* says that *upādiṇṇa-rūpa* comes into being through the action of *kamma*, this has to be understood, not as a definition of *upādiṇṇa* as such, but as an explanation on the origin of the matter so designated.

There is, however, some positive evidence which suggests that *upādiṇṇa* is not used in the same sense as *upātta*. The evidence comes from another passage of the *Dhammasaṅganī* purporting to give the complete denotation of the term *upādiṇṇa*. To the question : "what *dhammas* are *upādiṇṇa*?" it provides the following answer :—

> " *Sāsavā kusalākusalānaṃ vipākā kāmāvacarā rūpāvacarā arūpāvacarā vedanakkhandho saññakkhandho saṅkhārakkhandho viññānakkhandho—yañ ca rūpaṃ kammassa kaṭattā—ime dhammā upādiṇṇā*."[6]

This statement makes it abundantly clear that not only matter but also the other four aggregates (*khandhas*) that come into being through the action of *kamma* (*vipāka*, *kammassa kaṭattā*) are considered as *upādiṇṇa*. On the other hand, as stated

[1] *AK*. Ch. 1, p. 63 ; *cf* also *La Siddhi*. pp. 193 ff.
[2] *AK*. Ch. 1, p. 63.
[3] *Cf.* Les sept *dhātus* de pensée, le *dharmadhātu* et l'audible (*śabdadhātu*) ne sont jamais appropries.—*Ibid.* Ch. 1, p. 62.
[4] See *Dhs*. p. 146.
[5] See *AK*. Ch. 1, pp. 68-70.
[6] *Op. cit.* p. 211 ; see also. p. 255. N.B. As to why the **term** *vipāka* is not used in respect of *rūpa* which arises as a result of *kamma*, see below, pp. 109-110.

in the *Kośa*, mental elements (*vedanā*, *saññā*, etc.) are not called *upātta*—a fact implied by the very definition given to it : " ce que la pensée et les mentaux prennent en qualité de support."

To sum up the difference : while the *Dhammasaṅganī* uses *upādiṇṇa* to denote all resultant states of *kamma*, mental as well as material, the *Kośa* uses *upātta* to designate those *rūpa-dhammas* which the mind and the mind-factors take as their support.

It could, however, be said that the original meaning of *upādiṇṇa* is the same as that of *upātta* and that when the *Dhammasaṅganī* uses it to include mental elements as well, it has illegitimately extended the meaning of the term. Herein we are concerned with the meaning of *upādiṇṇa* as used in the *Dhammasaṅganī*. Whether it represents a subsequent development or not, is another question.

Such a view could, however, be maintained if there were evidence in the earlier texts—the Suttas for instance—which would lend support to the meaning assigned to *upātta* in the *Kośa*. An examination of some passages in the Suttas shows that neither the *Dhammasaṅganī* nor the *Kośa* is representing the original meaning.

In a number of Suttas the term *upādiṇṇa* occurs in a stock formula where the four *mahābhūtas* are described. Each *mahābhūta* is said to exist either internally (*ajjhattaṃ paccattaṃ*), i.e. as part of the complex that makes the individual, or externally (*bāhira*), i.e. in the non-sentient world. The distinction in question is sought to be established by designating the former as *upādiṇṇa*. Such bodily constituents as teeth, hair, nails, bones, blood, etc. are cited as *upādiṇṇa*.[1] Although the negative term, *anupādiṇṇa* does not occur, yet we may say that the matter which enters into the composition of trees, hills, rocks, etc. is " *anupādiṇṇa*."

In the Mahāhatthipadopama Sutta where this distinction is extended to the *ākāsa-dhātu* as well *upādiṇṇa* is explained as that which is appropriated by craving—*taṇhūpādiṇṇa*.[2]

Thus in the Suttas *upādiṇṇa* is used to distinguish the matter that enters into the composition of a living being from other instances of matter. Since *upādiṇṇa* is further explained as " *taṇhūpādiṇṇa* ", it may be asked why only the matter of the body is so designated. The answer is provided in the same passage where the term is explained : One appropriates one's own body with craving (*taṇhā*), which manifests itself in such thoughts as " This am I " (*ahan ti*), " This is mine " (*maman ti*) and " I am (this) " (*asmī ti*).[3] Accompanied by craving such thoughts can be directed to other things, too. But, in the main, it is one's own body that one appropriates with craving, with it one identifies oneself. It is *upādiṇṇa* par excellence. And in this sense the term is used to qualify only the body (so as to distinguish it from other instances of matter).

[1] *Cf. e.g. M.* 1, pp. 185 ff. ; 421 ff.
[2] *M.* 1, p. 185.
[3] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

Buddhaghosa's remarks in this connection are quite significant. Commenting on *upādiṇṇa*, as used in the Suttas, he observes that it means : " *daḷhaṃ ādinnaṃ ahaṃ maman ti evaṃ daḷhaṃ ādinnaṃ gahitaṃ parāmaṭṭhaṃ*."[1] In point of fact, the commentators were quite aware that in the earlier texts *upādiṇṇa* was used in a sense different from the sense in which it came to be used in the Abhidhamma. For instance, the commentator of the *Majjhimanikāya* observes that *upādiṇṇa* (as used in the *Majjhimanikāya*) refers to all matter, irrespective of the distinction as to whether it is *kamma*-caused or not, that enters into the composition of the body (*sarīraṭṭhaka-rūpa*).[2]

That the earlier meaning of *upādiṇṇa* is different from either of the meanings given to it by the *Dhammasaṅganī* and the *Kośa*, is further confirmed by the difference in the items brought under the term. Since the Suttas understand *upādiṇṇa* as referring to the matter that constitutes the body, they bring under it such things as hair, bones, blood, urine, excreta, etc.[3] For the *Dhammasaṅganī*, since *upādiṇṇa-rūpa* means the matter that arises by way of *kammic* fruition, it eliminates from the category so designated such *rūpa-dhammas* as the triad of *lahutā* etc., because they are *cittasamuṭṭhāna*.[4] For the *Kośa*, since *upātta* means " ce que la pensée et les mentaux prennent . . . . en qualité de support (*adhiṣṭhāna*) ", it eliminates from the category so designated such things as the head-hair, bodily hair, nails and teeth—" en exceptant la racine, laquelle est liée au corps ou organe du tact " and excreta, urine, saliva, mucus, blood, etc.[5]

Prof. De la Vallée Poussin has drawn attention to the fact that the " *Majjhima* iii 240, reproduit dans Pitāputrasamāgama, donne les cheveux . . . . les excréments comme *ajjhattaṃ paccattaṃ kakkhaḷaṃ upādiṇṇaṃ*." Since " les cheveux ne sont pas *upādiṇṇa*,"[6] he is inclined to believe that one has confused the *ajjhattika-rūpa* with *upātta-rūpa*.[7] It appears to us that it is not necessary to explain away the anomaly in question by putting it down to a confusion between *upādiṇṇa* and *ajjhatta*. The anomaly persists because it is concerned with a term which has two meanings, the earlier and the later. If in the Suttas a term occurs in a sense different from what it has assumed subsequently, this is understandable. For when a term acquired a different meaning subsequently, attempts were not always made to change the contexts in which the self-same term had been used in the original sense, so as to bring all in line with the later meaning. Sometimes even in the same work both meanings do occur. In the *Vibhaṅga*,[8] for instance, *upādiṇṇa* is used in the Nikāyan sense as well as in the sense in which it is used in the *Dhammasaṅganī*.

---

[1] *Vism.* p. 349.

[2] *Cf. Upādiṇṇan ti na kammasamuṭṭhānam eva, avisesena pana sarīraṭṭhakassa etaṃ gahaṇaṃ. Sarīraṭṭhakaṃ hi upādiṇṇaṃ vā hotu anupādiṇṇaṃ vā ādinna-gahita-parāmaṭṭhavasena sabbaṃ upādiṇṇam eva nāma.—op. cit.* ii, p. 222.

[3] See e.g. *M.* 1, pp. 185 ff. ; 421 ff.

[4] See *Dhs.* p. 146 ; also see below, pp. 112-13.

[5] *AK.* Ch. 1, p. 63.

[6] i.e. from the point of view of the *Kośa*-definition.

[7] *AK.* Ch. 1, p. 63, n. 1.

[8] *Op. cit.* pp. 2, 6.

Since the meaning of *upādiṇṇa* of the *Dhammasaṅganī* is different from that of *upātta* of the *Kośa*, and both from that suggested by its usage in the Suttas, we may reasonably assume that the first two cases are two separate developments of the original idea. It may, however, be noted here that, since the *Kośa* does not bring mental elements under *upātta*, to that extent it is more faithful to the earlier. The term is explained in a similar way in the *Abhidharmāmṛta* of Ghosaka, where also all the mental elements are excluded from the category of *upātta*.[1]

Even the Pāli commentaries and the *ṭīkās* do not lend any support to the interpretation of the *upādiṇṇa* of the *Dhammasaṅganī* in the light of the *upātta* of the *Kośa*. They all agree in maintaining that the matter so designated is *kammaja* or *kammasamuṭṭhāna*, [2] i.e. given rise to by *karma*. The *Visuddhimagga* observes that it is called so, because it is grasped by *kamma*—" *tam kammena upādiṇṇattā upādiṇṇam*."[3] The explanation given in the *Vibhāvinī Ṭīkā*, although almost the same, seems to combine the two meanings given to it in the Suttas and in the *Dhammasaṅganī* : " *taṇhā-diṭṭhihi upetena kammunā attano phalabhāvena ādiṇṇattā* "[4] = " (so termed) because it has been grasped at by the *karma* that is closely attended with craving and erroneous opinion, by way of its own fruit."[5] However, it should not be overlooked here that in the commentarial works the Nikāyan explanation of *upādiṇṇa* is also recognized.

The items brought under *upādiṇṇa* may be considered now. On the basis of *upādiṇṇa* and its negative *anupādiṇṇa*, the *Dhammasaṅganī* arranges the *rūpa-dhammas* into three groups.[6]

The first group is invariably *upādiṇṇa*. It consists of the eight *indriya-rūpas*, namely, the five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex and the faculty of life.

The second group is sometimes *upādiṇṇa* and sometimes *anupādiṇṇa*. It consists of eleven items, namely, the four *mahābhūtas*, *rūpa*, *gandha*, *rasa*, *āhāra*, *ākāsa-dhātu*, *upacaya* and *santati*. These items represent the type of matter with which the *indriya-rūpas* are associated. Since the *indriya-rūpas* are a variety of *upādā-rūpa*, they cannot exist without being supported by the *mahābhūtas*. And the *mahābhūtas* cannot exist independently of four of the *upādā-rūpas*, namely, *rūpa*, *gandha*, *rasa and āhāra*.[7] This explains the presence of the first eight items in the second group. The inclusion of *ākāsa-dhātu* seems to have been necessitated by the need to account for any cavities or holes involved in the constitution of the sense-organs. The inclusion of *upacaya* and *santati* appears rather strange. We have seen that both signify the growth of the matter of the body. Their inclusion

---

[1] *Cf. Aṣṭādaśasu katyupattāḥ kati niranupattāḥ. nava upāttānupāttabhedena dvividhāḥ. indriyena saha pratyutpannā upāttāḥ. cittacaitasikadharmānāṃ sahabhāvāt. —op. cit.* p. 58.

[2] See *Asl.* pp. 336-7 ; *ADS.* p. 28 ; *ADSS.* p. 121.

[3] *Op. cit.* p. 451.

[4] *Op. cit.* p. 108.

[5] *Cpd.* p. 159 n. 6.

[6] *Dhs.* p. 146.

[7] See above, p. 33.

in this group shows that according to the logic of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* the growth of the *upādiṇṇa-rūpa* is itself *upādiṇṇa*. In other words the growth of the *kamma*-caused *rūpa* is also considered as *kamma*-caused.

Why the items included in this (second) group are not recognized as invariably *upādiṇṇa* is not far to seek. When they exist in association with the *indriya-rūpas* they are *upādiṇṇa*, and when they exist otherwise they are *anupādiṇṇa*.

It will be seen that in this (second) group there are some items which in the commentaries are brought under the heading, *anipphanna*. We have already noted that, in the view of the commentators, strictly speaking, none of the *anipphanna-rūpas* can be described as *kammasamuṭṭhāna* (= *upādiṇṇa*), although they can be so described in an indirect way (*pariyāyato*) or in a conventional sense.[1] Hence, from their point of view, strictly speaking, *ākāsa-dhātu*, *upacaya* and *santati* are not *upādiṇṇa*.

The third group is invariably *anupādiṇṇa*. It consists of eight items, namely the two *viññattis*, the triad of *lahutā*, *mudutā* and *kammaññatā*, *jaratā* and *aniccatā*, and *sadda*. Elsewhere in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* the first five items are brought under the heading, *cittasamuṭṭhāna*.[2] This explains why they are completely excluded from the category of *upādiṇṇa*, which is " *kammasamuṭṭhāna*." The *Kathāvatthu* shows that, although the authors of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka had no objection to assigning causes to *jāti* (genesis) and *upacaya-santati* (growth), they were not prepared to treat *jaratā* and *aniccatā* in the same way.[3] It is in keeping with this tradition that *jaratā* and *aniccatā* are included in this group. For to have included them in either of the first two groups is to recognize that they are brought about by *kamma*.

The recognition of *sadda* (sound) as invariably *anupādiṇṇa* shows that, as the Vaibhāṣikas do, the Theravādins, too, do not consider that sound could ever result from *kamma*. However, there were other schools which maintained the opposite view, namely that sound, too, could be conditioned by *karma*. From the *Kathāvatthu* and its Commentary one gathers that the Mahāsāṅghikas were of this opinion.[4]

In support of their theory they adduce evidence from a passage in the *Dīghanikāya*,[5] which runs as follows : " He through having wrought, having accumulated, having piled up, having increased such *karma* becomes reborn with the voice of Brahmā God, like that of the karavīka bird ".[6] Hence the Mahāsāṅghikas maintain that sound could certainly be a result of *karma*. The Theravādin, on his part, does not adduce a convincing counter-argument. He merely says that sound is not *vipāka* ; but, as we shall soon see,[7] in the terminology of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka,

[1] See above, pp. 68-69.
[2] See above, pp. 75, 77.
[3] See *Kvu.* pp. 460-462 ; 353-355.
[4] See *Kvu.* pp. 466-7 and *KvuA.* p. 130.
[5] *Op. cit.* iii, p. 173.
[6] Translation from *Points of Controversy*, p. 267.
[7] See below, p. 110.

vipāka is given a restricted denotation to include only those results of *kamma* which belong exclusively to the realm of mental phenomena. Hence the Theravādin's argument, based as it is on the definition of *vipāka*—a definition which the non-Theravādin does not accept—takes the whole controversy to a different level without providing a direct answer to the opposite view as embodied in the cited sentence. The commentator, too, evades the issue by observing that the Mahāsāṅghikas have come to this conclusion by a careless interpretation of the quotation.

While the Theravāda view is shared by the Vaibhāṣikas, the opposite view is shared by the Vātsīputrīyas and the Vibhajyavādins.[1] The Vaibhāṣikas, too, were confronted with a somewhat similar passage occuring in the *Prajñaptiśāstra* : " This mark of the *mahāpuruṣa* which one calls ' voice of Brahmā ' (*brahmasvaratā*) results from the perfect practice of abstinence from injurious language ".[2] How is this to be reconciled with the thesis that sound is never a *karmic* result ? Two slightly different answers are given. The following view is common to both : It is true that vocal sound is produced by the concussion of the *mahābhūtas* which have resulted from *karma* ; yet, since the sound itself does not result directly from *karma*, it is not to be regarded as *karma*-caused.[3] However, according to the quotation, the Brahma-voice has its cause in the good *karma* accumulated previously. As such it recognizes the fact that the nature of the sound is determined by the previous *karma*.

What one can gather from all this is that the early Buddhist texts—where the mechanism of *kammic* fruition was not explained in detail—too the general view that as a result of good *kamma* one could possess in the next birth a good voice. This idea is clearly implied in the two quotations referred to. During the period of the Abhidhamma systematization, when the mechanism of *kammic* fruition came to be explained in more detail, some schools, notably the Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣikas, changed the earlier view. This change seems to have been necessitated by this reason : Of the many *rūpa-dhammas* only the *indriya-rūpas* are recognized as invariably *kamma*-caused. However, *rūpa*, *gandha*, etc., too, must be included in the group of *dhammas* which are sometimes *kamma*-caused, because, being *avinibhoga-rūpas*,[4] they are necessarily and inseparably integrated with the *indriya-rūpas*. *Sadda* (sound), on the other hand, is not an *avinibhoga-rūpa*. As such it is not necessarily co-existent with every *rūpa-dhamma*. Hence its complete exclusion from the category of *kamma*-caused matter could be effected without thereby violating the principle that the sense-organs and the other *indriya-rūpas* are brought into being through the action of *kamma*.

Closely connected with the theory that the sense-organs are *kammasamuṭṭhāna* is the problem arising from the definition of *vipāka*. In four of the *Kathāvatthu* controversies the Theravādins deny that matter can ever be *vipāka*.[5] Since *vipāka*, as

[1] See *AK.* Ch. 1, p. 69, n. 4.
[2] *AK.* Ch. 1, pp. 69-70.
[3] *Ibid.* Ch. 1, p. 70 ; see also *AKvy.* 1, p. 70.
[4] See above, p. 33; below, pp. 155 ff.
[5] See *Kvu.* pp. 536-7; also pp. 349-52; 466-69.

6——RR 19372 (11/66)

it is generally understood means the results of *kamma*, this denial at first sight seems to contradict what we have been saying so far, namely that some *rūpa-dhammas* come into being through the action of *kamma*.

The Theravāda arguments, however, point to a different conclusion. Against the assertion of the Mahāsāṅghikas,[1] namely that the sense-organs are *vipāka*, the following objection is raised : " The *vipāka* is a matter of feeling, pleasant, painful or neutral ; it is conjoined with feeling of these three kinds ; it is conjoined with mental contact, feeling, perception, volition and thought ; it goes with a mental object ; with it go adverting, attention, volition, anticipation and aiming. Are the five sense-organs anything of this kind ? "[2] This counter-argument is meant to show that, in the view of the Theravādins, the term is applicable only to the mental states resulting from *kamma*. In other words, for the Theravādins *vipāka* is essentially a subjective experience.

But this does not mean that they object to the recognition of the sense-organs as the results of *kamma*. It only means that, in the terminology of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the term *vipāka* is given a restricted denotation. The controversy concerns a question relating to the use of terms. In actual fact both parties agree with the view that the sense-organs are *kamma*-results. In point of fact, the commentator observes that the Theravāda argument is meant to show that the usage (*vohāra*) of *vipāka* does not apply to the *rūpa-dhammas* resulting from *kammic* fruition.[3] This explains why no objection is raised against the Mahāsāṅghikas' assertion that the *manāyatana* could be *vipāka*.[4] It is also in keeping with this circumstance that in the *Dhammasaṅganī* passage which we have quoted above,[5] while the four *khandhas* which represent the mental elements are described as *vipāka*, the *rūpa-dhammas* are separately mentioned with the qualification : *kammassa kaṭattā*. Most probably it is this phrase that later gave rise to *kaṭattā-rūpa*, which in the *Paṭṭhāna*,[6] became the standard term for *kammasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*.

Whether the sense-organs are the result of one *kamma* or of a multiplicity of *kammas*, is another question that drew the attention of the Buddhists. Nāgasena confirms the latter alternative. Just as—so runs the illustration—five different seeds sown in a field later yield five different kinds of fruits, even so the five sense-organs result from diverse *kammas* and not from one *kamma*.[7]

Buddhaghosa, too, seems to have had the same theory in mind when he says that the difference between the sense-organs is due to *kamma-visesa*, the difference in the *kammas* of which they are the results.[8]

[1] i.e. according to *KvuA*. p. 136.
[2] *Points of Controversy*, p. 267 ; (*Kvu*. pp. 467 ff.).
[3] *Cf. Rūpadhammesu panāyaṃ vohāro vā natthī ti dassetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa.*—*KvuA*. p. 136.
[4] See *Kvu*. pp. 467 ff.
[5] See above, p. 104.
[6] *Cf. e.g. Tkp*. p. 5 ; *Dkp*. pp. 16, 17.
[7] *Mil*. p. 65.
[8] *Vism*. p. 445.

However, his commentator interprets, " *kamma-visesa* ", not as referring to a multiplicity of *kammas*, but as referring to a single *kamma* having the potentiality of differentiating the sense-organs. In explanation it is said that, although the *kamma* is one, arising as it does from the desire for a mode of existence (*attabhāva*) complete with five sense-bases, yet, since it is the cause of the differentiation of the sense-organs, it is described as " *kamma-visesa* ".[1] It is further observed that that difference of this *kamma* by which it is a condition (*paccaya*) for the organ of sight by that same difference it is not a condition for the organ of hearing and so on, for otherwise there will not be any difference between the sense-organs.[2]

It is very unlikely that Buddhaghosa had used " *kamma-visesa* " in the same sense as his commentator interpreted it. The probability is rather that he meant a multiplicity of *kammas*, as was recognized by Nāgasena. Since " *bhūta-visesa* ", which occurs in the same sentence,[3] means the difference between the primary elements (plural), it seems more proper that *kamma-visesa*, too, should be similarly interpreted.

What interests us more here is the fact that both explanations attempt to show that the difference between the sense-organs is due to the *kamma* or *kammas* of which they are the results. The reason for this is not far to seek. We saw how certain Buddhists, adopting a Vaiśeṣika theory, maintained that the difference between the sense-organs was due to the difference in their supporting primary elements. We also noticed what prevented the Theravādins from accepting that theory.[4] This explains why both explanations insist on the fact that the difference between the sense-organs is due to the *kamma* or *kammas* of which they are the results.

Finally a fact which has been implicit in the foregoing account of *kammasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* should be made explicit here. The matter that comes into being through the action of *kamma* does not obtain outside of the body of a living being. This is only an implication arising from the fact that only the *indriya-rūpas*, the *hadaya-vatthu*[5] and what is inseparably associated with them are recognized as *kamma-samuṭṭhāna*.

However, there had been a tendency, on the part of certain Buddhists, to extend the sphere of *kammic* influence on matter. Since human action is sometimes directed to gain domination and sovereignty over the earth, some Buddhists are recorded to have concluded that the earth itself is the result of *kamma*.[6] This view, which the Theravādins attribute to the Andhakas, is rejected by the former as completely untenable. Their counter-argument, in brief, is as follows :

[1] *Cf. Ekam pi kammaṃ pañcāyatanikāttabhāvabhavapatthanā nipphannaṃ cakkhādivisese hetutāya aññamaññassa asādhāranan ti ca kammaviseso ti ca vuttan ti daṭṭhabbaṃ*—*VismṬ*. p. 444.
[2] *Na hi taṃ yena visesena cakkhussa paccayo teneva sotassa paccayo hoti ,indriyantarābhāvappattito*—*VismṬ*. p. 444.
[3] *Kiṃ pana taṃ yam aññamaññassa asādhāranaṃ, kammam eva nesaṃ visesakāraṇaṃ, tasmā kammavisesato etesaṃ viseso na bhūtavisesato.*—*Vism*. p. 445.
[4] See above, pp. 47 ff.
[5] i.e. according to the commentaries, see above, p. 65.
[6] *Cf. Hañci atthi issariya-saṃvattanikaṃ kammaṃ ādhipaccasaṃvattanikaṃ kammaṃ; tena vata re vattabbe paṭhavī kammavipāko ti*—*Kvu*. p. 352.

If the earth were the result of *kamma*, then either one living being or all the living beings in common should be responsible for the *kamma* in question. The first hypothesis is not tenable because in that case many will enjoy the fruit of *kamma* for which only one is responsible. The second is equally untenable because all beings do not share the use of the earth : there are those who utterly pass away (*parinibbāyanti*) without enjoying the use of it. But it is impossible—so runs the argument —for one to pass away utterly without exhausting the result of *kamma* for which he or she is responsible.[1]

The objection of the Theravādins is significant in that it shows that they did not want to modify the view, namely that one is responsible for all the consequences arising from one's own *kamma*. This view is said to be supported by a stanza in the *Khuddakapāṭha*,[2] where it is stated that *kammic* fruition is not commonly enjoyed by all (*asādhāranaṃ aññesaṃ*).[3] Equally significant is the opposite view in that it seems to show the beginning of an attempt to relate the results of *kamma* to a wider basis or if we may say so to " socialize " the fruition of *kamma*.

The arrangement of *rūpa-dhammas* on the basis of *cittasamuṭṭhāna* and its negative may be considered now.

The term *cittasamuṭṭhāna*, as observed by Mrs. Rhys Davids, does not imply creation of matter by mind.[4] In our account of the two *viññattis*, it was stated that some *rūpa-dhammas* arise in response to a thought, wholesome (*kusala*), unwholesome (*akusala*) or neutral (*avyākata*).[5] The implication is not that they are created but set up or prompted by mind. It is precisely for this reason that in the *Paṭṭhāna*, consciousness (*citta*) and its concomitants (*cetasika*) are instanced as a condition by way of co-nascence (*sahajāta-paccaya*) in relation to all *rūpa-dhammas* qualified by *cittasamuṭṭhāna*.[6]

As in the case of *upādiṇṇa* and its negative, on the basis of *cittasamuṭṭhāna* and its negative, too, all *rūpa-dhammas* are made into three groups.[7] The first is recognized as invariably *cittasamuṭṭhāna* and it consists of the two *viññattis*. We have already shown that these two items are not two discrete *rūpa-dhammas* in the sense that each signifies an *ākāra-vikāra* (a particular position or situation) of a set of (other) *rūpa-dhammas*.[8] We have also drawn attention to the fact that, since the set of *rūpa-dhammas* in question is *cittasamuṭṭhāna*, the *Dhammasaṅganī* has thought it proper to extend the same description to the two *viññattis*, too.[9] And once the two

[1] See *Kvu.* pp. 349 ff; Cf. also the following passage from *Divy.* p. 56: *Pūrṇena karmāni kṛtāny upacitāni ko'nyaḥ pratyanubhaviṣyati. ṇa bhikṣavaḥ karmāni kṛtyāny upacitāni vāḥye pṛthivīdhātau vipacyante nābdhātau na tejodhātau na vāyudhātav. api tūpāttesv eva skandhātvāyataneṣu karmāni kṛtyāny upacitāni vipacyante śubhānyaśubhāni ca.*

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 7.

[3] *Kvu.* p. 351.

[4] *Bud. Psy. Ethics*, p. 188, n. 3.

[5] See above, pp. 70, 72.

[6] *Tkp.* p. 3, see below, p. 131.

[7] See *Dhs.* pp. 147–8.

[8] See above, pp. 75–76.

[9] See above, p. 75.

viññattis are described as *cittasamuṭṭhāna*, it is but proper that this description should be further qualified as " invariably ". For each of them represents an *ākāra-vikāra* of only those *rūpa-dhammas* which are *cittasamuṭṭhāna*.

The second group comes under both headings, i.e. *cittasamuṭṭhāna* and its negative. It includes the four *mahābhūtas*, *rūpa*, *gandha*, *rasa*, *āhāra*, *sadda*, *ākāsa-dhātu*, the triad of *lahutā*, etc., *upacaya* and *santati*. Their inclusion under the negative heading is because of the simple reason that they do not always arise in response to, or conditioned by, consciousness (*citta*). Their inclusion under the positive heading is because of the fact that they are the kind of *rūpa-dhammas*, the *ākāra-vikāras* of which are represented by the two *viññattis*. In this case they are *cittasamuṭṭhāna*, As to the selection of the items included in this group, the following facts may be noted here. The first eight items are the basic elements present in every instance of matter. The ninth, i.e. *sadda*, refers to vocal sound associated with *vacīviññatti*. *Ākāsa-dhātu*, which, in this case, represents the cavities and holes in the body, is also connected with the *viññattis*. In the production of vocal sound the cavity in the mouth, for instance, has its part to play. The triad of *lahutā*, etc., which represents bodily efficiency, could facilitate bodily movements involved in *kāyaviññatti*. These, it seems to us, are the reasons for recognizing the first thirteen items as (sometimes) *cittasamuṭṭhāna*. The inclusion of *upacaya* and *santati* need not deter us here. What we have said about their inclusion under *upādiṇṇa* applies here, too.

In the above (second) group we find certain items, which in the commentaries are recognized as *anipphanna*. Hence from their point of view, strictly speaking, all such items are not *cittasamuṭṭhāna*.

The third group is never *cittasamuṭṭhāna*. It consists of the eight *indriya-rupas*, *jaratā* and *aniccatā*. The first eight, as we have seen, are invariably *upādiṇṇa*, i.e. *kammasamuṭṭhāna*. Hence they must be included in this group. The inclusion of the next two items is because no cause or condition is assigned to them.[1]

The two headings, *upādiṇṇa* (*kammasamuṭṭhāna*) and *cittasamuṭṭhāna*, which we have considered so far, imply two generative conditions (*samuṭṭhāna-paccaya*) of matter, namely *kamma* and *citta*. To this the commentators add *utu* and *āhāra*.

Utu (temperature or season) is another name for *tejo-dhātu*, which is one of the *mahābhūtas*, and which represents the phenomenon of heat and cold. *Āhāra* is the same as *kabaḷiṅkāra-āhāra*, which is one of the *upādā-rūpas*, and which represents the nutritive aspect of matter, the " quality " of nutrition. Both are recognized as two generative conditions of matter. The kinds of matter conditioned by *utu* and *āhāra* are called *utusamuṭṭhāna* and *āhārasamuṭṭhāna* respectively.[2] While *āhārasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* is confined to the body of a living being, *utusamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* obtains both internally and externally, i.e. as part of the matter that constitutes the body and also outside of it.[3]

[1] See above, p. 108.

[2] See *Vism.* pp. 366, 451–2 ; *Asl.* pp. 340 ff.

[3] See *ADS.* p. 29 ; *NRP.* p. 30.

Finally there remains to be considered the classification of the *rūpa-dhammas* into two groups as *ajjhattika* and *bāhira.*[1] While the five sense-organs are brought under *ajjhattika-rūpa*, the remaining items are brought under *bāhira.*[2] This arrangement is not an Abhidhammic innovation for it is implied in the classical list of twelve *āyatanas*, arranged in the same way, into two groups.

With reference to what are some items *ajjhattika* (internal) and the others *bāhira* (external)? Buddhist exegesis gives more than one explanation, and they all purport to show that no implication of *ātmavāda* (the belief in a soul, self) should be associated with the term *ajjhattika*, " belonging to the self ".

According to one explanation—frequently repeated—*ajjhattika* means that which belongs to the *atta*. And the term *atta* is interpreted, not as referring to soul, but as synonymous with *attabhāva*, i.e. the empiric individuality as composed of mental and physical factors. Since the sense-organs such as *cakkhu*, *sota*, etc. exist only as a part of the complex that makes the living being, they are called *ajjhattika*, " belonging to the *attabhāva* ".[3]

There are, however, other *rūpa-dhammas* which also go to make the living being. Therefore one may ask why they are not brought under the heading, *ajjhattika-rūpa*. The exclusion of such items as the four *mahābhūtas* is understandable, for unlike the sense-organs they do not exist exclusively as a part of the complex that makes the living being. But the same is not true of *itthindriya*, *purisindriya*, *rūpa-jīvitindriya* and *hadaya-vatthu*. Along with the sense-organs they, too, are recognized as invariably *kammasamuṭṭhāna*. Because of this very fact[4]—not to mention any other—they never exist outside of the body of a living being.

Sumangala, the author of the *Vibhāvinī Ṭīkā*, seems to have taken notice of this situation when he observes that, as a matter of fact, *rūpa-dhammas* other than the sense-organs also go to make up what is called *attabhāva* but, as a matter of convention, the latter alone are designated as *ajjhattika-rūpa.*[5] As an alternative explanation it is said that the sense-organs alone are *ajjhattika* par excellence (*visesato*), because they are so helpful to the *attabhāva* that they seem to say : " If it were not for us you would be like unto a log of wood !".[6]

The *Abhidharmakośa*, on the other hand, takes *ātman* as a synonymous term for *citta*, consciousness. Consciousness is the object of the notion of self (*ātman*); it is that which the people falsely take to be their self. Hence, by way of metaphor, it receives the name, *ātman*. Then it observes that the sense-organs (including the *mano-dhātu*) are proximate (*pratyāsanna*, *abhyāsanna*) to consciousness because they

[1] See above, p. 101.
[2] *Dhs*. p. 148.
[3] See *Vism*. p. 450 and *ADSVṬ*. p. 115.
[4] See above, pp. 111–12.
[5] *Kāmaṃ aññe pi hi ajjhattasambhūtā atthi, rūḷhivasena pana cakkhādikaṃ yeva ajjhattikaṃ.* *ADSVṬ*. p. 115.
[6] *Atha vā yadi mayaṃ na homa tvaṃ kaṭṭhaliṅgarūpamo bhavissasī ti vadantā viya attabhāvassa sātisayaṃ upakārattā cakkhādineva visesato ajjhattikāni nāma.—ibid. loc. cit.*

are in fact its " point d'appui " (*āśraya*). For this reason the sense-organs are described as *ādhyātmika*, whereas *rūpa*, *rasa*, etc. which become the objects of consciousness are described as *bāhya*, external (to consciousness).[1]

What all these explanations attempt to show is that the dichotomy between *ajjhattika* (*ādhyātmika*) and *bāhira* (*bāhya*) has no reference to a self (*atta*, *ātman*). Since the Buddhist attitude to *ātmavāda* is one of emphatic denial, as far as this fact is concerned, they are all correct.

However, in understanding why in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī* only the sense-organs are brought under the heading *ajjhattika-rūpa*, the explanation given in the *Abhidharmakośa* is more helpful than any other. If, as is suggested by the other explanations, *attabhāva* is the centre with reference to which the distinction between " internal " (*ajjhattika*) and "external" (*bāhira*) is established, then this raises the question as to why such items as the two faculties of sex are excluded from the category of *ajjhattika-rūpa*. The question does not arise if, as is suggested by the *Abhidharmakośa*, consciousness (*citta*) is taken as the point of reference. That is to say, the bases or supports (*vatthu*, *nissaya*) of consciousness (*citta*) are internal to it, whereas the things that become the objects are external to it.

It is true that no consciousness can arise without reference to an object, too. However, since the sense-organs are the very bases of consciousness, in this sense they are more proximate to it. This idea seems to be implied by the fact that the consciousnesses are named after their bases as *cakkhu-viññāna* (eye-consciousness), *sota-viññāna* (ear-consciousness), etc. The statement made in the Commentary to the *Paṭṭhāna*, namely that when consciousness arises it seems to spring forth from within the sense-organs,[2] is based on the same idea.

Sumangala's statement, namely that the use of the term *ajjhattika* to qualify only the sense-organs is mostly a matter of convention,[3] becomes more meaningful if it is understood in the context of an observation made by Sthavira (=Śrīlāta), a celebrity of the Dārṣṭāntika School. The latter rightly points out that the distinction between *ādhyātmika* and *bāhya* is not a hard and fast one but is of relative application (*pāryāyikaṃ*): As bases of consciousness the sense-organs alone are *ādhyātmika*, but since the sense-organs, too, can become the objects of consciousness, they become *bāhya* as well.[4]

Sthavira's observation could be confirmed from another point of view. From a *Vibhāṣā* passage, cited by De la Vallée Poussin, one gathers that the difference between the two terms is established from two other points of view : (*a*) les *dharmas* qui se trouvent dans la personne propre (*svātmabhāva*) sont personnels ; ceux qui

[1] *AK*. Ch. I, p. 74 ; cf. . . *ātmānāṃ vā cittaṃ adhikṛtya ye dharmāḥ pratyāsanna-bhātvā āśraya-bhāvena vartante. te ādhyātmikāḥ.—AKvy*. I, p. 74.
[2] *Cf. Arūpino hi khandhā cakkhādīnaṃ vatthūnaṃ abbhantarato nikkhantā viya uppajjanti—Tkp*. pp. 53–4.
[3] See above, p. 114.
[4] *Sthavira āha. pāryāyikaṃ eṣāṃ ādhyātmika-bāhyatvaṃ. vijñānaṃ āśrayās te cakṣru ādaya ity ādhyātmikāḥ. mano-vijñāna-viṣayatvāt tu bāhyā iti—AKvy*. I, p. 40.

se trouvent chez autrui et aussi ceux qui ne sont pas intégrés aux êtres vivants (*asattvākhya*) sont externes ; (*b*) less *dharmas* intégrés aux êtres vivants peuvent-être personnels ; les autres sont externes.[1]

A similar situation obtains in the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Dhammasaṅganī* : The two terms in question are used in the adverbial as *ajjhattaṃ* and *bahiddhā* to signify another distinction. " *Rūpaṃ ajjhattaṃ* " denotes the matter that makes up one's own person and " *rūpaṃ bahiddhā* " that which makes up all other living beings.[2] The point of reference differs from person to person. To A his own body is *ajjhattaṃ*, but to B it is *bahiddhā*. Curiously enough, this does not take into account the matter that does not enter into the composition of living beings. As such, it cannot be identified with either (*a*) or (*b*) of the *Vibhāṣā*. Nor does it fall in line with the Nikāyas, where the two terms are often used in the adverbial to establish the dichotomy between the matter that constitutes the body of the living being and the matter that obtains outside of it. In the *Vibhaṅga* and the *Dhammasaṅganī* the same pair of terms is applied to the other four *khandhas*, too.[3] Perhaps for the sake of uniformity a stock formula is used in respect of *rūpakkhandha* as well as the other four *khandhas*. This explains why " *rūpaṃ ajjhattaṃ* " and " *rūpaṃ bahiddhā* ", as understood by these two works, do not represent matter in its totality.

---

[1] *AK*. Ch. I, p. 73, n. 1.

[2] See *Vbh*. pp. 1 ff ; *Dhs*. pp. 187–8

[3] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE MATERIAL ELEMENTS

Abbreviations

Classification-headings.

A = upādā	a = anupādā
B = upādiṇṇa	b = anupādiṇṇa
C = upādiṇṇupādānīya	c = anupādiṇṇupādānīya
D = sanidassana	d = anidassana
E = sappaṭigha	e = appaṭigha
F = indriya	f = na indriya
G = mahābhūta	g = na mahābhūta
H = viññatti	h = na viññatti
I = cittasamuṭṭhāna	i = na cittasamuṭṭhāna
J = cittasahabhū	j = na cittasahabhū
K = cittānuparivatti	k = na cittānuparivatti
L = ajjhattika	l = bāhira
M = oḷārika	m = sukhuma
N = santike	n = dūre

Material Elements.

1 = paṭhavī	10 = rūpa	19 = ākāsa
2 = tejo	11 = sadda	20 = lahutā
3 = vāyo	12 = gandha	21 = mudutā
4 = āpo	13 = rasa	22 = kammaññatā
5 = cakkhu	14 = itthindriya	23 = upacaya
6 = sota	15 = purisindriya	24 = santati
7 = ghāna	16 = jīvitindriya	25 = jaratā
8 = jivhā	17 = kāyaviññatti	26 = aniccatā
9 = kāya	18 = vacīviññatti	27 = āhāra

(Hadaya-vatthu is not known to the Dhammasaṅgaṇī)

* = The items indicated by this mark come under *upādiṇṇa* as well as under *anupādiṇṇa* (see above, p. 107) or under *cittasamuṭṭhāna* as well as under *na cittasamuṭṭhāna* (see above, p. 113).

Classifications of the 1st Section

I	A 5–27	a 1–4
II	B 5–9, 14–16, (1–4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	b 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (1–4, 10, 12, 13 19, 23, 24, 27)*
III	C 5–9, 14–16, (1–4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	c 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (1–4, 10, 12, 13 19, 23, 24, 27)*
IV	D 10	d 1–9, 11–27
V	E 1–3, 5–13	e 4, 14–27
VI	F 5–9, 14–16	f 1–4, 10–13, 17–27
VII	G 1–4	g 5–27
VIII	H 17, 18	h 1–16, 19–27
IX	I 17, 18, (1–4, 10–13, 19–24, 27)*	i 5–9, 14–16, 25, 26, (1–4, 10–13, 19–24, 27)*
X	J 17, 18	j 1–16, 19–27
XI	K 17, 18	k 1–16, 19–27
XII	L 5–9	l 1–4, 10–27
XIII	M 1–3, 5–13	m 4, 14–27
XIV	N 1–3, 5–13	n 4, 14–27

Classification-headings.

A = upādā		a = anupādā	
B = upādiṇṇa		b = anupādiṇṇa	
C = upādiṇṇupādānīya		c = onupādiṇṇupādānīya	
D = sanidassana		d = anidassana	
E = sappaṭigha		e = appaṭigha	
F = indriya		f = na indriya	
G = mahābhūta		g = na mahābhūta	
H = viññatti		h = na viññatti	
I = cittasamuṭṭhāna		i = na cittasamuṭṭhāna	
J = cittasahabhū		j = na cittasahabhū	
K = cittānuparivatti		k = na cittānuparivatti	
L = ajjhattika		l = bāhira	
M = oḷārika		m = sukhuma	
N = santike		n = dūre	

Material Elements.

1 = paṭhavī	10 = rūpa	19 = ākāsa
2 = tejo	11 = sadda	20 = lahutā
3 = vāyo	12 = gandha	21 = mudutā
4 = āpo	13 = rasa	22 = kammaññatā
5 = cakkhu	14 = itthindriya	23 = upacaya
6 = sota	15 = purisindriya	24 = santati
7 = ghāna	16 = jīvitindriya	25 = jaratā
8 = jivhā	17 = kāyaviññatti	26 = aniccatā
9 = kāya	18 = vacīviññatti	27 = āhāra

(Hadaya-vatthu is not known to the Dhammasaṅganī)

* = The items indicated by this mark come under *upādiṇṇa* as well as under *anupādiṇṇa* see above, p. 107) or under *cittasamuṭṭhāna* as well as under *an cittasamṭṭuhāna* (see above, p. 113).

Classifications of the 2nd Section

i	LA 5–9	lA 10–27	la 1–4
ii	LB 5–9	lB 14–16, (1–4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	lb 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (1–4 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
iii	LC 5–9	lC 14–16, (1–4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	lc 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (1–4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
iv	Ld 5–9	lD 10	ld 1–4, 11–27
v	LE 5–9	lE 1–3, 10–13	le 4, 14–27
vi	LF 5–9	lF 14–16	lf 1–4, 10–13, 17–27
vii	Lg 5–9	lG 1–4	lg 10–27
viii	Lh 5–9	lH 17, 18	lh 1–4, 10–16, 19–27
ix	Li 5–9	lI 17, 18, (1–4, 10–13, 19–24, 27)*	li 14–16, 25, 26, (1–4, 10–13, 19–24, 27)*
x	Lj 5–9	lJ 17, 18	lj 1–4, 10–16, 19–27
xi	Lk 5–9	lK 17, 18	lk 1–4, 10–16, 19–27
xii	LM 5–9	lM 1–3, 10–13	lm 4, 14–27
xiii	LN 5–9	lN 4, 14–27	ln 1.3, 10–13

Abbreviations

Classification-headings.

A = upādā
B = upādiṇṇa
C = upādiṇṇupādānīya
D = sanidassana
E = sappaṭigha
F = indriya
G = mahābhūta
H = viññatti
I = cittasamuṭṭhāna
J = cittasahabhū
K = cittānuparivatti
L = ajjhattika
M = oḷārika
N = santike

a = anupādā
b = anupādiṇṇa
c = anupādiṇṇupādānīya
d = anidassana
e = appaṭigha
f = na indriya
g = na mahābhūta
h = na viññatti
= na cittasamuṭṭhāna
j = na cittasahabhū
k = na cittānuparivatti
l = bāhira
m = sukhuma
n = dūre

Material Elements.

1 = paṭhavī
2 = tejo
3 = vāyo
4 = āpo
5 = cakkhu
6 = sota
7 = ghāna
8 = jivhā
9 = kāya

10 = rūpa
11 = sadda
12 = gandha
13 = rasa
14 = itthindriya
15 = purisindriya
16 = jīvitindriya
17 = kāyaviññatti
18 = vacīviññatti

19 = ākāsa
20 = lahutā
21 = mudutā
22 = kammaññatā
23 = upacaya
24 = santati
25 = jaratā
26 = aniccatā
27 = āhāra

(Hadaya-vatthu is not known to the Dhammasaṅganī)

* = The items indicated by this mark come under *upādiṇṇa* as well as under *anupādiṇṇa* (see above, p. 107) or under *cittasamuṭṭhāna* as well as under *na cittasamuṭṭhāna* (see above 113).

Classifications of the 3rd Section

i	AB 5–9, 14–16 (10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	Ab 20–22, 25, 26, (10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	aB (1–4)*	ab (1–4)*
ii	AC 5–9, 14–16, (10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	Ac 17, 11, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	aC (1–4)*	ac (1–4)*
iii	AE 5–13	Ae 14–27	aE 1–3	ae 4
iv	AM 5–13	Am 14–27	aM 1–3	am 4
v	AN 5–13	An 14–27	aN 1–3	an 4
vi	BD 10*	Bd 5–9, 14–15, (1–4, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	bD 10*	bd 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (1–4, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
vii	BE 5–9, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	Be 14–16, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	bE 11, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	be 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
viii	BG (1–4)*	Bg 5–9, 14–16, (10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	bG (1–4)*	bg 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 24, 26, (10, 12, 13, 29, 23, 24, 27)*
ix	BM 5–9, (1–4, 10, 12, 13)*	Bm 14–16, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	bM 11, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	bm 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
x	BN 5–9, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	Bn 14–16, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	bN 11, (3–1, 10, 12, 12, 13)*	bn 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
xi	CD 10*	Cd 5–9, 14–16, (1–4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	cD 10*	cd 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (1–4, 10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
xii	CE 5–9, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	Ce 14–16, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	cE 11, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	ce 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*

Classification-headings.

A = upādā	a = anupādā
B = upādiṇṇa	b = anupādiṇṇa
C = upādiṇṇupādānīya	c = anupādiṇṇupādānīya
D = sanidassana	d = anidassana
E = sappaṭigha	e = appaṭigha
F = indriya	f = na indriya
G = mahābhūta	g = na mahābhūta
H = viññatti	h = na viññatti
I = cittasamuṭṭhāna	i = na cittasamuṭṭhāna
J = cittasahabhū	j = na cittasahabhū
K = cittānuparivatti	k = na cittānuparivatti
L = ajjhattika	l = bāhira
M = oḷārika	m = sukhuma
N = santike	n = dūre

Material Elements.

1 = pathavī	10 = rūpa	19 = ākāsa
2 = tejo	11 = sadda	20 = lahutā
3 = vāyo	12 = gandha	21 = mudutā
4 = āpo	13 = rasa	22 = kammaññatā
5 = cakkhu	14 = itthindriya	23 = upacaya
6 = sota	15 = purisindriya	24 = santati
7 = ghāna	16 = jīvitindriya	25 = jaratā
8 = jivhā	17 = kāyaviññatti	26 = aniccatā
9 = kāya	18 = vacīviññatti	27 = āhāra

(Hadaya-vatthu is not known to the Dhammasaṅganī)

* = The items indicated by this mark come under *upādiṇṇa* as well as under *anupādiṇṇa* (see above, p. 107) or under *cittasamuṭṭhāna* as well as under *na cittasamuṭṭhāna* (see above, p. 113).

xiii	CG (1–4)*	Cg 5–9, 14–16, (10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	cG (1–4)*	cg 11, 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (10, 12, 13, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
xiv	CM 5–9, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	Cm 14–16, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	cM 11, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	cm 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
xv	CN 5–9, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	Cn 14–16, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*	cN 11, (1–3, 10, 12, 13)*	cn 17, 18, 20–22, 25, 26, (4, 19, 23, 24, 27)*
xvi	EF 5–9	Ef 1–3, 10–13	eF 14–16	ef 4, 17–27
xvii	EG 1–3	Eg 5–13	eG 4	eg 14–27
xviii	FM 5–9	Fm 14–16	fM 1–3, 10–13	fm 4, 17–27
ixx	FN 5–9	Fn 14–16	fN 1–3, 10–13	fn 4, 17–27
xx	GM 1–3	Gm 4	gM 5–13	gm 14–27
xxi	GN 1–3	Gn 4	gN 5–13	gn 14–27

CHAPTER SEVEN

Matter and the System of Correlation

ONE of the fundamental postulates of Buddhist philosophy is that a plurality of conditions is necessary for the origination of every element of existence, mental as well as material. In the tradition of the Theravādins this principle is summed up in the phrase: " *ekadhammassa anekapaccaya-bhāva* ".[1] The same idea finds expression in what the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism call " *pratyaya-sāmāgrī* ".[2] Accordingly, it is with reference to a concurrence of relations that the occurrence of an event is sought to be explained.

The Theravāda Abhidhamma seeks to explain the inter-dependence and the conditionality of all *dhammas* (elements of existence) with reference to what is called " *paccayākāra-naya* ", the system of correlation. It is said to provide an explanation as to the causal relation of all *dhammas*, not only in their temporal sequence but also in their spatial concomitance. In regard to this subject there are two things which should be noted at the very outset, namely, (*a*) *paccaya*, the condition or the relating thing and (*b*) *paccayuppanna-dhamma*, the conditioned or the related thing. In a given relation between two *dhammas*, if one constitutes a necessary ground for the existence of the other, then it is designated as *paccaya* and the other, i.e. what is conditioned thereby, *paccayuppanna-dhamma*. In the words of Buddhaghosa, whatever *dhamma* which is a support for the persistence or origination of another is to be taken as the *paccaya* of the latter.[3] It is to be understood, he says, in the sense of assisting in the arising or coming to be of the (*paccayuppanna*) *dhamma*.[4]


In all there are twenty four *paccayas*, i.e. twenty four ways in which one *dhamma* is a condition for another, namely, *hetu* (moral root), *ārammaṇa* (object), *adhipati* (dominance), *anantara* (contiguity), *samanantara* (immediate contiguity), *sahajāta* (co-nascence), *aññamañña* (reciprocity), *nissaya* (basis), *upanissaya* (inducement), *purejāta* (pre-nascence), *pacchājāta* (post-nascence), *āsevana* (habitual recurrence), *kamma* (volitional action), *vipāka* (retribution), *āhāra* (nutriment), *indriya* (faculty), *jhāna* (Absorption), *magga* (Path), *sampayutta* (association), *vippayutta* (dissociation), *atthi* (presence), *natthi* (absence), *vigata* (disappearance) and *avigata* (non-disappearance).[5]

[1] *Tkp.* p. 59.
[2] *AKvy.* I, p. 235.
[3] *Yo hi dhammo yassa dhammassa ṭhitiyā vā uppattiyā vā upakārako hoti, so tassa paccayo ti vuccati.*—*Tkp.* p. 11.
[4] See *ibid. loc. cit.*
[5] *Ibid*, p. 1.

The schools of Sanskrit Buddhism postulate six kinds of *hetu* (cause) and four kinds of *pratyaya* (condition) as factors responsible for the origination of all *dharmas*. *Kāraṇa-hetu* (the raison d'être), *sahabhū-hetu* (co-existent cause), *sabhāga-hetu* (identical cause), *samprayukta-hetu* (associated cause), *sarvatraga-hetu* (universal cause), and *vipāka-hetu* (cause of retribution) are the six kinds of *hetu*. *Hetu-pratyaya* (cause-condition), *samanantara-pratyaya* (immediate contiguity-condition), *ālambana-pratyaya* (object-condition) and *adhipati-pratyaya* (dominance-condition) are the four kinds of *pratyaya*.[1]

Yaśomitra says that no distinction is drawn between *hetu* and *pratyaya* and that both are synonymous.[2] We may then ask why some items are brought under *hetu* and the others under *pratyaya*. The answer given is that the exposition of *hetus* is based on an examination of causes by way of non-obstacle (*avighna-bhāva*), coexistence (*sahabhūtva*), identity (*sadṛśatva*), etc., whereas that of the *pratyayas* is based on an examination of causes by way of immediate contiguity (*samanantara*), etc.[3] That there is, however, an element of redundancy involved here is shown by the explanation given as to the relation between the two groups.

In his Systems of Buddhistic Thought, which is mainly based on the Chinese sources, Yamakami Sōgen gives the following diagram to illustrate the relation between *hetu*, *pratyaya* and *phala* (effect) as understood by the Sarvāstivādins.[4]




As is shown here, *hetu-pratyaya* corresponds to five of the *hetus*, while *kāraṇa-hetu* corresponds to three of the *pratyayas*—a fact which clearly shows that the two classifications in question are not mutually exclusive but that they completely coalesce, one into the other. The five varieties of *phala* which are posited against the *hetus* should be understood as related to the *pratyayas*, too, because the four *pratyayas* do correspond to the six *hetus*. That is to say, while *hetu-pratyaya* refers to five of the

[1] See *AK.* Ch. II, pp. 245 and 299 ff.
[2] *hetūnāṃ pratyayānāṃ ca kaḥ prativiśeṣaḥ. na kaścid ity āha .... hetuḥ pratyayo nidānaṃ kāraṇaṃ nimittaṃ liṅgam upaniṣad iti paryāyāḥ.*—*AKvy.* I, p. 188.
[3] *AKvy.* I, p. 188.
[4] *Op. cit.* p. 315.

hetus, the remaining three *pratyayas* are referred to by the last of the *hetus*. This explanation as to the relation between *hetu* and *pratyaya* is identical with the one which, according to De la Vallée Poussin, was advanced by the " premiéres maitres " of the *Vibhāṣā*.[1]

The *Abhidharmakośa* and its *Vyākhyā* give a slightly different explanation.[2] The difference lies in the fact that according to them *kāraṇa-hetu* corresponds only to *adhipati-pratyaya*. This explanation is identical with the one attributed to the " seconds maitres " of the *Vibhāṣā* and also with the one adopted by the *Prakaraṇa*.[3] The masters of the Mahāyāna explain the relation in question in a still different way : " Le *sabhāgahetu* est à la fois *hetupratyaya* et *adhipati pratyaya*, les autres cinq *hetus* sont *adhipatipratyaya* ".[4] We may illustrate these two kinds of relation between the *hetus* and the *pratyayas*, as follows :



In the first, *hetu-pratyaya* stands as a general designation for all the *hetus* except *kāraṇa-hetu* which corresponds to *adhipati-pratyaya*. In the second, it is the *adhipati-pratyaya* that stands as a general designation for all the *hetus*, the first of which corresponds to *hetu-pratyaya*, too. In both, *ālambana-* and *samanantara-pratyayas* have not been related to any of the *hetus*.

What one can gather from the three different explanations as to the relation between the six *hetus* and the four *pratyayas* is that the two groups have not been considered as completely exclusive of each other. In other words, the two terms in question are understood as more or less convertible. This is in keeping with the terminology of the Nikāyas where *hetu* and *paccaya* are used in apposition,[5] but is quite in contrast

[1] See *AK*. Ch. II, p. 299, n. 1.
[2] *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 244 ff ; *AKvy*. I, pp. 188 ff.
[3] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 299, n. 1.
[4] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[5] *Cf. e.g. D*. III, p. 284 ; *S*. II, p. 224, IV, pp. 68, 151 ; *A*. I, p. 66.

to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka where the use of *hetu* is restricted to denote only those factors (*lobha, dosa, moha*, etc) which determine the ethical quality of volitional acts.[1]

This is a brief *résumé* of the Theravādins' *paccayākāra-naya* and of the *hetus* and *pratyayas* of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.[2] We are interested in the subject only in so far as it bears some relevance to the analysis of matter. Hence all abstruse and hair-splitting details have been omitted. In regard to this subject, too, there are many points of contact between the Theravāda and the other schools of Buddhist thought. In this connection there are three things to be noted.

It is true that the Theravādins have postulated comparatively a large number of *paccayas*. However, an examination of the list should show that it is unduly inflated : sometimes an item is repeated under different names ; sometimes a group of (already mentioned) items are brought under a new heading. That the scholiasts were not unaware of this element of redundancy is shown by Anuruddha's observation, namely that the twenty four *paccayas* are reducible to six.[3] Secondly, as we have already observed, in the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism the two terms *hetu* and *pratyaya* are recognized as more or less convertible. Therefore, in finding out what corresponds to (Pāli) *paccayas* one need not confine oneself to (Sanskrit) *pratyayas*, but may take into account the *hetus*, too. Thirdly, as De la Vallée Poussin remarks, certain differences concern the nomenclature but not the interpretation.[4] For example, the *aññamañña-sahajāta-paccaya* of the Theravādins is the same as the *sahabhū-hetu* of the Sarvāstivādins.[5] To this should be added : sometimes the nomenclature remains the same but the interpretation differs. For example, the *hetu-paccaya* of Pāli Buddhism has practically no correspondence with the *hetu-pratyaya* of the Sanskrit schools.[6]

Taking all these points into consideration we may examine how matter enters into the system of correlation of the Theravādins. Wherever possible we may also observe the parallel cases as found in the other systems of Buddhist thought. In the main, we are interested in those relations where matter constitutes either a *paccaya* or a *paccayuppanna-dhamma*. In other words, the following discussion is an attempt to unfold the implications of the phrase, " *rūpaṃ sappaccayaṃ* " which occurs in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇī*.[7]

[1] See below, p.137.
[2] For more details on the subject, see Mrs. Rhys Davids' article on relations (Buddhist) in *ERE* ; Ledi Sadaw, *Paṭṭhānuddesadīpanī*, his article, *The philosophy of relations*, *JPTS*, 1915-16 ; Nyanatiloka, *Guide through the Abhidhamma Piṭaka*, pp. 58 ff ; Tatia, article on *Paṭiccasamuppāda*, *Nava-Nālanda-Mahāvihāra Research Publication*, Vol. I ; W. S. Karunaratne, *Development of the Theory of Causality in early Theravāda Buddhism.*
[3] See *ADS*. p. 39.
[4] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 299, n. 1.
[5] See below, pp. 130-31.
[6] See below, pp. 137-38.
[7] *Op. cit.* pp. 124-5.

Ārammaṇa-paccaya :

Ārammaṇa-paccaya (=*ālambana-pratyaya*) can mean anything which, as object, constitutes a condition for the arising of consciousness (*citta*) and its concomitants (*cetasika*).[1] We have already indicated how all *rūpa-dhammas* fall under six different headings according to the way they become the objects of consciousness.[2] *Rūpa*, *sadda*, *gandha*, *rasa* and *phoṭṭhabba* are known as objects of the five kinds of *viññāna* named after the corresponding sense-organs (= *cakkhu-viññāna*, *sota-viññāna*, etc.), and the remaining *rūpa-dhammas* as the objects of *mano-viññāna*. Hence, while the first five items are instanced as *ārammaṇa-paccayas* in relation to the first five kinds of *viññāna*, the remaining *rūpa-dhammas* are instanced as *ārammaṇa-paccayas* in relation to the sixth.

Adhipati-paccaya :

Adhipati-paccaya, the condition by way of dominance, is of two varieties: *ārammaṇādhipati* and *sahajātādhipati*.

The former is the same as *ārammaṇa-paccaya* but for this difference : only those objects which exert a dominant influence on the consciousness and its concomitants are recognized as *ārammaṇādhipati*.[3]

The latter applies only to the four kinds of *iddhipāda*, namely, *chanda-samādhi* (concentration of intention), *viriya-samādhi* (concentration of energy), *citta-samādhi* (concentration of consciousness) and *vīmaṃsa-samādhi* (concentration of investigation).[4] These four factors alone are recognized as *sahajātādhipati* because they exert an overwhelming influence on the mental states which arise simultaneously with them. They are so powerful that at a given moment only one of them can arise.[5] If a particular consciousness and its concomitants, which are influenced by one of these *iddhipādas*, give rise to *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*, then this *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* is also recognized as influenced by that *iddhipāda*.[6] This is the position of matter in relation to *sahajātādhipati-paccaya*. In this particular relation the position of matter is only that of the *paccayuppanna-dhamma* (conditioned).

The *adhipati-paccaya* of the Theravādins should not be confused with the *adhipati-pratyaya* of the *Abhidharmakośa*.

According to the latter work, it is the same as *kāraṇa-hetu*. As such its scope is greater than that of any other *pratyaya*. For what is called *kāraṇa-hetu* applies to all *saṃskṛta-dharmas* but for one exception : a *dharma* is not the *kāraṇa-hetu* of itself. The function of *kāraṇa-hetu* is to be understood, not in a positive sense, i.e., as a *kāraka* (agent), but in a negative sense, i.e., as offering no obstacle.[7] Its universal

[1] See *Tkp*. pp. 2, 12 ff.
[2] See above, pp. 102, 103.
[3] *Tkp*. pp. 13, 31.
[4] *Ibid*. pp. 13, 31 ff.
[5] *Cf. Na ekakkhaṇe bahū jeṭṭhakā nāma honti*—*Tkp*. p. 31.
[6] See *Tkp*. p. 2.
[7] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 307.

application is based on the contention that no *dharma* constitutes an obstacle (*avighnabhāvāvasthā*) to the origination of those other *dharmas*, which are destined to be originated (*uppattimant*).[1] The implication is that " it does not directly make any disturbance in the causal nexus ".[2]

It is because of two reasons that *kāraṇa-hetu* is also called *adhipati-pratyaya* : The first is that it applies to the largest number of *dharmas* (*adhikaḥ pratyayaḥ*). The second is that it constitutes a condition in relation to the largest number of *dharmas* (*adhikasya pratyayaḥ*).[3]

That there is a big difference between the *adhipati-pratyaya* of the *Abhidharmakośa* and that of the Theravādins is obvious. Stated briefly : for the *Abhidharmakośa*, *adhipati* signifies dominance mainly by way of quantity, whereas for the Theravādins, *adhipati* signifies dominance solely by way of quality.[4]

In view of the fact that *kāraṇa-hetu* (=*adhipati-pratyaya*) applies to all *dharmas*, it goes without saying that each and every *rūpa-dharma* constitutes a *kāraṇa-hetu*, not only in relation to the other *rūpa-dharmas* but also in relation to all *arūpa-dharmas* (mental elements).

Sahajāta-paccaya :

In the case of two *dhammas*, if one cannot arise unless simultaneously with the arising of the other, then the latter is recognized as a *sahajāta-paccaya* (co-nascence-condition) in relation to the former. If the relation between A and B is such, that B always arises simultaneously with A, then A is the *paccaya* and B the *paccayuppanna-dhamma*. This does not necessarily mean that A cannot arise independently of B. It only means that under no circumstances can B arise independently of A. The two are not on a par.[5]

When they are on a par, the relation between them is described as *aññamañña*, reciprocal. It is one of mutual support. In this case, while A is a *sahajāta-paccaya* in relation to B, B too is a *sahajāta-paccaya* in relation to A. What is true of one is equally true of the other.[6] Accordingly, in such a relation each becomes at one and the same time the *paccaya* as well as the *paccayuppanna-dhamma*.[7]

The latter variety of *sahajāta-paccaya*, which is distinguished from the former by being qualified as *aññamañña*, is the same as the *sahabhū-hetu* of the Sarvāstivādins. For in the case of *sahabhū-hetu*, too, the related things are considered not only as causes but also as effects in relation to each other.[8]

[1] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 248 ; see also *AKvy*. I, pp. 189 ff.
[2] Sogen, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, p. 86.
[3] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 308.
[4] *Cf. Jeṭṭhakaṭṭhena upakārako dhammo adhipatipaccayo*—*Tkp*. p. 13.
[5] See *Tkp*. pp. 14, 36.
[6] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[7] *Iminā va etesaṃ dhammānaṃ ekakkhaṇe paccayabhāvañ c'eva paccayuppannabhāvañ ca dīpeti.*—*Tkp*. p. 36.
[8] See *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 248 ff ; *AKvy* pp. 191 ff.

The Sautrāntikas take strong exception to this principle of reciprocal conditionality or causation. They concede, however, that between two co-existent things one could become the cause of the other, and cite the relation between the visual organ and the visual consciousness as a case in point. But they refuse to believe that two co-existent things could be related in such a way that one becomes at one and the same time the cause as well as the effect of the other.[1] The counter-argument of the Sarvāstivādins amounts to this : There are certain things which always arise simultaneously ; when one is present the others are also present and when one is absent the others are also absent. Therefore, it is to be concluded that the relation between such things is one of reciprocal causation.[2]

The well-known example cited in this connection is that of three sticks set upright, all leaning against one another, at their upper ends.[3] The Sautrāntikas contend that there is a complex of anterior causes which is responsible for this peculiar position of the sticks (because of which position the three sticks do not fall to the ground).[4]

The objection of the Sautrāntikas to recognizing the *sahabhū-hetu* is not without significance for it shows that their general policy of reducing the lists[5] was applied to the list of *hetus* and *pratyayas* as well.

How the two kinds of *sahajāta-paccaya* apply to matter may be considered now. Two cases were noted in two previous chapters : (*a*) The four *mahābhūtas* are a *sahajāta-paccaya* (non-reciprocal) in relation to the *upādā-rūpas*.[6] (b) Each of the *mahābhūtas* is a *sahajāta-paccaya* (*aññamañña*=reciprocal) in relation to the other.[7] The first establishes the necessary dependence of the *upādā-rūpas* on the *mahābhūtas* and the second the co-ordinate position of the *mahābhūtas*.

There are two more cases to be noted : (*a*) Consciousness and consciousness-concomitants are a *sahajāta-paccaya* (non-reciprocal) in relation to *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*.[8] Here the conditionality is not recognized as reciprocal because of the simple reason that a consciousness and its concomitants can arise without necessarily giving rise to *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*. (*b*) The other refers to the relation between *nāma* (mind) and *rūpa* (matter) at the moment of conception (*paṭisandhi*). Here the conditionality is recognized as reciprocal with a view to showing that both come into being simultaneously and that the one cannot come into being independently of the other.[9]

---

1 See *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 253 ff.
2 *Ibid. loc. cit.*
3 *Ibid.* p. 254 ; see also *Tkp.* p. 14.
4 *AK*. Ch. II, p. 255.
5 See above, p. 40.
6 See above, pp. 31-32.
7 See above, pp. 23-24.
8 See *Tkp.* pp. 3, 14, 37 ff.
9 *Tkp.* pp. 3, 14.

Nissaya-paccaya :

This refers to something which aids something else in the manner of a base or foundation. Consequently, all the examples given with reference to *sahajāta-paccaya* are repeated as *nissaya-paccayas*, too. Again, since the first five sense-organs are the physical bases of the first five kinds of consciousness named after them, the former are instanced as *nissaya-paccayas* in relation to the latter. Similarly is explained the position of *hadaya-vatthu* (i.e. *yaṃ rūpaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ* of the *Paṭṭhāna*[1]) in its relation to *mano* and *mano-viññāna*.[2]

Purejāta- and Pacchājāta-paccaya :

Purejāta-paccaya (pre-nascent condition) refers to something, which, having arisen first, becomes a support to something else which arises later ; and *pacchājāta-paccaya* (post-nascent condition) to something, which, having arisen later, becomes a support to something else which has arisen earlier.[3] In the first as well as in the second, that which becomes the *paccaya* (condition) and that which becomes the *paccayuppanna* (conditioned) are not co-nascent. The first is like the father who supports his son. The second is like the son who supports his father.

The first five sense-organs (*cakkhu*, *sota*, etc.) and the corresponding sense-objects (*rūpa*, *sadda*, etc.) are recognized as *purejāta-paccayas* in relation to the first five kinds of consciousness (*cakkhu-viññāna*, *sota-viññāna*, etc.).[4] Their recognition as such is because of the circumstance that by the time, say, visual consciousness arises, the organ of sight and the visible have been existing. The organ of sight and the visible do not come into existence simultaneously with the visual consciousness, in relation to which they become *paccayas*. This statement is true enough from the point of view of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka and the earlier works where the relative duration of matter is recognized.[5] But as we have already seen, the early doctrine of impermanence later gave rise to a formulated theory of moments.[6]

It may be recalled here that according to the theory in question, each element of existence, mental or material, has three momentary phases, namely, the nascent (*uppāda*), the static (*ṭhiti*) and the cessant (*bhaṅga*). There is, however, this difference to be noted : the static phase (*ṭhiti*) of a material element is longer than that of a mental element.[7] Therefore, if a material element and a mental element come into existence simultaneously, they will not cease to exist simultaneously. The former will continue to exist (for some time) even after the cessation of the latter. Thus the principle, namely that matter is of longer duration than mind, is not abandoned even after the development of the theory of moments.

---

1 See above, p. 64.
2 See *Tkp.* pp. 3-4.
3 *Ibid.* pp. 17, 42 ff.
4 *Tkp.* pp. 17, 42 ff.
5 See above, pp. 81 ff.
6 See above, pp. 84 ff.
7 See *VbhA.* pp. 25 ff. ; *Vism.* p. 613.

From this it follows that a material element, which arises earlier, can become a condition in relation to a mental element, which arises later. In other words, the former can become a *purejāta-paccaya* in relation to the latter. We have already noted that the first five sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects are *purejāta-paccayas* for the first five kinds of consciousness. The time-difference involved here is explained by the commentators as follows: When consciousness arises, say, with the organ of sight as its basis and the visible (*rūpa*) as its object, then both the organ of sight and the visible (*rūpa*) are in their static phase (*ṭhiti*).[1] That is to say, at this time both the organ of sight and the visible (*rūpa*) have passed their nascent phase (*uppāda*). It is because of this chronological priority that they are described as *purejāta*, and it is because they become the basis and the object respectively of visual consciousness that they are considered as *paccayas*.

The other item that is considered as *purejāta-paccaya* is the *hadaya-vatthu*, i.e. in relation to *mano* and *mano-viññāna*.[2] At the moment of conception, however, the relation is not of this kind. For, as we have already indicated,[3] at this moment *hadaya-vatthu* and *manāyatana* come into being simultaneously.

In the case of the relation by way of *pacchājāta*, the *paccaya* is always mental: Consciousness (*citta*) and its concomitants (*cetasika*) constitute a *pacchājāta-paccaya* for (the preservation of) the body.[4] This too is based on the principle that matter is of longer duration than mind. Since the static phase (*ṭhiti*) of a material element is longer than that of a mental element, there is the possibility of the matter of the body being conditioned by post-nascent (*pacchājāta*) consciousness and its concomitants.

It will be seen that *purejāta-* and *pacchājāta-paccaya* do not apply to those relations where both *paccaya* (condition) and *paccayuppanna* (conditioned) are mental. This is because of the following reason: Mental elements arise either simultaneously or in immediate contiguity. If they arise simultaneously, they must perish simultaneously. If they arise in immediate contiguity, then the immediately preceding one has to perish before the immediately succeeding one could appear. Hence a mental element cannot become either a *purejāta-* or a *pacchājāta-paccaya* in relation to another mental element.[5]

Kamma-paccaya :

As a *paccaya* in the system of correlation, *kamma* is of two kinds: If what is conditioned thereby arises simultaneously with it, it is known as *sahajāta*. If what is conditioned thereby is asynchronous, it is known as *nānākhaṇika*. In both cases the reference is to *cetanā*, volition.

[1] See *Tkp*. p. 42.
[2] *Tkp*. p. 43.
[3] See above, p. 80 n. 3.
[4] *Tkp*. pp. 5, 43 ff.
[5] Based on the implications of the relation between *citta* and *cetasikas* and the definition of *samanantara-paccaya*, see below, pp. 139 ff.

Concerning the first, it is said that *cetanā*, whether wholesome (*kusala*) or unwholesome (*akusala*), forms a *paccaya* for those mental states which arise together with it. If these mental states give rise to (*cittasamuṭṭhāna*) *rūpa*, then the latter too is considered as conditioned by that *cetanā*. The implication is that the mental states and the matter in question are determined, fashioned and impelled by the force of *cetanā*.[1]

Cetanā (volition), it may be noted here, is one of those *cetasikas* which arise with every kind of consciousness. Hence it is described as *sabba-citta-sādhārana*.[2] From this it follows that *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* is always conditioned by *cetanā*. And, if *kamma* is another name for *cetanā*, it may be asked why *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* is not described as "*kammasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*". This calls for a consideration of the Buddhist theory concerning the fruition of *kamma*.

The Buddhists maintain that the effect of *kamma* never takes place concurrently with the *kamma*.[3] It is argued that if *kamma* fructifies at the very moment of its occurrence then a person who performs a *kamma* which is conducive to birth in heaven will be born a *deva* at that very moment.[4] This view, namely that the effect of *kamma* is not synchronous with the *kamma* itself, is maintained in the *Abhidharmakośa*, too: "La rétribution n'est pas simultanée à l'acte qui la produit, car le fruit de rétribution n'est pas degusté au moment ou l'acte est accompli."[5] This work goes on to say that the fruition of *karma* does not take place even immediately after (*anantara*) the occurrence of the *karma*.[6]

In view of the fact that *kamma* and *kammic* fruition do not take place simultaneously, the *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* which arises together with, and conditioned by, *cetanā* cannot be understood as the fruition of that *cetanā* (*kamma*). In other words, the relation between *cetanā* and *cittasamuṭṭhanā-rūpa* is not the same as that between *kamma* (*cetanā*) and its fruit (*phala*). This does not mean that *cetanā* is not partly responsible for the arising of the matter in question. For otherwise the former would not have been recognized as a *paccaya* in relation to the latter.

Consequently the second variety of *kamma-paccaya*, which is described as *nānākhaṇika*, is the *kamma-paccaya* par excellence. The relation involved here is that between *kamma* (*cetanā*) and its *phala* (fruit, effect), because the qualification, *nānākhaṇika* signifies a difference in time in their occurrence. It is in order to account for all those mental and material elements which come into being as the result (*phala*) of *kamma* that this variety of *paccaya* is established. As for matter, we have already stated that the first five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex, the

[1] See *Tkp*. pp. 45 ff.
[2] See *ADS*. p. 6.
[3] See *Tkp*. pp. 45 ff.
[4] *Kusalākusalaṃ hi kammaṃ attano pavattikkhaṇe phalaṃ na deti. Yadi dadeyya, yaṃ manusso devalokūpagakusalakammaṃ karoti; tass'ānubhāvena tasmiṃ yeva khaṇe devo bhaveyya.—Tkp.* p. 46.
[5] *Op. cit.* Ch. II, p. 275.
[6] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 275.

physical basis of mental activity and all other material elements which are inseparably associated with them are results of *kamma* (*kammasamuṭṭhāna*).[1] Suffice it to note here that it is in relation to the above kinds of matter that *kamma* (*nānākhaṇika*) constitutes a *paccaya*.

Vipāka-paccaya :

In the previous chapter we drew attention to the fact that in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the use of the term *vipāka* is restricted to denote only those results of *kamma* that are mental.[2] It is in keeping with this tradition that only mental elements are instanced as examples of *vipāka-paccaya*. This does not mean that matter cannot become the *paccayuppanna* (the conditioned) in relation to *vipāka-paccaya*.

Vipāka (results of *kamma* which are mental) is considered to be of a very delicate and tranquil nature (*santabhāva*). For it comes into being as if it were not impelled by any effort (*nirussāha*). Hence, in the capacity of a *paccaya*, *vipāka* exerts a tranquillizing influence on its *paccayuppanna-dhamma*.[3]

At the time of conception (*okkantikkhaṇe*), all the mental elements are *vipāka*. As such, at this time they all form a *paccaya* by way of *vipāka* for the matter that comes into being simultaneously with them.[4] Again, the (*cittasamuṭṭhāna*) *rūpa* which arises in response to a consciousness and its concomitants which are *vipāka*, is also recognized as conditioned by *vipāka-paccaya*.[5] These are the two occasions when matter comes under the influence of *vipāka*.

The *vipāka-paccaya* of Pāli Buddhism does not correspond to the *vipāka-hetu* of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.

In the case of the former, as we have seen, *vipāka* itself is the *paccaya*. As such, *vipāka-paccaya* does not mean condition in relation to *vipāka*. It means condition by way of *vipāka*. The kind of relation involved here applies to things which arise simultaneously.

In contrast, the latter refers to the cause (*hetu*) of *vipāka* : " *vipākasya phalasya hetur vipāka-hetuḥ* ".[6] The cause (*hetu*) of *vipāka* is *karma*. Therefore the *vipāka-hetu* of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism corresponds to the *kamma-paccaya* (i.e. *nānākhaṇika*) of Pāli Buddhism. The kind of relation involved here is between the antecedent *karma* and the subsequently arising *karma*-result (*phala*).

Āhāra-paccaya :

In its technical sense, *āhāra* (food, nutriment) means not only *kabaḷīkāra-āhāra* which is one of the material elements, but also *phassa* (sensory or mental impression), *cetanā* (volition) and *citta* (consciousness), for they all nourish, sustain and keep going

[1] See above, pp. 107 ff.
[2] See above, pp. 109–110.
[3] See *Tkp*. p. 18.
[4] *Tkp*. pp. 47-8.
[5] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[6] *AKvy*. I, p. 112.

the empiric individuality as composed of mental and material factors. Each of them is therefore cited as an *āhāra-paccaya*, condition by way of nutriment. In their capacity as *paccayas*, they nourish their related things so as to enable them to endure long, to develop, to flourish and to thrive.[1]

Of the last three items *phassa* and *cetanā* are two of the *cetasikas* which arise with every kind of consciousness.[2] And the other, i.e. *citta* means consciousness itself. As such, whenever *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* arises, it is always conditioned by these three *āhāra-paccayas*. And, as stated above,[3] at the moment of conception all the mental elements are a condition in relation to all the material elements. Therefore matter at the time of conception is also similarly conditioned.[4]

The last, i.e. *kabaḷīkāra-āhāra* which stands for the material " quality " of nutrition nourishes and sustains the body. Hence the former is postulated as an *āhāra-paccaya* in relation to the latter.[5]

Indriya-paccaya :

Indriya-paccaya, the condition by way of faculty, is like *adhipati-paccaya*, the condition by way of dominance, in the sense that it exercises a dominating influence over the things related to it.[6]

In all there are twenty two *indriyas*. Of them fourteen are *arūpino*, mental (one is *mano* and the other thirteen are *cetasikas*). They become *indriya-paccayas* in relation to *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*.[7]

The remaining eight *indriyas*, namely, the first five sense-organs, the two faculties of sex and the (material) faculty of life are *rūpino*, material. The two faculties of sex, though designated as *indriya*, are not postulated as *indriya-paccayas*.[8]

Over what and what things the first six items wield a dominating influence has already been indicated : The sense-organs are *indriya-paccayas* in relation to the five kinds of consciousness named after them in the sense that if the former are weak the latter too become weak and if the former are strong the latter too become strong.[9] The uninterrupted continuity of the *kammasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa* depends on the presence of the material faculty of life.[10] It is in this sense that the latter wields a dominating influence on the former.

[1] See *Tkp*. pp. 48 ff.
[2] See *ADS*. p. 6.
[3] See above, p. 131.
[4] *Tkp*. p. 48.
[5] *Tkp*. pp. 5, 15.
[6] *Tkp*. p. 18.
[7] *Tkp*. pp. 6, 19.
[8] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[9] See above, p. 49.
[10] See above, p. 59.

As to the non-recognition of the two faculties of sex as *indriya-paccayas*, the commentators give the following explanation : At the initial stages of the embryonic development, although the faculty of masculinity and the faculty of femininity are present, they do not perform their respective functions, that is to say, they do not bring about the manifestation of sex distinctions. Since they remain dormant and inactive at this stage, it is to be concluded that they are not *indriya-paccayas*. This conclusion is based on the contention that at no time does an element of existence, whether mental or material, which can rightly be called an *indriya-paccaya*, remain inactive or dormant.[1]

From the point of view of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the above explanation has no relevance. For, as we have seen,[2] according to the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, the two faculties of sex mean femininity and masculinity, and not their *raison d'être* as interpreted by the commentators.

Jhāna– and Magga-paccayas :

The seven *jhāna*-factors (e.g. *vitakka*, thought-conception, *vicāra*, discursive thinking, etc.) and the twelve Path-factors (e.g. *paññā*, wisdom, *viriya*, energy, etc.) influence those mental states which arise in association with them. And, if such mental states give rise to (*cittasamuṭṭhāna*) *rūpa*, the latter too is considered as influenced accordingly.[3]

Hetu-paccaya :

We have already indicated how *hetu-pratyaya* is explained in the *Abhidharmakośa* : Every *dharma* is a *hetu-pratyaya* in relation to all other *dharmas*. The implication is that no *dharma* constitutes an obstacle (*avighnabhāvāvasthā*) to the origination of those other *dharmas* which are destined to be originated. Hence *hetu-pratyaya* is not a *kāraka*, i.e. it is not something that helps something else positively. Its function is negative, i.e. non-obstruction.[4]

According to the Theravādins, on the other hand, *hetu-paccaya* signifies those factors which determine the ethical quality of volitional acts. The factors in question are *lobha* (covetousness), *dosa* (hatred), *moha* (delusion) and their opposites. It is on the basis of these factors that a particular thought is judged as wholesome (*kusala*) or unwholesome (*akusala*).[5]

They form *paccayas* by way of *hetu*, "moral root", in relation to those mental states which arise together with them. And if such mental states give rise to (*citta-samuṭṭhāna*) *rūpa*, the latter too is considered as conditioned thereby.[6]

[1] See *Tkp*. p. 50.
[2] See above, p. 55.
[3] See *Tkp*. p. 53.
[4] See above, p. 129.
[5] See *Tkp*. pp. 12, 23 ff.
[6] *Tkp*. pp. 1, 23 ff.

This does not mean that material elements too become morally qualifiable as wholesome (*kusala*) or unwholesome (*akusala*). For it is a well established thesis that no ethical quality can be predicated of matter.[1] In this connection it should be noted that the function of *lobha*, *dosa*, etc. is not limited to determining the ethical quality of mental states. Those mental states which are conditioned by them are said to be firm and well-fixed like firmly rooted trees.[2] Consequently the (*citta-samuṭṭhāna*) *rūpa* which arises in response to such mental states does also become firm and well-fixed. It is in this sense that *lobha*, *dosa*, etc. are instanced as *hetu-paccayas* in relation to *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*.

Atthi– and Avigata-paccayas :

As two *paccayas*, *atthi* (presence) and *avigata* (non-abeyance) are completely identical. They need not deter us here, for they are two names given to a combination of four *paccayas*, namely, *sahajāta* (co-nascence), *aññamañña* (reciprocity), *nissaya* (basis) and *purejāta* (pre-nascence).[3] We have already examined their implications with reference to matter.[4]

Upanissaya-paccaya :

The *Paṭṭhāna* does not include any of the material elements in the relation based on the *upanissaya-paccaya*, the condition by way of inducement. In the commentaries, however, the sense-objects are cited as constituting *ārammaṇa-upanissaya-paccayas*, object-inducement-conditions, in relation to consciousness and its concomitants. What is called *ārammaṇa-upanissaya* need not be examined here for it corresponds to *ārammaṇādhipati*.[5]

So far we have been considering those relations with reference to which matter becomes either a *paccaya* or a *paccayuppanna-dhamma*. There are certain varieties of relation into which matter does not enter. They are based on the following *paccayas : āsevana*, *sampayutta*, *anantara*, *samanantara*, *natthi* and *vigata*. We may consider, as briefly as possible, why such relations are not obtainable in the domain of matter.

The function of *āsevana-paccaya*, the condition by way of habitual recurrence, is that of causing its *paccayuppanna-dhammas* to accept its inspiration for them to gain greater and greater proficiency. It is just as in learning by heart through constant repetition the later recitation becomes gradually easier and easier.[6] Now, this so-called energy or proficiency which each succeeding event comes to acquire is

[1] *Cf. rūpaṃ avyākataṃ—Dhs*. p. 125 ; see also *Vbh*. p. 12 ; *Kvu*. pp. 532 ff.
[2] See *Tkp*. p. 12.
[3] See *Tkp*. pp. 55 ff.
[4] See above, pp. 130 ff.
[5] See above, p. 130.
[6] See Ledi Sadaw, *Paṭṭhānuddesanā*, p. 12; cf. *Āsevanaṭṭhena anantarānaṃ guṇabalavabhāvāya upakārako dhammo āsevana-paccayo ganthādisu purima-purimābhiyogo viya.—Tkp*. p. 17.

interpreted and evaluated entirely in ethical terms.[1] But, as stated earlier,[2] no ethical quality can be predicated of matter—hence its exclusion from this kind of relation.

Consciousness (*citta*) and its concomitants (*cetasika*) are said to be related by way of *sampayutta*, association, when they have the following four characteristics: the same sense-organ as their basis (*ekavatthu*); the same object (*ekārammaṇa*); simultaneous origination (*ekuppāda*); and simultaneous cessation (*ekanirodha*).[3] Material elements cannot be so related because of the simple reason that they cannot share the above-mentioned four characteristics in toto. For although the last two characteristics apply to them, e.g. the four *mahābhūtas* which come into being simultaneously and cease to exist simultaneously, the first two do not. Nor can mind (*nāma*) and matter (*rūpa*) be so related. For a mental element and a material element can have in common only one of the above four characteristics, i. e. either simultaneous origination (*ekuppāda*) or simultaneous cessation (*ekanirodha*): If they arise simultaneously, e.g. at the moment of conception, then they do not cease to exist simultaneously. If they cease to exist simultaneously, then they could not have arisen simultaneously. This is based on the theory that the duration of a material element is longer than that of a mental element.[4]

It is for these reasons that the relation between mind and matter is described as one of *vippayutta*, dissociation, and not *sampayutta*. All mental elements are *vippayutta* in relation to all material elements and *vice versa*.[5] However, only the physical bases of consciousness, viz. the first five sense-organs and the heart-basis (*hadaya-vatthu*), are considered as *vippayutta-paccayas*.[6] It is said that when consciousness springs up, it springs up as if it were "issuing forth" (*nikkhantā viya*) from within its physical basis. Thus there is some kind of close association between the consciousness and the physical basis—an association not observable between the consciousness and the sense-object. Hence the physical basis alone is said to constitute a *vippayutta-paccaya* in relation to the consciousness.[7] This conclusion seems to be based on the idea that when something is related to something else by way of *vippayutta-paccaya*, there should exist a close connection between them—an idea which appears rather paradoxical, and which reminds one of the definition given to *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras* in the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism.[8]

Anantara (contiguity) and *samanantara* (immediate contiguity) are but two names given to the same kind of *paccaya*. All classes of consciousness (*citta*) and their concomitants (*cetasika*), which have just ceased to exist, are *anantara-* or *samanantara-paccayas* in relation to all classes of consciousness and their concomitants,

[1] See *Tkp*. pp. 17–18, 44 ff.
[2] See above, p. 137.
[3] See *ADS*. p. 6.
[4] See above, p. 132.
[5] See *Tkp*. p. 53.
[6] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[7] See *Tkp*. pp. 53–4.
[8] *Cf. citta-viprayuktā iti citta-grahaṇaṃ citta-samāna-jātīya-pradarśanārthaṃ. cittam iva cittena ca viprayuktā ity arthaḥ.—AKvy*. I, p. 142.

which arise in the immediately succeeding moment.[1] The schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, too, understand *samanantara-pratyaya* in a similar way and like the Theravāda they, too, apply it only to mental elements.[2]

What concerns us here is why *samanantara-paccaya* is excluded from the domain of matter. It is stated that only those phenomena which are capable of giving rise to other phenomena, immediately after their cessation, are reckoned as *samanantara-paccayas*, conditions by way of immediate contiguity.[3] Since *samanantara-paccaya* is applied only to mental elements, it is implied that the succession of elements in a regular order is not always true of material elements.

The following argument, attributed to Vasumitra, elucidates the above situation: "Dans un même corps, sans que la série d'un *rūpa* d' accroissement (*aupacayika*) soit rompue, peut naitre un second *rūpa* d'accroissement ; donc le *rūpa* n'est pas *samanantarapratyaya*."[4] Here, "*rūpa* d'accroissement (*aupacayika*)" refers to that variety of matter which evolves in the body as a result of food, sleep or trance.[5] Yaśomitra adds that when a person having eaten food were to sleep or enter into trance (*dhyāna*), then concurrently there would be *aupacayika* or accumulation born of food as well as that born of sleep or trance.[6]

The underlying assumption is that in the case of *samanantara* the antecedent *dharma* should cease to exist at the moment when the subsequent *dharma* arises. As shown in Yaśomitra's example the *aupacayika* born of food and the *aupacayika* born of sleep or of trance co-exist. If the principle of *samanantara*, immediate contiguity, applies to the domain of matter, then the *aupacayika* born of food should cease to exist the moment when the *aupacayika* born of sleep or of trance arises.

As two *paccayas* there is no difference between *natthi* (absence) and *vigata* (abeyance).[7] The definitions and the examples given in respect of them, show that they are identical with *samanantara-paccaya*. The *Paṭṭhāna* says: "*Samanantara-vigatā cittacetasikā dhammā paccuppannānaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ vigata-paccayena paccayo*".[8] (Those consciousnesses and their concomitants which have just ceased to exist are a condition by way of disappearance to those consciousnesses and their concomitants which have just arisen). This is the same as *samanantara-paccaya* stated differently. The immediately preceding *dhamma* is a condition for the immediately succeeding *dhamma*, in the sense that the disappearance of the former affords an opportunity for the origination of the latter. Since these two *paccayas* represent only a restatement of the *samanantara-paccaya*, what has been observed as to the exclusion of matter from the relation by way of *samanantara*, applies equally to these two cases, too.

[1] See *Tkp*. pp. 13–4, 33 ff.
[2] See *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 300 ff.; *AKvy*. I, pp. 232 ff.
[3] See *Tkp*. p. 13.
[4] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 301.
[5] See *AK*. Ch. II, p. 301, n. 2.
[6] *yadā hi bhuktvā svapiti dhyānaṃ vā samāpadyate. tad'āhāraja aupacayikaḥ svapna-jas ca samādhi-jo vā aupacayika udpadyate.—AKvy*. I, p. 232.
[7] See *Tkp*. p. 59.
[8] *Ibid*. p. 7.

7——RR 19372 (11/56)

CHAPTER EIGHT

Atomism

ONE of the Theravāda theories, without, apparently, any antecedent history in the Pāli Canon itself, is the theory of *rūpakalāpas*. A post-canonical development in all its essentials, it makes its first appearance in the *Visuddhimagga* and in the Abhidhammic commentaries. In its fully developed form, however, it occurs in the manuals and commentaries of the twelfth century and later, notably the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* of Anuruddha, its Sinhalese *sannē* by Sāriputta, its Pāli *ṭīkā* by Sumangala and such Abhidhammic compendiums as the *Nāmarūpasamāsa* and the *Saccasaṃkhepa*.

An examination of the fundamental principles of the theory of *rūpakalāpas* would show that it is nothing but the Theravāda counterpart of the atomic theory of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. Much has been done by modern scholarship to critically examine the atomism of the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas.[1] Very little, however, is known about the close analogy which the theory of *rūpakalāpas* presents to the atomic theory of Sanskrit Buddhism.

There are valid reasons to believe that in developing the theory in question the Theravādins were much influenced by the Sanskrit Buddhist scholasticism. De la Vallée Poussin and Mc. Govern have drawn attention to the fact that atomism as a subject is discussed in the *Mahāvibhāṣā*.[2] The allusion therein to the opinions of Vasumitra, Bhadanta and Buddhadeva on the question whether the atoms come into contact or not,[3] shows clearly that in its time the atomic theory had become a well-established tenet of Sanskrit Buddhism.[4]

It is true that the (earlier) Pāli commentaries, where we meet with the theory of *rūpakalāpas* in a very undeveloped form, are based on the *Sīhaḷa Aṭṭhakathās* which are not extant now. It is also true that, in view of this circumstance, it is not easy

[1] See De la Vallée Poussin, *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 143 ff, *La Siddhi*, pp. 39 ff. ; Sōgen, *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, pp. 121 ff ; Mc Govern, *A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy*, I,pp. 125 ff. ; Sylvain Levi, *Materiaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra*, pp. 51 ff. ; Stcherbatsky, *Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp. 200 ff. ; Murti, *Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, pp. 200 ff. ; Rosenberg, *Probleme der buddhistischen philosophie*, pp. 158 ff.

[2] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 90 n. 1 ; *Manual of Bud. Phi.* I, pp. 126 ff.

[3] See *AK*. Ch. I, pp. 89 ff. ; *AKvy*. I, p. 85.

[4] On the various theories of Indian atomism and on the question of its origin and development, see Jacobi, *Atomic Theory (Indian)*, ERE. ; Keith, *Indian Logic and Atomism ;* Basham, *History and Doctrines of the Ājīvikas*, pp. 262 ff. ; Bhaduri, *Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, pp. 54 ff.

to ascertain how much of the Abhidhamma was developed in the latter before the compilation of the former. However, since the Theravāda scholasticism developed in comparative isolation in Ceylon, it is very unlikely that it influenced the Buddhist schools which flourished in the mainland. Therefore, and in view of the close parallelism that exists between the Theravādins' theory of *rūpakalāpas* and the atomic theory of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, it seems very probable that the former was formulated on the basis of the latter. In the manuals and the commentaries of the twelfth century and later, where the theory under consideration is presented in its fully developed form, the signs of external influence are more marked and therefore more unmistakeable.

This is not to suggest that the theory of *rūpakalāpas* is a complete replica of the atomic theory of Sanskrit Buddhism. As we shall soon see, there are certainly some differences. But most of them are unavoidable, stemming as they do from the fundamental differences as to the way the Theravādins and the non-Theravādins have conceived the various elements of matter. For instance, since the Theravādins have postulated comparatively a large number of material elements, it is but natural that this numerical discrepancy should reflect itself in the theory of *rūpakalāpas*, too. It is also worth noting here that between the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas there had been some differences of opinion concerning certain aspects of the theory. A close examination of the theory of *rūpakalāpas* will show that in regard to some aspects the Theravādins preferred to follow the Vaibhāṣikas and in regard to others the Sautrāntikas.

The Vaibhāṣikas have postulated two kinds of *paramāṇu* (atom), viz. the *dravya-paramāṇu* (the unitary atom) and the *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* (the aggregate-atom, i.e. the molecule).

The former is the smallest unit of matter : it is the most subtle (*sarva-sūkṣma*);[1] it is partless (*niravayavat*) and therefore no spatial dimensions (*dig-bhāga-bhedatva*) can be predicated of it.[2] Sanghabhadra, one of the celebrities of the neo-Vaibhāṣika school, defines it as follows : " Parmi les *rūpas* ' susceptibles de résistance '(*sapratigha*), la partie la plus subtile, qui n'est pas susceptible d'être scindée a nouveau, s'appelle *paramāṇu* ; c'est-à-dire : le *paramāṇu* n'est pas susceptible d'être divisé en plusieurs par un autre *rūpa*, par la pensée. C'est ce qu'on dit être le plus petit *rūpa* ; comme il n'a pas de parties, on lui donne le nom de ' plus petit '. De meme un *kṣaṇa*[3] est nommé le plus petit temps et ne peut être divisé en demi-*kṣaṇas*."[4]

[1] See *AK*. Ch. II, p. 144 and *AKvy*. I, pp. 34, 123 ; *cf. sarvasūkṣmāḥ khalu rūpasaṃskāropadānasaṃcayabhedaparyantaḥ paramāṇuriti prajñapyate*—*Abhd.* p. 65.

[2] *Cf. tad etad dig-bhāga-bhedattvaṃ necchanti Vaibhāṣikāḥ. dig-bhāga-bhedo hi saṃghāta-rūpānameva kalpayate*—*AKvy*. I, p. 85 ; see also *La Siddhi*, pp. 39 ff. ; *Viṃś.* p. 7.

[3] See above, p. 84.

[4] *AK.* Ch. II, p. 144 n. 3.

A *dravya-paramāṇu* never arises or exists in isolation. It always arises and exists in combination with other *dravya-paramāṇus*. A collection of them, forming a unity and having a simultaneous origination and a simultaneous cessation, is called *saṃghāta-paramāṇu*, "aggregate-atom", i.e. molecule.[1] The smallest *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* is an octad consisting of the four primary elements and four of the secondary elements, namely, *rūpa*, *gandha*, *rasa* and *bhautika-spraṣṭavya*.[2] That the four primary elements always arise simultaneously and that the secondary elements cannot arise independently of the primary, are the two fundamental principles involved in the conception of the *saṃghāta-paramāṇu*.

This is a brief statement of the two kinds of *paramāṇu* postulated by the Vaibhāṣikas. We have given it in brief outline with a view to finding out whether the two varieties are represented in the atomic theory of the Theravādins, too.

At the outset it should be noted that, as far as the medieval manuals and the commentaries, wherein the theory of *rūpakalāpas* appears in its developed form, are concerned, there is no evidence to suggest that the Theravādins have incorporated the Vaibhāṣika conception of the *dravya-paramāṇu*. However, two intriguing passages in the *Visuddhimagga* seem to contain an allusion to such a conception.

In the first passage it is stated that the bodily constituents such as head-hair, bodily-hair, etc. should be understood by way of *kalāpas*, groups: What in common parlance is called head-hair is only a collection of eight material elements, namely, the four primary elements and four of the secondary elements: *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha* and *āhāra*. Therefore, the passage goes on to say, from the point of view of the ultimate analysis head-hair is an "*aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa-matta*", i.e. merely a collection of eight elements.[3]

The second passage enjoins another way of looking at the matter that enters into the composition of the body, i.e. by way of *cuṇṇa*, particles. "In this body the *paṭhavī-dhātu* taken as reduced to fine dust and pounded to the size of *paramāṇu* might amount to an average *doṇa*-measure full, and that is held together by the *āpo-dhātu* measuring half as much".[4]

In the medieval works of the Theravādins the term *kalāpa* is used in a technical sense, i.e. as referring to the smallest unit of matter, which is a collection of material elements.[5] In this technical sense, *kalāpa* corresponds to the *saṃghāta-paramāṇu*

[1] See *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 144 ff. and *AKvy*. I, pp. 123 ff. (*na vai paramāṇu-rūpam ekaṃ pṛthag-bhūtam asti—AKvy*. I, p. 34).

[2] *Ibid. loc. cit.; Cf. sarvasūkṣmaḥ khalu rūpa-saṃskāropadāna-saṃcaya-bheda-paryantaḥ paramāṇur iti prajñapyate. sa tu sapta-dravyāvinirbhāgī catubhir bhūtais tribhiś copādāya rūpais tribhis tribhir vā bhūtaiś caturbhiś copādāya rūpair avinirbhāgavarty asāv aṣṭama iti—Abhd*. p.65.

[3] *Kalāpato ti yā ayaṃ kesā lomā ti ādinā nayena vīsatiyā ākārehi paṭhavīdhātu, pittaṃ semhan ti ādinā nayena dvādasākārehi āpodhātu niddiṭṭhā. Tattha yasmā: Vaṇṇo gandho raso ojā catasso cāpi dhātuyo/aṭṭhadhammasamodhānā hoti kesā ti sammuti/tesaṃ yeva vinibbhogā natthi kesā ti sammuti // Tasmā kesā pi aṭṭhadhammakalāpamattam eva; . . . op. cit*. p. 364.

[4] . . . *imasmiṃ hi sarīre majjhimena pamāṇena parigayhamānā paramāṇubhedasañcunnā sukhumarajabhūtā paṭhavīdhātu doṇamattā siyā, sā tato upaḍḍhappamāṇāya āpodhātuyā saṅgahitā.—op. cit*. p. 365.

[5] *Cf. e.g. ADS*. p. 29; *ADSS*. p. 156; *ADSVṬ*. p. 58; *SS*. p. 4; *NRS*. p. 19.

of the Vaibhāṣikas. If one were to understand the *kalāpa* of the first passage (see *aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa*) in this technical sense, then one could suggest that *aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa* corresponds to the *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* and that *cuṇṇa* or *paramāṇu* of the second passage corresponds to the *dravya-paramāṇu*. However, a close examination of the implications of the two passages along with a consideration of the contexts in which they occur would lead to a different interpretation.

That in the *Visuddhimagga* passage the term *kalāpa* is not used in the same sense as it came to be used in the medieval works, is easily seen. What the *Visuddhimagga* says is that the head-hair, for instance, is an *aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa*, a collection or group of eight elements. If it had used the term *kalāpa* in the technical sense, then it should say that the head-hair is a collection of *kalāpas* (each consisting of eight elements). The term should be put in the plural and not in the singular. For, in its technical sense, *kalāpa* means the smallest unit of matter and as such the head-hair should consist of a large number of *kalāpas*. It is clear therefore that when the *Visuddhimagga* says that the head-hair is an *aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa*, it is referring to the eight kinds of material elements that enter into its composition.[1]

As yet, there is no implication here that, in the "ultimate" analysis, material things consist of atoms. Nor is there any contradiction between the two usages of the term, for a given material thing can be described in either sense of the term. From the Buddhist point of view, one can say that the hair on one's head is a *kalāpa* of eight material elements, because it consists of the four primary elements and four of the secondary elements, viz. *rūpa*, *gandha*, *rasa* and *āhāra*.[2] One can also say that the hair on one's head consists of an enormous number of *kalāpas*, each consisting of the above-mentioned eight material elements.[3] It is in the former sense that Buddhaghosa, the author of the *Visuddhimagga*, uses the term *kalāpa*. On the other hand, Anuruddha, the author of the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha*, uses the term *kalāpa* to mean the smallest unit of matter. For the former, it means a group (the general sense); for the latter, the smallest group (the technical sense).

On the other hand, it can be shown that what the medieval works call *kalāpa* (i.e. in the technical sense) corresponds to what the *Visuddhimagga* in the second passage calls *cuṇṇa* or *paramāṇu*.

We have already shown that in the Buddhist works the names of the four primary elements are used in two distinct senses: one in the sense of *lakkhaṇa* (characteristic) and the other in the sense of *ussada* (intensity). In the first sense, *paṭhavī* is *kakkhalatta* (solidity). In the second, what is *kakkhala* (solid) is *paṭhavī*, for whatever material thing wherein the characteristic of *kakkhalatta* is most intense (*ussada, sāmatthiya*) is also called *paṭhavī*, although in fact it consists of all the four primary elements and their concomitants.[4]

[1] This conclusion is also confirmed by the *VismS*. IV, p. 136, where it is stated that *aṭṭha-dhamma-kalāpa* refers to the eight kinds of *rūpa*, which in their combination, make up what is called head-hair: (*aṭṭhadhammakalāpamattam eva*) *yanudu keśa-prajñaptiyaṭa kāraṇa vū varṇādīn ekatvayen gena kīha. ovun aṣṭadharmamātra noveyi data yutu.*

[2] See above, p. 33.

[3] See below, pp. 164–55.

[4] See above, pp. 28–29.

When the *Visuddhimagga* refers to the atomization of *paṭhavī-dhātu*, it uses *paṭhavī-dhātu* in this second sense. In point of fact, at the beginning of the passage concerned, it is said that head-hair, bodily-hair, etc. are *paṭhavī* and that blood, mucus, etc. are *āpo*. It is also said that they are called so on account of the respective prominence of each primary element—*ussada-vasena pana paṭhavī-dhātu āpo-dhātū ti saṅgahaṃ gato*.[1] Thus, in the statement, namely that the *paṭhavī-dhātu* of the human body is reducible to *paramāṇu* (atoms), the term *paṭhavī-dhātu* refers to the head-hair, bodily-hair, etc.

Next, it may be noted here that according to the theory of *avinibhoga-rūpa*,[2] the four primary elements and four of the secondary elements, namely, *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha* and *āhāra* are necessarily co-existent (*niyata-sahajāta*) and positionally inseparable (*padesato avinibhoga*).[3] From this it follows that those parts of the human body, which, on account of the intensity of the *paṭhavī-dhātu*, are conventionally called *paṭhavī-dhātu*, consist of the above-mentioned eight material elements. And, since these eight elements are positionally inseparable (*padesato avinibhoga*), even when the head-hair, bodily-hair, etc. are reduced to *paramāṇus*, each of the *paramāṇu* should in turn consist of the same number of elements. Thus what the *Visuddhimagga* calls *cuṇṇa* or *paramāṇu* turns out to be an aggregate of eight material elements. It is the same as *kalāpa* in its technical sense and does correspond to the *saṅghāta-paramāṇu* of the Vaibhāṣikas.

Our interpretation of *cuṇṇa* or *paramāṇu* in this way is also confirmed by the statement, namely that the *paṭhavī-dhātu*, when reduced to the size of *paramāṇus*, might amount to an average *doṇa*-measure and that the *āpo-dhātu* to half as much. In a given instance of matter there is no quantitative difference between the primary elements that enter into its compostion; the only difference is one of intensity (*ussada*). If the *Visuddhimagga* had used *paṭhavī* and *āpo* in the philosophical sense (in the sense of *lakkhaṇa* only), then it would not say that, when reduced to the size of *paramāṇus*, the former might amount to a *doṇa*-measure and the latter to half as much.

From the fore-going observations it should appear that, in the two passages of the *Visuddhimagga*, there is no allusion to the *dravya-paramānu*. Even in the subsequent Abhidhammic compendiums and the commentaries, the situation remains unchanged. For the Theravādins, the ultimate unit of matter is an aggregate—a collection of material elements forming a unity and having a simultaneous origination (*ekuppāda*) and a simultaneous cessation (*ekanirodha*).[4]

In the *Visuddhimagga*, where the theory in question is introduced for the first time, this ultimate unit is called *paramāṇu* or *cuṇṇa*. In the subsequent works *kalāpa* became the standard term. While the first two terms are indicative of the fact that what is indicated thereby is the smallest unit of matter, the other brings

[1] *Vism.* p. 365.

[2] See above, p. 33.

[3] See below, pp. 154 ff.

[4] *Ekuppādā ekanirodhā . . . rūpakalāpā nāma.*—*ADS.* p. 29.

into relief that, although it is the smallest, yet in the ultimate analysis, it is but a plurality of different material elements. The preference shown by the authors of the medieval works for the use of *kalāpa* instead of *paramāṇu* and *cuṇṇa*—the two earlier terms—is itself indicative of their desire to emphasize this fact. The use of the term *piṇḍa* in the *Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha* and its paraphrase as *rūpa-samudāya* in the Sinhalese *sannē* of Sāriputta are also suggestive of the same fact.[1]

The fundamental principle underlying this theory is not far to seek. What are called secondary elements (*upādā-rūpas*) are always dependent on the primary elements (*mahābhūtas*), for they cannot arise independently of the latter. Nor can a single primary element arise independently of the other three and at least four of the secondary elements.[2] Thus there is no material element, whether it is primary or secondary, that can have an independent existence. Hence material elements always arise by way of groups (*piṇḍa-vasena*).[3] Consequently, when a given instance of matter, say, a piece of stone, is reduced to smaller pieces—whatever be the number of pieces or whatever be the size of each piece—the fact remains that each of them is a group or plurality of material elements. The smallest unit of matter, whether we call it *cuṇṇa*, *paramāṇu*, *piṇḍa*, *kalāpa* or *rūpa-samudāya*, is no exception to this universal law.

The nearest Theravāda term to the *dravya-paramāṇu* of the Vaibhāṣikas is *kalāpaṅga*, literally, " the limb of the group ", i.e. a constituent of a *kalāpa*.[4] The very term *aṅga* (*kalāpa*+*aṅga*) suggests that it has no independent existence and implies a whole. But is not the part smaller than the whole ? Therefore is it not more logical to postulate the *kalāpaṅga* as the smallest (*sabba-pariyantima*) unit of matter ?

The Vaibhāṣikas would answer this question in the affirmative. For, in their view, the constituent, i.e., the so-called *dravya-paramāṇu*, though it cannot exist independently—it always arises in combination with seven others—is the most subtle (*sarva-sūkṣma*).[5] They seem to have argued that, since the *saṅghāta-paramāṇu* is an aggregate of *dravya-paramāṇus*, it admits divisibility. To describe as *sarva-sūkṣma* what admits divisibility is a contradiction in terms.

The Theravādins, on the other hand, seem to have followed a different line of argument. It is true that, since the *kalāpa* is an aggregate, each of the constituents (*kalāpaṅga*) that make up this aggregation, is smaller (subtler) than the aggregate itself. But this is only logically so. In reality, the *kalāpaṅga* does not exist by itself; it is in inseparable association with other *kalāpaṅgas*. With this view, the Vaibhāṣikas too agree. The *Atthasālinī* observes that although it is possible, for the sake of defining the characteristics (*lakkhaṇato*), to speak of *rūpa*, *rasa*, etc. as separate elements,yet positionally (*padesato*) they are not separable, one from another. *Rūpa*, *rasa*, etc.—so runs the argument—cannot be dissected and separated like

[1] *ADS.* p. 28 ; *ADSS.* p. 166.

[2] See above, pp. 33-34.

[3] See *ADSS.* p. 166 ; cf . . . . *etāni rūpāni kammādito uppajjamānāni pi ekekaṃ va na samuṭṭhahanti, atha kho piṇḍato va samuṭṭhahanti.*—*ADSVṬ.* p. 58.

[4] See *ADS.* p. 29 ; *NRP.* p. 51.

[5] See above, p. 142.

particles of sand.[1] The colour (*rūpa*) of the mango, for instance, cannot be separated from its hardness (*pathavī*) or from its taste (*rasa*). This situation is true of the *kalāpaṅgas* of a *kalāpa*, too. Hence there is no necessity, other than merely logical, to postulate the *kalāpaṅga* as the *sabba-pariyantima*, for in actual fact it is not positionally (*padesato*) separable from the other *kalāpaṅgas* of the same *kalāpa*.

This, it appears to us, is the line of argument that led the Theravādins to observe silence on the question of the *dravya-paramāṇu* and to define the *rūpakalāpa* as the *sabba-pariyantima*. In taking up this position, they seem to have been influenced by the Sautrāntikas.

For, it may be noted here, the Vaibhāṣika conception of the *dravya-paramāṇu* came in for severe criticism on the part of the Sautrāntikas. As a matter of fact, it was the most significant issue that divided the two schools over the atomic theory.

What made the Sautrāntikas join issue with the Vaibhāṣika conception of the *dravya-paramāṇu* was that it was sought to be defined as devoid of parts (*niravayavat*) and exempt from *pratighāta*, resistance or impenetrability, which is the fundamental characteristic of matter.[2] The Vaibhāṣikas did not want to define the *dravya-paramāṇu* as possessing parts, because this implied the divisibility of the atom. Its exemption from *pratighāta*, according to Yaśomitra, is a corollary arising from the first thesis: when there are no parts there cannot be *pratighāta*.[3] To the objection that, if the *dravya-paramāṇu* is of this nature, it escapes the definition of matter, the Vaibhāṣikas reply: " Sans doute, la monade est exempt de *rūpana*; mais un *rūpa* de monade n'existe jamais a l'état isole; en l'état d'agglomere, étant dans un agglomere (*saṃghātastha, saṃcita*) il est susceptible de détérioration et de résistance ".[4]

But this way of defining the atom led to further complications. The *Abhidharmakośa* and the *Vyākhyā* rightly point out that, if the *dravya-paramāṇu* is devoid of parts and exempt from *pratighāta*, then even the aggregate will be devoid of parts and exempt from *pratighāta*, because the aggregate is ultimately constituted of the atoms. What is lacking in the latter cannot be predicated of the former.[5]

In this connection one cannot also forget the severe diatribes launched by the Buddhist Idealists (Vijñānavādins) against the definition of the atom as devoid of spatial division. In order to have a basis for their polemics they provisionally agreed with the objection of the Sautrāntikas that the aggregates are ultimately constituted of, and therefore not different from, the atoms, the difference between one atom and an aggregate being only one of quantity.

It was the failure, on the part of the Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmīr, to take notice of this fact that gave rise to the fallacy of their assumption that, although the atoms do not

[1] See *Asl.* p. 311.
[2] See *AK.* Ch. 11, pp 89 ff; *AKvy.* 1, p. 85.
[3] See *AKvy.* 1, p. 34; 11, p. 355.
[4] *AK.* Ch. 1, p. 25.
[5] See *AK.* Ch. 11, p. 143; *AKvy.* 1, pp. 34 ff.

touch, the same situation is not true of the aggregates.[1] Once this oneness (*ekatva*) is overlooked, it leads to many mutually incompatible conclusions and fails to give a rational explanation to many a phenomenon of day to day experience: It is a matter of common experience, for instance, that when the sun rises a given aggregate is found to be illuminated at its eastern direction and dark at its western direction, or when one sees or touches, say, a wall, one does not see or touch its opposite side—two situations which unmistakably point to the conclusion that the aggregates have spatial divisions. This characteristic cannot be predicated of them if the atoms which constitute them do not severally possess it.[2]

It is supposed (by the neo-Sarvāstivādins) that the combination of atoms takes place in such a way that six different atoms occupy six points of space—east, west, north, south, above and below—of another atom. This law of atomic aggregation carries with it the implication that the atom has at least six sides. On the other hand, if it be contended that the locus occupied by one atom is common to all the six, then the atom being devoid of parts and exempt from resistance (*pratighāta*), all the six would coalesce into one; the difference between the magnitude of one atom and that of six would vanish.[3]

These objections and counter-objections between the Buddhist schools show that when it came to the question of defining the atom, the atomists were caught in the horns of a big dilemma. On the one hand, to admit the spatial dimensions (*digbhāga-bhedatva*) of the atom is to admit its divisibility—a contradiction in terms if the atom is defined as the smallest and not amenable to further division. On the other hand, to deny the spatial dimensions of the atom is to deny the spatial dimensions of the aggregate—a situation contradicted by common experience. The Vaibhāṣikas followed the first line of argument and the Sautrāntikas the second, each party tenaciously clinging to its own view without attempting a solution to the resulting paradox.

This gave a good opportunity for the Buddhist Idealists to refute both alternatives and to establish their theory that matter is " logiquement inadmissible ": If, as the Sautrāntikas say, the atoms " sont étendus (ont *digdeśabhāga*) . . . ils peuvent être divisés et par consequent ne sont pas réels ". If, as the Vaibhāṣikas say, the atoms " ne sont pas étendus . . . ils ne pourront pas constituer un *Rūpa* massif (*sthūla*) ". If anything, the atom should be " étendu ", but what is " étendu " is divisible, and what is divisible cannot be " entité réel " (*dravyasat*). The inescapable

[1] *Cf. naiva hi paramāṇavaḥ saṃyujyante niravayavatvāt. mā bhūd eṣa doṣaprasaṅghaḥ. saṃhatāstu parasparaṃ saṃyujyanta iti kāśmīravaibhāṣikāsta idaṃ praṣṭhavyāḥ. yaḥ paramāṇūnāṃ saṃghāto na sa tebhyo' rthāntaram iti.—Viṃś.* p. 7; see also *La Siddhi.* pp. 39 ff.
[2] See *La Siddhi.* p. 40; *Cf.* also: *chāyāvatī kathaṃ vā yady ekaikasya paramāṇor digbhāgabhedo na syād ādityodaye katham anyatra chāyā bhavaty anyatrātapaḥ. na hi tasyānyaḥ pradeśo'sti yatrātapo na syāt. āvaraṇaṃ ca kathaṃ bhavati paramāṇoh paramānvantarena yadi digbhāgabhedo neṣyate. na hi kaścid api paramāṇoḥ parabhāgo'sti yatrāgamanād anyenānyasya pratighātāḥ syāt.—Viṃś.* p. 7.
[3] *Cf. ṣaṭkena yugapadyogātparamāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṃśatā, ṣaḍbhyo digbhyaḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ paramāṇubhir yugapadyoge sati paramāṇoḥ ṣaḍaṃśatāṃ prāpnoti. ekasya yo deśas tatrānyasyasaṃbhavāt. ṣaṇṇāṃ samānadeśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ. atha ya evaikasya paramāṇor deśah sa eva ṣaṇṇāṃ. tena sarveṣāṃ samānadeśatvāt sarvaḥ piṇḍaḥ paramāṇumātraḥ syāt. —Viṃś.* p. 7.

conclusion, they contended, is that matter is " logiquement inadmissible ".[1] Thus the paradox was solved, but the solution offered was not in favour of either of the contending parties. The intervention of the umpire, in this case, is not to judge who is right but to show that both are equally wrong.

In this big controversy over the definition of the smallest, the Theravādins[2] appear to have played the part of the spectator. They were therefore in a better position to judge the whole situation. They had before them three alternatives. However, there was no possibility of accepting the conclusion of the Vijñānavādins, because being realists the Theravādins were not prepared to subscribe to the idealistic metaphysic underlying that conclusion. They were therefore left with two alternatives—the two interpretations given by the Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas. They opted to follow that of the Sautrāntikas for, on the whole, it was more satisfactory and less riddled with complications.

This is only a tentative suggestion as to why the Theravādins deemed it proper to recognize an aggregate as *sabba-pariyantima*, while observing a (deliberate) silence on such questions as whether the constituents of this aggregate have spatial dimensions or not.

On the other hand, that spatial dimensions can be predicated of the *kalāpa* is clearly suggested by an isolated reference in the *Viśuddhimārgasannaya* which says that *ākāsa*, the intervening space between two *kalāpas*, " has the function of delimiting the *kalāpa* as : this is the lower side (*yaṭa*) of the *kalāpa* and that is the upper side (*uḍa*) of the *kalāpa* ".[3]

This is further confirmed by a theory advanced as to the size of the *kalāpa* in relation to a (cubic) inch (*aṅgula*). It occurs in the *Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā*.[4] The term used is *paramāṇu*. We propose to interpret the *paramāṇu* of the Theravādins as identical with the *rūpakalāpa*, on the strength of the observations made in the course of this chapter. The table runs as follows :

36 *paramāṇus*	= 1 *aṇu*
36 *aṇus*	= 1 *tajjāri*
36 *tajjāris*	= 1 *ratharenu*
36 *ratharenus*	= 1 *likhā*
7 *likhās*	= 1 *ūkā*
7 *ūkās*	= 1 *dhaññamāsa*
7 *dhaññamāsas*	= 1 *aṅgula*, " finger-breadth ", i.e. (cubic) inch.

Thus the size of the *paramāṇu* in relation to the cubic inch will be :

$$\frac{1}{36\times36\times36\times36\times7\times7\times7}$$

=1/581, 147, 136

[1] See *La Siddhi.* pp. 40-1.
[2] i.e. of the medieval manuals and the commentaries.
[3] *ākāsadhātu . . . mē uḍaya mē yaṭayayi kalāpayangē paryantaya pahaḷa kirīma kṛtya koṭa ettēyi*—*VismS.* V, p. 68.
[4] *Op. cit.* p. 343 ; see also *Abhidhānappadīpikā-sūci*, ed Subhūti, (Colombo, 1938), pp. 138 ff.

That this table which gives the size of the *paramāṇu* in relation to the cubic inch is one that is arbitrarily assumed goes without saying. For there were no physical data for a mathematical calculation of infinitesimal units. A somewhat similar table—perhaps the original source of the above—is given by Varāhamihira.[1] Yamakami Sōgen[2] and Takakusu[3] have referred to similar tables adopted by the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism. At best, they all may be described as attempts to emphasize how infinitesimally small the *paramāṇu*, the ultimate unit of matter, is.

For the *paramāṇu* is so small that in the *Vibhaṅgaṭṭhakathā* it is (figuratively) described as a particle of space (*ākāsa-koṭṭhāsa*).[4] The *Visuddhimagga-ṭīkā* observes that it comes only within the province of the divine eye (*dibba-cakkhu*).[5] This is similar to the view expressed in some Jaina works, namely that the *paramāṇu* can be known only by those who have realized *kaivalya-jñāna*.[6]

Another problem that was hotly debated by the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism that adopted atomism was whether the atoms came into contact with one another.

Since the Vaibhāṣikas believed that the *dravya-paramāṇu* was devoid of parts, any conclusion in respect of this problem should in no way contradict this belief. In point of fact, the Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmīr take the *niravayavatva*, partlessness of the atom as the very premise of the expected conclusion. They grant the possibility of two alternatives both of which, they say, are inadmissible : (I) si les atomes se touchaient dans leur totalité, les choses (*dravya*), c'est-à-dire, les différents atomes, se mêleraient ', c'est-à-dire, n'occuperaient qu'un lieu ; (2) si les atomes se touchaient par un endroit, c'est donc qu'ils auraient des parties (*avayava*) : or les atomes n'ont pas de parties.[7] Another argument, the one attributed to Vasumitra, is based on the theory of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatā*) : " Si les atomes se touchaient, c'est donc qu'ils dureraient deux moments ".[8] That is to say an atom should arise first (1st moment) in order to touch (2nd moment)—a view which, if accepted, would go against the doctrine that an element of existence endures but for one moment (*kṣaṇa*).

On the strength of these arguments the Vaibhāṣikas conclude that atoms do not come into contact with one another and that between two atoms there is always an intervening space (*antara*). In this intervening space there is no *āloka* (light) and it is so small that another atom cannot occupy it.[9] The presence of *āloka* has to be ruled out because *āloka* being included in the category of matter, to affirm its existence is to deny the vacuity between the two atoms. To the possible objection that if there is " *antara* " between atoms how is it that the aggregates which are ultimately composed of these atoms do not fall into pieces when struck, the reply is that *vāyu-dhātu*, the air-element, keeps them together.[10]

[1] See Seal, *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus*, pp. 82 ff.; Ray, *Indian Chemistry*, pp. 248 ff.
[2] *Systems of Buddhistic Thought*, p. 122.
[3] *Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 64.
[4] *Tattha paramāṇu nāma ākāsakoṭṭhāsiko .... —op. cit.* p. 343.
[5] .... *maṃsacakkhussa āpāthaṃ n'āgacchati, dibbacakkhuss'eva āgacchati.—op. cit.* p. 286.
[6] See e.g. *Pañcāstikāyasāra*, p. 84.
[7] *AK.* Ch. I, p. 89.
[8] *Ibid.* Ch. I, p. 91.
[9] *AK.* Ch. I, pp. 89. ff ; *AKvy I*, p.85 : *yan madhye nāsti kiṃcid iti bruvānā Vaibhāṣikā madhye ālok'ādi necchanti. anya-para māṇu-praveśanāvakāśaṃ tu na bruvate.*
[10] See *AK* Ch. I, pp. 89 ff ; *AKvy.* I. pp. 84 ff.

It is to be expected that the Sautrāntikas should challenge this conclusion for it is mainly based on the premise that the atom is *niravayavat*—a dogma to which they did not want to subscribe. Hence it is that the author of the *Abhidharmakośa*, whose sympathies are more with the Sautrāntikas, and his commentator launch severe diatribes against this theory. In their opinion the interpretation given by Bhadanta, namely that contact is another expression for " *nirantaratva* ", is the best. They propose to interpret *nirantaratva* in this context as indicating absence of interval.[1] For otherwise, the argument runs, what would prevent the atoms from moving within the interval.[2] In putting forth this objection, they seem to have overlooked the fact that in the case of momentary elements, as reminded by Vasumitra, here is no motion : wherever an element arises there itself it perishes. On the other hand, Saṅghabhadra, a celebrity of the Vaibhāṣika school, interprets *nirantaratva* of Bhadanta as lending support to the theory that there is *antara*, interval between atoms.[3] The main objection directed against the Vaibhāṣika theory is that it is but absurd to deny contact between the atoms while recognizing contact between the aggregates.[4]

Since the theory of *rūpakalāpas*, as suggested earlier, is modelled on the atomic theories of the schools of Sanskrit Buddhism, it may be interesting to consider what position the Theravādins took up in respect of this problem. According to the Theravādins,since the *kalāpaṅgas* that constitute a *kalāpa* are positionally inseparable, the possibility of their being separated by an interval does not arise. Hence the problem boils down to this : Can two *kalāpas* come into (physical) contact ?

The question is not raised, let alone being answered, in the earlier commentaries where we meet with the theory in its rudimentary form. The authors of the later works took up the matter and provided the answer : *rūpakalāpas* do not come into contact ; between them there is space.

Every *rūpakalāpa* is delimited (*paricchindate*) by the environing *ākāsa*, space.[5] This *ākāsa* is so small that the fact of delimitation is described as " as if delimiting " (*paricchindantī viya*).[6] However, the *kalāpas* are not touching one another for

[1] *Ibid. loc. cit. ; cf. nirantare tu spṛṣṭa-saṃjñe ti Bhadantaḥ. Bhadanta-mataṃ caiṣṭavyam iti. Vaibhāṣika-mataṃ kasmān naiṣṭavyaṃ.nanu Vaibhāṣikair apy evam uktaṃ. tad evaiṣāṃ nirantaratvaṃ yan madhye nāsti kiṃcid iti. asty evaṃ. sāvakāśaṃ tu tad vacanaṃ.—AKvy.* 1, p.85.

[2] *anyathā hi sāntarāṇām paramāṇūnāṃ śūnyesv antaresu gatiḥ kena pratibadhyeta gatimata iti vākya-śeṣaḥ.—AKvy.* 1, p. 85.

[3] See *AK.* Ch. 1, p. 91, n. 3.

[4] See *AK.* Ch. 1, p. 92; *Viṃśatikā*, p.7 ; *cf. na ca paramāṇubhyo'nye saṃghātaḥ yathā Vaibhāṣikā kalpayanti. ta eva te saṃghātāḥ. paramāṇavaḥ spṛṣyante yathā rūpyanta iti.—AKvy.* 1, p. 85.

[5] See *VismT.* p. 453 ; *ADSVT.* p. 98 ; *Abhvk.* p. 279; *VismS.* V,p. 67 ; *Cf.* (*āk sadhatu*), *karmādi eki ekī pratyayen samurthita vū cakṣurdaśakādi kalāpayan kalāpantaraya hā saṃkara novana heyin pirisindinā svabhāva vū ākāśadhātu tomo;* (*pariccheda-rūpaṃ nāma*) *paricchedarūpa nam vē.—ADSS.* p. 156.

[6] ***VismT.* p. 453.**

each *kalāpa* is qualified as " not touched " (*asamphuṭṭha*) by the other *kālāpas* separated from it.[1] The implication is that the vacuity is a fact, although it is infinitesimally small. Hence the *ākāsa* is said to manifest itself as " untouchedness " (*asamphuṭṭha-paccupaṭṭhāna*).[2]

In maintaining this view the Theravādins were anxious to stress the separateness of each *kalāpa*. Sāriputta and Sumangala take special care to emphasize the fact that each *kalāpa* is in itself an entity, physically separated from the others. This separation is not possible if there is contact. And it is the *ākāsa*, the so-called *paricchedākāsa*, that is responsible for their being prevented from mixing (*asaṃkarabhāva*).[3]

The admission, on the part of the Theravādins, of *ākāsa* between *kalāpas* suggests Vaibhāṣika influence. However, the reasons given for accepting this view are quite different. This is inevitable, because the Vaibhāṣika theory of non-contact between the *dravya-paramāṇus* is mainly based on the denial of their spatial dimensions (and the denial of motion), whereas for the Theravādins the question as to the possibility or otherwise of physical contact is a question relating to the *kalāpas*, the spatial dimensions of which are not denied.

Hence it is that King Parākramabāhu II, the author of the Sinhalese *sannē* to the *Visuddhimagga*, attempts to show how the non-contact of the *kalāpas* is only a logical corollary arising from the fact that the *kalāpaṅgas* of a *kalāpa* are positionally inseparable (*padesato avinibhoga*). It is argued that if the *kalāpas* are not separated by *ākāsa*, then this leads to the acceptance of one of two alternatives, both of which are not compatible with the above-mentioned principle.

The first alternative is to deny that there is *ākāsa* between two *kalāpas*.[4] The *kalāpaṅgas* of a *kalāpa*, be it repeated here, are positionally inseparable. Now, if there is no actual separation between two *kalāpas*, then the characteristic of positional inseparability which applies only to the *kalāpaṅgas* of a *kalāpa*, has to be extended to the two *kalāpas* as well.[5] That is to say, the separateness of each of the *kalāpas* vanishes and both combine to form a bigger *kalāpa*. If the principle could be extended to two *kalāpas*, then it could also be extended to three or more, and so the process could be indefinitely extended. If a given piece of stone is composed, let us say hypothetically, of one million *kalāpas*, then these million *kalāpas* would become one big *kalāpa*, precisely as big as the piece of stone. This would undermine the very foundation of the theory of *kalāpas*.

[1] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[2] (*rūpa-mariyāda-paccupaṭṭhānā*) *ti yasmiṃ kalāpe bhūtānaṃ paricchedo teh'eva asamphuṭṭhabhāva-paccupaṭṭhānā.—VismT.* p. 453.

[3] *Abhvk.* p. 279 ; *ADSS.*p. 156 : . . . *ekeka-kalāpa-gata-rūpānaṃ kalāpantarehi asaṃkiṇṇabhāvāpādana-vasena paricchedakaṃ rūpaṃ pariccheda-rūpaṃ.*
Dhammapāla takes the fact of separateness as synonymous with untouchedness—*abyāpitā hi asamphuṭṭhatā—VismT.* p. 453.

[4] *Cf. . . . paricchedākāśaya temē rū pirisinda rūpakalāpa hema ekkoṭa pirisindiyeti yi—VismS.* V, p. 68.

[5] *Cf. Esē hot nan kalabūyehi rū da ekakalabuyehi rū seyinma avinirbhogabavaṭa peminena heyin hē no meneva—Ibid. loc. cit.*

In the first place, it goes against the established thesis that the *kalāpaṅgas* of a *kalāpa* are not separable, one from another. For, if the stone in question is a (big) *kalāpa*, then it should be of such a nature that no part of it can be separated. The moment one breaks the stone we are speaking of into pieces, then the theory, namely that the constituents of a *kalāpa* are not separable, one from another, too, so to say, breaks into pieces.[1]

In the second place, it would also go against the view of a plurality of *kalāpas*. For, according to this alternative under consideration, the Mount Himālaya would be one big *kalāpa*. But the Mount Himālaya is not completely separated from the rest of the physical world. If the physical world is characterized by unbroken continuity, in the sense that no part of it is completely separated from the rest, then one will be forced to the conclusion that the whole physical world is one mighty *kalāpa*.

In this connection it is interesting to note that one of the arguments advanced by the Vaibhāṣikas of Kāśmīr to deny physical contact of the atoms is that if two of them touch in their totality, then the atom being non-resisting (*apratigha*) and partless (*niravayavat*), all the atoms would coalesce into one, the whole universe would coalesce into one atom, so small that no spatial dimensions can be predicated of it.[2] The objection of the Theravādins, when its implications are fully developed, is that if *kalāpas* are not separated by *ākāsa*, then the whole physical world would become one enormous *kalāpa*. The Vaibhāṣika objection is that the world will be reduced to a partless atom ; the Theravāda objection is that the atom will be inflated to the size of the world—two situations literally with a world of difference.

The other alternative is to affirm that the *kalāpaṅgas*, not the *kalāpas*, are separated by *ākāsa*. This too would lead to many difficulties somewhat similar to the ones that stem from denying the separateness of the *kalāpas*. If it were assumed that in a given *kalāpa* the *kalāpaṅgas* are separated by *ākāsa*, then the separateness and independence of the *kalāpas* would fade away, establishing the separateness and independence of the *kalāpaṅgas*.[3] The ultimate unit of matter, then, would be the constituent (*kalāpaṅga*) and not the aggregate (*kalāpa*). For the reasons we have given above,[4] the Theravādins were not prepared to accept such a conclusion. Although it is logically true that the *kalāpaṅga* should be smaller (subtler) than the *kalāpa*, yet in a given *kalāpa* the *kalāpaṅgas* are not separable, one from another. They arise, exist and perish as one unit. There is therefore no point in postulating the *kalāpaṅga* as the ultimate unit of matter. The refutation of the second alternative, although it is not explicitly stated, does amount to a criticism of the Vaibhāṣika standpoint.

---

[1] Ledi Sadaw, the Burmese *thera*, argues that it is solely because there is *ākāsa* around *kalāpas* that " lumps of stone and iron can be broken up, or cut into pieces, or pounded into dust, or melted "—*Buddhism in England*, 1930, Vol. V, No. 4.

[2] See *AK*. Ch. 1, p. 89.

[3] *Cf. Ekkalāpayakama rū ven ven koṭa pirisindiyen. Mē esē vuvahot ek kalabuyehi rū da nānā kalāpayehi rū seyin ma vinirbhogabavaṭa peminena bevin hē da no menava.—VismS*. V,p. 68.

[4] See above, pp. 146-47.

In all there are seventeen kinds of *kalāpa*. The smallest is an octad consisting of the four primary elements and four of the secondary, namely, *rūpa* (colour), *rasa* (taste), *gandha* (odour) and *āhāra* (nutriment). This collection of eight material elements, called *suddhaṭṭhaka*,[1] the bare octad, corresponds to the smallest *saṅghāta-paramāṇu* of the Vaibhāṣikas, but for two differences :

Firstly, in place of *āhāra* the Vaibhāṣika list contains *spraṣṭavya* (the tangible).[2] The difference is unavoidable. According to the Theravādins, *phoṭṭhabba* (the tangible) includes only the primary elements with the exception of one, i.e. *āpo-dhātu*.[3] Hence from the point of view of the Theravādins, it is not necessary to repeat *phoṭṭhabba* because it is already represented by the enumeration of the primary elements. According to the Vaibhāṣikas, *spraṣṭavya* includes the four primary elements i.e. *bhūta-spraṣṭavya* (the primary tangible) and eleven secondary elements, i.e. *bhautika-spraṣṭavya* (the secondary tangible).[4] It is in order to represent the latter, the so-called *bhautika-spraṣṭavya*, that *spraṣṭavya* is repeated, although one aspect of it is represented by the primary elements. A similar situation is responsible for the inclusion of *āhāra* in the Theravāda list. While the Theravādins have postulated *āhāra* as a separate element of matter, the Vaibhāṣikas have conceived it as a combination of *rasa*, *gandha* and *spraṣṭavya*, which three items occur in their list.[5]

The two lists are thus representative of the same items except for the fact that *bhautika-spraṣṭavya* is not represented in the list of the Theravādins. This is unavoidable, because the latter do not admit that any of the secondary elements of matter come under the object of touch.

The other difference is more significant. It is a Vaibhāṣika principle, with which the Sautrāntikas do not seem to have had any sympathy, that each secondary element is dependent on a separate tetrad of the primary elements. Those primary elements which serve as a support (*āśraya*) for a given secondary element, say, colour, do not at the same time serve as a support for another, say, smell.[6] Hence, as the *Abhidharmakośa* rightly points out, the smallest *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* should consist of, not eight, but twenty elements, for, since each secondary element is dependent on a separate tetrad of the primary elements, the four secondary elements of the *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* should have, for their support, sixteen separate primary elements.[7] The Vaibhāṣika reply is quite reasonable. They say that " la nature (*jāti*) de la tetrade de grands éléments reste la même, que ceux-ci supportent la matière derivée odeur ou les matières derivées visible, saveur, tangible " and that

---

[1] See *ADS*. p. 29 ; *SS*. p. 5 ; *NRP*. p. 39.

[2] See *AK*. Ch. 11, p. 145.

[3] See above, pp. 29-30.

[4] See *AK*. Ch. 1, pp. 18 ff.

[5] See above, pp. 61-62.

[6] *Cf. yad bhūta-catuṣkam āśraya ekasyopādāya-rūpasya nīlasya pītasya vā. na tad evānyasyopādāyarūpasya gandhasya rasasya v'āśrayaḥ. kiṃ tarhi. anyad eva bhūta-catuṣkaṃ tasyāśraya iti Vaibhāṣika-siddhāntaḥ.—AKvy*. 1, p. 123.

[7] *AK*. Ch. 11, p. 148.

therefore there is no anomaly in counting the primary elements as four, although there are four of each type.[1] In contrast, the Theravādins believe that the four primary elements of the *suddhaṭṭhaka* are the common support (*eka nissaya*) of the secondary elements.[2]

These, then, are the two significant differences between the *suddhaṭṭhaka* of the Theravādins and the octuple *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* of the Vaibhāṣikas.

The conception of the octuple *saṃghāta-paramāṇu*, on which the *suddhaṭṭhaka* is modelled, reminds one of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika theory of the four elemental substances and their respective qualities. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintain that odour (*gandha*), taste (*rasa*), colour (*rūpa*) and touch (*sparśa*) are respectively the special qualities (*viśeṣa-guṇa*) of earth, water, fire and air.[3] It will be seen that it is the same items that constitute the octuple *saṃghāta-paramāṇu*. The special qualities, as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas maintain, are invariably associated and co-existent with their respective elemental substances.[4] The eight items of the *saṃghāta-paramāṇu*, as the Vaibhāṣikas maintain, are necessarily co-existent (*niyata-sahotpanna*). It should of course be conceded that in the Buddhist schools the secondary elements are not recognized as the qualities of the primary. However, by recognizing four of the octad as secondary to the other four rather than assigning equal status to all the eight, the resulting picture appears to be a veiled recognition of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory. It should be more logical and more in keeping with the Buddhist denial of the duality between substance and quality to have given equal status to the eight items in question. In point of fact, a suggestion in this direction was given by the Sautrāntikas, which, the Vaibhāṣikas, with their usual dogmatism, did not want to accept.[5] Perhaps it was the desire to escape from this seeming similarity with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view that impelled the Vaibhāṣikas to declare that each secondary element of the octad is dependent on a separate tetrad of the primary elements.

The remaining sixteen *kalāpas* are formed according to the same principle as adopted by the Vaibhāṣikas in forming the *saṃghāta-paramāṇus* other than the octad. The (eight) items of the octad are the basic material elements ; they are present in every instance of matter. Therefore, in all the *kalāpas* these eight material elements are present as their basis. The other *kalāpas* are formed by adding one or more, as the situation demands, of the remaining material elements (= those other than the eight in question) to the basic octad.

Since we have already examined all the material elements,[6] we shall confine ourselves to the way they enter into the composition of the *kalāpas*.

---

[1] *Ibid*. Ch. 11, p. 149.

[2] See *ADSS*. p. 166 ; *cf. Suddhaṭṭhakan ti cattāri mahābhūtāni tannissitā vaṇṇa-gandha-rasa-ojā ti idaṃ—Abhvk*. p. 297.

[3] See Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics*, pp. 52 ff.

[4] *Ibid*. pp. 52 ff.

[5] *Cf*. the Sautrāntika criticism of the theory of reciprocal causation (*sahabhū-hetu*) in *AK*. Ch. 11, p. 254.

[6] See above, Chs. II, III, IV.

Next to the basic octad comes *sadda-navaka*, the sound-nonad, which, according to both schools, is formed by adding one element of sound to the basic octad.[1]

As to the formation of the five sense-organ *kalāpas* or *saṃghātas*, the two schools follow two slightly different methods.

According to the Vaibhāṣikas, of the sense-organs, the *kāyendriya* (the organ of touch) consists of the minimum number of *dravya-paramāṇus*. It is a nonad consisting of the basic octad and one *dravya-paramāṇu* of *kāyendriya* added to it. Each of the other four sense-organ *saṃghātas* is formed by adding one *dravya-paramāṇu* of each of them to the *kāyendriya*-nonad. Thus while the *kāyendriya saṃghāta* is a nonad, the other sense-organ *saṃghātas* are decads.[2]

For the Theravādins every sense-organ *kalāpa* is a decad (*dasaka*). First one *kalāpaṅga* of *rūpa-jīvitindriya* (the material faculty of life) is added to the basic octad to make it organic. The resulting nonad is called *jīvita-navaka*, the vital nonad. The five sense-organ *kalāpas* are then formed by adding each of the sense-organ *kalāpaṅgas* to the *jīvita-navaka*. Thus there are *cakkhu-dasaka* (eye-decad), *sota-dasaka* (ear-decad), *ghāna-dasaka* (nose-decad,) *jivhā-dasaka* (tongue-decad) and *kāya-dasaka* (body-decad).[3]

The Vaibhāṣikas add one *dravya-paramāṇu* of *kāyendriya* to the other four sense-organ *saṃghātas*, because the other four sense-organs are said to be associated with *kāyendriya* (*tat-pratibaddha-vṛttitvāt*).[4] They seem to have taken the view that the organs of sight, hearing, taste and smell are certain modifications of the organ of touch—a view accepted by certain Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, too.[5] It is rather strange that the Theravādins do not add one *kalāpaṅga* of *kāyendriya* to the other four sense-organ *kalāpas*. For, in the commentaries we are told that the organ of touch is present in every part of the body (*sabba-sarīra-byāpaka*), existing as it were like oil soaked in cotton.[6] Why the Vaibhāṣikas, unlike the Theravādins, do not include *jīvitendriya* in the sense-organ *saṃghātas*, is understandable. For, as stated earlier,[7] they have recognized only one variety of *jīvitendriya* which is included in the category of (*rūpa*)-*citta-viprayukta-saṃskāras*.

Since the Theravādins have defined the two faculties of sex as separate elements of matter rather than conceiving them as part of the organ of touch,[8] and since they have postulated the heart-basis as the seat of mental activity,[9] these three items, too, are explained by way of *kalāpas*, to which corresponding *saṃghāta-paramāṇus*

---

[1] See *AK*. Ch. 11, p. 144 ; *AKvy*. 1, p. 123 ; *ADS*. p. 29 ; *SS*. p. 5.

[2] *Cf. kāmeṣṭadravyakośabdaḥ paramāṇur anindriyaḥ. kāyendriyo navadravyo daśadravyo' parendriyaḥ* — *AK*. Ch. 11, p. 22.

[3] See *ADS*. p. 29 ; *SS*. p. 4 ; *NRP*. p. 38.

[4] *Cf. yatra hi cakṣuḥ śrotr' ādi vā tatra kāyendriyena bhavitavyaṃ tat-pratibaddha-vṛttitvāc cakṣur' ādīn iṃ.—AKvy*. 1, p. 123.

[5] See Bhaduri, *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika-Metaphysics*, Ch. III.

[6] See *Asl*. p. 311, *Vism*. p. 432 ; see above, pp. 131-32.

[7] See above, p. 59.

[8] See above, pp. 55-56.

[9] See above, pp. 62 ff.

are not found in Sanskrit Buddhism. The method of their formation is like that of the sense-organs. That is to say, one *kalāpaṅga* of *itthindriya* (faculty of femininity), *purisindriya* (faculty of masculinity), and *hadaya-vatthu* (heart-basis) is added to the *jīvita-navaka*; the resulting three decads are called *itthibhāva-dasaka* (femininity-decad), *pumbhāva-dasaka* (masculinity-decad) and *vatthu-dasaka* (basis-decad) respectively.[1]

The *kalāpaṅgas* or the constituents of the *kalāpas* which we have considered so far are all *nipphanna-rūpa*. Of the ten *anipphanna-rūpas* only five are recognized as *kalāpaṅgas*.

The five which are not recognized as *kalāpaṅgas* are *ākāsa-dhātu* (space-element), *upacaya* (growth), *santati* (continuity), *jaratā* (decay) and *aniccatā* (impermanence). Why they are excluded needs hardly any explanation. *Akāsa-dhātu*, i.e. space delimited by matter, is not something that enters into the composition of the *kalāpas*; it is that which intervenes between the *kalāpas*. That is to say, it sets bounds to, and is itself bounded by, the *kalāpas*. The other four items are merely indicative of certain phases of matter.[2] As such they are not material constituents of the *kalāpas*.[3]

The five *anipphanna-rūpas* which are recognized as *kalāpaṅgas* are the two *viññattis* (intimation) and the triad of *lahutā* (lightness), *mudutā* (plasticity) and *kammaññatā* (wieldiness). We have already shown that, although the *anipphanna-rūpas* are called *rūpa-dhammas*, they do not stand for something distinct from the *nipphanna-rūpas*.[4] Accordingly, although some *anipphanna-rūpas* are recognized as *kalāpaṅgas*, they do not stand for something distinct from the *nipphanna-kalāpaṅgas*. Let us take one example to clarify the situation.

Kāyaviññatti, it may be recalled here, signifies an *ākāra-vikāra* (a particular position or situation) of a set of *citta-samuṭṭhāna-rūpas* which are *nipphanna*.[5] According to the theory under consideration, *kāyaviññatti* signifies an *ākāra-vikāra* of the *cittasamuṭṭhāna-kalāpas* (for the *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpas* too exist by way of *kalāpas*). Now, each of these *kalāpas*, an *ākāra-vikāra* of which is called *kāyaviññatti*, is indicated by the addition of *kāyaviññatti* as one of its *kalāpaṅgas*. Thus the recognition of *kāyaviññatti* as a *kalāpaṅga* does not carry the implication that it is something distinct from the *nipphanna-kalāpaṅgas*. Its purpose is to indicate the type of *kalāpas*, an *ākāra-vikāra* of which is represented by the *kāyaviññatti*. It is in this manner that we should understand the significance of the five *kalāpaṅgas* which are *anipphanna*.

Let us now consider those *kalāpas* some of the *kalāpaṅgas* of which are *anipphanna-rūpa*.

[1] *ADS*. p. 29.
[2] See above, pp. 90–91.
[3] *Kalāpānaṃ pariccheda-lakkhaṇattā vicakkhaṇā / na kalāpaṅgam icc'āhu ākāsaṃ lakkhaṇāni ca //* — *ADS*. p. 29.
[4] See above, pp. 67–69.
[5] See above, pp. 75–76.

The first, called *kāyaviññatti-navaka* (bodily-expression-nonad), is formed by the addition of one *kalāpaṅga* of *kāyaviññatti* to the basic octad. It represents the *citta-samuṭṭhāna-kalāpa*, an *ākāra-vikāra* of which is called *kāyaviññatti*. Next comes *vacīviññatti-dasaka* (vocal-expression-decad), which is formed by the addition of two *kalāpaṅgas* of sound and *vacīviññatti* to the basic octad. This represents the *cittasamuṭṭhāna-kalāpa*, an *ākāra-vikāra* of which is called *vacīviññatti*.[1] The addition of sound is necessary, because *vacīviññatti* is intimately connected with vocal sound.[2] Since the Vaibhāṣikas treat *kāyavijñapti* as a part of *rūpāyatana*,[3] they do not recognize a separate *saṅghāta-paramāṇu* corresponding to it. But the same is not true of *vāgvijñapti*. Although it is treated as a part of *śabdāyatana*,[4] its composition as a *saṃghāta* is more complex than that of ordinary sound. For " le son (*śabdāyatana*) qui est produit par les grands éléments qui font partie de l'organisme (*upātta*) n' existe pas indépendament des organes ".[5] Hence in the case of a *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* of *vāgvijñapti* sound, the usual sound-nonad becomes an undecad by the addition of two *dravya-paramāṇus* of *kāyendriya* and *jiḥvendriya*.[6]

The last four *kalāpas*, to which, except perhaps to one, no corresponding *saṃghāta-paramāṇus* can be traced in Sanskrit Buddhism, have as their *kalāpaṅgas* the usual eight inseparables of the basic octad, the triad of *lahutā*, *mudutā* and *kammaññatā* and the two *viññattis*.[7]

The first, called *lahutādekādasaka* (undecad of plasticity) consists of the basic octad plus three *kalāpaṅgas* of *lahutā*, *mudutā* and *kammaññatā*. It may be recalled here that the last three items, which represent the body when it is healthy and efficient, arise always together (*na aññam' aññaṃ vijahanti*).[8] This explains why the three items are included in the same *kalāpa* rather than establishing three separate *kalāpas*.

The second and the third, called *kāyaviññatti-lahutādi-dvādasaka* (dodecad of bodily-expression and plasticity, etc.) and *vacīviññatti-sadda-lahutādi-terasaka* (tredecad of vocal-expression, sound, plasticity, etc.), are formed by adding *lahutā*, *mudutā* and *kammaññatā* to the previously mentioned *kāyaviññatti-navaka* and *vacīviññatti-dasaka* respectively. The occurrence of the two *viññattis* could be accompanied (facilitated) by the triad of *lahutā*, etc.[9] It seems that it is in order to explain such situations that these two *kalāpas* have been postulated.

The last *kalāpa* is *sadda-lahutādi-dvādasaka* (dodecad of sound, plasticity, etc.). It is the same as the previously mentioned *vacīviññatti-sadda-lahutādi-terasaka* except for the absence of one constituent, namely, *vacīviññatti*. Since the triad of

[1] See above, pp. 75–77.
[2] See above, p. 76.
[3] See above, p. 71.
[4] See above, p. 76.
[5] *AK*. Ch. II, p. 145.
[6] *Ibid. loc. cit.*
[7] See *ADS*. pp. 29 ff.
[8] See above, p. 77.
[9] See above, p. 113.

lahutā, etc. is included here, it certainly concerns itself with a phenomenon associated with the physical body of a living being.[1] And since *vacīviññatti* is lacking, we may interpret it as representative of vocal sound unaccompanied by *vacīviññatti* as well as sound produced by the other parts of the body. In the *Abhidharmakośa* there is reference to a *saṃghāta-paramāṇu*, called the sound-decad, which consists of the basic octad and two *dravya-paramāṇus* of sound and the organ of touch. It represents the phenomenon of *upātta-mahābhūtika* sound, i.e. sound produced, say, by the clapping of hands, etc.[2] Cases like these, it may be observed, are represented by the *kalāpa* in question. The non-inclusion of *kāyendriya* as a constituent of this *kalāpa* is understandable, for we have already seen that, unlike the Vaibhāṣikas, the Theravādins do not add *kāyendriya* either to the *kalāpas* of the first four sense-organs or to the *kalāpa* of *vacīviññatti*-sound.

This brings us to an end of our survey of the seventeen kinds of *kalāpa*. They all are again classified into four groups on the basis of the four generative conditions (*rūpa-samuṭṭhāna-paccaya*) of matter, namely, *kamma*, *citta*, *utu* and *āhāra*. Since we have discussed them elsewhere,[3] herein we shall confine ourselves to indicating how the *kalāpas* are classified accordingly. It should also be noted here that if a *kalāpa* is conditioned by more than one of the four factors, say, by three (*ti-samuṭṭhāna*), then that particular *kalāpa* is counted thrice. In this way, although there are seventeen distinct *kalāpas*, the number is brought up to twenty one.

Since the eight *rūpa-indriyas* and the *hadaya-vatthu* are recognized as coming into being through the action of *kamma*,[4] the five sense-organ *dasakas*, the two sex *dasakas*, the *jīvita-navaka* and the *vatthu-dasaka* are brought under *kammasamuṭṭhāna*. Since the two *viññattis* represent *ākāra-vikāras* of *cittasamuṭṭhāna-rūpa*,[5] the four *kalāpas*—*kāyaviññatti-navaka*, *vacīviññatti-dasaka*, *kāyaviññatti-lahutādi-dvādasaka* and *vacīviññatti-sadda-lahutādi-terasaka*—are brought under *cittasamuṭṭhāna*. The two *kalāpas*, *sadda-navaka* and *sadda-lahutādi-dvādasaka*, are *utusamuṭṭhāna*. These two *kalāpas* refer to two varieties of sound, the first to sound produced in the body of a living being, and the second to sound produced in the insentient (*aviññāṇika*) world. It should be noted here that, although sound arises owing to the concussion (*ghaṭṭana*) of the primary elements, *utu* (the temperature of cold and heat) is considered as a special condition for its continuity.[6]

On the other hand, the two *kalāpas*, *lahutādekādasaka* and *suddhaṭṭhaka* are *ti-samuṭṭhāna* in the sense that they are alternatively conditioned by *citta*, *utu* and *āhāra*.

---

[1] See above, p. 77.
[2] See *AK*. Ch. II, p. 145 and Ch. I, p. 17.
[3] See above, p. 113.
[4] See above, p. 59.
[5] See above, pp. 69 ff.
[6] *Cf. ADSS*. pp. 167–8.

The first which refers to the triad of *lahutā*, etc. is *ti-samuṭṭhāna* because bodily efficiency which is implied by the triad could be brought about by a wholesome state of mind (*citta*), or by agreeable nutrition (*āhāra*), or by good temperature (*utu*).[1]

When the *suddhaṭṭhaka*, which consists of the four primary elements and the four secondary elements inseparably associated with them, is brought into relation with consciousness, as in the case of bodily movements arising in response to a thought, it is called *cittasamuṭṭhāna*. When it arises conditioned by nutrition or by temperature of cold and heat, it is called *āhārasamuṭṭhāna* and *utusamuṭṭhāna* respectively. All matter, other than that which enters into the composition of living beings, is ultimately constituted of *suddhaṭṭhakas* and *sadda-navakas*, both conditioned only by *utu*.[2] For the temperature of cold and heat, according to the Theravādins, is an essential factor for the arising, continuity and all changes of all such matter.[3]

Why the *suddhaṭṭhaka* is not *kammasamuṭṭhāna* needs explanation. It is true that the (eight) constituents of this octad enter into the composition of all *kalāpas*, including those that are *kamma*-conditioned. It should, however, be recalled here that, although some material elements come into being, being conditioned by *kamma*, yet their uninterrupted continuity is said to depend on the *rūpa-jīvitindriya*.[4] Therefore a *kammasamuṭṭhāna-kalāpa* should at least be a nonad (*navaka*), consisting of the eight inseparables (basic octad) and one *kalāpaṅga* of *rūpa-jīvitindriya*. An octad in itself can never be *kammasamuṭṭhāna*.

Before we conclude this chapter a few comments are called for on the position of *kalāpas* in relation to *Rūpa-loka*, the second plane of existence according to Buddhist cosmology.

The Theravādins and the Vaibhāṣikas share the view that all elements of matter exist in the *Kāma-loka* and none in the *Arūpa-loka*. Therefore the same situation is true of the *kalāpas*/*saṃghāta-paramāṇus* in relation to these two planes of existence.[5]

That some material elements exist in the *Rūpa-loka* is admitted by both schools, but opinion differs as to what they are.

The Vaibhāṣika view is that *gandha*, *rasa*, and the two faculties of sex which are a part of *kāyendriya*, do not obtain in the *Rūpa-loka*.[6] The first two are eliminated because along with *spraṣṭavya* they form what is called *kavaḍīkārāhāra*.[7] Since "personne ne nait dans le *Rūpadhātu* qui ne soit détaché de cet aliment",[8] it has to be excluded. But *spraṣṭavya* which is also a part of *kavaḍīkārāhāra* is

---

[1] *Cf. Laghutādi-traya ; (utucittāhārehi) satprāya ṛtuya prasanna cittaya satprāya āhāraya yana meyin (sambhoti) vannēyi.—ADSS*. p. 165.
[2] *Cf. Tattha suddhaṭṭhakaṃ saddanavakañ ceti dve utusamuṭṭhānakalāpā bahiddhā pi labbhanti avasesā pana sabbe pi ajjhattamevā ti—ADS*. p. 29.
[3] See *Asl*. pp. 342 ff.
[4] See above, p. 61.
[5] See *ADSS*. p. 172 ; *NRP*. p. 40.
[6] See *AK*. Ch. I, pp. 55 ff. ; *cf. na sto rūpa-dhātau gandha-rasau. niḥprayojanatvāt. strī-puruṣendriya-viṣayavad iti.—AKvy*. I, p. 61.
[7] See above, p. 62.
[8] *AK*. Ch. I, p. 55.

retained, partly because in itself it cannot constitute *kavaḍīkārāhāra*, and partly because—this is the more important reason—the four primary elements are included in the *spraṣṭavya*.[1] Since the primary elements are the support (*āśraya*) of the secondary elements (*bhautika*), their presence must be admitted. The reason given for the elimination of the two faculties of sex is that they arise as a result of desire for tactile consciousness associated with sexual union, from which desire the beings who are destined to be born in the *Rūpa-loka* are completely free.[2]

Since the two faculties of sex are conceived not as independent material elements but as a part of the organ of touch, the elimination of the former does not affect the principle of atomic aggregation. On the other hand, since savour (*rasa*) and odour (*gandha*) are conceived, not only as two separate elements of matter, but also as two of the constituents of the basic octad, their elimination necessitates the reduction of every *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* of the *Rūpa-loka* by two *dravya-paramāṇus*. Consequently, the smallest *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* of the *Rūpa-loka* becomes an aggregate of six constituents ; and this quantitative deficiency is reflected in the composition of the other *saṃghāta-paramāṇus*, too.[3]

The Theravādins agree with the Vaibhāṣikas in eliminating the two faculties of sex,[4] presumably for the same reason. However, they disagree with the latter over the other elements of matter to be eliminated. Instead of savour (*rasa*) and odour (*gandha*) they have excluded the two sense-organs corresponding to them and also the organ of touch. Consequent on this reduction, the two *bhāva-dasakas* (sex-decads), the *jivhā-dasaka*, the *ghāna-dasaka* and the *kāya-dasaka* get eliminated from the *Rūpa-loka*.[5]

A comparison between the two lists of material elements eliminated by the two schools should show that the differences are of a considerable nature, the Vaibhāṣikas eliminating the sense-objects and the Theravādins the sense-organs. Although it might appear that the two schools have completely parted ways, yet on closer examination it will be seen that they are following two different methods for a common purpose.

Both schools agree on the view that *jivhā-viññāna* (gustatory consciousness) and *ghāna-viññāna* (olfactory consciousness) are absent in the *Rūpa loka* ; the Theravāda eliminates, in addition, *kāya-viññāna* (tactile consciousness).[6] If this latter fact is overlooked for the moment, then there is complete agreement between the two schools. Since consciousness (*viññāna*) requires for its arising the conjunction between the sense-organ and the sense-object, its absence can be indicated in one

[1] See above, p. 29.

[2] See *AK*. Ch. I, p. 55 ; Cf. *maithuna-sparśa-vītarāgaś ca rūpāvacarāḥ sattvāḥ. tasmāt tatra na tṛṣṇā pūrvakaṃ karma bhavati. tasmād ahetukatvāt.—AKvy*. I, p. 63.

[3] See *AK*. Ch. II, pp. 147 ff.; cf. *ya ihāṣṭa-dravyaka ukto nirindriyo' śabdaḥ. sa tatra ṣaḍ-dravyakaḥ. yo nava-dravyakaḥ kāyendriyā. sa sapta-dravyakaḥ. yo daśadravyako'parendriyaḥ. so'ṣṭa-dravyakaḥ. sa-śabdakāḥ punar ete saptāṣṭa-nava-dravyakā ity avagantavyam—AKvy*. I, p. 125.

[4] See *ADS*. p. 30.

[5] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[6] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

of two ways : either by the exclusion of the sense-organ or by the exclusion of the sense-object. The Theravādins have followed the first alternative, and the Vaibhāṣikas the second.

Although the two methods brought the two schools to a common conclusion, yet they separated them over one vital issue, an issue concerning the composition of the *saṃghātaparamāṇus/ kalāpas*. In pursuance of the second alternative, the Vaibhāṣikas had to eliminate *gandha* and *rasa* from each and every *saṃghāta-paramāṇu* of the *Rūpa-loka*. Thereby the theory of *avinirbhāga-rūpa*, according to which the four *mahābhūtas* and *rūpa*, *rasa*, *gandha* and *bhautika-spraṣṭavya* are necessarily co-existent (*niyata-sahotpanna*), could not be retained in the same form both in the *Kāma-loka* and in the *Rūpa-loka*. On the other hand, the adoption, on the part of the Theravādins, of the first alternative did not necessitate such a course. For what required reduction was not the number of constituents of each *kalāpa* but the number of *kalāpas*.

The concern of the Theravādins to retain the theory of *avinibhoga-rūpa* unmodified is also shown by the way they solved the problem of *āhāra-rūpa*. They, too, were of the opinion that the beings in the *Rūpa-loka* were completely detached from *kabaḷīkārāhāra*. But, since *āhāra* is one of the *avinibhoga-rūpas*, it could not be eliminated from the *kalāpas*. The desired effect was realized by eliminating all the *āhāra-samuṭṭhāna-kalāpas* from the *Rūpa-loka*.[1] Thereby they admitted that there was *āhāra-rūpa* in the *Rūpa-loka*, but denied that the beings therein were nourished by it.

[1] See *ADS*. p. 30.

Abbreviations

1 = paṭhavī-dhātu (earth-element)
2 = āpo-dhātu (water-element)
3 = tejo-dhātu (fire-element)
4 = vāyo-dhātu (air-element)
5 = rūpa (colour)
6 = sadda (sound)
7 = gandha (smell)
8 = rasa (taste)
9 = āhāra (nutriment)
10 = cakkhu (organ of sight)
11 = sota (organ of hearing)
12 = ghāna (organ of smell)
13 = jivhā (organ of taste)
14 = kāya (organ of touch)
15 = jīvitindriya (faculty of life)
16 = itthindriya (faculty of femininity)
17 = purisindriya (faculty of masculinity)
18 = hadaya-vatthu (heart-basis)
19 = kāyaviññatti (bodily expression)
20 = vacīviññatti (vocal expression)
21 = rūpassa lahutā (lightness of matter)
22 = rūpassa mudutā (pliancy of matter)
23 = rūpassa kammaññatā (wieldiness of matter)

Composition of the Rupakalapas

Rūpakalāpas	Kalāpaṅgas
Suddhaṭṭhaka (Basic octad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9
Sadda-navaka (Sound-nonad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+6
Jīvita-navaka (Vital nonad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15
Cakkhu-dasaka (Eye-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+10
Sota-dasaka (Ear-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+11
Ghāna-dasaka (Nose-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+12
Jivhā-dasaka (Tongue-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+13
Kāya-dasaka (Body-decad)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+14
Itthibhāva-dasaka (Decad of femininity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+16
Pumbhāva-dasaka (Decad of masculinity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+17
Vatthu-dasaka (Decad of heart-basis)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+15+18
Kāyaviññatti-navaka (Nonad of bodily expression)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+19
Vacīviññatti-dasaka (Decad of vocal expression)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+6+20
Lahut'ād'ekādasaka (Undecad of plasticity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+21+22+23
Kāyaviññatti-lahut'ādi-dvādasaka (Dodecad of bodily expression and plasticity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+19+21+22+23
Vacīviññatti-sadda-lahut'ādi-terasaka (Tredecad of vocal expression, sound and plasticity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+20+6+21+22+23
Sadda-lahut'ādi-dvādasaka (Dodecad of sound and plasticity)	1+2+3+4+5+7+8+9+6+21+22+23

CHAPTER NINE

The Ethico-Philosophical Basis of the Buddhist Analysis of Matter

THE exact nature of the earliest form of Buddhism is still a matter of controversy.[1] However, on the basis of the Pāli Nikāyas as they exist in their present form, it may be said that Buddhism is, in the main, a doctrine of salvation. Deliverance from the " *saṃsāric* " plane of existence, in other words, the realization of *Nibbāna*, is its final goal. Its analysis of the world of experience is undertaken, not for its own sake, but for evolving a rationale for its practical doctrine and discipline. Attention is not concentrated on the empirical world in and for itself. The Buddhist inquiry into the nature and constitution of matter and its relevance to Buddhism as a spiritual discipline cannot be properly understood if the subject is divorced from this religious context.

The close connection between the Buddhist analysis of matter and Buddhist ethics is indicated by the oft-recurrent statement, namely, " *rūpaṃ saññojanīyo dhammo* ",[2] i.e. matter is something that is favourable to, or productive of, fetters (*saññojana*)—the fetters that bind the living being to " *saṃsāric* " existence. The description of *rūpa* as *saññojanīya*, favourable to the creation of fetters, does not mean that it is a *saññojana*, a fetter (in itself). It is the *upādāna*, " the laying hold of " i.e. the craving for or attachment to *rūpa* that constitutes the *saññojana*. One is said to be bound by Māra when one grasps at *rūpa*—*Rūpaṃ upādāniyamāno baddho*

[1] On various theories on the nature of the earliest form of Buddhism and the connected problems see specially A.B. Keith, *Bud. Phi.* pp. 1–74, '*The Doctrine of the Buddha*', BSO (A) S. Vol. IV, pp. 393–404, '*Pre-canonical Buddhism*', IHQ, Vol. XII, pp. 1–20 ; J. C. H. Kern, *Manual of Ind. Bud.*, pp. 46 ff. ; Maryla Falk, *Nāmarūpa and Dharmarūpa* ; T. R. V. Murti, *Cent.Phi. of Bud.*, pp. 14 ff. ; J. Przyluski, '*Origin and Development of Buddhism*', Journal of Theological Studies, Vol. XXXV, pp. 335 ff. ; S. Radhakrishnan, *Ind. Phi.* Vol. I, pp. 341–476 676–94; Mrs. Rhys Davids, *Sakya or the Buddhist Origins* ; O.K.J. Rosenberg, *Die Probleme...*; pp. 47 ff.; St. Schayer, '*Precanonical Buddhism*', AO. Vol. VII, pp. 121–32, '*New contributions to the problem of pre-Hīnayānistic Buddhism*', PBO. Vol. 1, pp.8–17 ; Th. Stcherbatsky, *Cent. Concep. of Buddhism, Bud. Logic*, Vol. I, pp. 3–7, '*The Doctrine of the Buddha*', BSO(A)S. Vol. VI, pp. 867–96, '*The "Dharmas" of the Buddhists and the "Guṇas" of the Sāṃkhyas*', IHQ. Vol. X, pp. 737–60 ;E. R. Sarathchandra, *Bud. Psy. of Percep.* pp. 1–22, 97–105 ; L. A. Waddell, *Bud. of Tibet*, pp. 76–122 ; A. K. Warder, '*On the relationships between early Buddhism and other contemporary systems*', BSOAS. Vol. XVIII, pp. 43–63, '*Mātikā*', Mvn. xix ff. ; M. Winternitz, '*Problems of Buddhism*', VBQ. (New Series), Vol. II, pp. 41–56. Further references can be obtained from the works cited here.

[2] See e.g. *S*. III, p. 166 ; IV, p. 57.

Mārassa.[1] Since *rūpa* is favourable or leading to *upādāna*, it is called *upādānīya* ;[2] since *upādāna* is a *gantha*, a tie, fetter, it is also called *ganthanīya* ;[3] and since *gantha* nourishes and prolongs *ogha*, the flood (of *saṃsāric* existence), it is also called *oghanīya*.[4]

That *rūpa* in itself is neither a *saṃyojana* nor a *gantha* is very well illustrated by a conversation between Sāriputta and Mahākoṭṭhita.[5] When the latter asks whether the eye (*cakkhu*) is a bond in relation to the visible (*rūpa*), or *vice versa*, the former denies both alternatives and goes on to say that what constitutes the bond is the *chandarāga*—any desire or passion that might arise as a result of their contact. If two oxen, one white and one black, are tied by a yoke or a yoke-tie, it is not correct to say that the black ox is a bond for the white ox or *vice versa*. It is the yoke or the yoke-tie that constitutes the bond, it is that which unites them both. So it is in the case of the eye and the visible. The *saṃyojana* lies in the *chanda-rāga*.[6] This situation is true of the relation between the whole cognitive apparatus on the one hand and the external sense-objects on the other. If it were otherwise, then one had to rule out the very basis of the practice of higher life (*brahmacariyavāsa*), which has as its goal the elimination of all suffering (*sammā-dukkhakkhaya*).[7] More or less the same idea is reflected in the Indriyabhāvanā Sutta[8] where Buddha questions a disciple of Pārāsariya how his master teaches the culture of the senses. In reply the latter says that the senses are to be trained to the extent when they fail to fulfill their respective functions : The eye does not see forms ; the ear does not hear sounds. Buddha rejoins that this kind of sense-culture would lead to the conclusion that the blind and the deaf have their senses best cultivated. The implication is that mental culture is not to be associated with the suppression of the senses ; they should be cultivated to see the truth, to see things as they really are (*yathābhūtaṃ*).

Because *rūpa* in itself is not a *saṃyojana*—therefore freedom from *rūpa* (*rūpassa nissaraṇaṃ*) means, not the abandonment and elimination of *rūpa*, but the abandonment and elimination of *chanda-rāga* towards *rūpa*.[9] One is said to be freed from the Evil One when one ceases to grasp at *rūpa*—*rūpaṃ anupādiyamāno mutto pāpimato*.[10] It is with the complete waning away (*khayā*), cessation (*nirodhā*), letting go (*cāgā*), or abandonment (*paṭinissaggā*) of whatever desire (*chanda*), passion (*rāga*), attachment (*nandi*), craving (*tanhā*), graspings (*upādāna*) and all kinds of mental prejudices and biases (*cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusaya*) towards (in relation to) *rūpa*,

[1] S III, p. 4.

[2] *Ibid*. III, p. 167 ; also *Dhs*. pp. 125, 133.

[3] *Dhs*. pp. 125, 133.

[4] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[5] *S*. IV, pp. 162–5.

[6] *Na kho āvuso Koṭṭhita cakkhu rūpānaṃ saṃyojanaṃ na rūpā cakkhussa saṃyojanaṃ. Yañ ca tattha tad ubhayaṃ paṭicca uppajjati chandarāgo taṃ tattha saṃyojanaṃ . . . Na kho āvuso kāḷo baḷivaddo odātassa baḷivaddassa saṃyojanaṃ nāpi odāto baḷivaddo kāḷassa baḷivaddassa saṃyojanaṃ. Yena ca kho ekena damena vā yuttena vā saṃyuttā taṃ tattha saṃyojanaṃ. Evam eva kho āvuso na cakkhu . . .*—*S*. IV, p. 163.

[7] *Cakkhu vā āvuso rūpānaṃ saṃyojanaṃ abhavissa rūpā vā cakkhussa saṃyojanaṃ na yidaṃ brahmacariyavāso paññāyetha sammādukkhakkhayāya*—*S*. IV, p. 163.

[8] See *M*. III, pp. 29 ff.

[9] *Cf. Yo bhikkhave rūpesu chandarāgavinayo chandarāgappahānaṃ idaṃ rūpassa nissaraṇaṃ*—*S*. IV, p. 99.

[10] *S*. III, p. 74.

that the mind is said to be "*suvimutta*", well-freed, from *rūpa*.[1] Hence it is that the monks are constantly advised to eschew all kinds of desire and passion in respect of *rūpa*—*yo bhikkhave rūpasmiṃ chandarāgo taṃ pajahatha*.[2]

But this *chanda-rāga* cannot be properly disciplined or eliminated without a proper knowledge about the nature of *rūpa*. In other words, because *rūpa* is *saṃyojanīya*—therefore it should be *pariññeyya* (understood, comprehended).[3] Ignorance breeds attachment which in turn impedes spiritual progress. For it is by not knowing, not seeing things as they truly are that one gets attached to them—*ajānaṃ apassaṃ sārajjati*.[4] Hence if one wants to free oneself from *rūpa*, i.e. to free from the attachment to *rūpa*, one should know its true nature. One who is wanting in such knowledge cannot be expected to make an end of suffering (*dukkha*)—*Rūpaṃ bhikkhave anabhijānaṃ aparijānaṃ . . . abhabbo dukkhakkhayāya*.[5] Hence it is that the monks are advised to be "*rūpaññū*", "knowers of matter". One who is not *rūpaññū* cannot be expected to reach the higher stages of spiritual progress (*vuddhi, virūḷhi*).[6]

Here then is the relevance of the analysis of matter to the practical doctrine and discipline of Buddhism. Buddhism recognizes that *rūpa* is *saṃyojanīya* and concludes that it should (therefore) be *pariññeyya*. The analysis of matter is thus necessitated by an ethical need and is therefore elaborated mainly in the interests of ethics. This is also true of the Buddhist analysis of mind (*nāma*). Both mind (*nāma*) and matter (*rūpa*) are analysed and described with a practical end in view.

In the earlier texts where *rūpa* is explained in simple and general terms the ethical approach to the subject is much more pronounced. That *rūpa* is impermanent and that therefore it cannot be made the basis of true happiness is the main theme that runs throughout all such discussions.

Whatever form it assumes *rūpa* is certainly not permanent (*nicca, dhuva*).[7] Its origination is manifested (*uppādo paññāyati*); so is its dissolution (*vayo'pi paññāyati*).[8] It arises owing to a complex of causes (*paṭicca-samuppanna*), is conditioned (*saṅkhata*), is subject to becoming otherwise or change (*aññathābhāvī*), to waning away (*khayadhamma*), to passing away (*vayadhamma*), to cessation (*nirodhadhamma*).[9] This is true of all *rūpa*, whether it exists as a part of the complex that makes the living being (*ajjhattaṃ, ajjhattika*) or whether it exists externally (*bahiddhā, bāhira*). "There comes a time when the external water-element is wroth and the external earth-element disappears before it. Then will this external earth-element, ancient though it be, reveal how transient is its nature, how subject to dissolution and decay, how mutable. And what of this short-lived body bred of cravings?"[10] Since all *rūpa*

[1] *S*. II, p. 66.
[2] *S*. III, p. 159.
[3] *Cf*. *Rūpaṃ bhikkhave pariññeyyo dhammo* . . . —*S*. II, p. 159.
[4] *M*. III, p. 287.
[5] *S*. III, p. 27; see specially *S*. III, pp. 260–63.
[6] See *M*. I, pp. 220–23.
[7] *S*. III, p. 139.
[8] *M*. III, p. 282.
[9] See *S*. III, pp. 24, 43, 125.
[10] SBB. Vol. V, p. 134 (*M*. I, p. 185).

in which one participates is characterized by impermanence, it cannot be made the basis of true happiness. It may give rise to some kind of pleasure—for otherwise the living beings would not get attached to it[1]—but certainly not permanent happiness. The things one gets attached to are constantly changing. Hence attachment to them would inevitably lead to unrest and sorrow.[2] One who follows them with avid greed and passion will have his mind scattered and dissipated (*vikkhitta, visaṭa*).[3] For they give rise to ideas of attachment and repugnance and hence to a desire to satisfy the feelings so excited.

Accordingly *rūpa* is often described in such a way as to bring into relief the dangers (*ādinava*) that arise from attachment to it and the happiness that results from detachment from it. Hence it is that *rūpa* is often described as, or compared to, Māra, a slayer (*māretā*), a disease (*roga*), a pestering wound (*gaṇḍa*), an arrow (*salla*), pain (*agha*), a slaughterer (*vadhaka*), fire (*āditta*).[4] These are descriptions made for the purpose of religious edification, and as such should be understood in a profoundly religious context. They testify not only to the reality of *rūpa* but also to its provocative influence.

With this same purpose in view, sometimes *rūpa* is sought to be described in quite a different way—in a way which seems to suggest its unreality. *Rūpa*, it is said, should be approached as *suñña* (void), *tuccha* (false), *ritta* (empty) and *asāra* (essenceless).[5] Similar statements are extended to the other four *khandhas*, too. In the *Saṃyuttanikāya*, for instance, *rūpa* is compared to a drop of froth (*phenapiṇḍa*), *vedanā* to a bubble of water (*bubbula*), *saññā* to a mirage (*marīci*), *saṅkhāra* to a plantain-trunk (*kadali*) and *viññāna* to an illusion (*māyā*).[6] In the *Suttanipāta* Mogharāja is bidden to consider the world as *suñña*—*suññato lokam avekkhassu*.[7] Then we have: "*ajjhattañ ca bahiddhā ca natthi kiñci ti passato*"[8] (There is nothing internal or external to one who thinks: Is there anything); "*natthī ti nissāya tarassu oghaṃ*"[9] (Cross the flood basing on the thought: There is nothing).

Statements such as these seem to give the impression that Buddhism (as represented in the Nikāyas) does not believe in the reality of *rūpa* or any other *khandhas* and that it is, or, at least tends to be, nihilistic. In point of fact, Prof. Kern who confirms Prof. Waddell's suggestion, namely that early Buddhism is an "idealistic nihilism",[10] refers to the last two statements as an instance where "nihilism is tersely expressed".[11]

[1] *No cedaṃ bhikkhave rūpānaṃ assādo abhavissa na yidaṃ sattā rūpesu sārajjeyyuṃ. Yasmā ca kho bhikkhave atthi rūpānaṃ assādo tasmā sattā rūpesu sārajjanti*—*S*. IV, p. 43.
[2] *Cf*. *S*. III, p. 107.
[3] See *M*. III, p. 225.
[4] See *S*. III, pp. 32, 33, 114; IV, p. 189; cf. *Mh. Nd*. II, p. 277 where 43 ways of approaching *rūpa* are given.
[5] See *Mh. Nd*. II, p. 277.
[6] *Phenapiṇḍūpamaṃ rūpaṃ vedanā bubbulūpamā/marīcikūpamā saññā saṅkhārā kadalūpamā/ māyūpamañ ca viññānaṃ dīpitādiccabandhunā//*—*op. cit*. III, p. 142.
[7] *Op. cit*. p. 217 (verse, 1119).
[8] *Ibid*. p. 215 (verse, 1113).
[9] *Ibid*. p. 205 (verse, 1070).
[10] See Waddell, *Buddhism of Tibet*, p. 121; also JRAS (London, 1894), pp. 367 ff.
[11] See Kern, *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, p. 50 n. 6.

These statements, it seems to us, are made in a profoundly religious context. And once they are understood in this context, they do not lend themselves to such an interpretation.

Suññatā, as explained in the Nikāyas, does not really mean void (although we have translated it so) but devoid—devoid of *atta* (self, substance) or of anything pertaining to *atta* (*attaniyena*).[1] *Ritta, tuccha, asāra* carry more or less the same meaning. To deny a persistent or ever-perduring substance, mental or material, does not mean that the world of experience is unreal. It only amounts to a different interpretation of the world. The Nikāyas make it abundantly clear that the cosmos or the world (*loka*) is lacking (*ūna*) in any persistent and permanent substance and that consequently it cannot be held to be permanent (*dhuva*). In view of this fact, it is not possible to regard it an one's own (*saka*) or as a haven of security (*tāna*).[2] Hence the description of the world as *suñña, tuccha, ritta* is not without significance even within a realistic context.

Stated otherwise, those statements which seem to suggest a nihilistic metaphysic are really indicative of the fact of *dukkha*, which characterizes all forms of *saṃsāric* existence. The term, *dukkha*, as pointed out by Prof. Stcherbatsky,[3] should not always be translated as "pain", "misery", or "suffering". As a philosophical term it means much more, in the sense that it includes such ideas as "imperfection", "absence of an abiding substance", "conflict", "unrest". This explains why the characterization, *dukkha*, is extended even to matter. It also explains why the states of *jhāna*, resulting from the practice of higher meditation and which are free from suffering as ordinarily understood, are also included in *dukkha*. For they, too, are conditioned and subject to change. The later scholiasts recognize the wider implications of the term when they explain it as three-fold, namely, *dukkha-dukkha* (*dukkha* as suffering), *vipariṇāma-dukkha* (*dukkha* as change) and *saṅkhāra-dukkha* (*dukkha* as conditioned state).[4]

It is, in fact, these wider implications of the term *dukkha* that are brought into relief in the few quotations we have cited above. Moreover, if the texts sometimes describe "*saṃsāric*" existence in such a way as to suggest its unreality this is understandable, particularly in a religious context. That is to say, for the purpose of religious edification it was necessary to show what a worthless thing "*saṃsāric*" existence is when compared to the eternal bliss of *Nibbāna*. What is involved here is a ques ion of valuation. Since *Nibbāna* represents the highest goal, from the point of view of *Nibbanā, saṃsāra* is, in a way, a "nonentity". For it does not afford a permanent basis on which permanent happiness can be established. In this sense it is unreal. This seems to be the reason why the *Suttanipāta* says that one should cross the "flood", thinking that there is nothing here.

---

[1] *Cf. Suñño loko suñño loko ti bhante vuccati. Kittāvatā nu kho bhante suñño loko ti vuccati ? Yasmā ca kho Ānanda suññaṃ attena vā attaniyena vā tasmā suñño loko ti vuccati*—S. IV,p. 54 ; see also Coomaraswamy, HJOS. Vol. IV, (1939), p. 189.

[2] See e.g. *M*. II, pp. 68 ff.

[3] *Concer tion of Buddhist Nirvāna*, pp. 54 ff.; see also W.Rahula, IHQ., Vol. XXXII, pp. 249 ff.

[4] See *Vism*. p. 499.

Statements which, at first sight, seem to countenance an idealistic interpretation of the world are also not wanting : "The world is led by the mind and is activated by the mind ".[1] "Verily I declare to you, my friend, that within this very body, mortal as it is and only a fathom high, but conscious and endowed with mind, is the world and the waxing thereof and the waning thereof and the way that leads to the passing away thereof".[2]

Here, too, we should guard ourselves against relying on isolated passages and those, too, taken out of their context. For on the basis of such statements as these one may be tempted to conclude that Buddhism as revealed from the earlier texts is, or, at least, tends to be, idealistic. The presence of such statements should become clear if we constantly keep in mind the obvious fact that Buddhism is a religion and that mental culture plays an important part in it.

Since the whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of *Nibbāna* as its final goal, is based on a course of mental culture, it is but natural if Buddhism gives a pre-eminent position to mind. But from this circumstance the conclusion does not necessarily follow that matter exists by virtue of mind. *Rūpa* is not "*manomaya*", mind-made, but *manorāma*,[3] pleasing the mind, provoking the mind. Consciousness (*viññāna*) is said to be " externally agitated and dissipated " (*bahiddhā vikkhittaṃ visaṭaṃ*) when one with avid greed and passion follows the sense-objects.[4] To one who is not free from passion, craving, desire and thirst towards *rūpa*, with the change and dissolution of *rūpa* there arise all kinds of frustration.[5] But when one knows things as they truly are, i.e., as *anicca, dukkha* and *anatta*, one ceases to get agitated by them, one ceases to seek refuge in them.[6] On one's understanding of things depends one's reaction to them. Just as attachment to things is to get fettered by them, even so detachment from them is to get freed from them. Thus both the malady and the remedy lie within. In this context we could conveniently understand the significance of those statements which give a prominent place to mind.

The latter quotation, as pointed out by Prof. Keith,[7] need not be understood as a metaphysical deliverance. It points to the fact that salvation is within oneself and

---

[1] *Cittena niyyati loko cittena parikissati*—*S*. I, p. 39.

[2] *Api khvāhaṃ āvuso imasmiṃ yeva vyāmamatte kaḷevare saññimhi samanake lokañ ca paññāpemi lokasamudayañ ca lokanirodhañ ca lokanirodhagāminiṃ paṭipadañ ca* —*S*. I, p. 62 ; see also *A*. II, p. 48 (tr. from *Dialogues of the Buddha*, I, p. 273).

[3] *M*. II, p. 56.

[4] *Cf. Kathaṃ c'āvuso bahiddhā viññānaṃ vikkhittaṃ visaṭan ti vuccati ? Idh'āvuso bhikkhuno cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā rūpanimittānusāriṃ viññānaṃ hoti rūpanimittassādagathitaṃ rūpanimittassādavinibaddhaṃ* . . . (applied to the other sense-organs, too)—*M*. III, p. 225.

[5] *Cf. . . . rūpe avigatarāgassa avigatachandassa avigatapemassa avigatapipāsassa avigatataṇhassa tassa rūpassa vipariṇāmaññathābhāvā uppajjanti sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā*.—*S*. III, p. 123.

[6] See *D*. I, p. 239 ; *S*. III, p. 123.

[7] *Bud. Phi*. p. 56.

that therefore one must work out one's own salvation—a theme on which the Nikāyas constantly dwell upon. [1] It is more in the nature of a counsel on self-reliance, and it is scarcely possible to draw any idealistic implications from it.

A somewhat similar idea seems to be reflected in another oft-recurrent statement, namely, " Where there is eye, where there is visible (*rūpa*), where there is visual consciousness . . . , there lies the world . . . ". The same formula is extended to the other sense-organs and the corresponding sense-objects.[2] This has sometimes been understood as countenancing a phenomenalistic interpretation of the external world : The external world has no independent reality but is dependent on the activities of the senses.[3] Taken in itself the quotation does point to such a conclusion. However, it seems doubtful whether it was meant to be an exhaustive definition on the nature of the external world. It seems more proper if we understand it as an attempt, made in the interests of the Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, to show what " world " (*loka*) means for each individual. As far as each individual is concerned, his knowledge of things, mental as well as material, is gained through the activities of his six sense-spheres (*saḷ-āyatana*).[4] And all his ideas of attachment and repugnance and the desire to satisfy the feelings so excited function within this (his) " world ". Since the Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline advocates the elimination of all ideas of attachment and repugnance, it is understandable if the texts say that, as far as each individual is concerned, the world is synonymous with the activities of his six sense-spheres. This, it seems to us, is the context in which the above and similar statements should be understood. The severely practical approach of Buddhism seems to be responsible for their presence. It is also not without significance that the above-mentioned definition of the world is often accompanied by the words, " *ariyassa vinaye* ",[5] i.e., in (according to) the noble discipline. That it was made in a narrower context is therefore fairly obvious.

If we base ourselves on the Pāli Nikāyas, then we should be compelled to conclude that Buddhism is realistic. There is no explicit denial anywhere of the external world. Nor is there any positive evidence to show that the world is mind-made or simply a projection of subjective thoughts. That Buddhism recognizes the extra-mental existence of matter and the external world is clearly suggested by the texts. Throughout the discourses it is the language of realism that one encounters.[6] The whole Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline, which has the attainment of *Nibbāna* as its final goal, is based on the recognition of the material world and the conscious living beings living therein.

As soon as an individual is born the outside world plays upon that individual. Sensations are stirred up within. They give rise to ideas of attachment and repugnance. There arises desire to satisfy the excited feelings. This is the problem in

[1] *Cf. Attā hi attano nātho*—*Dhp.* 24 ; *Attadīpā bhikkhave viharatha*—*D.* II, p. 187.
[2] *Yattha . . . atthi cakkhuṃ atthi rūpā atthi cakkhuviññānaṃ . . . atthi tattha loko . . .*—*S.*IV, p.39.
[3] See Sarathchandra, *Bud. Psy. of Percep.*, p. 11.
[4] See *S.* IV, pp. 87, 96.
[5] See *S.* IV, p. 95 ; *A.* IV, p. 430.
[6] See Keith, *Bud. Phi.* Ch. III.

which Buddhism is mainly interested. What matters is the given. It is seen that the individual is constantly played upon by the outside world. It is also seen that it is this contact between within and without that signifies the beginning of all kinds of unrest and attendant miseries.[1] It is this situation which Buddhism seeks to explain, not for its own sake, but for making an end of all suffering. As a philosophy Buddhism begins where necessity sets in.

The Siṃsapā Sutta,[2] as Prof. Oldenberg observes, states briefly what Buddhism is and what it is not. " It does not purport to be a philosophy which inquires into the ultimate ground of things, unfold to thought the breadths and depths of the universe ".[3] For it is little interested in metaphysical questions and in constructive speculations of the universe, which have no immediate relevance and reference to the problem of salvation. Hence questions concerning the first and final causes or the original germ of all things are set aside. Speculative questions on the infinity and duration of the world are among those brought under the heading, " *avyākata* "[4] (not explained). The reason for this attitude is that knowledge of such questions—whether they can be known or not is another question—is not essential for one to work out one's own salvation.

It is in the problem of *dukkha* and its elimination that Buddhism is primarily interested. " As the vast ocean, O disciples, is impregnated with one taste, the taste of salt, even so this doctrine and discipline is impregnated with one taste, the taste of deliverance ".[5] But in order to fashion out a way of deliverance from *saṃsāra*, it was necessary to study the nature of " *saṃsāric* " existence. The individual should be shown exactly where he stands in relation to the universe around and within him, the obstacles with which he is besetted and the potentialities with which he is endowed. It is for this reason that Buddhism seeks to explain the empiric individuality in relation to the external world.

The earlier attempts to explain this situation are represented by the analyses into *khandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*. They are the component factors into which existence is analysed. They purport to show that there does not exist a " unity ", " substance ", " *atta* " or " *jīva* ". Unity is really a complex of factors, " one " is really " many ". This applies to both mind (*nāma*) and matter (*rūpa*). Both exist as complexes. In the case of living beings there is no self (*atta*) which is immortal, while in the case of things in general there is no essence which is ever-perduring. That existence does not consist of a primary substance, mental or material, but is composed of a variety of factors is the conclusion that could be drawn from the analyses into *khandhas*, *āyatanas* and *dhātus*. " The *Tathāgata* sees in its true

[1] *Cf. Cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññānaṃ tinnaṃ saṅgati phasso phassapaccayā vedanā vedanāpaccayā taṇhā taṇhāpaccayā upādānaṃ upādānapaccayā bhavo bhavapaccayā jāti jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā sambhavanti* (applied to the other sense-organs and the sense-objects)—*S.* I, p. 73.
[2] See *S.* V, pp. 437-8.
[3] Oldenberg, *Buddha* . . ., p. 205.
[4] See *M.* I, pp. 426 ff. ; *S.* V, p. 438.
[5] *Seyyathā pi bhikkhave mahāsamuddo ekaraso loṇaraso, evam eva kho bhikkhave ayaṃ dhammavinayo ekaraso vimuttiraso.*—*Vin.* II, p.239.

perspective the world which consists of a plurality of elements, a variety of elements"—" *Tathāgato . . . aneka-dhātu-nānā-dhātu-lokaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti* ".[1] Since existence, both mental and material, is sought to be explained with reference to a plurality of basic factors, we may, following Prof. Stcherbatsky,[2] call Buddhism (as represented in the Nikāyas) pluralistic.

Prof. Murti is inclined to believe that the doctrine of elements (*khandha-dhātu-āyatana*) was not meant to be taken as an ultimate standpoint: " On our interpretation the doctrine of elements was necessary as a preliminary step. If there had been only the substance view (*ātmavāda*) in the field, Buddha could not have been led to the dialectical consciousness. A modal view too was necessary. A thesis had to be opposed by a counter-thesis before there could emerge the dialectical consciousness. Then alone could there be a Conflict in Reason and the attempt to transcend it. As a matter of dialectical necessity then did Buddha formulate, or at least suggest, a theory of elements ".[3]

There are certain trends in the canonical works which seem to support such a conclusion.[4] But, if we take into consideration the immense emphasis with which Buddhism advocates the eradication of all kinds of attachment to, or craving for, any kind of thing, mental or material, we could, however, understand them in a different way. Here we may do well to draw a sharp distinction between the Buddhist analysis of existence and the Buddhist practical doctrine and discipline. Although existence is reduced to a multiplicity of basic factors, this certainly does not mean that one should lean on them, that one should have any attachment to them. They are as impermanent as the compounds they produce. They too belong to the level of " *saṃsāric* " existence. Hence they too should be transcended in the sense that one should free oneself from any kind of desire towards them. *Dhātu-kusalatā*,[5] the ability in the analysis of existence into different elements, is in itself not sufficient. In the context of the practical doctrine and discipline, it is only a preliminary step to *manasikāra-kusalatā*,[6] the ability to reflect on their true nature, i.e. as impermanent (*anicca*), as devoid of any persistent substance (*anatta*) and as characterized by unrest or as a source of suffering (*dukkha*). It is only then that the yogin begins to turn away from them and ceases to have any kind of attachment to them.[7] Thus within the context of the Buddhist ethical discipline, *dhātu-kusalatā* is only a preliminary step to *manasikāra-kusalatā*, and *manasikāra-kusalatā* is only a preliminary step to the elimination of all desires, which in turn has the realization of *Nibbāna* as its goal. But the advocacy of non-attachment (even) to the basic factors does not necessarily mean that they are considered as ultimately unreal. It seems that

[1] *M.* I, p. 70.

[2] See *Bud. Logic*, I, pp. 3-7.

[3] *Cent. Phi. of Bud.*, p. 54.

[4] *Cf.* for instance, the Mūlapariyāya Sutta in *M.* I, pp. 1 ff.; see also Warder, BSOAS. Vol. XVIII. p. 50.

[5] See *A.* I, p. 83.

[6] *Ibid. loc. cit.*

[7] *Cf. Puna ca paraṃ āvuso bhikkhuno rūpaṃ manasikaroto rūpesu cittaṃ na pakkhandati nappasīdati na santiṭṭhati* . . . —*D.* I, p. 239.

it is the immense emphasis with which Buddhism advocates its doctrine of non-attachment (*virāga*) that is responsible for the presence, in the texts, of certain trends which seem to suggest that the doctrine of elements (*khandha-dhātu-āyatana*) is not meant as an ultimate standpoint.

The fundamental character of Buddhist philosophy (as represented in the Nikāyas) is well illustrated by the Buddhist refutation of the four theses, namely, *sabbaṃ atthi, sabbaṃ natthi, sabbaṃ ekattaṃ* and *sabbaṃ puthuttaṃ*.[1]

Avoiding the two extremes (*anta*) of *sabbaṃ atthi* (everything is) and *sabbaṃ natthi* (everything is not), it steers a middle course: " This world, O Kaccāna, generally proceeds on a duality, of the ' it is ' and the ' it is not '. But, O Kaccāna, whoever perceives in truth and wisdom how things originate in the world, in his eyes there is no ' it is not ' in this world. Whoever, Kaccāna, perceives in truth and wisdom how things pass away in this world, in his eyes there is no ' it is ' in this world."[2] Thus neither Being nor non-Being is the truth. There is only Becoming, happening by way of cause, continuity without identity, persistence without a persisting substance. " He who discerns origin by way of cause he discerns the Dhamma; he who discerns the Dhamma he discerns origin by way of cause ".[3] No permanence is associated with the basic factors of existence or the compounds they produce. They are conditioned (*saṅkhata*), brought about by certain causes (*paṭiccasamuppanna*) and are subject to dissolution (*nirodhadhamma*). *Anicca* (impermanence), *aññathatta* (otherwiseness), *vipariṇāma* (fluctuation), *khaya* (waning away), *vaya* (passing away), *udayabbaya* (rise and fall)—these words, more or less synonymous, and occurring in the texts with more or less equal frequency, indicate the great emphasis with which Buddhism advocated its doctrine of change.[4]

Buddhism also steers a middle course between *sabbaṃ ekattaṃ* and *sabbaṃ puthuttaṃ*.[5] *Ekattaṃ* implies a unity, a whole with fractions. The component parts of the universe, according to the Buddhist analysis, are not fractions of a whole indicating an absolute unity (*ekatta*), but a number of co-ordinate ultimates. This seems to be the reason why Buddhism refuses to subscribe to the view of existence implied by the thesis, *sabbaṃ ekattaṃ*. *Puthutta*, on the other hand, implies a theory of " absolute separateness " and suggests that the world is a concatenation of separate and discrete factors with no inter-connection, with no inter-dependence. A theory of this kind is, in fact, advocated by one of the six *paribbājakas* mentioned in the

[1] See *S.* II, p. 77.

[2] *Dvayānissito khvāyaṃ Kaccāyana loko yebhuyyena atthitañ ca natthitañ ca. Lokasamudayaṃ kho Kaccāyana yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke natthitā sā na hoti. Lokanirodhaṃ kho Kaccāyana yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passato yā loke atthitā sā na hoti.*—*S.* II, p. 17.

[3] *A.* I, p. 78.

[4] Two things should, however, be noted: One is that in the earlier texts the doctrine of change is not explained on the basis of a theory of moments, as is done in the later texts. The other is that the relative permanence of matter is not denied.— see above, pp. 81 ff.

[5] See *S.* II, p. 77.

Sāmaññaphala Sutta.[1] The Buddhist view of existence does not amount to such an extreme (*anta*). For according to Buddhism the factors of existence are inter-connected by laws of causality. Although the factors are not the fractions of a whole, yet they are inter-connected and inter-dependent. Thus causality emphasizes some kind of unity, but not an extreme form of unity as implied by *sabbaṃ ekattaṃ*.

In the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka the realistic and pluralistic view of existence is retained and is developed further. That existence does not consist of a primary substance is the main theme that is sought to be explained here. Although the analyses into *khandhas, āyatanas* and *dhātus* are retained, the general pattern of the analysis has undergone some notable change. *Nāma* (mind, the mental) is divided into two broad groups as *citta* (consciousness) and *cetasika* (consciousness-concomitants). *Rūpa* (matter) is divided (analysed) into twenty seven items. These mental and material factors of existence are introduced by the technical term, *dhammā*.

The definition of these mental and material *dhammas* and the explanation of their inter-connection form the primary function of the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka. One cardinal principle that is implicitly accepted is that to understand properly any given item is to know it in all relations, under all the aspects recognized in the philosophy and the practical doctrine and discipline of Buddhism. Therefore the same material is sought to be classified in different ways and from different points of view. This explains why in the *Dhammasaṅganī* and other Abhidhamma *pakaraṇas*, one encounters interminable lists of classifications. Although they may appear as repetitive and therefore monotonous, yet they serve a useful purpose. For they bring into relief, not only the individual characteristics of each *dhamma*, but also its position in relation to other *dhammas*.

In the list of *rūpa-dhammas* given in the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka, some of the items—particularly those which in the post-canonical Abhidhammic works are brought under the heading, *anipphanna*—may appear as artificial constructions. However, if we try to understand the list in the context of the Buddhist (Theravāda) philosophy and its practical doctrine and discipline, the selection of the items becomes meaningful.

Of the twenty seven[2] *rūpa-dhammas*, the four *mahābhūtas* and *rūpa, gandha, rasa* and *āhāra* explain the constitution of matter in general. For they are the basic elements (the *avinibhoga-rūpa* of the commentators) present in all instances of matter, whether they exist as a part of the complex that makes the living being or otherwise. *Sadda* stands for sound, and *ākāsa-dhātu* for delimited space, the space delimited by matter. All the remaining seventeen items pertain exclusively to the body of a living being. This fact, at least indirectly, suggests that it was the physical aspects of a personality more than matter in general that drew the special attention of the Ābhidhammikas. When we remember the nature and the scope of the Buddhist

[1] *Cf.* the doctrine attributed to Pakudha Kaccāyana in *D.* I, p. 56.

[2] *i.e.* according to the works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

analysis of existence, such a situation becomes quite understandable. Of the seventeen items in question five, namely *cakkhu, sota, ghāna, jivhā* and *kāya* are the first five sense-organs, the physical bases of the five kinds of consciousness named after them, or the material constituents of the cognitive apparatus. *Itthindriya* and *purisindriya* signify the sex-distinctions, and *rūpa-jīvitindriya* accounts for the life principle of *kamma*-caused matter. The two *viññattis*, namely *kāyaviññatti* and *vacīviññatti*, explain how a personality expresses itself. They are really connected with the Buddhist theory of *kamma*. For they represent the physical manifestation of *karmically* qualifiable thoughts The triad of *lahutā, mudutā* and *kammaññatā* shows the special importance attached to bodily health or efficiency (which is necessary for mental culture). The last four items, namely *upacaya, santati, jaratā* and *aniccatā* represent four phases of the history of the body, from the moment of conception to the moment of death. It will thus be seen that the list of *rūpa-dhammas* is an attempt to explain and account for all the physical aspects—as well as certain facts connected with these physical aspects—of a personality and its physical environment.

INDEX